Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Muslim Thought and Practice in Contemporary Indonesia 2 1 1ernment for a series of financial and administrative reforms. Severe economichardship and frustration with the enforcement of the reforms served to exacerbatemounting opposition to the regime. This dissatisfaction had beenbuilding throughout the 1990s as the gap between rich and poor drasticallywidened. In addition, actions taken against potential political challengers likeMegawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of former president Soekarno, drewwidespread negative attention and anger against the political mechanics ofthe regime.S u h a r t o ’s “election” to his seventh term in 1997 was no surprise, and the figureswho were appointed to fill the cabinet were all too familiar to many.Within a year, street protests erupted in the capital, several of which turnedinto clashes with the police and military. Four students were shot and killed bygovernment security forces at Tri Sakti University, and their deaths unleashedfurther protest and unrest in Jakarta. Amid clamorous calls for the president’sresignation, groups of radical Islamists, some of whom had actually been quietlycourted by the New Order government over the previous few years, took tothe streets. This ignited religious and ethnically motivated violence againstnon-Muslims, particularly Indonesians of Chinese descent. President Suharto,who had led Indonesia since the events of 1965, stepped down in May 1998.Accompanying a new openness in the post-Suharto era came the challengesof a pluralistic society, confronted by Indonesians of every religious orientation.A few have capitalized on opportunities to further particularistic or factionalistideals. In the absence of constraints from the New Order government,the conditions of contemporary Indonesia have allowed for the emergence ofa number of Islamist organizations (Dijk 2001). Immediately following a tragicbomb blast in Bali in 2002, however, some radical groups, such as the LasykarJihad, were officially disbanded, while others, such as the Jemaah Islamiah,came under increased intelligence scrutiny, legal prosecution, and media attention.Such extremist groups have, however, not been successful in influencingthe mainstream of Indonesian Islamic thought, nor even the thought ofthat minority of Muslims within the mainstream who would like to see a moreIslamicized legal system as a way to realize Islamic ideals in a pluralistic society.With the end of the New Order, President Suharto delivered the presidencyto his vice president, B. J. Habibie. Habibie, a German-educated technocratand close compatriot of Suharto, had over the previous decade been namedthe head of a semigovernmental organization, the Indonesian Association ofMuslim Intellectuals (ICMI). This organization took on the role of the primevehicle for what has been termed the “greening” (Islamization) of the lateNew Order regime. ICMI, however, was also criticized by Muslim leaders outsideof ICMI, who saw it as having been co-opted by the designs of New Ordergovernment interests. Critics of ICMI included some of the major figures in acall for “total reform” in the post–New Order era. These included Abdurrah-
2 1 2Islam i n World Cult u r e sman Wahid, who declined to join the organization, and Amien Rais, who hadsplit from the group some years earlier. Between them, these two figures representedthe country ’s two largest Muslim organizations, those of the traditionalistsand the modernists, respectively.Amien Rais, who earned his doctoral degree in the United States, led theMuhammadiyya Muslim modernist organization beginning in 1993. Rais wasreceived as a Muslim advocate of social justice and at times garnered significantsupport in a political coalition with Megawati Sukarnoputri. Previous anti-Christian and anti-Chinese remarks and calls for the establishment of an Islamicstate by Amien Rais, however, had caused considerable concern amonghis potential constituents, many Muslims among them. After the 1999 parliame n t a ry session, some might have expected Amien Rais to become president,since he was at the forefront of the political opposition to Suharto at the endof the New Order. Similarly, many at that juncture would have predicted thatthe presidency would go straight to Megawati. Instead, however, it went to athird major player at the forefront of the broad-based movement for “re f o r-m a s i ,” Abdurrahman Wa h i d .Wahid is the grandson of the founder of the NU and had chaired that organizationsince 1984. He was educated in Javanese p e s a n t re n as well as in the MiddleEast. While there in the 1960s, he left the prestigious center of Islamic educationin Egypt, al-Azhar University, in order to take up a more secular programof study at the University of Baghdad (Barton 2002). Ever since, Wahid hasbeen a prominent public voice against what he has termed “Islamic formalism,”which includes some calls to establish Islamic legal ideals as a “basis of thestate,” in favor of interpretations that take more extensive account of contextualizedissues. In this vein, he has been known both as a strong advocate for theinterpretation of Islam in Indonesia according to localized or indigenized modelsand as a supporter of the official ideology of the Indonesian state, P a n c a s i l a .Since the end of the Suharto era, calls for the implementation of the s h a r i ’ ahave been increasingly pronounced in Indonesian public discussions. Wa h i d ’spositions were thus unpopular with some segments of the Muslim communityon this point. Islamist groups that emphasized more legal-formalist approachesto Islam were especially quick to criticize Wa h i d ’s presidency. Suchgroups proclaim the ultimate solution to Indonesia’s moral and social crises tobe in the formal implementation of Islamic law. Some of these same groupshad been encouraged and supported by the Indonesian government duringthe final years of Suharto’s New Order. For example, in 2000, Islamist activistspressed the government for the implementation of a new economic systembased on the s h a r i ’ a , and in January 2002, the Internal Affairs minister, HariSabarno, seemed not to completely rule out the issue, stating in response onlythat any aspirations for the Islamization of Indonesian law must be pursuedthrough the official political processes of the National Assembly (DPRD).
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2 1 2<strong>Islam</strong> i n <strong>World</strong> Cult u r e sman Wahid, who decl<strong>in</strong>ed to jo<strong>in</strong> the organization, and Amien Rais, who hadsplit from the group some years earlier. Between them, these two figures representedthe country ’s two largest Muslim organizations, those of the traditionalistsand the modernists, respectively.Amien Rais, who earned his doctoral degree <strong>in</strong> the United States, led theMuhammadiyya Muslim modernist organization beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1993. Rais wasreceived as a Muslim advocate of social justice and at times garnered significantsupport <strong>in</strong> a political coalition with Megawati Sukarnoputri. Previous anti-Christian and anti-Ch<strong>in</strong>ese remarks and calls for the establishment of an <strong>Islam</strong>icstate by Amien Rais, however, had caused considerable concern amonghis potential constituents, many Muslims among them. After the 1999 parliame n t a ry session, some might have expected Amien Rais to become president,s<strong>in</strong>ce he was at the forefront of the political opposition to Suharto at the endof the New Order. Similarly, many at that juncture would have predicted thatthe presidency would go straight to Megawati. Instead, however, it went to athird major player at the forefront of the broad-based movement for “re f o r-m a s i ,” Abdurrahman Wa h i d .Wahid is the grandson of the founder of the NU and had chaired that organizations<strong>in</strong>ce 1984. He was educated <strong>in</strong> Javanese p e s a n t re n as well as <strong>in</strong> the MiddleEast. While there <strong>in</strong> the 1960s, he left the prestigious center of <strong>Islam</strong>ic education<strong>in</strong> Egypt, al-Azhar University, <strong>in</strong> order to take up a more secular programof study at the University of Baghdad (Barton 2002). Ever s<strong>in</strong>ce, Wahid hasbeen a prom<strong>in</strong>ent public voice aga<strong>in</strong>st what he has termed “<strong>Islam</strong>ic formalism,”which <strong>in</strong>cludes some calls to establish <strong>Islam</strong>ic legal ideals as a “basis of thestate,” <strong>in</strong> favor of <strong>in</strong>terpretations that take more extensive account of contextualizedissues. In this ve<strong>in</strong>, he has been known both as a strong advocate for the<strong>in</strong>terpretation of <strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> Indonesia accord<strong>in</strong>g to localized or <strong>in</strong>digenized modelsand as a supporter of the official ideology of the Indonesian state, P a n c a s i l a .S<strong>in</strong>ce the end of the Suharto era, calls for the implementation of the s h a r i ’ ahave been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly pronounced <strong>in</strong> Indonesian public discussions. Wa h i d ’spositions were thus unpopular with some segments of the Muslim communityon this po<strong>in</strong>t. <strong>Islam</strong>ist groups that emphasized more legal-formalist approachesto <strong>Islam</strong> were especially quick to criticize Wa h i d ’s presidency. Suchgroups proclaim the ultimate solution to Indonesia’s moral and social crises tobe <strong>in</strong> the formal implementation of <strong>Islam</strong>ic law. Some of these same groupshad been encouraged and supported by the Indonesian government dur<strong>in</strong>gthe f<strong>in</strong>al years of Suharto’s New Order. For example, <strong>in</strong> 2000, <strong>Islam</strong>ist activistspressed the government for the implementation of a new economic systembased on the s h a r i ’ a , and <strong>in</strong> January 2002, the Internal Affairs m<strong>in</strong>ister, HariSabarno, seemed not to completely rule out the issue, stat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> response onlythat any aspirations for the <strong>Islam</strong>ization of Indonesian law must be pursuedthrough the official political processes of the National Assembly (DPRD).