Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

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Islam after Empire 5 9In this country if you are a young man . . . you have only four choices: you can remainunemployed and celibate because there are no jobs and no apartments tolive in; you can work in the black market and risk being arrested; you can try toemigrate to France to sweep the streets of Paris or Marseilles; or you can join theIslamic Salvation Front and vote for Islam. (Quoted in Munson 1993, 173–174)Political repression, stale economies, and a pervasive sense of hopelessnessmake the bright promise of a moral and prosperous Islamic future attractive toyouth who were raised during a century in which Islam was framed not only asa tradition of worship but also as a social philosophy in a modern sense, comparableand even superior to capitalism or socialism, fascism, nationalism, orsecularism. Such views of Islam are reinforced by the conversion of leadersfrom secularist philosophies to Islam, a common occurrence throughout theregion during the 1970s and 1980s. Heads of unions, journalists, and otherswho rediscovered Islam brought with them the cadences of revolutionary socialism,whether of the French or the Eastern Bloc variety. Concern for theplight of the poor, opposition to hereditary monarchy, and the image of theWest as a source of political repression and moral corruption animate the writingsof some Islamic activists, who see Islam as a radical doctrine. Note the interplayof Islamic and Marxist vocabulary in this 1981 manifesto of the Moroccangroup Islamic Yo u t h :Our present and our future are caught between the hammer of American Imperialismand the anvil of its agents represented by the corrupt monarchialr e g i m e . . . . [We are], God willing, in the vanguard of an authentic Islamic revolutionin Morocco; a revolution that enlightens the horizons of this country andliberates its people to bring them back to the Islam of Muhammad . . . not the Islamof the merchants of oil and the agents of the Americans. (Quoted in Munson1993, 159)But popular Islamic movements are not always strident, violent, or explicitlyr e v o l u t i o n a ry. As more and more ordinary, educated Muslims take the time toread, think, and talk about their religious heritage, they come to appreciate itsachievements, its depth, and its relevance to their daily lives. Most Islamic organizationsare, in fact, explicitly nonviolent, focused solely on religious education,virtuous action, and spiritual growth (Mahmood 2001a, 2001b;Hirschkind 2001a, 2001b). Many are relatively small and loose-knit networks ofteachers, friends, and students that manage to avoid the attention of repressivegovernments, rather than highly visible hierarchical organizations like theMuslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz 2000). Others, outgrowths of Sufi organizations,stress personal piety and reflection on God. Despite the suspicion andcontempt that many educated Middle Easterners have for traditional Sufism,

6 0Islam i n World Cult u r e swhich is increasingly stereotyped as a movement of peasants and the workingclasses, prominent Islamists sometimes have backgrounds that involved variouselements of Sufi thought and practice. Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, and popular leaders and cultural critics Fqih Zamzami andAbd al-Slam Yasin of Morocco all had roots in Sufism. In Lebanon, on theother hand, the Ahbash Sufi order has energetically organized to oppose politicallyactive Sunni Islamic groups. The Ahbash reject the ideology of SayyidQutb and call for pacifism and moderation, even while entering electoral politicsto counterbalance groups linked with Saudi and Egyptian Islamist radicals.P a r a d o x i c a l l y, they maintain good relations with Hizbullah, the Shi’ite groupthat became internationally notorious in the 1980s for its attacks on Israel andits kidnapping of foreigners in Beirut during the civil war that followed the1982 Israeli invasion. In Lebanon as well as in other countries where Sufism isa popular practice, the Shi’ite veneration of the Prophet Muhammad and hisfamily is attractive to Sunni Muslims as well and can act as a devotional bridgebetween the two communities (Hamzeh and Dekmejian 1996; Hoffmann-Ladd 1992).Electoral ventures such as that of the Ahbash are not rare in countrieswhere limited political participation is allowed. In Egypt and Jordan, membersor sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood have run for and won election toseats in Parliament and have been appointed to the judiciary. But the boundariesof toleration are always uncertain and are constantly shifting. In 1982,President Hafez al-Asad of Syria ordered the massacre of 10,000 people in thetown of Hama as part of an attack on Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood. Elsewhere,relative degrees of freedom to form political parties and participate in electionsfor local or national offices alternate with cycles of repression, vote fixing,and political arrests. The Egyptian government still periodically cracksdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, as it did in 1995 when it claimed to possessevidence of Brotherhood involvement in an assassination plot against PresidentHusni Mubarak. Days before an election for the lower house of Parliament,Egyptian police arrested hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members, aswell as leftists, human rights advocates, and others.In 1991, as Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win a roundof national elections, those elections were canceled when the country ’s milita ry seized control of the government and outlawed the FIS. This action precipitateda decade of obscene violence in which tens of thousands of Algeriansdied. The military claimed that FIS’s entry into the political arena was a platformfor the permanent seizure of power through the cancellation of futureelections, since some Islamist activists claim that human legislation throughp a r l i a m e n t a ry democracy is contrary to the rule of divine law. This is, ofcourse, a fundamental contradiction of modern liberalism: that people mightfreely elect those who would deprive them of freedom. But the military ’s ac-

<strong>Islam</strong> after Empire 5 9In this country if you are a young man . . . you have only four choices: you can rema<strong>in</strong>unemployed and celibate because there are no jobs and no apartments tolive <strong>in</strong>; you can work <strong>in</strong> the black market and risk be<strong>in</strong>g arrested; you can try toemigrate to France to sweep the streets of Paris or Marseilles; or you can jo<strong>in</strong> the<strong>Islam</strong>ic Salvation Front and vote for <strong>Islam</strong>. (Quoted <strong>in</strong> Munson 1993, 173–174)Political repression, stale economies, and a pervasive sense of hopelessnessmake the bright promise of a moral and prosperous <strong>Islam</strong>ic future attractive toyouth who were raised dur<strong>in</strong>g a century <strong>in</strong> which <strong>Islam</strong> was framed not only asa tradition of worship but also as a social philosophy <strong>in</strong> a modern sense, comparableand even superior to capitalism or socialism, fascism, nationalism, orsecularism. Such views of <strong>Islam</strong> are re<strong>in</strong>forced by the conversion of leadersfrom secularist philosophies to <strong>Islam</strong>, a common occurrence throughout theregion dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1970s and 1980s. Heads of unions, journalists, and otherswho rediscovered <strong>Islam</strong> brought with them the cadences of revolutionary socialism,whether of the French or the Eastern Bloc variety. Concern for theplight of the poor, opposition to hereditary monarchy, and the image of theWest as a source of political repression and moral corruption animate the writ<strong>in</strong>gsof some <strong>Islam</strong>ic activists, who see <strong>Islam</strong> as a radical doctr<strong>in</strong>e. Note the <strong>in</strong>terplayof <strong>Islam</strong>ic and Marxist vocabulary <strong>in</strong> this 1981 manifesto of the Moroccangroup <strong>Islam</strong>ic Yo u t h :Our present and our future are caught between the hammer of American Imperialismand the anvil of its agents represented by the corrupt monarchialr e g i m e . . . . [We are], God will<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> the vanguard of an authentic <strong>Islam</strong>ic revolution<strong>in</strong> Morocco; a revolution that enlightens the horizons of this country andliberates its people to br<strong>in</strong>g them back to the <strong>Islam</strong> of Muhammad . . . not the <strong>Islam</strong>of the merchants of oil and the agents of the Americans. (Quoted <strong>in</strong> Munson1993, 159)But popular <strong>Islam</strong>ic movements are not always strident, violent, or explicitlyr e v o l u t i o n a ry. As more and more ord<strong>in</strong>ary, educated Muslims take the time toread, th<strong>in</strong>k, and talk about their religious heritage, they come to appreciate itsachievements, its depth, and its relevance to their daily lives. Most <strong>Islam</strong>ic organizationsare, <strong>in</strong> fact, explicitly nonviolent, focused solely on religious education,virtuous action, and spiritual growth (Mahmood 2001a, 2001b;Hirschk<strong>in</strong>d 2001a, 2001b). Many are relatively small and loose-knit networks ofteachers, friends, and students that manage to avoid the attention of repressivegovernments, rather than highly visible hierarchical organizations like theMuslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz 2000). Others, outgrowths of Sufi organizations,stress personal piety and reflection on God. Despite the suspicion andcontempt that many educated Middle Easterners have for traditional Sufism,

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