Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Iran 8 3power began to break down in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as aconsequence of European imperial interests in the region. By combining theeconomic and political might wrought by the Industrial Revolution with thebureaucratic structure of the modern nation-state, the European powers andRussia became imperialists, seeking raw goods and markets within the Iranianworld. The Qajars lost land to Russia, and lucrative concessions were given toWestern European interests, such as the exclusive right to grow and sell tobaccoin Iran, a privilege that hurt local peasants and landowners. The clericsmoved to check this injustice in what is now called the Tobacco Protest of1891–1892. They used their religious influence and ruled that smoking tobaccowas against Islamic law, thus leading the way for a general boycott andopposition to the product, which eventually ended the concession.As the twentieth century progressed and imperial interference increased inIran, clerical protests and checks were no longer adequate to curb Qajar corruptionand European influence. In response to these conditions, We s t e r n -educated Iranians realized that to fight this trend, a new type of political consciousness,also taken from Europe, should arise: a national government basedupon a constitution. The clergy tended to be the most expedient social classaround which to rally nascent nationalist tendencies. Although the populacedid feel culturally Iranian, this cultural ethnic identity did not directly lead tocollective state political action. Whether wealthy merchant or poor peasant, allsaw themselves as Twelver Shi’ite Muslim, so Islam became the central ideasand its representatives, the clergy, became the central class behind which a nationalistcollective feeling in the modern sense arose to curtail Qajar misruleand end Western imperialism.In these contexts, Shi’ite teachings were reinterpreted by the clerical classin contemporary political terms to be used as powerful social-bindingmetaphors to protest against the Qajars. Semisecret societies arose proposingliberal nationalist reform, claiming religious legitimacy by stating that ImamHusayn had set the precedent by forming such groups himself. The politicalrhetoric of the clergy followed the Shi’ite teachings on the usurpation of thecaliphate, drawing upon symbolic language to call attention to unjust rulersoppressing sincere Muslim followers. But now, instead of being politically quietist,clerics demanded reform, just as Ali and Husayn had demanded reformof the Umayyads. Hence, “[s]ermons proclaimed the danger to Islam andcompared the tyranny of the Qajars to that of the Umayyads, who had martyredthe Imam Husayn” (Esposito 1998, 84). What had before been a storyabout injustice to inwardly motivate individuals to be better Muslims was reinterpretedas an agenda for social change. Just as the Umayyads were corruptand needed Husayn to fight them, so also the Qajars were corrupt and neededto be fought against. Major protests arose against Qajar policy, riots broke out,the merchants closed downed their markets, and the clergy kept up their rh e t-