Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...
Islam in China 1 6 9tion of large numbers of Hui during economic and political crises of the seventeenththrough the nineteenth centuries, assisting widespread Muslim-ledrebellions and resistance movements against late Ming and Qing imperial rulein Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang. The 1912 Nationalist Revolution allowedfurther autonomy in the regions of northwest China where Muslimswere concentrated, and wide areas virtually came under the control of Muslimwarlords. This situation gave rise to frequent intra-Muslim and Muslim-Hanconflicts until the eventual Communist victory in China led to the reassertionof central state control. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,Wahhabi-inspired reform movements, known as the y i h e w a n i , rose to popularityunder Nationalist and warlord sponsorship. They were noted for their criticalstance toward traditionalist Islam, which they viewed as being overly acculturatedto non-Muslim Chinese practices and to forms of popular Sufism suchas veneration of saints and saints’ tombs.Beyond such internal Muslim critiques, the Chinese state has also launchedits own criticisms of certain Sufi orders among the Hui. The stakes in such debateswere often economic as well as ideological. For example, during theLand Reform campaigns of the 1950s, the state appropriated mosque andw a q f (Islamic endowment) holdings from traditional Muslim religious institutions.These measures met with great resistance from the Sufi m e n h u a n , w h i c hhad accumulated a great deal due to their hierarchical centralized leadership.Islam and Chinese NationalismIn the twentieth century, many Muslims supported the earliest Communist callfor economic equality, autonomy, freedom of religion, and recognized nationalitystatus and were active in the early establishment of the People’s Republicof China (PRC). However, many of them later became disenchanted by growingcritiques of religious practice during several periods in the PRC beginningin 1957. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Muslims became the focusof both antireligious and anti-ethnic nationalist campaigns, leading towidespread persecutions, mosque closings, and at least one large massacre of1,000 Hui following a 1975 uprising in Yunnan Province. Since Deng Xiaopi n g ’s post-1978 reforms, Muslims have sought to take advantage of liberalizedeconomic and religious policies while keeping a watchful eye on the everswingingpendulum of Chinese radical politics. There are now more mosquesopen in China than there were prior to 1949, and Muslims travel freely on theh a j j to Mecca and engage in cross-border trade with coreligionists in CentralAsia, the Middle East, and, increasingly, Southeast Asia.With the dramatic increase in the number of Muslims traveling back andforth to the Middle East came new waves of Islamic reformist thought, includ-
1 7 0Islam i n World Cult u r e sing criticism of local Muslim practices in China. Through similar channels,Chinese Muslims have also been exposed to various new, often politically radical,Islamic ideologies. These developments have fueled Islamic factionalstruggles that have continued to further divide China’s Muslims. For example,in February 1994, four Naqshbandi Sufi leaders were sentenced to long-termimprisonment for their support of internal factional disputes in the southernNingxia Region that had led to at least sixty deaths on both sides and that hadrequired the intervention of China’s People’s Liberation Army. Throughoutthe summer and fall of 1993, bombs exploded in several towns in Xinjiang, indicatingthe growing demands of organizations pressing for an “independentTurkistan.” In February 1997, a major uprising in Ili led to the deaths of atleast thirteen Uyghur Muslims and the arrests of hundreds. It is clear that Huiand Kazakh Muslims are critical of these separatist actions among the Uyghur,but it is not yet clear how much support there is even among the Uyghur forthe violent acts, especially for such dramatic moves as an attempt to assassinatea “collaborating” imam in Kashgar. Beijing has responded with increased milita ry presence in the region, particularly in Kashgar and Urumqi, as well as withdiplomatic efforts in the Central Asian states and with Turkey to discourageforeign support for separatist movements.Increasing Muslim political activism on a national scale and rapid state responsesto such developments indicate the growing importance Beijing attachesto Muslim-related issues. In 1986, Uyghurs in Xinjiang marchedthrough the streets of Urumqi protesting against a wide range of issues, includingthe environmental degradation of the Zungharian plain, nuclear testingin the Taklimakan district, increased Han immigration to Xinjiang, andethnic insults at Xinjiang University. Muslims throughout China protested thepublication of a Chinese book, Sexual Customs, in May 1989 and a children’sbook in October 1993 that portrayed Muslims, particularly their restrictionagainst pork, in a derogatory fashion. In each case, the government respondedq u i c k l y, meeting most of the Muslims’ demands, condemning the publications,arresting the authors, and closing down the printing houses.These developments have influenced all Muslim nationalities in China toda y. However, they have found their most overtly political expressions amongthose Hui who are faced most directly with the task of accommodating new Islamicmovements in the framework of Chinese culture. By comparison, theU y g h u r, whose more recent integration into Chinese society was a result ofMongolian and Manchu expansion into Central Asia, have been forced toreach different degrees of social and political accommodations that have challengedtheir identity. The Uyghur as a people are perhaps the least integratedinto Chinese society, whereas the Hui, due to several historical and social factors,are at the other end of the spectrum.One way to examine this range of alternatives is to generalize about the
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<strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a 1 6 9tion of large numbers of Hui dur<strong>in</strong>g economic and political crises of the seventeenththrough the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth centuries, assist<strong>in</strong>g widespread Muslim-ledrebellions and resistance movements aga<strong>in</strong>st late M<strong>in</strong>g and Q<strong>in</strong>g imperial rule<strong>in</strong> Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and X<strong>in</strong>jiang. The 1912 Nationalist Revolution allowedfurther autonomy <strong>in</strong> the regions of northwest Ch<strong>in</strong>a where Muslimswere concentrated, and wide areas virtually came under the control of Muslimwarlords. This situation gave rise to frequent <strong>in</strong>tra-Muslim and Muslim-Hanconflicts until the eventual Communist victory <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a led to the reassertionof central state control. In the late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth and early twentieth centuries,Wahhabi-<strong>in</strong>spired reform movements, known as the y i h e w a n i , rose to popularityunder Nationalist and warlord sponsorship. They were noted for their criticalstance toward traditionalist <strong>Islam</strong>, which they viewed as be<strong>in</strong>g overly acculturatedto non-Muslim Ch<strong>in</strong>ese practices and to forms of popular Sufism suchas veneration of sa<strong>in</strong>ts and sa<strong>in</strong>ts’ tombs.Beyond such <strong>in</strong>ternal Muslim critiques, the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese state has also launchedits own criticisms of certa<strong>in</strong> Sufi orders among the Hui. The stakes <strong>in</strong> such debateswere often economic as well as ideological. For example, dur<strong>in</strong>g theLand Reform campaigns of the 1950s, the state appropriated mosque andw a q f (<strong>Islam</strong>ic endowment) hold<strong>in</strong>gs from traditional Muslim religious <strong>in</strong>stitutions.These measures met with great resistance from the Sufi m e n h u a n , w h i c hhad accumulated a great deal due to their hierarchical centralized leadership.<strong>Islam</strong> and Ch<strong>in</strong>ese NationalismIn the twentieth century, many Muslims supported the earliest Communist callfor economic equality, autonomy, freedom of religion, and recognized nationalitystatus and were active <strong>in</strong> the early establishment of the People’s Republicof Ch<strong>in</strong>a (PRC). However, many of them later became disenchanted by grow<strong>in</strong>gcritiques of religious practice dur<strong>in</strong>g several periods <strong>in</strong> the PRC beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> 1957. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Muslims became the focusof both antireligious and anti-ethnic nationalist campaigns, lead<strong>in</strong>g towidespread persecutions, mosque clos<strong>in</strong>gs, and at least one large massacre of1,000 Hui follow<strong>in</strong>g a 1975 upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Yunnan Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. S<strong>in</strong>ce Deng Xiaopi n g ’s post-1978 reforms, Muslims have sought to take advantage of liberalizedeconomic and religious policies while keep<strong>in</strong>g a watchful eye on the eversw<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gpendulum of Ch<strong>in</strong>ese radical politics. There are now more mosquesopen <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a than there were prior to 1949, and Muslims travel freely on theh a j j to Mecca and engage <strong>in</strong> cross-border trade with coreligionists <strong>in</strong> CentralAsia, the Middle East, and, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly, Southeast Asia.With the dramatic <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the number of Muslims travel<strong>in</strong>g back andforth to the Middle East came new waves of <strong>Islam</strong>ic reformist thought, <strong>in</strong>clud-