antilles ii

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorPANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITYINVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCESSURROUNDING THE GROUNDING SITUATIONONBOARD THE MV ANTILLES IIAccident Reporting and InvestigationThe fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations isTo determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safetyof life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose toapportion liability, nor, except so as is necessary to achieve the fundamentalpurpose, to apportion blame.R-022-07/DISAMPanama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorSYNOPSIS (Return to Index)This casualty investigation report is carried out on behalf of the Panamanian MaritimeAuthority on 4 th to 7 th of May 2007 while the “M.V. Antilles II” was lying safely afloatand fast, port side alongside at Domino Sugar Berth, Baltimore, MD USA.The vessel ran aground in Tampa Bay at 0520 Hrs on the 28 th of March 2007 in PositionLat 27-37.2N, Long 082-39.0W.At the time of grounding the vessel was loaded with a cargo of 10,704.694 MT offertilizer in bulk, GM of 1.59 and drawing 8.03 Mtrs Fwd and 8.38 Mtrs Aft, sea waterdensity being 1.019gms/cc. At the time of the incident the vessel was making good at aspeed of about 12.5 Knots, on a course of 242(T). The weather conditions were partlycloudy, light easterly winds of about 6 knots, smooth seas, visibility about 7 miles andthe tide was flooding at about 1 knot.There was no casualty to life nor injury or pollution as a result of this grounding. Nodamage to any property is suspected and so far, there have been no claims with respectto same.3Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorVessels Antilles II4Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorSECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION1.1 PARTICULARS OF VESSEL ANTILLES II“M.V. ANTILLES II” PARTICULAR1.1.1 General DataName:M.V.ANTILLES IIPort of Registry:PanamaIMO Number: 9223667Official Number:27775-01-AClassification Number: NKK 010699Call Sign:H3XVOwners:Oriente Meridian Maritime Inc.Operators:Hiong Guan Navegacion Japan Co.,LtdDowa Line Bldg.25-5Nishi-Shinbashi 2 Chome, Minato-Ku,Tokyo. 105 JapanShip’s Tel/Tlx No.: 335150510Ship’s Fax No.: 335150512Ship’s Email:Antilles-2@dowaship.co.jpType of Ship:Bulk CarrierShip’s Gear:3 Cranes X 30 TsClass:Nippon Kaiji KyokaiClass Notation:NS*(Bulk Carrier) (ESP) MNS*Builder:Shin Kurushima Dockyard Co., Ltd. Ehime Pref.Japan.Builder’s Hull No.:SNO.5047Keel Laid: 10/20/2000Launched: 12/27/2000Delivered: 3/06/2001GRT: 7265.005Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorNRT: 4279.00Length overall:115.33 MtrsLength (Between Perpendiculars): 109.00 MtrsBreadth (Moulded): 19.60 MtrsDepth (Moulded):11.40 MtrsSummer Draught:8.632 MtrsSummer Deadweight: 12,274 MTGross Tonnage:7,265 MTNet Tonnage:4,279 MTMain Engines:Type & number:Output (MCO):(CSO [90%MCO]):Means of Propulsion:Service Speed:7UEC37LA x 1 set3,603 kw (4,900 ps) x 210 rpm3,243 kw (4,410 ps) x 203 rpmDiesel12.50 Knots6Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents Investigator1.2 BACKGROUNDThe vessel loaded a cargo of 10,704.694 MT of DAP-Monocal fertilizers in bulk at Kinder MorganTampaplex, port of Tampa USA, and sailed out for the port of Caldera in Costa Rica. The pilotboarded the vessel at 0252 Hrs on 28 th March 2007. All Bridge Equipment and Engines were tried outat 0200 Hrs, and all lines were cast off at 0306 Hrs.Fortunately there was no casualty to life nor injury or pollution as a result of this grounding. Nodamage to any property is suspected and so far there have been no claims with respect to same.1.3 SUMARYBulk carrier M.V. Antilles II, ran aground on departure from Tampa Bay, Florida USA at 0520 Hrs onthe 28 th of March 2007 in position Lat 27-37.2N, Long 082-39.0W. The main cause was determined tobe poor quality of diesel oil that clogged the Fuel oil filters very badly as is seen in the photographswhich are attached.The vessel was refloated at 1131 Hrs on 28 th March 2007 on high tide with the assistance of three tugsand ship’s engines. The tanks were sounded continuously and no ingress of water was recorded.The vessel was brought along side Manatee berth for inspection. USCG teams headed by the portCaptain who boarded the vessel from 0555 Hrs – 0700 Hrs and 1015 Hrs – 1600 Hrs, and carried outthe inspection.1.3.1 Weather ConditionsThe weather conditions were partly cloudy, light easterly winds of about 6 knots, smooth seas,visibility about 7 miles and the tide was flooding at about 1 knot.1.3.2 LIST OF STATUTORY CERTIFICATES.Certificate Date of Date of IssuedIssue: Expiry: By:Certificate of Classification July 27 th , 2006 Mar 15 th , 2011 NKKCargo Ship Safety Equip. Cert. Mar 20th 2007 Mar 19 th , 2009 NKKCargo Ship Safety Const. Cert. July 27 th , 2006 Mar 15 th , 2011 NKKCargo Ship Safety Radio Cert. Mar 13 th , 2007 Mar 12 th , 2008 NKKInternational Tonnage Cert. Mar 16, 2001 ------ NKKInternational Load Line Cert. Jul 27, 2006 Mar 15 th , 2011 NKKInt’l Oil Pollution Prevention Cert. 13 Mar 2007 12 Aug 2007 NKK7Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorSafety Management Cert. Sept 6 th , 2006 Aug 29 th , 2011 NKKDocument Of Complianc Jul 2th, 2002 Jun 17 th , 2007 NKKMinimum Safe Manning Cert. Aug 27, 2004 ------ Panama1.4 THE CREWRankSigned On.Master: 11/14/2006Chief Officer: 03/26/2007A.B.: 11/14/2006Chief Engineer: 03/26/20072nd Engineer 02/14/2007Oilier: 03/26/20071.4.1. Interviewing some Crew MembersMasterThe Master stated that he joined the vessel on 11/14/2006, has been in Command for over 30years. He came on bridge at about 0250 Hrs on the 28 th of March 2007. Details of his attachedreport were concurred by him. He further narrated that even though the third tug was in thevicinity, she did not come to assist immediately, as the tug master was trying to negotiate andget a Salvage contract commitment, which the Master refused as per advice and instructions ofthe Ship’s managers. The tug finally did come to assist after about 2hrs 42 minutes, when thetwo tugs were unable to successfully re-float the vessel and at the request of the pilot throughthe agent.Chief OfficerChief Officer, OOW, stated that he joined the vessel on 03/25/2007at Tampa. He came onwatch at about 0345 Hrs on the day of the incident. When the vessel’s engines and steeringfailed, he was asked by the Master to go for anchor stations.He went forward and was asked to drop both anchors which he did. The anchor chains had runout to the bitter end, leading astern and very tight. The brakes could not hold the anchor chainfrom running out, damaging the brake lining. He later took rounds and monitored thesoundings.8Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorA. B.The A.B. at the wheel stated that he joined the vessel on 11/14/2006 and came on the bridge atabout 0350 hrs, for his duty. At the time when the black out took place and up observing loss ofsteerage he informed the duty officer and pilot of same. He later hoisted the not undercommand signal being 2 black balls.Chief EngineerThe Chief Engineer stated that he joined the vessel on 3/25/2007 at Tampa. He went in theengine room at about 0300 hrs, on the day of the incident. The No. 2 & No. 3 DieselGenerators were running unload, and all machinery was in good running order. At about 0515hrs suddenly the No.3 generator tripped off, and due to overload the No. 2 generator startedsurging and also tripped off.The No. 1 generator started automatically but also tripped off immediately. Soon after thatwithin 2 – 3 minutes the emergency generator started automatically. Simultaneously allmachinery, pumps tripped off causing Main Engine failure. When the generators were surging,he opened the flow meter by pass valve which did not help leading him to believe that theprimary filter was choked (Pipe line diagram attached).There was no abnormality or vibrations felt in the engine room at the time of the grounding.The filters were opened, found badly clogged, cleaned and the engines restarted in about 30minutes and Master was updated of the situation. Much later, after coming alongside thepurifier was also opened and it was found to be choked and cleaned.This led him to believe that the settling tank could also be dirty. On opening the settling tank,same was found to be very dirty and the ships crew cleaned both settling and service tanks eachof 4.68 cubic meters capacity.9Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorSERVICE SETTLING TANKSERVICE SETTLING TANK10Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorAs per the ship’s records, the settling tank was last cleaned in Feb’07 and the service tank was lastcleaned in Oct’06. The diesel oil in use was supplied at New Orleans on 03/11/2007. Attached is theBoat delivery report and the analysis report. It is also to be noted that the oil strainers of the D.O. werebeing cleaned very frequently after receiving the bunkers in New Orleans, however at the time ofhanding over this was not highlighted by the Out Going Chief Engineer.The diesel oil filters both Primary and secondary, were there after being cleaned on daily basis untilthe 3 rd of May. No deflection readings have been taken after the incident.2 nd . EngineerThe engineer on duty was the 2 nd Engineer and he stated that he joined the vessel on 2/14/2006 andwas assisting the Chief Engineer during the incident.OilerThe Oiler on duty stated that he, the joined vessel on 3/25/2007 at Tampa USA and he came to theengine room at about 0345 Hrs on the day of the incident. After the vessel had rum aground, he wasasked to inspect the bilges and he found no ingress of water. He was assisted the engineers thereafter.1.5 NARRATIVEOn interviewing, questioning the Master, Bridge & Engine watch keeping staff and going through theLog books and other documents detailed of the sequence of events leading to the grounding and her refloatingare as follows:The weather conditions were partly cloudy, light easterly winds of about 6 knots, smooth seas,visibility about 7 miles, and the tide was flooding at about 1 knot.0050 Hrs: The vessel completed loading a cargo of 10,704.694 MT of fertilizer in bulk fromKinder Morgan Tampaplex and sailed out for the Port of Caldera at 0306 Hrs.0252 Hrs: Pilot, Rose Tobias boarded the vessel.0306 Hrs: All lines Cast Off, vessel underway.0515 Hrs: The ship’s Generators tripped off causing Black out, Main Engine Failure and Steeringfailure. Vessel’s speed was 12.50 Knts and the Ship’s heading was 242(T).0516 Hrs: Master sounded Emergency Alarm mustered crew and exercised Emergency SteeringOperations. The pilot communicated with inbound vessels and Port Authorities.0518 Hrs: Port and Starboard Anchors were cast.11Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents Investigator0520 Hrs: It was concluded that Vessel was aground in Position Lat 27-37.2N, Long 082-39.0W,0.61 NM off Sunshine Skyway Bridge Tampa, Florida. USA. At the time of groundingthe vessel was drawing 8.03 Mtrs Fwd and 8.38 Mtrs Aft, water densitybeing1.019gms/cc. Vessel was making good a speed of about 12.5 Knots on a course of242(T). The weather conditions were partly cloudy, light winds, smooth seas, visibilityover 7 miles and the tide was flooding at about 1 Knots. The final heading when thevessel lay aground was 174(T). There was no casualty to life nor injury or pollution as aresult of this grounding. No damage to any property was suspected.Hoisted and displayed Vessel Aground signals as per the Rule 30 of the Rules of theRoad.0555-0700Hrs:USCG Personnel on board for investigation.0600 Hrs: Sounded all Water Ballast Tanks, Bilges, F.O. Tanks, and D.O. Tanks and observed noingress of water and no oil pollution.Master contacted the DPA and Manager of the company.The Port Authority were requested for assistance of tugs and as per the pilots advise, itwas planned to pull the vessel out on high water, and the tide tables showed timings asfollows :St. Petersburg, Florida: 28 th March 2007High WaterLow Water1304 Hrs 1.5 Ft 0523 Hrs -0.3 Ft2238 Hrs 1.9 Ft 1645 Hrs 1.2 FtThe difference for Muller Key Channel (Skyway) Position Lat 27-36.9N, Long 082-43.6W beingTIMEHEIGHTHigh Water Low Water High Low WaterWater-2Hrs 03 Min -2Hrs 01 Min 0.92 Ft 0.92 Ft12Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents Investigator1.6 DETAILS AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OF RESCUE OPERATIONAFTER THE INCIDENTThe Master updated the DPA with the circumstances and the situation after the incident, and wasadvised by the vessel’s operators to request for tugs via the agent and not to sign any L.O.F or SalvageAgreement or Contract. The Port authority dispatched three tugs to assist the vessel and try to re-floather at the high water the sequence of events was as follows:28 th March 20070845 Hrs: Tug Freedom made fast with one Tug line on Port Bow.Tug Independence made fast with one Tug line on Starboard Bow. Attempted to re-floatthe vessel by the help of two tugs and engines but unsuccessful.1015-1600Hrs:Second batch of USCG Personnel boarded the vessel to carry out further investigation,stayed on board while attempting to re-float the vessel and bring her alongside.1127 Hrs: Third Tug Canaveral made fast aft with one Tug line, Centre lead.1128 Hrs: Reattempted / Commenced attempt to re-float the vessel1131 Hrs: Vessel re-floated with the help of three tugs and engine movement.1145 Hrs: Port / Starboard anchor aweigh. Commenced underway and maneuvering towardsManatee berth for further inspections.1200HRS:Sounded and monitored all tanks every hour and final soundings confirmed that therewas neither ingress of water nor any oil pollution.1319 Hrs: First line ashore / Manatee berth.1336 Hrs: All three Tugs cast off1350 Hrs: Pilot away.13Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents Investigator1.7 THE CREW AFTER THE INCIDENTDeck and Engine personnel were collectively involved in taking soundings of the tanks and of takingsoundings around the ship. The engine crew opened and cleaned the diesel oil filters.1.7.1 BRIDGE AND ENGINE ROOM PROCEDURE AND OPERATIONSThe Master was in command of the vessel and the Chief Officer was the Officer on watch. Atthe time of the incident the vessel was on hand steering with both steering motors running,. Theengine room was manned by the Chief Engineer, Duty Engineer and Oilier. The Engines wererunning on diesel oil, and switching over to H.O. was gradually in progress.1.7.2 ASSISTANCE AFTER THE INCIDENTAfter the vessel rum aground, assistance was received from following by way ofAdvise, Cooperation, and or Arrangement:• Port Authority of Tampa• Tugs• D.P.A.• The Company• USCG• Ocean ship, Port Agents in Baltimore14Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorCHART NOA 11416 – AGROUND POSITIONCHART NOA 11416 – CORRECTED EDITION15Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorCHART NOA 11416 – MANATEE BERTH # 191. 8 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONThe cause of the incident was due to the clogging of the diesel oil filters Generators. This tripped theGenerators that caused a “Black Out” and in turn tripped all machinery; main engines and steeringfailure. It is to be noted that as per the records the filters were cleaned very frequently in the last 2weeks, especially after receiving bunkers at New Orleans on 03/11/2007. (Record of the filters cleanedin last 2 weeks is attached with photographs of the clogged filters).It is to be noted that the oil strainers of the diesel oil were being cleaned very frequently after receivingthe bunkers in New Orleans, however, at the time of handing over this was not highlighted by theoutgoing Chief Engineer.The diesel oil in use was supplied at New Orleans on 03/11/2007 and the Primary filter was lastcleaned on 3/26/2007, prior to the incident.There was also no maintenance procedure or guide line for the periodical cleaning of the primary orsecondary filters in the ship`s planned maintenance system.16Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorNo records show that the Master or Ship’s staff inspected or viewed the results of the underwaterinspection. Neither the report was sited by the Master. The least that could have been done was that theMaster should have monitored the film / photos while being taken to ascertain the following• Point of contact• The condition of paint / bottom, etc• Any indentation, and if so, in which area.The bridge movement book did not show any records of the engine movement at the time of grounding/ re-floating.No inspection of the double bottom; holds; recorded or carried out after discharging the cargo in CostaRica. Thus there is no inspection carried out to ascertain if any frames are bent and if there is anyindentation on the hull.The analysis report of the bunkers supplied at NOLA does not show any abnormalities. (a copyattached as item 27)Viewing the Service; Settling Tanks photos, mixing of oils could be the main cause of the problem.The same was pointed out to Chief Engineer and he agreed that the mixing should be avoided, but theyhad been mixing in this vessel.17Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorDIESEL OIL PRIMARY FILTERDIESEL OIL SECONDARY FILTER18Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorBridgeThe M.V. Antilles II was built in Japan and delivered the year 2001. The Bridge isequipped with all latest navigational aids and in compliance with the requirements.GENERAL BRIDGE VIEW CLOSE UP OF GPS 13CLOSE UP OF ECHO SOUNDERCLOSE UP OF BRIDGE CONTROL19Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents InvestigatorCLOSE UP OF STEERING MOTOR ALARMActions by the MasterUpon realizing the failure of machinery the Master immediately called for emergencysteering operations and dropped both port and starboard anchors, in consultation withthe pilot and as per his advice.The vessel was near the sunshine bridge in the Tampa Bay channel. Due to loss ofpower coupled with flooding tide and loss of headway, the vessel could not steer asrequired and ran aground.2.0 HUMAN FACTORSSince the cause of the incident was machinery failure, and all emergency procedureswere followed, the element of human error cannot be attributed to the cause. Theaforesaid staff which was interviewed was found to be professional / knowledgeable andcooperative in assisting with the investigation and information required for this report.The Master also confirmed that the alcohol and drug procedures were being adhered toas a part of the company’s policy. When the USCG boarded the vessel, they subjectedthe Pilot, Master and 3 rd Off for alcohol analysis test. The Master and 2 nd Officer were20Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama

Grounding - M/V ¨ ANTILLES II¨Captain Khush FitterAccidents Investigatorsent ashore on 3/29/2007 for a drug test. All reports indicated no presence of anyalcohol or drugs as stated by the Master and 2 nd Officer.3.0 RECOMENDATIONSThe fuel oil filters / strainers to be cleaned out more often and should also be cleanedprior to vessel’s arrival/departure port. The company should incorporate same in themaintenance planning system for their entire fleet. As is evident that the bunkerssupplied in New Orleans were of poor quality and also mixing of bunkers should beavoided.4.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION BY THE COMPANYThe company has with immediate effect taken following corrective action andrevised the manuals.4.1 Added new tasks in their “Orca Maintenance Planning System” forFO & DO Strainer maintenance as follows:a. F.O. Primary strainer to be cleaned every week and also prior departureport irrespective to the interval of maintenance fuel oil Secondary strainersto be cleaned every 2 weeks and also prior departure port irrespective to theinterval of maintenance.b. Primary strainer to be cleaned every week and also prior departure port. irrespective to the interval of maintenance.4.2 Revised ISM Code and SMS manual and attached Orca form “HGJ-MRN-2-14 “Departure / Arrival Check list ( Please provide copy)as follows:1) All strainer of FO line and2) All strainer of DO lineAbove items to be confirmed cleaned in advance prior every departure and arrivalfrom/to port.21Panama Maritime AuthorityDirectorate General of Merchant MarineMarine Casualty Investigation BranchPanama, Republic of Panama