Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Muslim Thought and Practice in Contemporary Indonesia 1 9 5base was not the rural p e s a n t re n or Sufi t a re k a t but, rather, modern voluntary associations.These associations were of many types, covering a broad spectrumof social and ideological interests, ranging from literary and scientific clubs tolabor and trade organizations, educational collectives, and religious movements.They created a new social space for personal action in the Muslim publicsphere, providing an alternative to existing t a re k a t and p e s a n t re n c i r c l e s .One early example of such an organization was the Jami’yyat Khayr, whichheavily emphasized education and print publication in order to promote itsgoals. This organization was founded at Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1911, and it recruitedits teachers from Tunisia, Morocco, and Sudan. After the Jami’yyatK h a y r, the most influential Indonesian voluntary association of the early twentiethcentury was the Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah (Islamic Commercial Union), alsofounded in Batavia, in 1909. Within a year, the organization’s first branchopened at Bogor, near present-day Jakarta, and it subsequently expanded rapid l y. In 1911, the group’s central leadership encouraged the establishment of abranch for batik traders in Surakarta (Solo, a city in Central Java). The organizationexpanded and evolved into what was to become a nationwide political party,which shortened its name to Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1915 (Kahin 1952, 65–70).The rise of organizations like SI, which were active in both the economicand political spheres, was paralleled in this period by the establishment of organizationswith specifically religious concerns, such as the Islamic modernistorganization Muhammadiyya, founded in 1912 by K. H. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta,Central Java. The Muhammadiyya movement spread rapidly to theMinangkabau region of West Sumatra and elsewhere. West Sumatra by thattime was already home to a wide array of Muslim reformist institutions. Suchinstitutions were “modernist,” a term that in this period meant they had a newimpetus for progressive reform that in many cases usually set itself against theidea of “tradition.” For example, in West Sumatra, the Diniyah Putri Schoolwas a Muslim women’s school and a “modernist” institution. Founded in 1915,it was first in the area to introduce a formal class system on a European modeland a standard curriculum including nonreligious subjects. Its structure seemsto have been influenced by its founder’s experience of study in Egypt. It is anexample of how many Muslim reformers in Asia and elsewhere in the colonialperiod turned to building educational institutions as a means to enact “modernizing”social change.Over the years that followed, more local organizations began appearing inother areas of the archipelago. In response to the proliferation of modernist,reformist, and other types of organizations, more traditionally oriented u l a m aorganized themselves into the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This important group,founded in 1926 by Kyai Haji Hasjim Asjari of Pesantren Jombang, located inEast Java, also promoted the practical benefits of modern organizational modelsand attempted to adapt them to suit their goals (Barton and Fealy, 1996).
1 9 6Islam i n World Cult u r e sIn the early twentieth century, especially as conditions under Dutch colonialismbecame harsher, many Muslims in the Indonesian archipelago wereimagining how to organize for eventual autonomy from foreign Europeandomination. They questioned what role Islam would play in a future nationalsystem. The organizations formed in this period would come to make up thebasis for the Islamic political landscape of present-day Indonesia. DevelopingMuslim ideologies ranged across a wide spectrum, from the work of “secular”thinkers who considered religion to be a personal and private matter, to thatof Islamists who felt that the ideals of Islamic law ( s h a r i ’ a ) , however understood,should be realized concretely and applied within actual constitutionalor statutory systems.In this period, direct Muslim opposition to foreign rule also assumed theform of voluntary associations, such as the Persatuan Ulama–Ulama SeluruhAceh (PUSA), which was founded in 1939 by Mohammad Daud Beureu’eh.This organization eventually evolved into a full-blown separatist movement,developing alongside other Islamic separatist movements that were at thattime underway elsewhere in the archipelago: in West Java, South Kalimantan,and South Sulawesi (Dijk 1981). These particular movements were known asDarul Islam, and each declared itself to be an Islamic state autonomous fromany kind of secular, external authority or governance. Under pressure fromvarious Muslim groups, the Dutch made a number of significant concessionsto Islamic groups in 1940. These measures appear, however, not to have affectedthe widespread frustration and resentment of Muslims living underDutch colonial rule or the emerging Indonesian nationalist resolve of Indonesiaoverall.In the World War II period, a new imperialist power, Japan, transplanted theDutch and took control of Indonesia as part of Japanese military expansion inAsia. The Muslim experience of the politics of Islam under Dutch rule seemsto have facilitated the relatively open reception the Japanese received fromsome Muslim leaders when they arrived in the archipelago in the name of theGreat East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Under the Japanese occupation, IndonesianIslam underwent significant changes in structure and organization,mobilizing the Muslim population as never before (Benda 1958). As historianM . C. Ricklefs has pointed out, although both the Dutch and the Japanesewanted to control Indonesia for their own interests, they pursued this objectivein very different ways, especially with respect to their policies on Islam.The Dutch were accustomed to imposing an “orderly quiet” on Muslim activitiesin their colonies, whereas the Japanese, strapped by wartime demands forenergy and resources, chose to govern through mass mobilization (Ricklefs1993, 201). Islamic groups that were strengthened by Japanese institutionalsupport emerged from the war more powerful than they had ever been underthe Dutch.
- Page 156 and 157: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 158 and 159: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 160 and 161: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 162 and 163: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 164 and 165: Muslims at a shrine in Bukhara, Uzb
- Page 166 and 167: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 168 and 169: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 170: Islam in Contemporary Central Asia
- Page 174 and 175: Islam in China 1 6 3Kurds now make
- Page 176 and 177: Islam in China 1 6 5sue for some Tu
- Page 178 and 179: Islam in China 1 6 7it that religio
- Page 180 and 181: Islam in China 1 6 9tion of large n
- Page 182 and 183: Islam in China 1 7 1Muslim national
- Page 184 and 185: Islam in China 1 7 3rather recent p
- Page 186 and 187: Islam in China 1 7 5A Muslim Uyghur
- Page 188 and 189: Islam in China 1 7 7While further r
- Page 190 and 191: Islam in China 1 7 9pressure and wi
- Page 192: Islam in China 1 8 1Israeli, Raphae
- Page 196 and 197: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 198 and 199: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 200 and 201: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 202 and 203: Muslim students working on Arabic c
- Page 204 and 205: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 208 and 209: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 210 and 211: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 212 and 213: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 214 and 215: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 216 and 217: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 218 and 219: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 220 and 221: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 222 and 223: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 224 and 225: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 226: Muslim Thought and Practice in Cont
- Page 230 and 231: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 232 and 233: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 234 and 235: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 236 and 237: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 238 and 239: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 240 and 241: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 242 and 243: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 244 and 245: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 246 and 247: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 248 and 249: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 250 and 251: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 252 and 253: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
- Page 254 and 255: Religion, Language, and Nat i o n a
1 9 6<strong>Islam</strong> i n <strong>World</strong> Cult u r e sIn the early twentieth century, especially as conditions under Dutch colonialismbecame harsher, many Muslims <strong>in</strong> the Indonesian archipelago wereimag<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g how to organize for eventual autonomy from foreign Europeandom<strong>in</strong>ation. They questioned what role <strong>Islam</strong> would play <strong>in</strong> a future nationalsystem. The organizations formed <strong>in</strong> this period would come to make up thebasis for the <strong>Islam</strong>ic political landscape of present-day Indonesia. Develop<strong>in</strong>gMuslim ideologies ranged across a wide spectrum, from the work of “secular”th<strong>in</strong>kers who considered religion to be a personal and private matter, to thatof <strong>Islam</strong>ists who felt that the ideals of <strong>Islam</strong>ic law ( s h a r i ’ a ) , however understood,should be realized concretely and applied with<strong>in</strong> actual constitutionalor statutory systems.In this period, direct Muslim opposition to foreign rule also assumed theform of voluntary associations, such as the Persatuan Ulama–Ulama SeluruhAceh (PUSA), which was founded <strong>in</strong> 1939 by Mohammad Daud Beureu’eh.This organization eventually evolved <strong>in</strong>to a full-blown separatist movement,develop<strong>in</strong>g alongside other <strong>Islam</strong>ic separatist movements that were at thattime underway elsewhere <strong>in</strong> the archipelago: <strong>in</strong> West Java, South Kalimantan,and South Sulawesi (Dijk 1981). These particular movements were known asDarul <strong>Islam</strong>, and each declared itself to be an <strong>Islam</strong>ic state autonomous fromany k<strong>in</strong>d of secular, external authority or governance. Under pressure fromvarious Muslim groups, the Dutch made a number of significant concessionsto <strong>Islam</strong>ic groups <strong>in</strong> 1940. These measures appear, however, not to have affectedthe widespread frustration and resentment of Muslims liv<strong>in</strong>g underDutch colonial rule or the emerg<strong>in</strong>g Indonesian nationalist resolve of Indonesiaoverall.In the <strong>World</strong> War II period, a new imperialist power, Japan, transplanted theDutch and took control of Indonesia as part of Japanese military expansion <strong>in</strong>Asia. The Muslim experience of the politics of <strong>Islam</strong> under Dutch rule seemsto have facilitated the relatively open reception the Japanese received fromsome Muslim leaders when they arrived <strong>in</strong> the archipelago <strong>in</strong> the name of theGreat East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Under the Japanese occupation, Indonesian<strong>Islam</strong> underwent significant changes <strong>in</strong> structure and organization,mobiliz<strong>in</strong>g the Muslim population as never before (Benda 1958). As historianM . C. Ricklefs has po<strong>in</strong>ted out, although both the Dutch and the Japanesewanted to control Indonesia for their own <strong>in</strong>terests, they pursued this objective<strong>in</strong> very different ways, especially with respect to their policies on <strong>Islam</strong>.The Dutch were accustomed to impos<strong>in</strong>g an “orderly quiet” on Muslim activities<strong>in</strong> their colonies, whereas the Japanese, strapped by wartime demands forenergy and resources, chose to govern through mass mobilization (Ricklefs1993, 201). <strong>Islam</strong>ic groups that were strengthened by Japanese <strong>in</strong>stitutionalsupport emerged from the war more powerful than they had ever been underthe Dutch.