Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

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H i s to r i cal Introduction and Overv i e w 3 3logues who posit Islam as the antithesis, in every way, to the “barbaric ignorance”( j a h i l i y y a ) of non-Islam. Most readers of this book will probably be familiarwith the former through their exposition in the U.S. media, and there islittle need to extensively elaborate them here. However, something does needto be said of the latter in relation to the Islamic resurgence that has manifesteditself in societies around the world since the 1970s. In such developments, onecan see something of the complexity of relations between political and culturalaspects of Islamization in contemporary societies and the difficulty ofcompletely separating them.For example, the modern history of Libya illustrates one of the ways Islamcame to be understood as a culturally authentic source of authority. As DirkVandewalle notes, Mu‘ammar Qadhafi’s early policies of radical cultural decolonization—suchas “[the] prohibition of alcohol, attempts to contain theinfluence of the West and its presence within the region, the closing ofnightclubs, the conversion of churches into mosques, the adoption in principleof Islamic punishment—preempted many of the issues that became thefoci of Islamist movements elsewhere” (Vandewalle 1998, 132–133). Nevertheless,Qadhafi himself increasingly grew wary of other Libyan political Islamists,whom he saw as threatening his own hold on power. For the Islamicrevivalism that he promoted in Libya still takes for granted the basic unit ofthe nation-state—a concept of modern, Western, historical lineage. Howev e r, since the late 1980s, such Islamic variants of religious nationalism havehad to confront challenges from more radical movements of a new, globalizedIslamism, whose agendas do not correspond as neatly to the borders ofn a t i o n s .The term “Islamism” was coined by scholars to refer to certain late moderndevelopments and thus should not be confused with, or used as a synonym for,“Islam,” Islam as a whole. The French scholar Olivier Roy defines Islamism as“the perception of Islam more as a political ideology than as a merer e l i g i o n . . . . In this sense Islamism is a modern movement, the last wave of ananti-imperialist mobilization that dates back to the last century” (Roy 2001,199). Islamism’s more immediate origins, however, might be traced back tothe late 1970s, when the experiences of many in the Muslim world reflected asense summed up by Patrick Gaffney’s description of this period in Egyptianh i s t o ry as “a time of growing unrest and uncertainty, with rising social, economicand political expectations on a collision course with limited opportunitiesand resources” (Gaffney 1997, 263).Such conditions led some Muslims to turn toward more “revolutionary ”forms of Islamism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The most dramaticallysuccessful such movement was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Following thiswatershed event, the 1980s witnessed the rapid spread of new Islamist movements.Often these movements were mobilized under the leadership of charis-

3 4Islam i n World Cult u r e smatic individuals, such as Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah of the LebaneseShi’ite group Hizbullah, a group that rose to prominence in the wake of the Israeliinvasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Kramer 1997). A number of these movementsturned increasingly to the use of violence and even terrorist attacksupon civilians as the means to further their agendas. For many Americans beforeSeptember 11, 2001, this type of militant Islam was most often associatedwith the Palestinian i n t i f a d a—the “uprising” against the Israeli occupation ofthe West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Indeed, Islamic activists and ideologues likethe leader of Hamas, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, have masterfully manipulated Muslimsentiments to make Palestine “the symbolic, if not the actual, center ofworldwide Islamist resistance” (Abu-Amr 1997, 242). Suicide bombers and theterror they inspire have exploded on front pages and newscasts worldwidesince the 1980s with stories and gruesome images of militant Muslims killingJews and Christians. However, some Islamist movements directed their violencenot only toward non-Muslims but also toward Muslims whose politics didnot agree with their own.For example, in 1981 President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated bymembers of the Islamic Jihad. During the shooting, one of the gunmenshouted, “I have killed Pharaoh!” referring to the Qur’anic symbol of the greatantagonist of Moses (Kepel 1993, 192). During the Iran-Iraq War of1980–1988, some Iranian Shi’ite clerics preached that the issue was a battleagainst the “Great Enemy” of Islam in the person of Saddam Hussein. The governmentof the Islamic Republic of Iran also ordered an official boycott of thehajj from 1987 to 1990 in protest against the policies of the Saudi state. Theyear after the Iranian boycott ended, Saddam Hussein himself took a new turntoward Islamic politics, picking up the baton of self-righteous indignationagainst the Saudis to criticize their cooperation with the “infidel Americans”during the first Gulf War in 1991 (Piscatori 1991).One of the most visible trends in Islam in the late twentieth and earlytwenty-first centuries has been its increased ideologization and politicizationin many parts of the world. However, there has never been any consensus on aunified model of Islamic politics, and contestations over the place of Islam instate institutions have thus continued to be played out in myriad differentways in different places, dependent on local cultural contexts and on themodern histories. In Sudan, for example, a military coup in 1989 brought topower an Islamist government whose policies are directed by the We s t e r n -educated Hassan Turabi (Esposito and Voll 2001, 134). On the other hand, in1992, when Islamists had made significant gains in electoral politics in Algeria,the military staged a coup to prevent the Islamists from gaining powerthere, igniting waves of horrendous violence that decimated the country fornearly a decade (Willis 1996, 233ff.). In Malaysia, a nonviolent Muslim oppositionmovement led by the moderate Anwar Ibrahim was stifled when he was

H i s to r i cal Introduction and Overv i e w 3 3logues who posit <strong>Islam</strong> as the antithesis, <strong>in</strong> every way, to the “barbaric ignorance”( j a h i l i y y a ) of non-<strong>Islam</strong>. Most readers of this book will probably be familiarwith the former through their exposition <strong>in</strong> the U.S. media, and there islittle need to extensively elaborate them here. However, someth<strong>in</strong>g does needto be said of the latter <strong>in</strong> relation to the <strong>Islam</strong>ic resurgence that has manifesteditself <strong>in</strong> societies around the world s<strong>in</strong>ce the 1970s. In such developments, onecan see someth<strong>in</strong>g of the complexity of relations between political and culturalaspects of <strong>Islam</strong>ization <strong>in</strong> contemporary societies and the difficulty ofcompletely separat<strong>in</strong>g them.For example, the modern history of Libya illustrates one of the ways <strong>Islam</strong>came to be understood as a culturally authentic source of authority. As DirkVandewalle notes, Mu‘ammar Qadhafi’s early policies of radical cultural decolonization—suchas “[the] prohibition of alcohol, attempts to conta<strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>fluence of the West and its presence with<strong>in</strong> the region, the clos<strong>in</strong>g ofnightclubs, the conversion of churches <strong>in</strong>to mosques, the adoption <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipleof <strong>Islam</strong>ic punishment—preempted many of the issues that became thefoci of <strong>Islam</strong>ist movements elsewhere” (Vandewalle 1998, 132–133). Nevertheless,Qadhafi himself <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly grew wary of other Libyan political <strong>Islam</strong>ists,whom he saw as threaten<strong>in</strong>g his own hold on power. For the <strong>Islam</strong>icrevivalism that he promoted <strong>in</strong> Libya still takes for granted the basic unit ofthe nation-state—a concept of modern, Western, historical l<strong>in</strong>eage. Howev e r, s<strong>in</strong>ce the late 1980s, such <strong>Islam</strong>ic variants of religious nationalism havehad to confront challenges from more radical movements of a new, globalized<strong>Islam</strong>ism, whose agendas do not correspond as neatly to the borders ofn a t i o n s .The term “<strong>Islam</strong>ism” was co<strong>in</strong>ed by scholars to refer to certa<strong>in</strong> late moderndevelopments and thus should not be confused with, or used as a synonym for,“<strong>Islam</strong>,” <strong>Islam</strong> as a whole. The French scholar Olivier Roy def<strong>in</strong>es <strong>Islam</strong>ism as“the perception of <strong>Islam</strong> more as a political ideology than as a merer e l i g i o n . . . . In this sense <strong>Islam</strong>ism is a modern movement, the last wave of ananti-imperialist mobilization that dates back to the last century” (Roy 2001,199). <strong>Islam</strong>ism’s more immediate orig<strong>in</strong>s, however, might be traced back tothe late 1970s, when the experiences of many <strong>in</strong> the Muslim world reflected asense summed up by Patrick Gaffney’s description of this period <strong>in</strong> Egyptianh i s t o ry as “a time of grow<strong>in</strong>g unrest and uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty, with ris<strong>in</strong>g social, economicand political expectations on a collision course with limited opportunitiesand resources” (Gaffney 1997, 263).Such conditions led some Muslims to turn toward more “revolutionary ”forms of <strong>Islam</strong>ism <strong>in</strong> the Middle East and elsewhere. The most dramaticallysuccessful such movement was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Follow<strong>in</strong>g thiswatershed event, the 1980s witnessed the rapid spread of new <strong>Islam</strong>ist movements.Often these movements were mobilized under the leadership of charis-

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