Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in China 1 7 3rather recent phenomenon related to Great Game rivalries, Sino-Soviet geopoliticalmaneuverings, and Chinese nation-building (Gladney 1990, 3). Althougha collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the “Uyghur” existedfrom before the eighth century, this identity was lost from the fifteenththrough the twentieth centuries. In the historical record, we find the beginningsof the Uyghur Empire following the fall of the Turkish Khanate(552–744 C.E.), when Chinese historians first mention a people called the Huiheor Hui-hu. At that time, the Uyghur were but a collection of nine nomadictribes, who initially, in confederation with other Basmil and Karlukh nomads,defeated the Second Turkish Khanate and then dominated the federation underthe leadership of Koli Beile in 742.The Uyghur gradually became sedentary, and they defeated the Tu r k i s hKhanate precisely as trade with the unified Tang state (618–907) was becomingespecially lucrative. During that time, sedentarization and interaction withthe Chinese state was accompanied by socioreligious change: The traditionalshamanistic Turkic-speaking Uyghur came increasingly under the influence ofPersian Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and eventually, Nestorian Christianity. Extensivetrade and military alliances along the old Silk Road with the Chinesestate developed to such an extent that the Uyghur gradually adopted manyChinese cultural and even agricultural practices. Conquest of the Uyghur capitalof Karabalghasun in Mongolia by the nomadic Kyrgyz in 840 led to furthersedentarization and to the crystallization of Uyghur identity. At the time of thisattack, the Uyghur received no assistance from the Tang Chinese state, who bythen may have become intimidated by the wealthy Uyghur Empire and thuswould not lament the breakup of this potential rival for power in the region.One group of Uyghur moved out to what is now Turpan. There, they took advantageof the unique socioecology of the glacier-fed oases surrounding theTaklimakan and were able to preserve their merchant and limited agrarianpractices, gradually establishing Khocho, or Gaochang, the great Uyghur citystatethat lasted for four centuries (850–1250).From that time on, the people of Turpan-centered “Uyghuristan” who resistedIslamic conversion until the seventeenth century were the last to beknown as “Uyghur.” Muslims in that region, on the other hand, were referredto either by the name of their local oasis settlement or by the generic term“ Turki.” Thus, with the further spread of Islam in the region, the ethnonym“Uyghur” faded from the historical record. It was not until 1760 that theManchu Qing dynasty exerted full and formal control over the region, establishingit as their “new dominions” (Xinjiang). This administration lasted for ac e n t u ry before it fell to the Yakub Beg rebellion (1864–1877) and expandingRussian influence. 4 The end of the Qing dynasty in 1912 and the rise of GreatGame rivalries among China, Russia, and Great Britain saw the region torn bycompeting loyalties. The period was marked by two short-lived and drastically
1 7 4Islam i n World Cult u r e sdifferent attempts at independence: the proclamations of an “East Tu r k i s t a nRepublic” in Kashgar in 1933 and another in Yining in 1944 (Benson 1990). AsAndrew Forbes has noted, these rebellions and attempts at self-rule did little tobridge competing political, religious, and regional differences among the Tu r-kic people who became known as the Uyghur (Forbes 1986, 29). Furthermore,Justin Rudelson’s (1997) research suggests that regional diversity persistsalong three, and perhaps four, macro-regions of Uyghuristan: the northwesternZungharian plain, the southern Tarim basin, the southwest Pamir region,and possibly the eastern Kumul-Turpan-Hami corridor.Uyghur Indigeneity and the Challenge to Chinese SovereigntyThe Chinese Nationalists, in a Soviet-influenced policy of nationality recognition,identified five nationalities (minzu) of China, with the Han in the majority.The “ethnogenesis” of the concept of “Uyghur” as a bona fide nationalityand the recognition of the Uyghur as an official Chinese nationality (minzu)has contributed to today’s widespread acceptance of the idea that there iscontinuity with the ancient Uyghur kingdom. The minzu policy was continuedunder the Communists, who eventually recognized fifty-six nationalities, withthe Han occupying a 91 percent majority in 1990. The “peaceful liberation”of Xinjiang by the Chinese Communists in 1949, and its subsequent establishmentas the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on October 1, 1955, perpetuatedthe Nationalist policy of recognizing the Uyghur as a minority nationalityunder Chinese rule (Shahidi 1984). However, the designation of theUyghur as a “nationality” masks tremendous regional and linguistic diversity.For it also includes groups, such as the Loplyk and Dolans, that have very littlein common with the oasis-based Turkic Muslims who had come to beknown as the Uyghur. At the same time, contemporary Uyghur separatistslook back to the brief periods of independent self-rule under Yakub Beg andthe East Turkistan Republics, in addition to the earlier glories of the Uyghurkingdoms in Turpan and Karabalghasan, as evidence of their rightful claimsto the region.To d a y, in 2004, a number of Uyghur separatist organizations exist, basedmainly in foreign cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, Almaty, Munich, Amsterdam,Melbourne, and Washington, D.C. These groups may differ on their politicalgoals and strategies for the region, but they all share a common vision ofa unilinear Uyghur claim on the region that has been disrupted by Chineseand Soviet intervention. The achievement of independence by the former SovietCentral Asian republics in 1991 has done much to encourage theseUyghur organizations in their hopes for an independent “Turkistan,” despitethe fact that the new, mainly Muslim, Central Asian governments all signed
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<strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a 1 7 3rather recent phenomenon related to Great Game rivalries, S<strong>in</strong>o-Soviet geopoliticalmaneuver<strong>in</strong>gs, and Ch<strong>in</strong>ese nation-build<strong>in</strong>g (Gladney 1990, 3). Althougha collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the “Uyghur” existedfrom before the eighth century, this identity was lost from the fifteenththrough the twentieth centuries. In the historical record, we f<strong>in</strong>d the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gsof the Uyghur Empire follow<strong>in</strong>g the fall of the Turkish Khanate(552–744 C.E.), when Ch<strong>in</strong>ese historians first mention a people called the Huiheor Hui-hu. At that time, the Uyghur were but a collection of n<strong>in</strong>e nomadictribes, who <strong>in</strong>itially, <strong>in</strong> confederation with other Basmil and Karlukh nomads,defeated the Second Turkish Khanate and then dom<strong>in</strong>ated the federation underthe leadership of Koli Beile <strong>in</strong> 742.The Uyghur gradually became sedentary, and they defeated the Tu r k i s hKhanate precisely as trade with the unified Tang state (618–907) was becom<strong>in</strong>gespecially lucrative. Dur<strong>in</strong>g that time, sedentarization and <strong>in</strong>teraction withthe Ch<strong>in</strong>ese state was accompanied by socioreligious change: The traditionalshamanistic Turkic-speak<strong>in</strong>g Uyghur came <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly under the <strong>in</strong>fluence ofPersian Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and eventually, Nestorian Christianity. Extensivetrade and military alliances along the old Silk Road with the Ch<strong>in</strong>esestate developed to such an extent that the Uyghur gradually adopted manyCh<strong>in</strong>ese cultural and even agricultural practices. Conquest of the Uyghur capitalof Karabalghasun <strong>in</strong> Mongolia by the nomadic Kyrgyz <strong>in</strong> 840 led to furthersedentarization and to the crystallization of Uyghur identity. At the time of thisattack, the Uyghur received no assistance from the Tang Ch<strong>in</strong>ese state, who bythen may have become <strong>in</strong>timidated by the wealthy Uyghur Empire and thuswould not lament the breakup of this potential rival for power <strong>in</strong> the region.One group of Uyghur moved out to what is now Turpan. There, they took advantageof the unique socioecology of the glacier-fed oases surround<strong>in</strong>g theTaklimakan and were able to preserve their merchant and limited agrarianpractices, gradually establish<strong>in</strong>g Khocho, or Gaochang, the great Uyghur citystatethat lasted for four centuries (850–1250).From that time on, the people of Turpan-centered “Uyghuristan” who resisted<strong>Islam</strong>ic conversion until the seventeenth century were the last to beknown as “Uyghur.” Muslims <strong>in</strong> that region, on the other hand, were referredto either by the name of their local oasis settlement or by the generic term“ Turki.” Thus, with the further spread of <strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> the region, the ethnonym“Uyghur” faded from the historical record. It was not until 1760 that theManchu Q<strong>in</strong>g dynasty exerted full and formal control over the region, establish<strong>in</strong>git as their “new dom<strong>in</strong>ions” (X<strong>in</strong>jiang). This adm<strong>in</strong>istration lasted for ac e n t u ry before it fell to the Yakub Beg rebellion (1864–1877) and expand<strong>in</strong>gRussian <strong>in</strong>fluence. 4 The end of the Q<strong>in</strong>g dynasty <strong>in</strong> 1912 and the rise of GreatGame rivalries among Ch<strong>in</strong>a, Russia, and Great Brita<strong>in</strong> saw the region torn bycompet<strong>in</strong>g loyalties. The period was marked by two short-lived and drastically