Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Muslim Thought and Practice in Contemporary Indonesia 1 9 7Following the surrender of the Japanese, Muslim groups that had acquireda more organized power base and more sophisticated political tactics playedan important role in the early formation of the independent Republic of Indonesia.The most influential of these organizations for later Indonesian historywas Masjumi, which was founded in 1943 to be an umbrella organizationfor various Indonesian Islamic groups under the Japanese occupation. Thisgroup had originally brought together Muslims of all orientations, rangingfrom traditionalists to modernists. Such organizations put in place the Islamicpolitical movements of contemporary Indonesia while launching the politicalcareers of some of its most important figures. The conversations that began inthis time about how to realize ideals of Islam, law, the state, and society continuetoday in Indonesia, as national and global conditions continue tochange.Muslim Communities of Nation-Building in Contemporary IndonesiaBefore the Japanese surrender, Indonesian Muslims had asserted the politicalwill for self-rule in an independent Indonesia. Right after the war, Indonesiansvigorously resisted Dutch attempts to regain political control over their country. At the same time, Muslims began to imagine the shape of a new Indonesianstate, including sorting out how Islam would be configured into the nationalpolitical picture. In June 1945, the nine members of Soekarno’sA d v i s o ry Council came to a compromise on a draft for the Preamble to theConstitution, a document that came to be known as the Jakarta Charter (PiagamDjakarta). The issues relating to Islam are critical to the political landscapeof Muslim Indonesia to this day (Anshari 1997).In the disputes over the Jakarta Charter, the principal orientations to Islamand the state in Indonesia were delineated. The charter included the controversialpronouncement that the Republic was to be founded on a set of principles,known as Pancasila, the first of which was “the belief in God, with the obligationsfor adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law.” The second clause inthis phrase, referring to Islamic law ( s h a r i ’ a ) , was later struck from the Preambleout of regard for Christian populations of the eastern archipelago. SomeIndonesians saw this move as a testament to the triumph of nationalist overcommunitarian religious ideas, consistent with the nonsectarian political ideologyof President Soekarno. Others in the Muslim community, however,viewed the decision as a compromise of their aspirations for an autonomousMuslim-majority nation as well as a betrayal of their own participation and sacrificein the struggles that led to autonomy.As Muslim resentment mounted over the wording of the final version of thePreamble, the nationalist government of the new Republic realized that cer-
1 9 8Islam i n World Cult u r e stain compromises would have to be made with respect to the interests of organizedIslamic religious and political groups who desired a more Islamicizedstate system. One of the most significant of these compromises was the establishmentof the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946. The ministrygrew out of the Office for Religious Affairs that had been established underthe Japanese occupation government. The movement for the continuation ofthis body, however, as well as its incorporation into the state structure of independentIndonesia, was at first rejected by the secular nationalists. Mountingpressure, however, convinced the government to grant a major concession toMuslim interests in the form of a national government ministry. Capitalizingon the one foothold that overtly Muslim interests had now been granted in theadministration of the Republic, leaders of the ministry transformed it from apolitical concession to Islamic interests into an active agent for the mobilizationand engagement of Muslims. In particular, it would come to play a keyrole in the advancement of formal and informal Muslim education andschooling nationwide.President Soekarno was in office for two decades: from independence inthe 1940s to the mid-1960s. In this period, the supporters of the Ministry of ReligiousAffairs faced a number of significant challenges and obstacles on theway toward realizing their objectives. Under Soekarno’s administration duringthe 1950s and early 1960s, the interests of the military, leftists, those who weremore Islamically oriented in politics, and others all hung in a delicate balance.A tense situation was further exacerbated by internal Muslim factional disputes,which had increased dramatically following a decision by the “traditionalist”Muslim organization, NU, to leave the Muslim political party, Masjumifollowing arguments over leadership positions in the Ministry of Religious Affairsin 1952. The appointment of a modernist to the head of the ministry wasviewed by many within NU as a political setback in terms of potential influenceover the official interpretation of Islam in schools, courts, and official publications.While Muslims contested such matters, other groups began to assertmore power in Indonesian politics and society. The most notable of these wasthe Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), whose rise to prominence on the nationalstage eventually ended in a failed coup, a wave of tragic violence, and arapid destabilization of Soekarno’s hold on power.The turbulent toppling of Soekarno’s government in 1965 was followed, especiallyon the islands of Java and Bali, by the killing of tens of thousands of Indonesians.Suspected leftists, among others, were targeted. In the wake of thisturmoil, a general named Suharto came to power as president and declared a“New Order” for Indonesian society. Especially after the horror of 1965, manycommitted Muslims turned away from direct mass mobilization politics underS u h a r t o ’s New Order. In addition, in the early years of the New Order, the newg o v e r n m e n t ’s drive to consolidate power resulted in a political disenfranchise-
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1 9 8<strong>Islam</strong> i n <strong>World</strong> Cult u r e sta<strong>in</strong> compromises would have to be made with respect to the <strong>in</strong>terests of organized<strong>Islam</strong>ic religious and political groups who desired a more <strong>Islam</strong>icizedstate system. One of the most significant of these compromises was the establishmentof the Indonesian M<strong>in</strong>istry of Religious Affairs <strong>in</strong> 1946. The m<strong>in</strong>istrygrew out of the Office for Religious Affairs that had been established underthe Japanese occupation government. The movement for the cont<strong>in</strong>uation ofthis body, however, as well as its <strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>in</strong>to the state structure of <strong>in</strong>dependentIndonesia, was at first rejected by the secular nationalists. Mount<strong>in</strong>gpressure, however, conv<strong>in</strong>ced the government to grant a major concession toMuslim <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> the form of a national government m<strong>in</strong>istry. Capitaliz<strong>in</strong>gon the one foothold that overtly Muslim <strong>in</strong>terests had now been granted <strong>in</strong> theadm<strong>in</strong>istration of the Republic, leaders of the m<strong>in</strong>istry transformed it from apolitical concession to <strong>Islam</strong>ic <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong>to an active agent for the mobilizationand engagement of Muslims. In particular, it would come to play a keyrole <strong>in</strong> the advancement of formal and <strong>in</strong>formal Muslim education andschool<strong>in</strong>g nationwide.President Soekarno was <strong>in</strong> office for two decades: from <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong>the 1940s to the mid-1960s. In this period, the supporters of the M<strong>in</strong>istry of ReligiousAffairs faced a number of significant challenges and obstacles on theway toward realiz<strong>in</strong>g their objectives. Under Soekarno’s adm<strong>in</strong>istration dur<strong>in</strong>gthe 1950s and early 1960s, the <strong>in</strong>terests of the military, leftists, those who weremore <strong>Islam</strong>ically oriented <strong>in</strong> politics, and others all hung <strong>in</strong> a delicate balance.A tense situation was further exacerbated by <strong>in</strong>ternal Muslim factional disputes,which had <strong>in</strong>creased dramatically follow<strong>in</strong>g a decision by the “traditionalist”Muslim organization, NU, to leave the Muslim political party, Masjumifollow<strong>in</strong>g arguments over leadership positions <strong>in</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Religious Affairs<strong>in</strong> 1952. The appo<strong>in</strong>tment of a modernist to the head of the m<strong>in</strong>istry wasviewed by many with<strong>in</strong> NU as a political setback <strong>in</strong> terms of potential <strong>in</strong>fluenceover the official <strong>in</strong>terpretation of <strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> schools, courts, and official publications.While Muslims contested such matters, other groups began to assertmore power <strong>in</strong> Indonesian politics and society. The most notable of these wasthe Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), whose rise to prom<strong>in</strong>ence on the nationalstage eventually ended <strong>in</strong> a failed coup, a wave of tragic violence, and arapid destabilization of Soekarno’s hold on power.The turbulent toppl<strong>in</strong>g of Soekarno’s government <strong>in</strong> 1965 was followed, especiallyon the islands of Java and Bali, by the kill<strong>in</strong>g of tens of thousands of Indonesians.Suspected leftists, among others, were targeted. In the wake of thisturmoil, a general named Suharto came to power as president and declared a“New Order” for Indonesian society. Especially after the horror of 1965, manycommitted Muslims turned away from direct mass mobilization politics underS u h a r t o ’s New Order. In addition, <strong>in</strong> the early years of the New Order, the newg o v e r n m e n t ’s drive to consolidate power resulted <strong>in</strong> a political disenfranchise-