Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ... Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives - Islamic Books ...

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Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Iran 9 1gious knowledge and impeccable character, a marja-e taqlid; he oversees thewhole governmental process for life. His word is assumed to represent the willof the Hidden Imam and thus possesses potentially unlimited political and religiousauthority. The Guardian Council is also composed of clerics, whosemain duty is to make sure that all branches of government follow their versionof Islamic law. The juridical branch is also composed of clerics appointed bythe supreme leader. This version of the constitution enables the clergy to controlall three branches of the government, keeping the president and parliamentsubservient to clerical wishes. Hence, the government is both an absolutisttheocracy and a democratic republic, with the former holding sway overthe latter.Khomeini combined the totalitarian nature of the modern nation-state withan extreme interpretation of the Shi’ite imamate. Many m u j t a h i ds, such as thewell-loved and respected marja-e taqlid Ayatollah Khoie (1899–1992), citedK h o m e i n i ’s system as anti-Shi’ite (Sachedina 2001, 128). Opposition was ruthlesslypersecuted into silence. During Khomeini’s reign, tens of thousands ofmen and women, young and old, were imprisoned and executed, and manywere tortured into giving public recantations of their beliefs, which werebroadcast on radio and television (Abrahamian 1999). The regime’s brutalitywas considered greater than that of the shah’s government (Abrahamian 1999,124–138, 167).Khomeini was made supreme leader, and he ruled until his death in 1989.His word was broadcast as reflecting the will of the Hidden Imam. Indeed, hewas referred to as “Imam”—an epithet only previously used for the Tw e l v eImams of early Shi’ite history. Observers now agree that the position ofsupreme leader as originally conceived was tailored for Khomeini, who was theonly person with enough charisma to bring together the roles of marja-e taqlidand supreme executive leader of a modern state (Sachedina 2001, 142). Oncethe state was equated with religious authority, any person who argued againstthe government’s interpretation of Islam—a process of debate that has beennatural and endemic to Islam since its inception—was now considered an enemyof Islam and of God, and he or she could be imprisoned and killed withreligious legitimation.K h o m e i n i ’s vision turned Iran into a police state run by conservative clergyand backed by a less educated and poorer class of people. The government enteredinto the private and personal lives of Iranians, destroying “all independentforms and institutions of social and cultural life” (Yaghmaian 2002, 143).Radio, television, and newspapers were directly controlled by the government.Iranians were forced to pray, dress, and act a certain way in public. For example,women were compelled to veil their hair and cover their bodies to theirankles and wrists with dark scarves and an overcoat. Men were allowed to wearloose fitting, dark-colored Western-style clothes that reached the ankles and

9 2Islam i n World Cult u r e swrists. They were greatly discouraged from wearing ties, which was a symbol ofthe West and its secular values, and so Western-style shirts were buttoned to thetop. While women were allowed in public and held all the jobs they had beforethe revolution, unrelated men and women were forced to be segregated inmost public circumstances, such as walking on the streets and riding buses andtrains, which had special gender-divided sections (Esfandiari 2001).The modern family laws and courts established in the shah’s regime wereabolished and replaced by those enforcing official government interpretationsof Islamic law. Although at the beginning of the regime, the plan was to reducewomen’s presence in the public sphere, this never happened, for womenhave successfully asserted their rights using Islamic teachings to challenge thestate (Esfandiari 2001). In other areas, people were forced to pray and attendmosques during prayer time, music was prohibited, and even laughing in publicwas considered inappropriate Muslim behavior (Yaghmaian 2002, 49). Toenforce these rules, people were harassed in public by local government “committees,”volunteer youth brigades, and the Revolutionary Guards, whoroamed the streets on the lookout for deviants to punish. For example, unrelatedmen and women walking on the street who were caught by these policewould be brought before a judge to be married or to be punished by a fine,whipping, or a jail sentence.O b s e rvers of Iranian politics and religion (Dahlen 2002; Abrahamian1999) note ironically that in the Islamic Republic, the nature, use, and implementationof Islamic law is more modern than traditional in its institutionalform (see Arkoun 1994, 13). In premodern times, Islamic law was never enforcedby a state. Rather, it was practiced and mutually enforced by people onthe local, face-to-face level of society (see Abou El Fadl 2001, 5–6). The impersonalstate was responsible for protection from outside invaders and forpeace within its borders, not for making those living within its borders followany particular interpretation of Islamic law. Moreover, Islamic law was neverlegislated or produced in the modern sense that contemporary positive law is,and the clergy were not in the positions of political authorities or rulers.Rather, they were consulted by people when needed as cases arose. In contrastto this, laws in modern states are codified statutes based upon positivelaw, determined by case studies and precedents that have a utilitarian functionin society. In traditional i j t i h a d , the clergy do not make rulings basedupon statutes and codes or previous case studies, but they use certain principlesand analogies to come up with rulings for each case. As one observ e rnotes, Islamic law in the premodern sense “is not considered to be legislatedor produced but discovered, understood and formulated” (Dahlen 2002,350). The Islamic Republic of Iran modernized Islamic law by codifying it andenforcing it by a state government, and so it was fixed in an artificial way forall, which goes against the traditional practice of local probity coupled with a

Shi’ite <strong>Islam</strong> <strong>in</strong> Contemporary Iran 9 1gious knowledge and impeccable character, a marja-e taqlid; he oversees thewhole governmental process for life. His word is assumed to represent the willof the Hidden Imam and thus possesses potentially unlimited political and religiousauthority. The Guardian Council is also composed of clerics, whosema<strong>in</strong> duty is to make sure that all branches of government follow their versionof <strong>Islam</strong>ic law. The juridical branch is also composed of clerics appo<strong>in</strong>ted bythe supreme leader. This version of the constitution enables the clergy to controlall three branches of the government, keep<strong>in</strong>g the president and parliamentsubservient to clerical wishes. Hence, the government is both an absolutisttheocracy and a democratic republic, with the former hold<strong>in</strong>g sway overthe latter.Khome<strong>in</strong>i comb<strong>in</strong>ed the totalitarian nature of the modern nation-state withan extreme <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Shi’ite imamate. Many m u j t a h i ds, such as thewell-loved and respected marja-e taqlid Ayatollah Khoie (1899–1992), citedK h o m e i n i ’s system as anti-Shi’ite (Sached<strong>in</strong>a 2001, 128). Opposition was ruthlesslypersecuted <strong>in</strong>to silence. Dur<strong>in</strong>g Khome<strong>in</strong>i’s reign, tens of thousands ofmen and women, young and old, were imprisoned and executed, and manywere tortured <strong>in</strong>to giv<strong>in</strong>g public recantations of their beliefs, which werebroadcast on radio and television (Abrahamian 1999). The regime’s brutalitywas considered greater than that of the shah’s government (Abrahamian 1999,124–138, 167).Khome<strong>in</strong>i was made supreme leader, and he ruled until his death <strong>in</strong> 1989.His word was broadcast as reflect<strong>in</strong>g the will of the Hidden Imam. Indeed, hewas referred to as “Imam”—an epithet only previously used for the Tw e l v eImams of early Shi’ite history. Observers now agree that the position ofsupreme leader as orig<strong>in</strong>ally conceived was tailored for Khome<strong>in</strong>i, who was theonly person with enough charisma to br<strong>in</strong>g together the roles of marja-e taqlidand supreme executive leader of a modern state (Sached<strong>in</strong>a 2001, 142). Oncethe state was equated with religious authority, any person who argued aga<strong>in</strong>stthe government’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of <strong>Islam</strong>—a process of debate that has beennatural and endemic to <strong>Islam</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce its <strong>in</strong>ception—was now considered an enemyof <strong>Islam</strong> and of God, and he or she could be imprisoned and killed withreligious legitimation.K h o m e i n i ’s vision turned Iran <strong>in</strong>to a police state run by conservative clergyand backed by a less educated and poorer class of people. The government entered<strong>in</strong>to the private and personal lives of Iranians, destroy<strong>in</strong>g “all <strong>in</strong>dependentforms and <strong>in</strong>stitutions of social and cultural life” (Yaghmaian 2002, 143).Radio, television, and newspapers were directly controlled by the government.Iranians were forced to pray, dress, and act a certa<strong>in</strong> way <strong>in</strong> public. For example,women were compelled to veil their hair and cover their bodies to theirankles and wrists with dark scarves and an overcoat. Men were allowed to wearloose fitt<strong>in</strong>g, dark-colored Western-style clothes that reached the ankles and

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