Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

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Islam in Contemporary Central Asia 1 4 3Muslims praying at a government-sponsored mosque in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, July 2, 2002.(Photo by Scott Peterson/Getty Images)aries of “Muslimness” (Schoeberlein-Engel 1994, 222–244). Indeed, the rh e t o-ric of Muslimness did not exclude the possibility of antagonism with other“peoples” of Central Asia, let alone with Muslims abroad. While Muslimnessdistinguished locals from outsiders in the Soviet context, most Central Asiansdid not see being Muslim as counterposed to being Soviet. The Soviet governmentpresented Tashkent to the Third World, especially the Muslim world, as ashowpiece of Soviet achievements in overcoming underdevelopment. It was acommon destination for large numbers of foreign students, many of themMuslim. Yet there was little love lost between these foreign Muslim studentsand their hosts precisely because their common Muslimness meant little to thehosts. Indeed, most Central Asians at that time took great pride in being citizensof a superpower and of a state that stood against colonialism and oppression.Similarly, when Central Asians went abroad, especially to other Muslimcountries, they went as Soviet citizens proud of being “more advanced” thanother Muslims. Central Asians also served in large numbers in the Soviet forcesin the war in Afghanistan.Not only was Islam localized and “nationalized,” it now existed in a radicallyde-Islamized public space. As we have seen, the official rhetoric of the Sovietregime was framed in terms of universal human progress, defined in entirelynonreligious terms. Religion was seen as a human construct corresponding

1 4 4Islam i n World Cult u r e swith a certain (primitive) stage in the development of human society. Moreov e r, the ideological function of religion as the “opiate of the masses” was constantlyemphasized. Official channels of socialization, most importantly theschool system and the army, reached very deep into society. Islamic practicenow took place in an environment that was hostile to all religions.Islam in the Soviet period was intertwined with the nation, but in a way verydifferent from what had been the case with the Jadids. For the Jadids, belongingto Islam had become a form of national identity. But their attitude towardIslam was thoroughly reformist. The nation’s survival depended upon a thoroughreform of Islam itself. Practicing “true” Islam, accessible through moderneducation and a recourse to Islam’s original textual sources, shorn of themediation of generations of commentary and supercommentary, necessitatedjettisoning numerous customary practices. The Jadids were especially criticalof the t o ’ y, which they saw as wasteful and also as not sanctioned by Islam. Theyalso criticized visits to shrines and tombs and Sufi practices in general (Khalid1998, 142–147). During the Soviet period, these very practices were elevated tothe status of national customs that alone differentiated Central Asians fromoutsiders. Islam now was part of the civilizational and cultural heritage of a nationimagined as an ethnic entity. Instead of requiring the transformation ofc u s t o m a ry practices, Islam was now synonymous with them. And because thesec u s t o m a ry practices were so firmly ensconced in Soviet institutions and the Sovietway of life, Islam was politically quiescent.Islam in Contemporary Central AsiaThe collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has transformed this situation inmany ways, although, as the rest of this chapter will argue, fundamental continuitieswith the Soviet period remain. Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia ismarked by several important features that differentiate it from Islam in therest of the Muslim world.Mikhail Gorbachev’s promotion of openness and restructuring ushered inan era of religious revival in Central Asia, a revival that has continued since thecollapse of the Soviet Union. Disused mosques have been brought back intooperation, and many new ones have been built; thousands of pilgrims perf o r mthe h a j j e v e ry year; public expressions of piety have increased; and considerablepublishing activity has put many Islamic texts in print. Religious educationis allowed again. But while the existence of this revival cannot be denied,its extent and its political import can easily be exaggerated. Indeed, the religiousrevival has already caused a great deal of controversy, as many observ e r sin Central Asia, Russia, and farther afield have written of an “Islamic threat” tothe region. This view, which dominates opinion among state elites in Central

<strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contemporary Central Asia 1 4 3Muslims pray<strong>in</strong>g at a government-sponsored mosque <strong>in</strong> Tashkent, Uzbekistan, July 2, 2002.(Photo by Scott Peterson/Getty Images)aries of “Muslimness” (Schoeberle<strong>in</strong>-Engel 1994, 222–244). Indeed, the rh e t o-ric of Muslimness did not exclude the possibility of antagonism with other“peoples” of Central Asia, let alone with Muslims abroad. While Muslimnessdist<strong>in</strong>guished locals from outsiders <strong>in</strong> the Soviet context, most Central Asiansdid not see be<strong>in</strong>g Muslim as counterposed to be<strong>in</strong>g Soviet. The Soviet governmentpresented Tashkent to the Third <strong>World</strong>, especially the Muslim world, as ashowpiece of Soviet achievements <strong>in</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g underdevelopment. It was acommon dest<strong>in</strong>ation for large numbers of foreign students, many of themMuslim. Yet there was little love lost between these foreign Muslim studentsand their hosts precisely because their common Muslimness meant little to thehosts. Indeed, most Central Asians at that time took great pride <strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g citizensof a superpower and of a state that stood aga<strong>in</strong>st colonialism and oppression.Similarly, when Central Asians went abroad, especially to other Muslimcountries, they went as Soviet citizens proud of be<strong>in</strong>g “more advanced” thanother Muslims. Central Asians also served <strong>in</strong> large numbers <strong>in</strong> the Soviet forces<strong>in</strong> the war <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.Not only was <strong>Islam</strong> localized and “nationalized,” it now existed <strong>in</strong> a radicallyde-<strong>Islam</strong>ized public space. As we have seen, the official rhetoric of the Sovietregime was framed <strong>in</strong> terms of universal human progress, def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> entirelynonreligious terms. Religion was seen as a human construct correspond<strong>in</strong>g

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