Interim Stabilization Balancing Security and Development in Post ...

AcknowledgementsThis study on Interim Stabilisation was commissioned by the Folke BernadotteAcademy, financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and undertakenby Nat J. Colletta, Hannes Berts and Jens Samuelsson Schjörlien of the Sthlm(Stockholm) Policy Group. The authors take sole responsibility for the analysis,findings and recommendations therein. The report does not necessarily representthe views of the FBA or the MFA as such.A special thank you is directed to the partners that prepared country casestudies as well as contributed to the concluding discussions on findings andrecommendations: Colombia, Alexandra Guáqueta and Gerson Arias of theFundación Ideas para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org); Cambodia, Sinthay Neb andSven Edquist of the Advocacy Policy Institute (www.apiinstitute.org); andUganda, Justice Peter Onega and Fred Mugisha of the Amnesty Commission(www.amnestycom.go.ug). For the review of literature and relevant cases, thefollowing persons have provided assistance: Calder Yates and Paolo Mastrangelo ofthe New College in Sarasota, Florida; Francis Musoni of the Rwanda Commissionfor Reintegration and in their personal capacity; Rebecka Lundgren, JohanRutgersson, Fiona Rotberg and Anna Valve.The luxury of having access to a competent and experienced network ofpractitio ners and academics within the Stockholm Initiative of DDR has provento be an invaluable asset when discussing, writing and modifying results andrecommendations: Pablo de Greiff, International Center for Transitional Justice;Nita Yawanarajah, UN DPA; Kelvin Ong, UN DPKO; Sofie da Camara andCornelis Steenken, UNDP BCRP; Hans Thorgren, Swedish National DefenceCollege; Inger Buxton, EU Commission and researcher Pierre-Antoine Braud.The Chairs of the two additional SIDDR working groups, Virginia Gamba andAmbassador Jan Cedergren, deserves special mention for their ideas and guidance.The Folke Bernadotte Academy, which is a Swedish Governmental organizationwith a mandate on training and method development on international conflictand crisis management, has served as a platform on which to present the ideasand recommendations of the study. The authors would like to recognize theconstructive collaboration with the Academy. In particular for the purpose of thisstudy: its conflict prevention unit, led by Ambassador Ragnar Ängeby and its SSRunit,led by Michaela Friberg-Storey. The Director General, Henrik Landerholm,and deputy Director General, Jonas Alberoth, have been instrumental, not onlyfor the realization of this project, but also for general Swedish efforts seeking tomobilize the capacity of the international community to collectively support peaceand security.Lastly, we would be remiss if we did not especially acknowledge Ambassador

Lena Sundh at the MFA. Without her pioneering leadership in developing theinternational knowledge base and experiences within the field of peace, securityand development this study would have never come to fruition. As Chairwomanof the Stockholm Initiative on DDR, she performed a balanced role as facilitatorof discussions, and at times moderator of contentious debates. We owe her ourthanks and admiration.Nat J. Colletta, Jens Samuelsson Schjørlien and Hannes BertsSthlm Policy GroupStockholm and Sarasota, December 2008

Table of ContentsAcronyms ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4.Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 111. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 13The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration ........................ 14Generative Dialogues in Promoting Peace Processes ........................................................................................................... 16Rationale for a Study of Interim Stabilization (or “Holding Patterns”) ......................................... 162. Setting the Stage: Challenges in Early Transition and Peacebuilding .......................................... 19Understanding the Key Contextual Factors .................................................................................................................................................. 19Balancing Security and Development – Stability and Change ............................................................................ 20Linking SSR and DDR in Post Conflict Peacebuilding ............................................................................................................. 223. Conceptualizing Interim Stabilization ....................................................................................................................................................................... 23Clarifying the Terminology ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23Creating Space and Buying Time for Peacebuilding ..................................................................................................................... 24Strengthening Prospects for Durable Peace ................................................................................................................................................ 254. Study Objectives and Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................................... 27Interim Stabilization as a Strategic Peacebuilding Measure ....................................................................................... 27The Methodology: From Desk Review to Fieldwork .............................................................................................................. 275. Review of Select Interim Stabilization Approaches ............................................................................................................... 29Civil Service Corps ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30South African Service Corps ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30The Kosovo Protection Corps .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 33Military Integration ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36

The DRC Brassage Process .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36Angolan Ownership of the Military Integration Process ............................................................................40Nepal – Exploring Opportunities for Interim Stabilization ............................................................................ 43Transitional Security Forces ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 45The Transitional Afghan Militia Forces – a Necessary Initial Step ................................................... 45The Sunni Awakening ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 48Transitional Autonomy ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 49The Peshmerga in Kurdish Iraq – Autonomy in the Making .......................................................................... 49Dialogue and Sensitization (Halfway-House arrangements) .............................................................................. 49The Rwandan Ingando-process .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 496. Selected Country Fieldwork: Cambodia, Colombia and Uganda ..................................................... 55Cambodia ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 55Background and Rationale .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 55The Demise of the Khmer Rouge .................................................................................................................................................................................. 56The Win-Win Policy: Pragmatism Prevails in the Short Run ...................................................................... 58Interim Stabilization Through Defacto Autonomy ............................................................................................................. 58Challenges, Issues and Key Lessons ........................................................................................................................................................................... 59Colombia .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61Background and Rationale .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61The Paramilitary (AUC) ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 62Corporación Democracia – a Transitional Institutional Arrangement ............................. 63Shareholder Agro Business as an Interim Stabilization Measure ..................................................... 64Individual DDR: Cooptation of Combatants .................................................................................................................................... 66The “Soft Policing” Track .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 67Challenges, Issues and Key Lessons ........................................................................................................................................................................... 67Uganda ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 69Background and Rationale .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 69The Labora Farm Experiment – a Halfway-House Arrangement ................................................ 70Strategic Military Integration .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 72Uganda National Rescue Front II ................................................................................................................................................................................... 72Challenges, Issues and Key Lessons ........................................................................................................................................................................... 73

7. Comparative Analysis:Contextual Factors Shaping the Choice of IS Measures ........................................................................................... 75The Importance of Contextual Factors ................................................................................................................................................................... 751. The Nature and Duration of the Conflict ....................................................................................................................................... 76II. The Nature of the Peace .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 77III. Governance Capacity and Reach of the State .................................................................................................................... 79IV. The State of the Economy: Labor Absorption and Property Rights .......................... 79V. The Character of Communities and Combatants .................................................................................................... 80Maintaining Social Cohesion and Control Structures ............................................................................................................ 81The Importance of Agency, Livelihood, and Legitimacy .................................................................................................. 81Establishing Incentives through Transitional Institutional Arrangements .............................. 82Converting Potential Spoilers to Stakeholders ...................................................................................................................................... 83Managing Risks ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 848. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................................ 87Buying Time and Space During Early Transition .................................................................................................................................. 8 7Getting the Transitional Incentivesand Institutional Arrangements Right .......................................................................................................................................................................... 88Key Recommendations to Negotiators, Mediators,and DDR-SSR Program Planners .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 89ANNEX 1Definitions of DDR terminology established by the UN ............................................................................................... 91ANNEX 2Methodology: Interview Guide and Sample Thematic Questionaire .......................................... 93ANNEX 3Select Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 99

Executive SummaryIn the early phase of a transition from war to peace, numerous political aspirationsand concerns of individuals and groups must be carefully balanced. Movingfrom military conflict to sustainable peace requires a gradual adjustment by theconflicting parties from a dependence on military sources of power to an abilityto operate as civilian actors in a peacetime society. Many DDR and SSR processesfail because the political environment (i.e. primarily the trust and confidence thateach party will stick to what have been agreed) are not ripe at the time of signingan agreement. Mediation efforts, program planning and even terminology mustbe sensitive to cultural, economic, social and historical circumstances, allowing forownership of a peace process, by its relevant stakeholders.The Stockholm Initiative on DDR recommended that “In order to avoidgaps between the short-term and the long-term focus, consideration might be given totemporarily maintaining ex-combatants, who are designated for a DDR programme, in amilitary structure, i.e. ‘holding pattern’. Such an interim solution would provide the timeand space for debriefing and demilitarisation of the mindset of ex-combatants.” (FinalReport, 2006). Further studies were recommended on “transitional mechanisms thatwould allow control over armed groups while awaiting political solutions” (Testing thePrinciples, 2007).To better understand such transitional mechanisms for balancing security anddevelopment, this study has been conducted by the Folke Bernadotte Academyand Sthlm Policy Group during 2007/08. It elaborates on the idea of “holdingpatterns”, as a possible means of dealing with some of the obstacles to peace. Thestudy develops the concept of Interim Stabilization (IS), defined as measures thatMAY be used to keep former combatants’ cohesiveness intact within a military or civilianstructure, creating space for a political dialogue and the formation of an environmentconducive to social and economic reintegration.In addition to a review of available literature, the study includes three in-countrycase studies where Interim Stabilization measures have been put to the test:In Cambodia, we have studied the process in which former Khmer Rouge (KR)commanders were “de facto” provided an autonomous region within the state11

in which internal reintegration could be handled without external interference.(Study carried out by the Advocacy Policy Institute).In Colombia, our case study examines the processes of collective reintegrationof paramilitaries, with command and control structures kept intact, andsimultaneous individual reintegration of FARC and ELN rebels in civil-militaryroles during ongoing conflict/negotiations. (Study carried out by Fundación Ideaspara la Paz).In Uganda, we have studied the example of the Labora farm, where LRA(Lord’s Resistance Army) troops were offered civilian alternatives in farmingfor themselves and their families, with their military organization partly intact.(Study carried out by the Kampala International School of Ethics and the UgandaAmnesty Commission).The main rationale for IS-measures, common to all the cases examined in thisstudy, has been to help put an end to a situation of spiraling violence and reducethe risk of resumption of hostilities by holding former combatants in formalstructures, thereby maintaining a critical level of security. We have identified atypology of five categories of arrangements that fall within the IS-definition:1) creation of civilian service corps; 2) military integration arrangements; 3) creationof transitional security forces; 4) dialogue and sensitization programs and halfwayhousearrangements; 5) different forms of transitional autonomy. These categories arenot precise or mutually exclusive. In fact, in many cases Interim Stabilizationmeasures contain elements resembling the characteristics of two or more of thesecategories.The objectives of interim stabilization relate to the state level (to solveoutstanding issues relating to powers-sharing and institutional frameworks) as wellas to community- (to allow for initial sensitization preparing for the return ofex-combatants, and a thorough analysis of transitional justice and reconciliationneeds) and the individual level (guarantee security through the maintenance ofcohesion through familiar structures, the sense of agency and legitimacy throughtransitional livelihood, and/or room for life skills training and psycho-socialsupport).It is important to note that the concept of Interim Stabilization is not proposedas a mandatory first step in peace building, nor should it necessarily be conceivedas a new component of a DDR-SSR process. In fact, it may be considered a pre-DDR programme to manage security risks of premature demobilization. Theunderlying assumption of the study, however, is that sometimes, conventionaltools are not sufficient to deal with security concerns in the immediate aftermathof violent conflicts. In such situations Interim Stabilization could be introduced toallow for other enabling factors to fall into place.12

1.I. IntroductionThe necessity to interlink security and development oriented activities formsthe basis for contemporary international peacebuilding efforts. A number ofpeacebuilding tools are available to facilitate the war to peace transition. Theconcepts of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) andSecurity Sector Reform (SSR) are two such tools. They can be employed tofacilitate the transfer of control over the security and military apparatus tocivilian authorities (i.e. breaking existing command structures) while continuingthe political dialogue and building confidence between former rivals throughpower sharing mechanisms. The concept of Transitional Justice (TJ), dealingwith crimes committed by one or both sides to a conflict, is another key conceptin peacebuilding processes. Although TJ modalities are not the primary focusof this study, it is important to recognize and address justice concerns whenimplementing DDR and SSR programs to ensure legitimacy and accountability,especially through the application of transparent vetting processes.The successful employment of these peacebuilding tools is dependent on acertain level of stability, often lacking in the immediate aftermath of a violentconflict. This study sets out to explore ways in which minimum levels of securityand stability can be attained in the early phase after a peace agreement has beennegotiated and signed or when a cessation of hostilities is agreed. The workinghypothesis is that political processes to build sustainable peace take time –often more than is available in the fragile period following a peace agreement.Lack of quick results on the ground and impatience on both sides are oftenserious challenges. A rush to declare peace (and in the case of the internationalcommunity – to mark an exit strategy), in the absence of stability andopportunities for successful implementation of peacebuilding initiatives, is onemajor risk factor for relapse into violence.This race against time in early peacebuilding is at the heart of the topic of thisstudy. The tool – or menu of options – that is proposed can be described as a time-13

out or a “holding pattern”, in order to allow for continued political dialogue andmeasures to prepare institutions, communities and combatants for long-termpeacebuilding and reintegration efforts. The term Interim Stabilization(IS) is usedto conceptualize this phase of preparing for a sustainable transition. Unlike otherpeacebuilding tools and concepts, Interim Stabilization aims to describe a typeof measure defined by its timing and purpose, rather than a concrete measuredefined by its design. Hopefully this concept (and an understanding of the keycontextual factors shaping its use) can help broaden the range of options availableto negotiating parties, mediators and peacebuilding program designers in thefield. Throughout the study, we will go through a number of possible designs ofIS-measures and analyze their respective strengths and weaknesses. The aim is todraw general lessons and conclusions from relevant cases and experiences whilemaintaining that no blueprint can be established that is universally applicable.The research stems from the Stockholm Initiative on DisarmamentDemobilization Reintegration (SIDDR), and has been commissioned by theSwedish Government through the Folke Bernadotte Academy and financed by theSwedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In the following section, the backgroundand purpose of the research project is outlined.The Stockholm Initiative on DisarmamentDemobilization ReintegrationIn recent years, processes of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration(DDR) of former combatants have been placed at the center of the internationalcommunity’s support for peace processes (See for example SIDDR; UN IDDRS;the OECD/DAC CPDC-network; EU concept for support to Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration; the AU Framework Document for PostConflict Recovery Development – web pages provided in references). The DDRconcepthas gradually emerged from the lesson that a peace agreement anddeployment of peacekeeping operations does not automatically lead to long-termstability. It has become clear that in order to consolidate peace, these efforts mustbe coupled with longer-term peacebuilding initiatives. DDR links the initial postconflictphase of stabilization, disarmament and demobilization with programsfor more long-term social and economic reintegration of combatants.However, in spite of this approach where the security and development nexus istaken into account, many DDR-processes fail to sustain a peaceful development.Still, almost half of all conflicts that end through negotiated agreement relapseinto violence within five years (see Uppsala University, Department of Peace and14

Conflict Research Database). All too often, DDR has been approached from aprimarily technical perspective, neglecting the importance of the surroundingpolitical and social environment.1.In 2004, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs initiated the StockholmInitiative on Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (see SIDDR BackgroundStudies, Final Report and Testing the Principles). Aware of the challengesand opportunities of DDR in post conflict peace processes, the aim was to createpredictable frameworks for successful implementation of such programs. TheSIDDR was organized as an international working process, including nongovernmental(NGO) and inter-governmental (IGO) organizations as wellas government representatives. In 2006, a Final Report was presented to theSecretary General of the United Nations. The Report states that the primary aimof DDR is to contribute to a secure and stable environment in which an overallpeace process and transition to sustainable development can be achieved. It is onlyin this kind of ‘enabling’ environment that political and security oriented reforms,as well as social and economic reconstruction and longer-term development, cantake root.The Stockholm Initiative on DDR elaborated on the early phase of post-conflictsituations, where there might be a peace agreement signed at the high politicallevel, but where the options and opportunities for individual soldiers are oftenvery scarce. The SIDDR unbundled the concept of reintegration, proposing animmediate short-term focus on transitional reintegration of former combatantsaimed at primarily stabilizing a fragile peace. This early reintegration was referredto as Reinsertion, using the terminology of the United Nations (see reference tothe UN IDDRS below). In fact, the terminology and concept of “Reinsertion” wasinitially introduced as a “transitional safety net phase” in the 1996 multi-countrystudy on demobilization and reintegration programs undertaken by the WorldBank (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996). Although the primary focuswould be to guarantee that former combatants do not need to return to violenceto make a living, all initiatives must be tied to a long-term plan for sustainableeconomic and social development.In 2006, working in parallel with the SIDDR process, the United Nations’inter-agency working group on DDR established the Integrated DDR Standards(IDDRS) as guidance for technical support, financing and implementation ofDDR programs. Through the IDDRS, common definitions of the terminology:Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration, were established(See www.unddr.org or Annex 1 for definitions).15

Generative Dialogues in Promoting Peace ProcessesThe SIDDR working process identified a need to further explore the relationshipbetween the DDR concept and the context in which DDR-programs wereimplemented. The Swedish Government Agency, Folke Bernadotte Academy,was mandated to run a follow-up project; testing the recommendations andconclusions of the SIDDR Final Report. Whereas the SIDDR report focused onthe concept of DDR and its role in relation to parallel peace building concerns(e.g. SSR, justice, governance, and socio-economic recovery) the follow-up projectelaborated further on the political dynamics of the DDR-SSR interface. Thefindings of the SIDDR were brought to the field and introduced to parties andnegotiators in ongoing peace talks.The SIDDR had asserted that mediation efforts, program planning and eventerminology must be sensitive to cultural, economic, social and historicalcircumstances, allowing for real ownership of the DDR-process by its relevantstakeholders. Experiences from the follow-up project suggest that dealingwith disarmament and reintegration of former combatants under an adaptedterminology, such as ‘demilitarization and economic mainstreaming’ (as inMindanao) or ‘management of armies and arms’ (as in Nepal), can help establishthe trust and confidence necessary to maintain a process of dialogue. For the sakeof consistency, this report will use the concept DDR as defined by the SIDDRand IDDRS, understanding that the determinants of successful DDR, especiallyreintegration, must be identified and defined within the context of each particularpeace process.Rationale for a Study of Interim Stabilization(or “Holding Patterns”)While the vast majority of available literature advocates that DDR programsshould be designed and implemented within an overall peace strategy, there islittle precise guidance to be found on the topic. The determinants of effectivereintegration among individual combatants are often difficult to pin down(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005). This is particularly apparent in relation to theearly phase where the conditions might not yet be optimal for a DDR process.From an implementation point of view, the knowledge-gap regarding theformative initial stages of DDR program design and implementation leaves anumber of urgent questions unanswered. For example: How to deal with largenumbers of poorly educated and unskilled former combatants, and mid- and16

upper-level commanders in an economy with very limited labor absorptioncapacity? How to restructure a security sector while simultaneously absorbingcombatants into that sector? How to guarantee that a “security vacuum” is notinadvertently created? Unsettled issues of political power sharing and positioningoften further complicate the situation.1.The follow-up project noted that many DDR processes fail because the politicalcircumstances are not ripe at the time of signing an agreement. Often, what isprimarily lacking is mutual trust and confidence between the parties. Furtherstudies were therefore recommended on “transitional mechanisms that would allowcontrol over armed groups while awaiting political solutions” (SIDDR Testing thePrinciples p 35). This was in line with the SIDDR Final Report’s statement that“In order to avoid gaps between the short-term and the long-term focus, considerationmight be given to temporarily maintaining ex-combatants, who are designated for a DDRprogramme, in a military (or civil) 1 structure, i.e. ‘holding pattern’. Such an interimsolution would provide the time and space for debriefing and demilitarisation of the mindsetof ex-combatants” (SIDDR Final Report p 25).In light of these challenges in the early phase of war to peace transitions, thisstudy seeks to elaborate on the idea of “holding patterns”, referred to in this studyas Interim Stabilization, as a possible means of dealing with some of the obstaclesto peace outlined above. The working hypothesis is that reshaping “command”structures, but keeping former combatants in their existing organizational“control” structures (i.e. maintaining their social cohesion) for a limited periodof time, before integration into the (reformed) security apparatus and/orreintegration into productive civilian lives, might be a more effective interimstabilizing strategy than poorly planned demobilization and reintegrationprograms or premature Security Sector Reform.1. Author’s parenthesis added17

2.2. Setting the Stage:Challenges in Early Transitionand PeacebuildingUnderstanding the Key Contextual FactorsIn the early phase of a transition from war to peace, numerous political aspirationsand concerns of individuals and groups must be carefully balanced. Movingfrom military conflict to sustainable peace requires a gradual adjustment by theconflicting parties from a dependence on military sources of power to an abilityto operate as civilian actors in a peacetime society. While adjusting to a civilianpolitical arena may be imperative for the leadership level, a war to peace transitionoften entails serious implications for individual combatants as well. In a civiliansociety, they must find realistic alternative livelihoods, without the use of militaryforce. With an average implementation timeframe of 3–5 years, as suggested ina recent analysis from Escola de cultura de pau (Caramés, Fisas and Sanz, 2007),looking at all active DDR programmes 2006; the rapid launch of a programmedoes not guarantee a shortened disarmament and demobilization period.Generally, peace-agreements cannot reflect the concerns and aspirations of everystakeholder in a war-torn society. Many stakeholders may not even have a seat atthe negotiating table. For the sake of long-term stability, it is crucial that peaceagreementsare formulated so that they create an environment and a platform forcontinued political dialogue and a framework for a long-term augmented processtowards lasting peace.Understanding the key contextual factors that shape war to peace transitions helpsprepare the ground for a successful long-term peace process. Such factors are:19

1. Nature and duration of the conflict:› Underlying causes of conflict and the interests and agenda of the fightingparties (i.e. ideological, cultural and/or economic etc.).› The level of trust and confidence in political commitments betweenconflicting parties and in society at large (is there a tradition to stick toagreements? Is there a war fatigue within the communities etc.).II. Nature of the peace:› Manner in which the conflict ended (i.e. imposed, negotiated, or third partymediated peace);› Framework for dealing with war-time trauma, reconciliation andaccountability (Transitional Justice).III. Governance capacity and reach of the state:› Ability to provide security for communities and returning combatants;› Possibilities for alternative livelihoods in the military services and other partsof the security sector;› Capacity to organize transitional employment such as labor intensive publicworks and in the long run, to create opportunities for economic development.IV. The state of the economy:› The base of the economy and market opportunities (access to land and/orproperty rights, capital, technology, natural resources etc.);› Capacity of the economy to absorb unskilled labour.V. Character and cohesiveness of communities and combatants:› Level of ethnic homogeneity in the country and in communities (i.e. both inrelation to the causes of the conflict and the opportunities of communities towork towards socio-economic development for all ethnic groups);› Local cultural norms toward arms bearing and use;› Human capital of combatants (vocational and life skills);› Aspiration amongst the combatants and of their political and militaryleaderships as well as level of psychological capacity in the communities toabsorb and accept returning combatants;› Nature of social cohesion among the combatants and the conflict affectedcommunities.Balancing Security and Development – Stability and ChangeThere seems to be a general consensus amongst researchers and practitioners thatpost-conflict peacebuilding is ideally to be seen as a multidimensional process,including security, political and socio-economic aspects that reinforce andstrengthen each other (see for example UN Secretary General’s High Level PanelReport, 2004). These dimensions are not linear. They must be balanced at each20

point in time. A main objective of peacebuilding should be to improve the HumanSecurity situation. Although it is still debated whether the Human Security conceptshould encompasses anything beyond mere physical security, i.e. livelihoodsand “social security” (Tadjbakhsh, 2005), the introduction of the concept hasfacilitated the merger of the security and development agendas. The notion ofsecurity has been extended to include not only the security of state institutions andpower structures, but also the security of individual citizens (see Human SecurityReport, 2005). This study rest upon this understanding.2.Downsizing the security apparatus too quickly, without finding realisticalternatives, may threaten the peace process and the progress made in the politicalsphere. Ex-combatants cannot be reintegrated into communities lacking sufficientcapacity for labor absorption without risking that these combatants return toviolence to secure their livelihoods. Likewise, attempting to establish DDRprograms without dealing with issues of justice and reconciliation could lead tostigmatization and, in the worst cases, persecution. Indeed, in the aftermath ofa peace agreement, overcoming fear, mistrust and uncertainty amongst formercombatants is one of the most difficult challenges (Walter, 1997).Once the leaders agree to disarm and demobilize their troops they essentiallylose the bargaining power they have in the peace process. Should the other partyrenege on its agreements they can suffer grave consequences. Warring partiescan thus find themselves in the classical “prisoner’s dilemma”, where individualrationality trumps collective good. The parties have no way of overcomingfundamental distrust and uncertainty. The risk – or perceived risk – of taking thefirst step is often simply too large.DDR-programs have a symbolic as well as a functional value. They can signal acessation of hostilities, thereby severely undercutting the legitimacy of warringmilitia, and re-establish a state monopoly over the use of force under a reasonablylegitimate government. They can also, if the potential of Transitional Justice anddialogue are properly integrated, contribute to a sensitization process in whichcombatants’ mindsets are shifted towards a civilian life and the communities aresupported to deal with atrocities committed during the conflict. However, thereare still gaps in our understanding of exactly what factors can create environmentsconducive to successful transitions. Establishing and sustaining trust betweenformer rivaling parties remains one of the key challenges.21

Linking SSR and DDR in Post Conflict PeacebuildingSecurity is often the number one concern in the immediate aftermath of a violentconflict. Even in cases where an international peacekeeping force is present, safetyand security can rarely be provided and guaranteed for all groups and stakeholders.A premature disarmament and demobilization of a rebel group or militia, whichmay be the only provider of security in a community, risks creating a securityvacuum in which criminal groups take over (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005).Crime waves may undermine popular faith in the peace process and empowerauthoritarian actors (Call and Stanley, 2001). The dilemma becomes even morecomplicated in situations where the parties to a peace process are controllingdifferent parts of a country. With a Human Security approach, there may be reasonsfor postponing a DDR process, and relying on existing security forces with paidand trained individuals for the provision of transitional security. Gradually givingformer rebels a share in the state-monopoly over the provision of security couldfurther be a valuable strategic instrument in achieving sustainable peace.A thorough analysis of the entire security system – i.e. military and paramilitaryforces, intelligence services, security management and oversight bodies, justice andlaw enforcement institutions and various civil and military institutions (includingboth civil society organizations and non-statutory security forces) – providesimportant information on the general security situation, the possibilities of thestate to provide security to its citizens and the capacity to absorb former irregularcombatants into the national security apparatus. The concept of Security SystemReform (SSR), as defined by OECD/DAC, does not only aim at reconstructing thestate security and justice apparatus, but to achieve stability and security for boththe state and its citizens. This often entails incorporating non-statutory securityforces and civil society groups as non-state oversight mechanisms within theoverall reform framework. (OECD/DAC 2005).While conceptually different, DDR and SSR are synergistic (Brzoska, 2006)and can help us with at least two components of peace building; understandingthe macro determinants of demilitarization and; overcoming obstacles tosuccessful long-term social and economic reintegration. While the decision toreform the security system can sometimes be taken without a parallel process ofdemobilization and disarmament, the decision to undertake reintegration of alarge number of ex combatants requires some clarity on the shape and size of thefuture security sector. DDR is normally dependent upon a functioning securitysystem – for general stability but also for capacity to absorb ex-combatants into theregular security apparatus. Similarly, weaknesses in DDR-programs can often beexplained by identifying flaws in the existing security system.22

3.3. ConceptualizingInterim StabilizationClarifying the TerminologyFor the purposes of this study the concept of Interim Stabilization (IS) is defined as:› Stabilization measures that may be used to keep former combatants’ cohesivenessintact within a military or civilian structure, creating space and buying time fora political dialogue and the formation of an environment conducive to social andeconomic reintegration.In studying the potential of such measures as a means of maintaining minimumlevels of security in the immediate post-conflict period, it is interesting to takenote of a study by Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) showing that one third of all peaceprocesses since 1990 have included components of Military Integration (MI),i.e. integrating former rebels into the national army. They go on to argue thatsuccessful MI increases the chances for sustainable peace.Military integration and redeployment of armed groups as transitional securityforces (as mentioned above), present two options that may be suitable in somepost-conflict settings. However, an Interim Stabilization measure, as defined inthis study, could also be shaped as a civilian program where intact groups of formercombatants are given civilian duties or simply provided with life-skills trainingand/or socio-psychological support. An Interim Stabilization measure could thusbe employed as a military-, civilian-, or civil-military program. These choices areheavily dependent on the specific context and needs of each particular situation(see section on key contextual factors above).23

Presently, little literature exists on this type of military and similar civilian orcivil-military programs and the contextual factors, incentives and institutionalarrangements conditioning their use and determining their success orfailure. Similarly, there is no documented knowledge as to their organization,management and implementation arrangements, vetting procedures, specificprogram activities, costs and degree of effectiveness. A recent work by Glassmyerand Sambanis (2007) hint at some of the potential conditioning factors whichmay inform the strategic use of military integration or transitional civil/militarymechanisms, for example, economic opportunity; clear military victory ornegotiated peace settlement; and the existence of a broad multi-dimensional peaceprocess. The subject of the present study is broader in focus, aiming to fill a gap indocumentation and understanding of contextual factors, institutional modalitiesand incentives shaping the formative early post-conflict period.Creating Space and Buying Time for PeacebuildingThe main objective, common to all variations of Interim Stabilization measures,is to help put an end to the violence and reduce the risk of resumption of hostilitiesby holding former combatants in formal cohesive structures; maintaining a criticallevel of security and social support in order to “buy time” and create a space for:› Continued political dialogue and a settlement of outstanding issues relatingprimarily to the security sector and political power-sharing;› Trust and confidence to emerge allowing for political dialogue;› Formation of provisional bureaucratic structures and legal instruments;› Proper assessment of absorption capacity in different sectors of society andinitial economic reconstruction (i.e. alterative options available for demobilizedcombatants);› Sensitization of communities, and;› Socio-psychological adjustment of combatants.This list indicates that the primary objective of Interim Stabilizations – allowingfor an environment conducive to social and economic reintegration to emerge –relates to the state level as well as to community- and individual levels.At the state level a window could be created to resolve outstanding political issuesrelating to powers-sharing and institutional frameworks. This is central for theability to establish a sustainable post-peace-agreement process towards sustainablepeace. Through maintaining a critical level of security, IS measures could also buytime for thorough needs-assessments and careful planning of SSR initiatives (if24

needed) and DDR-programs. Unilateral defection by individuals and groups fromthe peace process would also be made more costly as the benefits inherent alreadyin the IS phase would be foregone.3.At community level, space is created for initial sensitization preparing for thereturn of ex-combatants and a thorough analysis of Transitional Justice (especiallyvetting) and reconciliation needs. The postponed return of combatants also givesprogram planners room for a careful assessment of the absorption capacity of localeconomies and labor markets as well as preparing community based programs andstrategies for socio-economic reintegration.From the individual’s point of view, an IS-phase could guarantee security throughthe maintenance of familiar group structures (even if the command is broken)and social cohesion, the sense of agency and legitimacy through transitionalemployment as a soldier on a wage and/or life skills training and psycho-socialsupport preparing ex-combatants for life in a peace-time society and economy.More often than not ex-combatants feel excluded and marginalized fromsociety. Their only bonds and support are their comrades in conflict and theircommanders. They often lack: a) An understanding of a civilian economy;b) Hope and a sense of opportunity; c) The feeling of agency through new foundeconomic and social skills and; d) Legitimacy and positive recognition to counternegative sterotypes .If carefully balanced, a period of Interim Stabilization could provide individualcombatants with the crucial basic elements of a successful long-term reintegration;a sense of agency, transitional livelihoods, and the comfort of civic legitimacy andsocial acceptance.Strengthening Prospects for Durable PeaceIt is important to note that the concept of Interim Stabilization is not proposedas a mandatory first step in peacebuilding; nor should it be conceived a necessaryelement of a DDR-SSR processes. The purpose of this study is not to offer a newprogram to be implemented in the peacebuilding process; rather to conceptualizeand learn more about the menu of stabilizing options available in the period oftransition between a peace agreement and its implementation. If the context ofa post-conflict situation allows for successful reinsertion packages or extendedperiods of encampment within a conventional DDR-framework, there may notbe a need for additional mechanisms. The underlying assumption of the study,however, is that sometimes, conventional tools are not sufficient to deal with25

security concerns in the immediate aftermath of violent conflicts; especially wherethere is no clear victor in the conflict, weak local governance persists (especially inthe provision of security), and the labor absorption is limited. In such situationsa phase of Interim DRAFT Stabilization – NOT could FOR be introduced CIRCULATION to the negotiating parties,with the purpose of preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and allowing forconditions and necessary the labor absorption for a sustainable is limited. In peacebuilding such situations a phase process of Interim to fall into place.Stabilization could be introduced to the negotiating parties, with the purpose ofpreventing the recurrence of violent conflict and allowing for conditions necessaryfor a sustainable peacebuilding process to fall into place.Figure 1 – Interim Stabilization in ContextFigure 1 – Interim Stabilization in ContextIntroducing a phase ofInterim Stabilization(Individual level)- Serious security concerns- Lack of trust & confidence- Low labor absorption- Weak state institutions –insufficient SSR- Situation premature forDDR-programsIntroducing a phase ofInterim Stabilization(State- and Communitylevels)Ex-combatantstemporarilyabsorbedPositive incentive- Initial crediblelivelihood forex-combatants- Space for lifeskills training- Conditions conducive to succeedwith both SSR and DDR are created- Communities sensitized- Individual ex-combatants prepared forreintegrationRemoving negativeincentiveSpace forcontinuedpoliticalprocess andplanningBasis for long-termalternativelivelihood andreintegration forex- combatantsRelativestability ismaintained orachievedCommunitysensitizationand initialeconomicreconstructionPositive incentiveThe figure 37. illustrates The figure illustrates how this how type this of Interim type of Interim Stabilization, or “holding or pattern”, pattern, could stabilizestabilize a fragile post-conflict situation, provide space for political dialogue anda fragile post-conflict program planning, situation, and remove provide negative space for incentive political thus dialogue turning potential and program spoilers planning, into andstakeholdersremove negative incentive thus turning potential spoilers into stakeholdersIV. Study Objectives and MethodologyInterim Stabilization as a Strategic DDR-SSR Measure38. This study aims to identify, analyze, document and disseminate best practice andlessons learned in early post-conflict stabilization efforts to balance security in thenear term with medium- to long-term Peacebuilding under varying conditions. Acentral study objective has been to better understand the underlying, contextualfactors that strategically shape the choice, timing and sequencing of reintegration2615

4.4. Study Objectivesand MethodologyInterim Stabilization as a Strategic Peacebuilding MeasureThis study aims to identify, analyze, document and disseminate best practice andlessons learned in early post-conflict stabilization efforts to balance security in thenear term with medium- to long-term peacebuilding under varying conditions.A central study objective has been to better understand the underlying contextualfactors that strategically shape the choice, timing and sequencing of reintegrationprograms, which contain military and civilian dimensions.The conceptual framework and lessons that have emerged from this study shouldbe of value to peace negotiators, mediators, and DDR-program designers. Theultimate objective is to provide peace negotiators (negotiating parties, mediatorsand facilitators) and DDR program design teams with lessons and best practicesin order to impact negotiations as well as the design, outcome and sustainabilityof peace-making and peace-building efforts. The report thereby also enforces theoverarching SIDDR recommendation that technical expertise on DDR, SSR orthe “management of arms and armies” as such, should be made available at earlystages of peace negotiations.The Methodology: From Desk Review to FieldworkThe work of this report is based on a preliminary desk study of select post-conflictcountries and programs resembling the type of IS measures described in previouschapters. Through the desk study, presented in summary fashion in this report,three particularly interesting cases were identified for deeper in-country fieldresearch: Cambodia, Colombia and Uganda.27

The fundamental aim of the field research was to understand, evaluate andhopefully contribute to filling the knowledge-gap in relation to “HoldingPatterns” and similar Interim Stabilization programs. Teams of consultantsand local lead researchers have carried out field studies focusing on a numberof ongoing and past reintegration programs that followed or involved a visibletransitional element – thereby falling under the study-definition of InterimStabilization. For the sake of saving space in this study report, the case studieshave been modified from their original versions by the editors (full versions of thestudies can be downloaded at the Folke Bernadotte Academy’s web page;www.folkebernadotteacademy.se). One of the overarching aims has been toidentify gaps and obstacles in theses programs and to garner an indication of howto address future cases. Preliminary best practices has been extracted and outlined.Primarily through in-depth individual and focal group interviewing, the fieldresearch has aimed at developing a deeper understanding of the key elements andissues underpinning the programs studied (see Annex 2). The selection process ofinterviewees has been ‘purposive’ rather than necessarily ‘scientific’ (randomized).A broad spectrum of information and opinions on the selected cases has beensurveyed – including, whenever possible and of substantive interest, governmentofficials, army staff as well as representatives of paramilitary and rebel groups,representatives from bilateral and multilateral organizations, local andinternational civil-society actors (including media), ex-combatants themselves andlocal community leaders. The use of multiple sources of information from varyingprogrammatic perspectives has allowed for ‘triangulating’ and cross verifyinginformation in the pursuit of relevant insights and patterns of response.In February 2008, a seminar was held in Stockholm; discussing the preliminaryfindings of the study and the conceptual framework on which it is build.Participants included key members of the SIDDR-network, the UN IDDRS andother practitioners, policymakers and academics. Comments and contributionsfrom this seminar have been integrated into this study report.28

5.5. Review of Select InterimStabilization ApproachesIn this chapter a number of past cases, illustrative of Interim Stabilization-likemeasures (military-, civilian- and civil-military programs) along the line ofthe conceptual discussion above, are reviewed. The background and rationalof such programs – as well as the issues they have come across and lessons thathave emerged – are analyzed. The purpose of the review is to provide a basisfor a comparative analysis of the different approaches to Interim Stabilizationarrangements that have emerged throughout the research project.Five rough categories of arrangements have been identified: 1) Civilian servicecorps; 2) Military integration arrangements; 3) Transitional security forces; 4)Different forms of transitional autonomy; and 5) Dialogue and sensitizationprograms and halfway-house arrangements. These categories are not preciseor mutually exclusive. In fact, in many cases IS measures contain elementsresembling the characteristics of two or more of these categories.Civil Service Corps – This category is demonstrated by the cases of the SouthAfrican Service Corps and to some extent the Kosovo Protection Corps in thesections below. Transforming former military groups into transitional civilianorganizations primarily addresses the need to employ former combatants, andpotential spoilers of the peace, in some form of meaningful activity. This type ofarrangements can prove effective both from a state- and individual perspective. Itmay allow the time and space needed for the political process and early recoveryefforts, while at the same time allowing individuals to ease into the idea of civilianlife.Military Integration – The concept of Military Integration has been outlined above.Below, the strategy of Military Integration as a vessel for Interim Stabilization is29

exemplified by the “brassage” process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)and the demobilization of rebel group UNITA in Angola. Variations of the MIstrategy has also been employed in many of the other cases examined in this study;Afghanistan, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda (demobilization of rebel groups inthe late 1980s and early 1990s).Transitional Security Forces – The creation of transitional security forces is oneof the most obvious IS measures; addressing the need for transitional security,meaningful employment of former combatants, and the need for a temporarilymaintained cohesion that many former combatants experience. The AfghanMilitia Forces and the Sunni Awakening Movements in Iraq provide illustrativeexamples from which some lessons can be drawn.Transitional Autonomy – The effects sought by establishing various IS mechanismscan also be obtained by allowing a certain level of autonomy during a transitionalperiod. The primary example of such schemes is the agreement between theGovernment of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, with Hun Sen’swin-win-policy. Certain elements of this approach were also employed in the Laborafarm experiment in Uganda. Both Cambodia and Uganda were subject to in-countrycase studies and will be discussed in Chapter VI. Another example provided in thislitterature review is the Peshmerga in Iraq.Dialogue and Sensitization Programs and Halfway-House Arrangements – Thiscategory is demonstrated below by the Rwandan Ingando-process, through whichformer combatants were gathered in camps for dialogue and trust building afterthe deep trauma of the Genocide in the spring and summer of 1994. Many ofthe characteristics of this category can also bee seen in the cases of Labora farmin Uganda and the creation of a non-governmental organization for formerparamilitaries in Colombia. These cases are discussed in-depth in the next chapteron in-country case studies.Civil Service CorpsSouth African Service CorpsBackground and RationaleThe South African Service Corps, established in the aftermath of the abolishmentof apartheid, is an example of an Interim Stabilization measure that addressedprimarily the community and individual levels. South Africa’s transition from30

apartheid was remarkable in that the two major parties, the ANC and theNational Party (NP), managed to agree on an entirely restructured politicalsystem, without an external mediator. It has been argued that the strong inclusionof grass roots dialogue parallel to formal negotiations was a key contributingfactor to the success. Potential spoilers were neutralized in the process andsolutions could be found to difficult challenges of power sharing and control overthe security apparatus.5.The new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was formed by severalformer rival groups; the former South African Defence Force (SADF) along with;the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) (of the Pan African Congress(PAC)); Umkhonto we Siswe (MK) (of the African National Party (ANC)) andthe former homeland armies and various other forces. The process to form theSANDF involved integration of no fewer than eight different armed groups.(Bouckaert, 2001)Those who did not meet the requirements of the SANDF were to be demobilizedand reintegrated into communities. A reintegration package consisting of acash gratuity and a voluntary two-week counseling program was offered fordemobilized individuals. They were also offered to join the Service Corps for amaximum of 18 months.The Service Corps was instituted within the SANDF in September 1995. It’spurpose was to assist with the reintegration of ex-service members into civil society byupgrading the standard of education, vocational and life skills to enable members to findemployment or start their own enterprise in the private sector, provide career guidance on acontinuous basis and assist with the social reintegration of members where possible (SouthAfrican Defence Review, 1996). The Service Corp was designed to train close to22,000 combatants, primarily from APLA and MK, between 1995 and 2001.Challenges and IssuesThe Service Corps experienced a number of inter-related challenges and problems(Williams, 2005). There were problems of getting the Service Corps operational.Poor planning and management of the Corps, at least initially, produced an imageof a questionable organization with little to offer those who urgently needed ameans to move away from their life as a rebel and attain skills necessary for acivilian life. This resulted in many of the demobilized combatants simply takingtheir demobilization gratuities and leaving the assembly camps instead of waitingfor vocational training to commence.31

No credible evaluation of the rate of employment and unemployment amongformer Service Corps trainees was undertaken. Eventually, the impression becamewidespread that those who went through the training were unable to secure asuccessful career or profitable employment afterwards; inevitably discouragingpotential recruits (Mashike, 2006). The lack of evidence of participants havingprofited from the experience can surely explain why few former combatantscompleted training.There were also administrative problems in handling information concerningresults and use of resources. An independent audit, presented in September 2000,concluded that despite the considerable budget of 30 million SA Rand between1995 and 2000, the Service Corps had only trained 604 ex-combatants. Officialfigures from the administration of the Corps, however, estimated that the total ofsome 4,600 demobilized APLA and MK combatants had been trained during theperiod 1995 to 2004. (Mashike, 2006)The Corps focused on lower level combatants and did not actively engage seniorofficers. Thereby, some of the most critical personnel to any demobilizationprocess were left out. The lack of focus on upper level commanders in post conflictrecovery programs may result in an increasing risk for such spoilers to influencethe outcome of events.This also created the perception that the Service Corps were merely a “dumpingground” for former guerrilla fighters with few chances of finding a role in acivilian community. Many former combatants were therefore reluctant to join theCorps (Williams, 2005). This perception was reinforced by the fact that only theleast educated soldiers were directed towards the Service Corps.The fact that the Corps was an institution under the Ministry of Defense and nota civilian oriented ministry created the perception that it was in fact a part of themilitary. For many combatants, with a will to distance themselves from their formerroles and positions, this became a sign of stagnation and an obstacle to progress.Key LessonsDespite many difficulties, the South African Service Corps is an interestingexample of an effort to include former warring parties in one overall structurewith the dual aim of enhancing and developing individual capacities (individuallevel) and creating mechanisms for societies to receive returning soldiers(community level) with limited skills of civilian livelihood. The Service Corps32

show that creating a halfway-house for those combatants who are not eligible, orwilling, to join the national armed forces, can be used as a strategy to phase theentry into civilian life.5.Continuous monitoring and qualitative evaluations are not just important tools toshow donors that their money is well spent – it can also reinforce the effect of theprogram itself by showcasing success and opportunities for beneficiaries (creatinga positive perception).The South African experiences point to the importance of solid planning,organization and partnerships with all key stakeholders. Depending on thecontext, it may also be important to involve all levels of former rebel groups in theprogram scheme. Involvement of commanders in the Service Corps could haveameliorated the perception that the Corps was merely a “dumping ground” forthose with weak prospects for the future. Rival parties that are negotiating onthe future size and shape of the security sector can draw from the experiences ofthe South African Service Corps. By learning from past mistakes they could findsolutions for redundant armed groups without risking loosing either face or theirbargaining power.The Kosovo Protection CorpsBackground and RationaleIn the spring of 1999, NATO launched a three-month air campaign to stopongoing aggression by Yugoslav and Serbian forces against the mainly KosovoAlbanian civilian population in Kosovo. When the war ended, there was a direneed for stabilizing measures in the area. Security Council Resolution 1244established international civilian (UN) and military (NATO) presence in Kosovoto create and uphold a full administration, pending a process determining thefinal status of the area (Alexander and Sabic-El-Rayess, 2005).The Kosovo Albanian non-state armed group KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army),who had been fighting the (Serbian) Yugoslav National Army and Serbianparamilitary groups, was the main military and political power in Kosovo whenthe Serbian forces withdrew in June 1999. With the initial agreement betweenComdr Hashim Thacis 2 , the representative of KLA, and Commander Jackson ofKFOR, former fighters of KLA were drawn into the overall security scheme andinto the much needed demilitarization process. Disarmament and demobilization2. Hashim Thaci is President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and since November 2007Prime Minister of Kosovo.33

was to be achieved through the creation of a civilian emergency responseorganization; the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).Neither the UN mission (UNMIK) nor the NATO led KFOR intended for theKPC to be a continuation or legitimization of the KLA. Officially the KPC wasan entirely new civilian creation. The mandate included protection of citizensfrom natural disaster and abetting in reconstruction initiatives, includingde-mining and rebuilding of infrastructure (for a summary of Legal Frameworkand Summary of Principles, see Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review, 2006).Members of the KPC were precluded from holding public office or from activelyengaging in political affairs. All inhabitants of Kosovo ethnic societies, includingKosovo Serbs, were eligible to join but interest among groups other than theKosovo Albanians was weak. The formation was modeled after the French SécuritéCivile. In practice, however, the organization basically retained the militarystructure of the KLA, including military uniforms and ranks; a precondition ofthe KLA to accept the terms (Petersen, 2005).Challenges and issuesTo the chance observer, there was very little visual differences between the KPCand KLA. In many Kosovo towns uniformed KPC members appeared just as theydid when they were KLA and the KPC red-black shoulder emblem had strikingsimilarities with the former KLA emblem (ICG, 2000). While internationalobservers viewed the KPC as a civil emergency service with no role in defence,law enforcement, or internal security, Kosovo Albanians viewed it as “an armyin waiting” (i.e. for the Future Status of Kosovo) (Rees). Serbs both insideKosovo and in Serbia proper considered it a criminal organization with terroristtendencies.Nevertheless, the KPC was the principal mechanism by which the KLA wouldbe drawn into a domestic arms control regime. The Corps was to be allowed2,000 weapons of which 1,800 would be “held in trust” in KFOR secure weaponsfacilities. The remainder would be available for the guarding of installations andsecurity when units were deployed. (Human Rights First)While its role as a civilian emergency service fell partially within the jurisdictionof the Ministry of Public Services and Department of Emergency Services as a“reserved power”, its chain of command extended upwards to the Commanderof KFOR. This meant that oversight of KPC was beyond the control of Kosovocivilians. (Kosovo Standard Implementation Plan, 2004)34

The KPC’s exclusion from other general development programs of Kosovo createda problematic relationship with the donor community. The creation of the KPCalso undermined the faith, within the Kosovo community, in the impartialityof KFOR and UNMIK. The two Serbs serving on the UN Transitional Councilwithdrew from the body in protest at the establishment of the KPC, arguing thatit had violated the declared multi-ethnic nature of Kosovo. (Rees)5.The KLA itself justified the desire for the KPC structure on the grounds that theKosovo Albanians needed a deterrence force against the Serbs. Symbolically, theretention of an organization resembling an army, irrespective of its effectiveness,would also represent an important affirmation of sovereignty and statehoodfurther representing a step along the path towards the KLA’s ultimate goal;independence from Serbia.The so called Ahtisaari plan of 2007 stipulated a transitional process in whichthe KPC would be dissolved and transitional self-governance supervised by theinternational community would lead up to independence. In February 2008,Kosovo declared its independence with immediate recognition by many EUmembers and other states. The proclamation preceded a planned change ofmandate from UNMIK to EULEX, leaving Kosovo’s status hanging and thefuture functions and role of the KPC unknown.Key LessonsThe KPC is illustrative of how the interests of relative stability and alternativecivilian livelihoods can be combined through transforming one or more militarygroups and redirecting them towards civilian tasks. The creation of KPC into aCivil Service Corps, had both strengths and weaknesses. The initial goal of theprogram was achieved and the dominant military unit in Kosovo was transformedinto a civilian entity. However, the ambiguity of the purpose and long-term aimof the KPC (civilian emergency response organization or nucleus of a futurearmy of an independent Kosovo) proved to be a major problem; leading toserious difficulties in recruiting individuals from minority groups, as well as toconsiderable international skepticism.The creation of the KPC could be understood as an integral part of ademobilization process designed to create employment for former KLAcombatants who might otherwise return to violence or crime, as had been theexperience in other post-conflict demobilization processes. Additionally, one canargue that the creation of the KPC, alongside with other initiatives in Kosovo,35

had the benefit of giving the KLA a stake in the reconstruction process; thustransforming the former military organization into a civilian actor. This providedthe international community with a source of leverage over the KLA, somethingthat it did not originally have.The Kosovo experience also shows the importance of local or national ownershipand the strengthening of civilian institutions as part of the overall strategy. Asnoted by Rees; the creation of the Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC)proved to be a successful move – although it could have been placed underindigenous civilian control, management and oversight. Similarly, the KPCDonors Conference in December 2003 successfully placed the KPC withinthe general public security debate – but it could have been organized earlierand within a long-term strategic framework, involving local communities andstakeholders. (Rees, 2005)Military IntegrationThe DRC Brassage ProcessThe “brassage” process in DR Congo is an example of an IS-measure initiatedwhile awaiting further political negotiations on a plan to strengthen and downsizethe security sector. The Military Integration (MI) strategy, i.e. integrating allforces under one national army, was chosen to establish a sense of power-sharingbetween rival groups during the transition period. The governance capacity andthe reach of the state to provide security were weak and there was an urgent needfor a transitional security apparatus. Also, the communities in the war struckareas of the country had to recover to allow for return of combatants. Thus, the“brassage” process is an example of an attempt to establish Interim Stabilization,in the form of MI, aiming at the state-, as well as community- and individuallevels. Unfortunately, however, it also provides a warning example of the inevitablefailure deriving from a process lacking political leadership.Background and RationaleDuring the past decade, the DRC has experienced several outbursts of violence.The war between 1998 and 2002, known as “the African World War” involvedseven African countries and has led to the death of approximately 4 million people(International Crisis Group , 2006). After four years of bitter and devastatingconflict, a Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed in December36

2002 in Pretoria, South Africa. In June 2003, a transitional government wasestablished, which included both members of the former government and ofdifferent belligerent groups that had fought in the conflict. Two key components ofthe peace agreement was the disarmament demobilization and reintegration intocivilian life of former combatants and the reform of the security sector, includingthe creation of an integrated national army.5.The establishment of an operational national defence force was critical becauseaside from MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo)the national army, FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratiquedu Congo), would constitute the only legitimate deterrent to spoilers. Themain armed groups to be integrated into the FARDC were the FAC (ForcesArmées Congolaises) from Kinshasa (100 000 combatants) and the RCD-G(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma) based in Goma andbacked by Rwanda (45 000 combatants). These and some other belligerent groupshave all signed the Pretoria peace agreement, but the militias in the Ituri regionwere excluded from the agreement. This led to continued fighting in the easternparts of the DRC. (Boshoff, 2005)The transitional government requested the UNDP and the MDRP (the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program governed by the WorldBank) to work with them in the development of a national program for DDR. TheNational DDR Plan (PN-DDR) was developed in a consultative process betweenthe transitional government, the UNDP, MONUC, UNICEF, MDRP, the WorldBank and the Belgian mission. (Ball and Hendrickson, 2006)PN-DDR consisted of two differentiated tracks: One for candidates for integrationinto the FARDC. One for candidates for demobilization and reintegration.However, these two tracks shared a number of activities mandatory to allindividuals whether intending to integrate into the new army or to demobilize. Itwas therefore named the “tronc commun” (combined core). The primary step ofthis process involved information and sensitization activities, which also includedcivilian populations affected by the conflict. Thereafter, the combatants fromvarious armed forces were regrouped in military operated regrouping centers, tobe followed by the disarmament, release, registration, safekeeping or destructionof combatants’ weapons and the transfer of disarmed combatants for identificationto orientation centers operated by CONADER (Commission Nationale pour laDémobilisation et la Réinsertion).At this stage in the process, the individual combatant would be regarded as37

either a potential candidate for enrolment in the FARDC or for reintegrationinto society as a demobilized combatant. After a stay in the orientation centreof approximately two weeks, adults opting for a placement in the FARDC weremoved to integration centers (centres de brassage et de recyclage), operated by themilitary, for basic training of around 45 days and integration into a newly-formedFARDC brigade. (Boshoff, 2005 & Amnesty International, 2007) These werecalled mixed brigades as they would consist of representatives from severaldifferent former armed groups.The draft PN-DDR aimed to limit the FARDC to 130 000 people. In May 2005,the transitional government adopted a strategic plan for army integration,visualizing a three-step process: The first step was the creation of six light infantrybrigades in the run up to the elections; step two was the creation of a rapid reactionunit and finally the formation of the main defence force by 2010. (Boshoff, 2005 &Sebahara, 2006)Delays suffered by the army reform process led to the formulation of an emergencyplan for the reform. According to the emergency plan, all armed units would beregrouped under the instructions of the Chief of the General Staff. Activities inthe regrouping centers would include identification, leading to the separation ofeligible and ineligible elements, and initial selection and orientation. Combatantswould then be moved to centres de brassage where they would be intermixed andretrained. This would be followed by final selection and placement of the new units.The emergency plan was intended to be a short-term solution to facilitate theintegration of six initial brigades prior to the elections in 2006. It was seen as asolution to the transitional government’s immediate need to stabilize the east ofthe DRC. The plan called for training personnel from Belgium and South Africato be deployed in the DRC. Budget proposals were submitted, but met littleresponse. This reinforces the experience of the difficulties to secure donor fundingfor Interim Stabilization type programs administered by the Ministry of Defense.Challenges and IssuesThe DDR and army integration processes have made some significant progressworth noting. The bodies responsible for the implementation of the PN-DDR arein place. The law on defence and armed forces was promulgated the 12 November2004. The first step of the strategic plan for army reform has been successfullyimplemented, through the formation of six brigades in the centres de brassagebefore the elections in July 2006.38

Yet, the processes have been plagued by severe delays and problems. At first, thesewere attributed to competing agendas and deep-seated distrust between theelements of the transitional government and an accompanying unwillingness tocompromise. (Sebahara, 2006)5.The coordination of the processes has been inefficient. Implementation of themultiple structures has been significantly delayed. The reasons were both a lack offunds for military integration and a lack of financial control mechanisms withinthe transitional government. The main reason for the shortfalls has, however,been a complete lack of political will within the transitional government, and thesubsequent elected National Government, to deal with the issues.A contact group has been set up to establish a common donor position on SSR;and especially army integration. The EU also created the EUSEC in order tosupport the Congolese authorities and FARDC with coordination. These twoinitiatives significantly improved the coordination between different role players.(Boshoff, 2005 II)Key LessonsDue to capacity constraints, CONADER was unable to set up orientationcenters for the identification of combatants for the DDR process. As a result, theorientation phase was left out and the combatants were immediately regroupedand transported to the centres de brassage. This process was implemented by theFARDC, supported by different donor countries. Mobile teams were set up toperform the functions that were to have taken place in the orientation centers toensure that this short cut did not affect the activities carried out in the centres debrassage. (Boshoff, 2005 & 2005 II )The centers, however, were severely under-funded and lacked basic hygiene andmedical facilities as well ass food supplies and proper shelter. This resulted indozens of soldiers dying and thousands deserting. Irregular payment of salariesresulted in unpaid soldiers preying on the local population for survival. EUSEChas put much energy into improving the conditions in the centres de brassage andthe routines for payment of salaries. (Amnesty International, 2007 & Walters andBoshoff, 2006)The continuing poor socio-economic situation in combination with the cultureof impunity, which has been rooted in the DRC over the past twenty years, hasinfluenced the increase in human rights violations committed by the FARDC39

soldiers. Civilians have been killed, raped and abducted and private propertyhas been looted and houses set on fire, especially in the eastern DRC where thewar with various rebel groups rages on. (Amnesty International, 2007) A graveobstacle to the military reintegration process is the continuous fighting in the eastof the country. Recent conflict in the region of North Kivu has shown that theintegrated FARDC brigades do not have the capacity to counter the rebels withoutthe support of MONUC. (Walters and Boshoff, 2006 & Boshoff 2007)Despite commitments made to a peace processes, recently in the Nairobi protocol,the Congolese presidency shows little sincerity to end violence in the east. So far,international players have not significantly criticized the use of violence by thegovernment of DRC or the supply of weapons to various armed groups. As part ofits mandate to support stabilization and the democratically elected government,MONUC has even provided the national army with logistical assistance andtraining. In practice this has meant that the international force has backedoffensives, against the rebel groups still operating in the country. The maininternational players have been considered as proxies, not as partners. At the timeof writing to the extent that they are directly threatned by rebel attacks in the cityof Goma.The DRC case demonstrates the importance of accountable, committed andlegitimate national counterparts for international actors supporting a war to peacetransition. Despite the limited success of integrating former rivalling parties intoa unified command and control structure of the FARDC, the almost completelack of parallel military (and full Security Sector) reform initiatives has in practicemade little difference to the civilian population targeted by the armed groups.With few alternatives to establish a civilian livelihood, these soldiers continue to“make their way” by military means, this time under the umbrella of the nationalarmy. Lingering unresolved political conflicts risk tearing the peace process apart.Angolan Ownership of the Military Integration ProcessBackground and RationaleAfter nearly four decades of war, Angola has come a long way towards achievinglasting peace. The two national resistance movements, Movimento Popular deLibertado de Angola (MPLA), and the Uniado Nacional para la IndependenciaTotal de Angola (UNITA), who had fought against the colonial authority andliberated Angola from the Portuguese colonial authority in 1975, failed to form ajoint transitional government as intended and were fighting each other for power.40

Two peace accords were signed in the beginning of the 90’s. Both agreements werebreached by UNITA. Finally, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)was signed in April 2002 (World Bank, 2002) as a result of a successful offensiveagainst UNITA and the death of its leader; Jonas Savimbi. The Luena MoU wasessentially a modified version or continuation of the Lusaka agreement of 1994with slight modifications (Imogen, 2004). In August 2002 the military branch ofUNITA was formally dissolved (World Bank, 2002).5.In June 2002, over 80 000 ex-combatants from UNITA had presented themselvesto the quartering areas across Angola. By August, 5 017 of them were integratedinto the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The remaining UNITA combatants werealso incorporated into the FAA, but as a temporary Military Integration strategy,i.e. only in anticipation of being demobilized. The government of Angola assumedresponsibility for demobilization of the new caseload of the Luena MoU, withfinancial support of the World Bank under the MDRP. (World Bank, 2002)In the Military Integration scheme, the ranks of UNITA combatants wereconsidered equal to those of FAA soldiers. The demobilization process startedin September 2002. Given that all UNITA combatants had formally beenincorporated into the national army before demobilization, the responsibility fordemobilization and related activities fell under the FAA. (Human Rights Watch,2003)Challenges and IssuesAlthough the MoU had anticipated approximately 50 000 UNITA combatants tobe demobilized, the final process showed a total of 138 000 combatants (105 000UNITA and 33 000 government forces). (Caramés, Fisas and Sanz, 2007 – Angola)In total it is estimated that 100 404 UNITA combatants were demobilized, butonly 5 000 posts were available to them in the national army. In the end, 5 007UNITA combatants were integrated into the national army and another 40 into thenational police force. Eighteen UNITA generals were integrated into the nationalarmy.By prioritizing those UNITA members conceived as potential threats to the peaceprocess the government chose to “buy off” senior generals and officers and offerthem high ranks in the national army. In this manner the high ranked officersand generals were permanently cut off from their leaders, as well as low-levelcombatants, a strategy that proved effective. (Parsons, 2004) The Governmentof Angola used this approach as a strategy to neutralize spoilers. This strategy41

was not as successful in the DRC, where the president refused one general ofintegrating into the national army only to realize that he later mobilized his oldsoldiers and resumed fighting in the province of Kivu.To ensure an effective and sustainable demobilization and integration of UNITAcombatants into the national army, the government outlined four fundamentalprinciples. The overall objective was to create trust in the process, something thathad been lacking in the former two demobilization attempts. (Doria, 2004)› The “commanders first” principle meant that the commanders of UNITA wereintegrated into the national army before the other combatants. The purposewas to make sure that the UNITA combatants were received by their owncommanders when demobilized and in this way create trust.› Within the “no tails behind” principles, the families of UNITA combatants werealso gathered in quartering areas in order to make sure that UNITA combatantswould not see it as an opportunity or incitement to leave the demobilizationprocess as deserters.› “Availability of vacant posts” indicated that the FAA had made sure that acertain number of posts, both in the leadership and at lower level were vacant inorder for the national army to effectively absorb the UNITA combatants.› “No foreigners in the process” referred to the fact that the whole process of armyreform was managed and financed by the government in an attempt to show thegovernments genuine intentions to secure peace and create trust among variousactors.Key LessonsThe demobilization of UNITA in Angola is an example of a program whereMilitary Integration was successfully used as an Interim Stabilization strategy.It is also an illustrative example of how potential spoilers can be dealt with andneutralized through transitional programs. However, evaluations show thatobstacles to reintegration have remained in Angola as a result of the delayedstart of the reintegration programs, social stigma, persisting poverty andlack of minimal conditions for resettlement due to destruction and lack ofinfrastructure, etc. This further underlines the need for parallel efforts to establishan environment conducive to reintegration. Interim Stabilization is not a goal initself and cannot be undertaken in isolation.42

Nepal – Exploring Opportunities for Interim StabilizationThe signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in November 2006, isan evidence of the burgeoning relationship between DDR and SSR in Nepal. TheCPA stipulated the formation of a special committee under the Interim Councilof Ministers to inspect, integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist combatants. Thiscommittee would also advise the Council in the preparation and implementationof a detailed action plan of democratization of the Nepali Army, including taskssuch as determining the right number, preparing democratic structures reflectingthe national and inclusive character and training them to perform democraticprinciples and values of human rights.5.Unlike the conventional language and process, the CPA established a separateagreement on “The Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies” withoutreference to DDR or SSR terminology as such. This agreement outlined theprocess of redeployment and concentration of forces in cantonments and barracks.It also provided an opportunity for weapons storage and control, similar to theNorthern Ireland “decommissioning process” (see for example de Chastelain,2004 for details), under the surveillance of a civilian UN mission. (For detailssee the “Full text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement held between theGovernment of Nepal and Community Party of Nepal (Maoist)”, November 22,2006. Also see “Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies”, 2006,Peace Secretariat, Kathmandu, Nepal).The question of ownership is evident in the Nepal case where the partiesapparently drafted the CPA with little outside input. The peace talks were initiatedwithout a clear victor to the conflict and as a result a negotiated settlementhas emerged; cantonment and arms storage were part of the transitional firststeps to build confidence and trust. Despite the recent elections in April 2008,establishing the new government, there are still some disagreements regarding the“integration”. The details of the integration process are still far from agreed.The Maoists interpretation was to “professionalize of the Maoist fighters anddemocratize the Nepali Army”. The top level of the national army could not,however, see Maoist fighters being integrated without having completed theexpected training and in addition being placed in the “proper” positions of thehierarchy.43

The interface between DDR and SSR 3 also allows for the critical application ofa transitional justice mechanism of “vetting”. Here, vetting can become a subtlebut powerful means of applying transitional justice, while keeping the door openfor safeguarding against impunity. This mechanism can help ensure that a truthand reconciliation process does not become an open-ended, immutable amnestyprogram.This reinforces the important lesson for negotiators and advisors alike that, whilekeeping a holistic framework in mind as to how various component elements ofa war to peace transition relate, understanding the contextual factors (cultural,historical, political, economic and social) shaping the nature of the war andthe deriving of peace, is critical in determining the timing and sequencing of peacebuilding actions, particularly security and development related matters.Again, balancing real political concerns (the distribution of power, particularlyin the security sector) with economic realities (the ability to absorb labor intothe fledging economy) provides an opportunity to explore IS initiatives to ensurestability and security in the early stages of the war-to-peace transition.Utilizing lessons from the Service Corps and Military Integration cases, a shortterm IS measure prior to integration and DDR might be a way forward in Nepal,combining military incorporation with civilian reintegration programs of Maoistsforces. Special brigades such as building, conservation and border patrol unitswithin the formal Nepal Army structure may or may not be an attractive optionfor the Maoist fighters, but if it is utilized as a short-term remedy to limitedpossibilities for integration at higher ranks and or reintegration into a sunkeneconomy, then it may be acceptable and should be followed carefully. 4Two lessons are again confirming the SIDDR report recommendations: First,that each conflict requires its own discourse (language) and process to reflectthe objective conditions on the ground and aspirations of the key stakeholders.Second, that the phasing and sequencing of conventional lockstep DDRapproaches may vary considerably depending upon the political-military mannerin which the conflict ended (i.e. stalemate, clear victor etc.). Although the notion3. The concept of SSR is understood as much wider than merely military reform. Ideally a right sizingof the Nepal army should be part of a more comprehensive strategy, including police, justice andoversight issues.4. In discussions on social and economic reintegration options in Nepal, several possibilities werementioned ranging from agricultural based industries and non-timber forest based livelihoodactivities to contracted overseas employment. Given the state of the economy, it is highly unlikely thatskill training in itself will ensure employment.44

of ownership in Nepal is very strong, the Nepali peace process has so far beensuccessful in adapting international knowledge to cultural and historical concernsof the country’s own situation.5.Transitional Security ForcesThe Transitional Afghan Militia Forces– a Necessary Initial StepBackground and RationaleThe signing of the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001 created the structuralconditions for assembling, under a united command and control, the variousarmed factions that had participated in the internal fighting in Afghanistanfrom the Soviet invasion in 1979 to the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The BonnAgreement created the Afghan National Army (ANA), which would be placedunder the jurisdiction of the civilian Afghan Interim Authority (AIA). The ANAwould incorporate former Mujaheddin, the Afghan armed forces, and other armedgroups in the country.However, while the Bonn Agreement was being negotiated, the Afghan MilitiaForces (AMF) was created by unifying various anti-Taliban faction to provide andcontrol over the armed groups in Afghanistan, under a loose but single command(Thruelsen, 2006). This represents a form of Interim Stabilization, where a newtransitional military structure is created to establish and maintain minimumlevels of security; keeping armed units occupied while more permanent structuresand programs are put into place.Having established the new ANA structure, the Ministry of Defence would paythe salaries of the combatants embedded in the AMF until these combatantswere able to return to civil life and until the communities were ready for them.The AMF program hopefully precluded these combatants from instigating aninsurgency in the power vacuum that occurred between the fall of the Taliban andthe creation of the ANA. The successful long-term establishment of a new nationalarmy, however, would require a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration program for the AMF.The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) conducted anextensive survey to identify and assess the approximate quantity of combatantsto be disarmed. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) sent out45

some 1,500 officers to perform a similar survey. After roughly two months, theUN assessed that there were some 94,000 combatants to be disarmed, while theMOD survey found that an estimated 250,000 combatants needed to be includedin the programs. The difference in the identified number of combatants by thetwo institutions and the problems concerning the identification process in thefield turned out to be one of the biggest challenges for the Afganistan’s NewBeginnings Programme (ANBP) (Thruelsen, 2006).When the Ministry of Defence identified a unit for disarmament, the regionalANBP office took over the verification of that unit. This was done through averification committee consisting of ANBP staff and local senior leaders of thatparticular region. The extensive verification process was relatively successful. Thesystem enabled the program to exclude free riders from the process and gave itlegitimacy – something all too often lacking in DDR processes (Thruelsen, 2006).Challenges and IssuesThe program did experience a number of challenges. The subversive behavior oflocal commanders and their unwillingness to demobilize and disarm seems tohave been one of the main reasons for the delayed DDR process in Afghanistan.One contributing factor in this was that only the warlords and commanders whosupported the Minister of Defense were enrolled into the AMF (Thruelsen, 2006),leaving a number of unaffiliated armed groups out of the process. This, naturally,compromised the legitimacy of the process as a whole.There also seem to have been a number of de facto disincentives to demobilize anddisarm built into the ANBP program and the ANA and AMF structures. PeterThruelsen hypothesizes that the difficulties in determining the actual number ofcombatants had to do with the mechanism for payment of salaries to the AMF.The salaries were channeled from the Ministry of Defense to the combatantsthrough their respective commanders, giving commanders an incentive tokeep their soldiers mobilized as long as possible. The setup also enabled thecommanders to earn extra money by reporting artificially high numbers ofsoldiers in their units. The actual turn up at disarmament was only about 50percent of the total strength initially stated by the commanders (Thruelsen, 2006).In the end of the summer 2004, almost three years since beginning ANBP, theGovernment began to use the threat of sanctions against the non-cooperativecommanders. Two kinds of sanctions were used.46

The first sanction, a combination of public announcements and the withholdingof salaries, was directed against the petty and middle commanders. The Ministryof Defence would first cut off money from the commanders who did not meet fordisarmament. Then the unit would be decommissioned and the individual soldierswould loose the possibility of joining the reintegration program. This pitted theprospect of reintegration against the soldiers’ loyalties to their commanders andgave soldiers an incentive to turn against uncooperative commanders.5.The second type of sanctions introduced followed from the constitution ofAfghanistan, stating that no leader of a political party with his own militia couldrun for public office in an election. This resulted in two of the more powerfulwarlords in the country joining the DDR program in order to be allowed toparticipate in the parliamentary election. It is interesting to note that publicopinion polls at the time showed that the number one priority of the Afghans wasdisarmament of the AMF in order to achieve security and economic development.The Afghan program has been subject to criticism. For example, the maintenanceof military structures is said to have helped commanders fortify positions intheir respective regions and strengthen their role as middlemen in the opiumeconomy. Another issue is that the ANBP did not allow for a weapons-fordevelopmentor other community-based programs when disarming the AMF.After demobilizing a unit the process became individualized and each soldierwould enter reintegration on their own. Some of the problems experienced in theimplementation process could perhaps have been remedied by experimenting withcommunity-based programs. (Thruelsen, 2006)Close coordination between SSR initiatives and the process of disarming anddemobilizing armed groups, such as the AMF, is critical. In many respectshowever, the Afghan Interim Authority viewed disarmament, demobilization andSecurity Sector Reform as separate, autonomous activities. Only about 3 percentof the demobilized combatants from the AMF have actually joined the ANA(Thruelsen, 2006).Key LessonsBy establishing the AMF (i.e. an Interim Stabilization strategy) and paying thesalaries of the soldiers, the Government bought time for the initiation of a formalDDR process. The system was designed to establish and maintain a critical levelof security while the political situation was sorted out. However, the Afghanexperience also further highlights the importance of including all stakeholders,47

especially potential spoilers, in the process. Armed groups, or disgruntledcommanders, left outside of the formal process will almost inevitably find ways tosabotage peace efforts.Much can also be learned from the apparent weakness of the system of payingex-combatant salaries through commanders and local warlords. This lesson hasalso been learned the hard way in other DDR-processes. As always, a carefulbalance must be struck between the importance of a sense of real local andnational ownership on one hand and accountability and efficacy on the other.Once the process entered a phase where some groups were showing tendenciesto leave or misuse the process, the introduction of a system of carrots andsticks (incentives and sanctions), reduced the risk of individual combatants orcommanders turning into spoilers. The successful disarmament was dependentupon a clear demobilization and reintegration strategy, antithetical to thetraditional view of disarmament occurring first.The Sunni AwakeningWhile currently unfolding, the emergence of the “Awakening Movements” inIraq is a recent phenomenon worth noting in the context of Interim Stabilization.These are essentially coalitions between tribal Sheikhs and the Government (aswell as Coalition Forces) to ensure local security in the form of local armed militiaor ad hoc armed forces providing local or community protection under traditionalleadership structures. The Sunni tribes in Anbar province have been particularlysuccessful with this Interim Stabilization-like model. As of September 2007 theleadership of 25 of the 31 Anbari tribes was cooperating with the governmentunder the aegis of the Anbar Salvation Council while six have been associated withal Qaeda in Iraq. Agency and livelihood in the form of wage incentives are beingprovided for local guards. Cohesiveness and legitimacy (aged tribal bonds andleadership) are part of the arrangements.The outstanding risk factors are what will become of this local militia after peaceand security has been restored. Will they be integrated into the formal Iraqi army,police and border forces? Provided training and assets for reintegration into anormal productive civilian life? (Roggio)48

Transitional AutonomyThe two case studies on Cambodia and Uganda provide a deepened discussion ofexamples of transitional autonomy (see Chapter 6). In this section, the case of thePeshmerga in Kurdish Iraq is presented as a brief illustration.5.The Peshmerga in Kurdish Iraq – Autonomy in the MakingSimilar to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo in 1999, the Peshmerga– a regional guard in Iraqi Kurdistan – fought alongside American and Coalitionforces during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since then the Peshmerga has beengiven full responsibilities for the provision of security in the region. There are anestimated 75 000 active Peshmerga and an unknown number has been integratedinto the reformed and coalition-trained Iraqi Security Forces (Katzman andPrados, 2006).The “Transitional Administrative Law”, agreed upon by the US and the IraqGoverning Council in November 2003, allowed for “regional control overpolice forces and internal security” and this regional competence over internalsecurity matters was retained in the Iraqi Constitution, approved by a referendumin October 2005. According to article 121 of the Constitution the regionalgovernment shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region,particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the regionsuch as police, security forces and guards of the region(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/ iraqi_constitution.pdf). This provides thelegal basis for the Peshmerga to persist within the new Iraqi security structure.The Peshmerga in Iraq thus represents a model of an Interim Stabilization evolvinginto a more permanent part of a states reformed security structure. With thethreat of partition of the country looming on the horizon, the question of whetherthe Peshmerga will transform into a national army and police or if a demobilizationof former Peshmerga fighters into the civilian work force, is yet to be answered.Dialogue and Sensitization (Halfway-House arrangements)The Rwandan Ingando-processMost of this section on the Ingando-experiences in Rwanda is based on a paperprepared by Francis Musoni, senior DDR planner and chief reintegration officer,Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. The paper was written49

for a seminar arranged to discuss the results and findings of this research project.Lessons and analysis also take the seminar’s comments and critiques into account,and does not necessarily reflect the views of Mr. Musoni.Background and RationaleThe Arusha protocols, signed in 1993 between the Government of the Republicof Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (later RPA), stipulated that bothforces should merge and form an integrated National Army after the conflict. OnApril 6 1994, following the death of the President of Rwanda in a plane crash,ethnic extremists seized government power and launched a campaign of genocidethroughout the country. During the course of the following three months, overone million Rwandans, mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus from oppositionparties, were massacred. In July 1994 the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) defeatedthe national army “Forces Armées Rwandaises” (FAR) and formed a newgovernment. The FAR split into three groups. One group comprised mainly forcesloyal to the genocide regime. This group fled to Congo with the informal militias(interahamwe) and civilian refugees. The second group comprised soldiers whosimply returned to their communities and either settled or went into hiding. Thethird group consisted of soldiers captured by or voluntarily surrendered to the RPA.Demobilization and reintegration of excess fighters had been adopted as apolicy already in the Arusha peace agreement in 1993. The security, political,social and economic realities, however, was significantly different immediatelyafter the genocide and civil war than at the time of signing the agreement. Theprotocols were articulated to provide for a gradual process of military integrationand disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. After the cessation ofhostilities in mid-1994, there were thousands of defeated soldiers showing interestto integrate into a new Rwandese Army. Others were waiting to be officiallydemobilized or hiding out in communities unsure of their fate under the newadministration.The situation called for urgent attention. The RPA sought to establish atemporary, Interim Stabilization-like program for the ex-FAR members whowere still in the country. All captured, surrendering and hiding members ofex-FAR were gathered in two separate camps for screening, sensitization andconsultations on integration and DDR. The programs came to be called Ingandoafter a traditional method of solving difficult problems by gathering to consultin isolation from everyday life. The RPA had initiated Ingando-processes alreadyduring the war, as a strategy to deal with captured enemy combatants and sensitize50

communities to their cause. The Rwandian Ingando-process entailed the gatheringof former enemy combatants in camps for “problem solving” dialogue sessionsrecounting the causes and taking ownership of the tragedy, exposing mutualmyths and stereotypes and endeavouring to rebuild trust after the deep trauma ofthe Genocide (see Rusagera, 2004).5.All officers were gathered at Gako Military School in the Eastern Province whiletheir soldiers camped at Rubona in the Southern Province. When these campswere set up, in the early aftermath of the war, there was still a war-like situation.Institutions had been shattered and the security situation was very fragile. Boththe communities and the ex-FAR needed protection and assurance for their safety.The Ingando-programs provided a sense of security, while also creating anopportunity for screening for skills (and of participation in the Genocide orother war crimes) among the ex-FAR; consultations on integration and DDR;workshops on government programs such as National Unity and Reconciliation,Economic Recovery and Development, National and Regional SecurityChallenges, rebuilding government and social institutions etc; and sensitizationexercises and recreational activities such as sports, music and dance. Aftercompleting the Ingando-process, each individual had a choice either to integrateinto the RPA or to go through formal DDR.During the process the ex-FAR were free to go home and visit their families and thecamps were open to visitors. In a way, this helped to build trust and confidence andhelped attract some of the ex-FAR hiding in the communities. When the registrationand orientation program for ex-FAR closed in 2005, approximately 13,000 formercombatants had signed up for the demobilization and subsequent reintegration.Challenges and IssuesProviding security in the interim between war and development, and establishing aminimum level of trust and confidence between former enemies, were the primaryconcerns when the Ingando programs were conceived. In a broad sense, theseobjectives were achieved. A critical level of human security, for communities andformer combatants, was maintained and a basis for reconciliation was established.Alternatives were provided for ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict.The ex-FAR combatants with skill and a reasonably clean record could optfor integration into the RPA. The process also gave the moderate ex-FAR anopportunity to distance themselves from the extremists and architects of theGenocide.51

During the initial stages, the program lacked sufficient resources. Stateinstitutions had broken down and looted by fleeing officials of the oustedgovernment. The donor community was initially focused on refugees andInternally Displaced Persons (IDP). Tax collection was generating only minimalrevenues. This was remedied in part when the UNDP intervened with funding forthe program. Since Ingando is undertaken after disarmament of combatants, theprogram did not experience the same difficulty in securing international fundingas some other Interim Stabilization programs examined in this study.While the Ingando-process has helped Rwanda to stop further divisions and toform a basis for reconciliation in the country, the model is not uncomplicated.There is a natural temptation, built into any sensitization scheme of thismagnitude, for the leading party to make use of the campaign for politicalpurposes. There have been serious allegations aimed at the Ingando-process in thisregard (see for example Mgbako, 2005). These allegations will not be dealt within depth here. For the purposes of the present study, it suffices to raise the issue ofpossible misuse as a risk factor in designing Interim Stabilization measures on thebasis of broad sensitization and political re-education programs.Key LessonsThe Rwandese Ingando model illustrates an Interim Stabilization measure builtaround the need to form a basis for long-term reconciliation in a society ravagedby one of the most brutal civil wars and most effective genocides of our time. It isimpossible to understand the dynamics of the current Ingando process outside ofits unique context. However, it bears important lessons for the study of InterimStabilization as a tool in post-conflict peace building.The Ingando clearly aims at creating an environment in which returningcombatants feel safe. This type of halfway house in which ex-combatants are givenspace to get used to the idea of returning to communities proved to be an effectivepull factor for combatants in hiding or still involved in fighting. It also managed togenerate an increased sense of confidence in the peace process.In undertaking combatant focused programs it is essential to remember theneeds of communities and to balance efforts and support activities. Sensitizationprograms for receiving communities are key to form a basis for successfulreintegration down the line. Reports vary significantly regarding the success ofcommunity sensitization programs in Rwanda. Given the trauma suffered by theentire population of the country the task has been immense.52

However, in any program aiming primarily at achieving reconciliation througha strengthened sense of national unity, there is a risk of misuse for political gainby one or more parties. The line between unifying history lessons and politicalindoctrination can be very thin in post-conflict settings. It is absolutely essentialto strike the right balance and allow for openness, critical examination of facts andmutual dialogue throughout these processes.5.53

6.6. Selected Country Fieldwork:Cambodia, Colombia andUgandaCambodiaThe case study on Interim Stabilization experiences in Cambodia was conductedby Sinthay Neb and Sven Edquist of the Advocacy Policy Institute(www.apiinstitute.org) in Phnom Penh. Comments and reflections at theFebruary 2008 seminar in Stockholm have been taken into consideration inediting the text below.Background and RationaleWhen, in January 1979, the Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia and put anend to Pol Pot’s authoritarian regime, the Khmer Rouge fled westwards towardsThailand. In the decade that followed, Cambodia was engulfed by civil warbetween the Vietnamese installed government in Phnom Penh and the KhmerRouge, protected by Thailand and China. Two additional guerrilla groups, theRoyalist group, FUNCINPEC, lead by King Sihanouk, and the Khmer People’sNational Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son San, formed the CoalitionGovernment of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to push oust the government,led by Hun Sen.Peace negotiations in the late 80-ies led to the “Comprehensive PoliticalSettlement of the Cambodia Conflict”, in October 1991; allowing for the ParisPeace Agreement (PPA), which entrusted the United Nations TransitionalAuthority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to supervise the unification of the fightingforces in the country and the subsequent demobilization from the unified army55

of approximately 140,000 soldiers. When the demobilization program wascompleted in May 1993, about 28,000 soldiers had officially been demobilized,mainly from the regular armed forces. The UNTAC plan did not encompass anycomprehensive reintegration support. (http://www.khmerinstitute.org/docs/PPA1991.htm)As a result of the first national election, the new Cambodian Constitution waswritten and a coalition government was established with Co-Prime Ministers,Prince Norodom Ranarriddh (FUNCINPEC), and Hun Sen’s Cambodia PeoplesParty (CPP) – from 1993–1998. Unconvinced about their prospects in the 1993election, the Khmer Rouge had pulled out of the PPA in 1992 and retreated to theirsafe havens in the west of the country; the fighting continued.Unity within the Government was needed to fight the Khmer Rouge and theGovernment managed, in July 1994, to adopt a bill officially outlawing themovement and calling for severe penalties against its members. However thecoalition and the power-sharing agreement in Phnom Penh quickly collapsedand the two parties began battling for full power. Both parties had searched forweapons and allies and began separate negotiations with the Khmer Rouge.The CPP was by far the stronger of the two government parties and was thereforeable to offer the most concrete incentives for the KR defectors. Hun Sen seizedpower in a coup (claiming that the action was merely a pre-emption of a coupplanned by the FUNCINPEC) and articulated his desire to put an end to thepolitical and military conflict and bring peace to Cambodia. As part of thisstrategy Hun Sen visited the KR areas Samlot, Pailin and Malai and announcedhis Win-Win policy (see below).On 23 February, 1996, a Khmer Rouge top leader, Keo Pong, defected to theGovernment in Phnom Oral, Kampong Speu province. This marked thebeginning of the end of armed conflict between the Khmer Rouge and theCambodian Government. In August 1996 the Khmer Rouge-held zones of Pailinand Phnom Malai in Cambodia’s northwest surrendered to the Government.This heralded a chain of defections that ended in 1998 in the movement’s ultimatedemise. After three decades of conflict and violence, the war was finally over.The Demise of the Khmer RougeWhile Cambodia has faced numerous challenges in the decade since the KhmerRouge defected, peace has been kept. It has been argued that the Khmer Rouge’s56

demise in 1998 was inevitable. The movement was increasingly outdated,emaciated and marginalized and it was no longer able to face the rigors ofrebellion, let alone revolution.6.However, the Khmer Rouge had shown a remarkable resilience to survive andstrike fear into the hearts of its opponents over four decades of political and threedecades of military struggle. The KR’s barbarism had come to overshadow the factthat it received significant support from the weakest section of the Cambodiancommunity – the downtrodden rural peasantry who felt they were suffering severeinjustices and that the Khmer Rouge would change things for the better. Theideas of the Khmer Rouge are still today strongly held by people living in the KRstrongholds of Pailin, Phnom Malai and Samlot.There appears to be two main factors causing the Khmer Rouge to return tonegotiations in 1996–1998: First, there was an internal conflict between the hardlineideologues based in Anlong Veng – who wanted to continue the struggleunder the leadership of Pol Pot – and those under the leadership of Ieng Sary basedin Pailin and Malai – who wanted to avoid persecution and retain the financial andother benefits gained during the conflict.The Ieng Sary groups were based in an area rich in natural resources and withgreater economic prosperity and freedom. They were increasingly reluctant tocontinue fighting and to take orders from the central Khmer Rouge control. Here,the concepts of democracy, freedom and private ownership were growing alongwith increasing trade across the border with Thailand. People were able to movefreely between their zones and Government-held towns as well as into Thailand.In Thailand they were able to purchase goods unattainable at home. Ieng Sary’sfaction saw the opportunity to break away when the Khmer Rouge leadership basedin Anlong Veng attempted to re-impose ‘collectivization’ of property threatenedinternal repression. This coincided with the deteriorating health of Pol Pot.Secondly, the political turmoil in Phnom Penh, and the success of Hun Sen’sCPP, had produced a powerful counterpart for negotiations, who could be trustedto deliver on offered incentives. The Win-Win policy offered an attractive exitstrategy for the KR leadership as well as for combatants.57

The Win-Win Policy: Pragmatism Prevails in the Short RunHun Sen’s Win-Win Policy states:› First- to guarantee personal and family safety for those willing to end the warand return to live in the society.› Second- to guarantee people’s careers by providing enough opportunities toenable them to continue their past professions.› Third- to guarantee the safety of people’s property from confiscation andalteration. 5In addition to these points, the government passed the “Law to Outlaw theDemocratic Kampuchea Group” (in 1994), which codifying the criminalizationof acts committed by the Khmer Rouge, but also provided a six months amnestyperiod for defectors. The amnesty was indefinitely extended in 1995, somethingthat certainly worked as an incentive for many Khmer Rough leaders having beena part of Pol Pot’s regime in the 1970’s. However, there was no amnesty and nostatue of limitations to crimes of genocide (see Law to Outlaw the DemocraticKampuchea Group, preamble §8).FUNCINPEC, being traditionally closer to the KR, had fought in the jungleagainst Hun Sen’s government alongside the KR and were partners in the UNrecognised government. The CPP saw its own political survival as dependentupon forging peace with the KR, making them an ally and further isolatingFUNCINPEC.Interim Stabilization Through Defacto AutonomyThe Win-Win policies allowed the Khmer Rouge to keep everything they alreadyhad; they could remain in their lands; they retained their military ranks andcommunity positions in the civil administration; and they were allowed to ownhouses and land.Three levels of reintegration was implemented:› Military integration – All defected KR soldiers were integrated into the RoyalCambodian Armed Forces. The mid-level commanders continued to lead theirsoldiers under the Cambodian Armed Forces structure.› Administrative reintegration – The Khmer Rouge leaders were allowed toeither keep their old positions or accept alternative positions in their own5. Extract from a copy of Samdech Hun Sen’s speech for closing the Open Academic Forum on the15th Anniversary of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of Cambodia Conflict,organized by International Relations Institute of Cambodia (IRIC), October 21, 200658

communities. Pailin was established as a city; Samlot became a district withinBattambang province; and Malai, Kamreang, Sampov Loun, and Phnom Prekbecame districts within Banteay Meanchey province. Today, ex-Khmer Rougeleaders still hold great sway in their former zones.› Socio-economic reintegration – The Government granted these KR areasautonomous economic development zone status: no taxes for three-years andpermission to open a number of ’Border Economic Gates’ with Thailand topromote trade.6.The economic development helped create social harmony, which was of crucialimportance in the reintegration process. Land was fairly distributed within theautonomous zones. Each combatant and his or her family were provided with twocows, five hectares of land and 5,000 Baht. Many still live peacefully on this land.Challenges, Issues and Key LessonsThe exact details of the agreement made between the CPP and the defectingKhmer Rouge commanders are not known. Apparently, it was solid enough to stopthe violence and allow for a period of stability and peace. The amnesty that wasoffered the former leadership of Pol Pot’s genocide administration, however, hasalso delayed a much-needed national reconciliation process.Some aspects of the process, which were considered successful at the time, may inretrospect seem counterproductive and detrimental to the democratic, social, andeconomic development. For example, the three-year tax exemption in KR areasled to a rush to exploit the natural resources in the areas within this period. Theresults have been devastating from both economic governance and environmentalperspectives.Some of the interlocutors interviewed also held that the only reason thatCambodia had enjoyed a sustained peace was the dominance and control of theCPP. The CPP controlled all state institutions and the nation’s main resources. Ina properly functioning democracy, where governing parties come and go, it maynot have been possible to sustain peace.It may also be argued that by 1996 the Khmer Rouge, or at least its effectivefighting forces, might have been prepared to concede defeat on a lot less generousterms than those offered by Hun Sen’s Win-Win policies. They were divided,undermanned and under-resourced. They had lost all international support andpractically all domestic credibility; they were exhausted.59

However, despite the seemingly terminal state of the movement, the KhmerRouge was still in existence. During the past three decades they had shown anastonishing resilience. This resilience and the KR leadership’s general disregardfor the lives of their countrymen, make case for the importance of the Win-Winpolicies to end the fighting.Due to the trade-off between justice and peace, Cambodia has never establisheda Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Win-Win policies and theKhmer Rouge defections served peace but did not address the need for nationalreconciliation and justice. The government was content with granting amnestyin exchange for peace. In this rush the government failed to involve civil societyactors and establish what role they would play in a democratic society.The program was not integrated into a wider scheme to establish a culture ofrespect for human rights. Because the government’s primary concern was to endthe war – and for the CPP to boost its powerbase – no concrete system was put inplace by the government to properly deal with the post-conflict reconciliation andreintegration process.By offering a “win-win policy”, the Cambodia People’s Party was able to establishconcrete incentives to KR defectors. Defectors were ensured a guarantee ofpersonal and family safety, safety of property and opportunities to continue theprofessions previously held. Providing these incentives within the framework oftransitional autonomy allowed for the Khmer Rouge to remain on their lands andretain their military ranks and community positions (i.e. social cohesion).Being an (at least originally) ideologically driven fighting force, the Khmer Rougefollowers also sustained a strong common identify and social cohesiveness. Thetransitional process in which areas under former Khmer Rouge control havegradually been integrated into national administrational structures, may also havecontributed to a sensitization process. Many of the KR fighters and families knewnothing but the Khmer Rouge political propaganda.The plan did succeed in helping to establish the foundation for sustainable peace inCambodia. Nonetheless, it raises a number of issues. The KR Interim Stabilizationscheme illustrates the need to tie any transitional measures into a longer-termpeacebuilding strategy, including, as appropriate, reintegration and nationalreconciliation programs. It also highlights the importance of not closing the dooron future justice processes dealing with crimes committed during the conflict. Thesingling out of specific crimes of genocides as exceptions to the Law to Outlaw the60

Democratic Kampuchea Group has allowed for recent arrests of former KhmerRouge leaders. Another issue is the environmental impact of the total KR controlover the natural resources of the de facto autonomous areas.6.In the Cambodian context, it is also interesting to ask whether involvement of theinternational community would have made a difference. It is likely that a numberof control- and safety functions would have been built into the program, hadinternational actors been involved. On the other hand, it is far from certain thatthe minimum conditions acceptable from an international community perspective(i.e. democratic governance, judicial procedures to deal with international crimes,environmental controls etc.), would have been accepted by the parties.ColombiaThe Colombian case study was undertaken by Alexandra Guáqueta and GersonArias, Fundacion Ideas Para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org). The preliminary results ofthe study were discussed at the February 2008 seminar in Stockholm and the mainpoints raised in these discussions are reflected in the summary below.Background and RationaleThere are around 46,000 demobilized combatants in Colombia. Most of them,31.671, are right-wing illegal paramilitary. This group demobilized betweenDecember 2003 and August 2006 as the result of negotiations between the ÁlvaroUribe government and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The AUCclaimed to be a counterinsurgent organization forced into existence because of thefailure of the state to protect citizens from guerrilla harassment but many of itsmembers had close ties to drug trafficking mafias and were involved in criminalactivities, most notably extortion.The remaining 14.329, mostly guerrillas, deserted on their own. Of these socalled “individually” demobilized, 8.268 belonged to the Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 1.944 to the Ejército de LiberaciónNacional (ELN) and 435 are dissidents from other guerrilla groups. The FARCand the ELN, who embrace a left-wing ideology, formed in the 60s claiming toredress social and political grievances. They have shunned any peace agreementwith the Colombian government and are the main targets of the ColombianArmed Forces, particularly the FARC who increasingly since the 1980s resorted tothe illegal coca industry.61

The remaining 3.682 of the individually demobilized combatants are paramilitarywho did not demobilize in the “collective” negotiations but chose to reintegrateaway from their blocs. Collective demobilized combatants (paramilitary groupswho struck a deal with the government) and individually demobilized combatants(essentially guerrilla deserters), are two separate populations. They pose differentthreats to peace and security and they have followed different reintegration paths.The Paramilitary (AUC)In May 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the presidency and soon thereafter, theparamilitary began reaching out to the government. Besides war fatigue, those infavor of demobilization and against ongoing drug trafficking feared increasing USpressure on Colombia to combat paramilitary drug trafficking and US extraditionrequests. Their only way out was a swift conversion into a political organization.After much discussion among paramilitary commanders and various informalconversation with church clergy and government officials, they decided to issuethe Declaracion por la Paz de Colombia. The document formally announced a ceasefireeffective as of January 1 st , 2003 and the willingness of the AUC to initiateformal talks.In December the Uribe government created an Exploratory Commission in chargeof the talks. Meetings with the AUC, the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) andVencedores de Arauca and the Eastern Alliance began in January 2003. All alongthere had been increasing pressure by the US, who had issued arrest warrantsand extradition petitions for various paramilitary leaders. The exploratory talksdefined the main issues that had to be negotiated and formally ended on July15, 2003 with the publicly announced Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement. The exactcommitments as well as tacit understandings by the different parts are unknown.The official document is vague. The paramilitary commit to demobilizing all itsmembers, support the Government’s purpose of having a Colombia without drugtrafficking and will concentrate their commanders in specially designated zones.In return, they expect the government to follow the Exploratory Commission’srecommendations: that the government finds “legal alternatives” to make thepeace agreement possible, gives priority to paramilitary regions of influence whenimplementing development and security policies and adjusts the governmentreintegration program.The government submitted to Congress a bill regarding paramilitarydemobilization that proposed an “alternate judicial” regime (the so called “Leyde Alternatividad Penal”) allowing combatants to forgo standard sentences for a62

variety of crimes, including human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, drugtrafficking and other economic illicit activities. The bill sparked a heated nationaland international debate, as different actors were opposed to the concessions beinggranted to the paramilitary in exchange for their demobilization. 66.In August 2006, president Uribe ordered all paramilitary commanders, who upuntil then had had special permits to move freely back and forth from the Santa Fede Ralito zone to other places, to transfer permanently to a detention center in LaCeja, nearby Medellin to begin complying with their prison time. 60 commanderscomplied but several others escaped.In December, the last major crisis of the process occurred when the commanderswere transferred to the Itagüí prison. Báez, the paramilitary spokesman for thepeace process said the settlement was off and implied they still held sway over theirmen and could rearm the various groups. The threat never materialized but someargue there are new illegal counter-insurgency groups emerging, which are notnecessarily under the command of those who participated in the peace process.(Rubini, 2008) All along there were ongoing problems related to middle-rankcommanders that never turned themselves in.Corporación Democracia –a Transitional Institutional ArrangementThe Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) demobilization was the first paramilitarygroup to disarm. A tripartite agreement was negotiated and signed between theBCN, the national government and the Medellin Mayor’s Office. The agreementwas that local authorities would administrate and, to an important extent, fundthe DDR program, which would last 18 months. The BCN was given some“assurances” in the form of a proactive role in the development and follow-up ofthe reintegration process. 7For that purpose, a BCN-run non-for-profit organization, the CorporaciónDemocracia (CD), would be created. The real functions of CD as well as thetacit expectations by both combatants and official authorities are unclear. Wasthe government settling for disarmament and a sort of “ceasefire”, as opposedto demanding a full dismantlement of the organization and its function in thecriminal world?6. Analyses of the different bills and opinions by key actors can be found in FIP’s Siguiendo el Conclito:hechos y análisis de la semana, volumes 1–3, compiled in 2005–2007.7. See “Acta de Compromiso entre la Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz y la Alcaldía deMedellín”, November 13, 2003.63

There were two key arrangements that implied the BCN would maintain its chainof command. One was joint policing by former BCN and Medellín police forcesof areas formerly controlled by the BCN. This was meant to provide securityguarantees to BCN members while at the same time allowing greater policecontrol over the comunas to which it had no access in the past. Former combatantswould be given radios, no weapons, to patrol alongside police units. They wouldfacilitate the entry of police forces into the neighborhoods and be in permanentcontact with the rest of the “boys” in order to receive information on the localsituation.The second arrangement was the appointment of BCN “zone coordinators”,meant to liaise between the Mayor’s office and the boys. They would monitorwhether the combatants were attending training sessions and appointments withthe social workers and psychologists, hear whether the local communities hadcomplaints on the behavior of any of the boys, and communicate any news fromthe program. In addition to these arrangements, up until his own demobilization,Don Berna, the former BCN leader, still commanded the BCN and had “LaTerraza” band at his service.The decline of violence more generally in Colombia was one of the majorachievements of the ceasefire commitments and the peace negotiations, whichhelped the Uribe government justify the process to Colombian and foreignaudiences. The BCN demobilization, however, has been strongly criticized by localNGOs, who argue that the “boys” still act as alternate authorities in the comunas,follow orders from Don Berna and have connections with the criminal world. 8Shareholder Agro Business as an InterimStabilization MeasureIn 1997, the BCB (Bloque Central Bolívar) emerged as a paramilitary group andby 2004 it had reached a force of 6000 combatants. Following the agreements withthe government, and after the Justice and Peace Law passed through Congress, theBCB demobilized 8 regional groups between July 2005 and January 2006. For thegovernment, the BCB demobilization was crucial given their size and power. Thispoint touches on some of the conundrums of the paramilitary peace process: onthe one hand, it was hard to justify a “peace” deal with organizations who were not8. For early reactions see “10 preguntas para pensar”, Revista Semana, December 1, 2003. Interviewsby FIP staff to local communities, clergy and NGOs in various visits in 2006 and 2007. See alsoInstituto Popular de Capacitación (IPC), “Narcotráfico desestabiliza a Medellín”, March 14, 2008;IPC, “Cartel del Norte del Valle tras la hegemonía armada en Medellín”, November 3, 2007; IPC,“En Medellín, reinsertados de las Auc venden propiedades expropiadas ilegalmente”, August 21, 2007.64

entirely politically-driven and should have been simply imprisoned; on the otherhand, such structures wielded great power and state authorities had not been ableto control them. A deal seemed to be the only viable option.6.Before disarming and demobilizing, the BCB began setting up agro- businesseswhere they expected lower ranking combatants to work. The ownership of theland and who exactly would benefit from any profit accrued was unclear. Thegovernment suspected that at least one function of these farms was to launderparamilitary ill-gotten land and monies. These farms would also enable leaders tomaintain ties with the combatants, reward and help those whom they consideredimportant and preserve physical presence and influence in certain territories.Fernando Soto, from Buscando Caminos Buenos, argues that the projects had anadditional rationale; to pose as reparation and reconciliation initiatives to gainpublic acceptance of the peace process.For public opinion, the possibility that commanders would enjoy economic wealthderived from crime and human rights abuses became morally unacceptable. Thefirst Santa Fe de Ralito agreement actually endorsed the idea of social investmentby the paramilitary leadership aimed at reintegrating its combatants. In favor ofsuch a model was the perception among some sectors in government and societythat it was unfair for tax payers to subsidize a resource-rich illegal armed group.There were also practical considerations; in many places the paramilitary hadbetter logistical capacity and local connections. Commanders could exercise controlto keep combatants from defecting from the reintegration process if necessary.The BCB made sure to make these projects appear as legitimate as possible andthe BCB was effectively dismantled (by Colombian standards). When the blocdemobilized it created two NGOs; Buscando Caminos Buenos and Semillas de Paz.Both worked on economic projects for former combatants and other membersof the communities, as well as a variety of social projects usually embedded in apolitically-correct reconciliation discourse. The idea of creating an NGO withthese functions stemmed from the precedent set by Corporación Democracia andthe “good” reputation that came along with the NGO status.It seems that in the case of the BCB, a real or perceived security dilemma (besidespersonal interests in drug trafficking) has undermined its commitment to thepeace process as well as influenced developments in other blocs. Since the DDRprocess began, BCB leader Macaco believed his security depended on keepingother blocs, criminal organizations or guerrillas from filling the vacuums left bythe BCB, not just in terms of territorial control but taking over illegal businesses.65

Individual DDR: Cooptation of CombatantsIn 2002 and 2003 desertions from FARC and ELN rose sharply. The newDemocratic Security Policy had launched a tough military offensive against theguerrillas, especially FARC, thereby increasing security risks for the rebels. Warfatigue due to fierce paramilitary pressure since 1997; and intense propagandaby the government, which focused on the advantages of living a normal life awayfrom “the bush”, inspired many to take part of the benefits offered by the newreintegration program.Deserters had to spend up to three days in detention, being debriefed bymilitary intelligence, who would act as a first filter to confirm the identity ofthe combatant. After that, the deserter would enter the Programa de AtenciónHumanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD) run by the Ministry of Defence. PAHDwould locate them in temporary homes and provide them with basic assistanceuntil they had passed the second filter, verification by the Attorney General’sOffice on their criminal history. If the combatant had not committed war crimes,he or she would receive a special certification and go on to the Programa deReincorporación a la Vida Civil (PRVC), run by the Ministry of Interior and begina reintegration program that lasted two years and that would end in the setting upof a business with a 4,000 USD grant.Even if not the sole and original purpose, deserters from the guerrilla groupsincreasingly became a valuable source of information on the active rebel groups,whom the Armed Forces had to combat. The term of transit trough the Ministryof Defence’s PAHD program was lengthened to two months. Demobilizedcombatants, who would often turn themselves in to the nearest military brigadeor police station in rural zones, would not be sent to Bogotá according to theestablished calendar. The military would keep him (or her), not against his willand in accordance with the law 9 , for weeks and months at the brigade to obtaininformation and collaboration.Very often, demobilized combatants accompanied operations as “guides”, attimes armed, to point at hidden weapon deposits or identify guerrilla members.Intelligence agents, police investigators and tax authorities working on terrorism,drug and weapons trafficking or specific homicide cases, also found demobilizedcombatants useful sources. In exchange they were granted financial compensation.The use of demobilized combatants in this particular security function was9. Decree 128 of 2003, the legal basis for the new reintegration program included language thatallowed such collaboration.66

criticized for being a means of war- not peace-building. It entailed serious risksto former combatants and could easily lead to distortions of the informationprovided. Former combatants reported that often, military and civilian authoritiesthreatened not to grant the person the benefits he’s entitled to unless they provideinformation.6.The “Soft Policing” TrackIn late 2004, the High Peace Commissioner, the PRVC and the Director Generalof the Police created a new formula to occupy former combatants that respondedto several needs at the same time: the auxiliares cívicos en convivencia y seguridadciudadana, security civilian aides; a type of “soft policing” mostly in towns, citiesand main roads. The idea was to offer former guerrilla and paramilitary, whetherindividually or collectively demobilized, to temporarily serve under the commandand supervision of the Police. In this way, they could remain occupied and earnsome money while they completed vocational training and found other moresteady jobs in the market.In the case of former guerillas, the program would also help them build trusttowards the state and public security agencies – their old enemies. The functionwas also framed as “service to the community”, in which former combatantscould “repair” the harms inflicted on society. (Colprensa, 2005) The programincludes training on citizenship competences, human rights, first aid, socialcommunication and basic policing. Combatants are not allowed to carry weaponsand they can serve as forest rangers, road safety assistants, tourist guides andsurveillance assistants in bus stations.Challenges, Issues and Key LessonsThe paramilitary DDR process in Colombia is different from most other similarprocesses for two principal reasons: 1) The paramilitary are not typical rebelorganizations; and 2) Colombia is a relatively developed democracy and thus notgoing through the typical war to peace transition. The ultimate expected outcomesof the process are: An absolute dismantlement of the paramilitary phenomenon;a good dose of punishment for committed crimes and a power-sharing agreementfacilitated by a transitional justice regime. The Justice and Peace Law and the DDRprograms were designed to move toward disarmament and demobilization of theparamilitary but stop short of achieving full dismantlement. This would have hadto entail neutralizing economic and political influence of the paramilitary groups.67

Interim stabilization in the case of Colombia has allowed flexibility in peacenegotiations and the demobilization process. The government was given a spacein which it could establish legal instruments, bureaucracies and necessary budgetlinesfor a long-term reintegration program. At the same time, however, there isa risk that complete demobilization of all the groups is endangered and that thedemands by the groups will only increase.Halfway-house arrangements, in which commanders are allowed to maintaininfluence over their troops but with a civilian focus of activities, can helpensure stability and control over ex-combatants. Combatants are not left aloneand they become part of a wide range of initiatives. This helps them maintainsocial cohesion while undergoing a sensitization process, gradually adjusting tocivilian roles. But the proximity of the demobilized troops to their networks andcontacts within the criminal world can also expose them to a greater risk of beingre-recruited.Linking the demobilized personnel to transitional security forces, such as thesoft policing, under the supervision of civil authorities, instead of incorporatingthem into the Armed Forces increases legitimacy and facilitates the work of Statesecurity structure and helps ex-combatants trust the system.Breaking the links to old command structures may be a crucial factor in thereintegration of combatants who are exposed to recruitment by criminalorganizations. If combatants are somewhat isolated from criminal contacts andnetworks and located in relative safe places, they may stand a chance to initiatea new life with a legitimate livelihood. Such combatants need, however, steadyemployment that fulfils his or her expectations with regards to salary and status.Training ex-combatants for work in private security companies regulated by theState is an alternative to having them join public forces. However, given that ingeneral the control over these companies in the countries in conflict is weak, therisks seem greater than the possible benefits.The paramilitary are not a conventional rebel army, but a coalition of groupsthat may ally or compete depending on their needs. Each group is a mix betweena criminal organization and a counterinsurgent army. On the one hand, it canbe argued that allowing the groups to maintain some cohesion, in the absenceof strong economic projects that could compete with salaries offered in thedrug business, has been counterproductive and that it has so far prevented thereintegration of many combatants. On the other hand, it may be argued that this68

was a necessary transitional trade-off, maintaining security, while moving towardmore competitive (with criminal options) and sustainable reintegration options(livelihoods).6.The case of individual guerrilla deserters is very different, as they have not demobilizedall in one block. In Colombia’s past guerrilla demobilizations, the groups made arelatively smooth transition from being combatants to becoming political partiesand NGOs. The temporary integration of demobilized guerrilla combatants intonational security structures is performed during an ongoing conflict but couldbecome a model for Military Integration in an eventual peace deal. At the momentany political agreement between the rebels and the Government seems far awayand the future of FARC and ELN, and the way in which these combatants will bebrought back into the fabric of society, is still an open question.UgandaThis section is based on a case study undertaken by Fred Mugisha, and apresentation by the chairman of the Uganda Amnesty Commission, Justice PeterOnega, at the February 2008 seminar in Stockholm organized to discuss thefindings of this research project. The analysis is also influenced by the findings andimpressions from a field visit in Northern Uganda in the summer of 2007. Theconclusions in the section are therefore the sole responsibility of the research team.Background and RationaleUganda has a complicated political history of internal violence and powerstruggles. Since President Yoweri Museveni consolidated power in 1986, at least22 separate groups have taken up arms against the government and a numberof separate peace deals have been made over the years. Reintegration programstherefore have a fairly long history in Uganda, dating back to the late eighties. Yetthe scope and sequencing of reintegration efforts have often been insufficient.One clear example is transitional economic reintegration. After ex-combatantscome out of rehabilitation centers (part of formal programs) they often end up inlow opportunity environments such as IDP camps. In this context, thinking interms of buying-time through transitional programs for former-combatants, andcreating opportunities to address short-term needs, such as a public-works corps,might be a viable alternative.The two decade long insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northernUganda, however, still awaits a durable resolution. Using bases in neighboring69

countries, the LRA have raided villages and refugee camps in northern Ugandato plunder and abduct new recruits for their struggle against the Uganda PeoplesDefence Forces (UPDF). At the height of the conflict, over 80% of the populationin northern Uganda was displaced living in refugee camps across the north.To provide incentives for LRA fighters to surrender, the Ugandan Amnesty Actwas enacted in 2000. The law grants immunity to any combatant or collaboratorwho returns and renounces the rebellion. Those who return are called reporters, asmost of the combatants have been forcefully recruited or kidnapped at very youngages. The reporters are entered into reintegration programs, administered by theUganda Amnesty Commission. To date, a total of 23 000 reporters have passedthrough the Amnesty Commission programs.Since 2006, the Government of Uganda (GoU) is engaged in peace negotiationswith the LRA in Juba, southern Sudan. During these negotiations, thesecurity situation in the north has improved considerably. As there are fewerconfrontations, and thereby fewer opportunities for combatants and abductees toescape from the LRA or be captured by Ugandan forces, the number of reportersreturning has decreased since the beginning of the peace talks. There are, however,still an estimated 2000–3000 people (combatants and families), who are expectedback to Uganda if the peace negotiations are successful.Strategies resembling the Interim Stabilization measures subject to this studyhave been employed in Uganda in the past. One of the most interesting of theseexamples is the Labora farm pilot case in Gulu, where the GoU provided farmlandfor cultivation by former LRA combatants. The Labora farm pilot was based onthe notion of a need to let LRA-soldiers ease into a civilian life, while allowingnearby communities get use to the thought of the combatants returning. It thusmostly resembles the category of “Dialogue and Sensitization Programs andHalfway-house Arrangements”, described above.The Labora Farm Experiment– a Halfway-House ArrangementThe former LRA brigadier-general Kenneth Banya and his contingents wereprovided with plows, seeds, and tools and left to themselves at the farm. TheUgandan authorities did not meddle in the leadership- and social structures at thefarm. This was left to the LRA-commanders.The project was funded through the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund(NUSAF), under the World Bank; US$ 100 million worth of ODA-funds were70

invested. An important factor in the Labora farm project was also that the securityof the former rebels at the farm was guaranteed by the UPDF. Information varies,but at the height of the project about 1,000 persons reportedly commuted dailyfrom the nearby town of Gulu to the farm. They were not permanently resettledon the farm, not returned to their communities of origin, nor placed in IDPcamps.The purpose was to provide temporary alternative livelihoods for formerLRA combatants, awaiting a lasting settlement of the dispute and preparingcombatants for reintegration into their communities. In a way, the Laborafarm was a reception center functioning as a holding pattern for former LRAcommanders, combatants and bush families.6.A range of opinions on the Labora farm project was offered to our fieldresearchers.One central issue, on which most interlocutors were in agreement, wasthe fact that the military ranks and chains of command of the LRA were allowedto be maintained on the farm; recreating the oppressive structures that haddeveloped in the bush. This had particularly adverse affects on the lives of womenand children on the farm.The critics of the Labora farm pilot project, among them many of the humanrights groups active in the area, argue that the experiment not only grantedimpunity to the LRA-commanders, but also allowed for a continuation of theabuse. There were serious accusations exploitation of children and women on thefarm and reports of despotism of General Banya. After some years General Banyawas replaced by Ray Apire (former LRA Bishop), who led the Farm in a somewhatsofter style. It was argued, and this turns out to be one of the main lessons of theproject, that the Labora experiment could only work in a civilian structure.Some members of nearby communities also criticized the project for focusingon the needs of the ex-combatants rather than helping the community to getback on its feet. They felt as if the combatants were awarded for the crimes theyhad committed. This type of criticism is not uncommon in relation to projectssupporting returning combatants and it represents a risk that must alwaysbe considered when designing support programs. The SIDDR suggested adual window funding mechanism, where the second window would focus oncommunities balancing whatever support is provided for returning combatants.There were also positive sides to the experiment. According to the ParamountChief of the Acholi, the Labora farm enabled the following important transitions:(a) it provided a secure place for the LRA to rest their minds and to clarify theirfeelings; (b) it allowed for rehabilitation through productive farm labor, an71

alternative to armed violence as a means of subsistence; (c) it facilitated a senseof self reliance as they produced their own food, not reinforcing the dependencysyndrome of the IDP-camps; and (d) it created an alternative attraction to othersto come in from the bush free of fear, community stigmatization, and reprisals.A general conclusion seems to be that the Labora farm project was a good idea thatwas poorly executed. A key lesson learned is that any program under which a rebelgroup, or parts thereof, is kept intact, some form of accountable, civilian authoritymust be established.Strategic Military IntegrationThe case study also established that some of the returning LRA-combatantsopt to join the national armed forces. By and large, the process of joining theUPDF is voluntary. According to the fourth Division Commander in Gulu,“These ex-combatants are given full military training and passed out in variouscategories. Some as part of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and othersas Local Para-militias”.This case study did not examine the merits of this process. Nevertheless, it is clearthat the practice of MI in a way has addressed the security issue in some partsof the country, particularly in Eastern Uganda were these militias were able torepulse the LRA advances in the Teso region.This practice has also drawn serious criticism from domestic as well asinternational institutions and commentators. Allegations are based on thecontention that the government is using the ex-combatants as human shieldsin the process of military confrontation with the LRA. The option of MilitaryIntegration during an ongoing conflict is always difficult (as the case on Colombiahas also confirmed) and the risk of coercion and exploitation must be carefullymonitored.Uganda National Rescue Front IIAnother example of a Ugandan experience resembling Interim Stabilization isthe peace agreement with, and the reintegration of, the Uganda National RescueFront II (UNRF II) – a rebel group from the West-Nile sub-region. In December2002, a peace agreement was signed between the GoU and the group. At the timeof the signing, the UNRF II was based in the DRC. The agreement provided for agradual return of the group to Uganda – in total approximately 2 500 combatants.72

The group was allowed to stay intact, step-by-step re-establishing contacts withrelatives and communities of origin. It is interesting to note that the agreementwas implemented without international involvement and without thoroughprogram planning. Things were left to unfold as the process moved forward.Problems were dealt with as they arose.6.The process satisfied the dual needs of avoiding a stream of restless formercombatants into communities that were not ready to receive them, and providing azone of comfort in which combatants could start adjusting to lives in peace.Around 700 of the UNRF II fighters were eventually integrated into the UPDF,while the remaining 1 800 were reintegrated into West-Nile communities. Theagreement stipulated that the UNRF II should establish a liaison office withinthe Office of the Prime Minister to monitor implementation of the peace. Whilevoices have been raised concerning the pace of implementation, the process hasbeen largely successful.Challenges, Issues and Key LessonsThe lessons drawn from the Uganda case study will focus on the experiences ofthe Labora farm pilot project. The project is an example of Interim Stabilizationby keeping former combatants occupied with civilian tasks, but separated fromcivilian communities, for an initial period of time. On paper, the project seemsvery attractive – keeping demobilizing ex-combatants into safe and productivefarm labor rather than the destructive, dangerous and frustrating environmentof the IDP-camps. However it experienced serious problems and has drawn heavecriticism from domestic as well and international actors.Some members of nearby communities have criticized the project for focusingon the needs of the ex-combatants rather than helping the community to getback on its feet. They felt as if the combatants were awarded for the crimes theyhad committed. This is a common objection against post-conflict reconstructionefforts aimed at former combatants. This brings us back to one of the centralrecommendations of the SIDDR Report that there is a need for parallel windowsof funding, targeting communities as well as returning combatants(see Recommendations page 44, SIDDR Final Report).The heavy criticism by human rights groups, that the LRA-commanders wereeffectively awarded impunity and that they were allowed to recreate the sameoppressive structures at the farm as in the bush, is highly relevant. The key lesson73

of the Labora pilot therefore, is that there is a need for a truly accountable, civilianauthority, even if the aim of the program is to temporarily keep the structure ofthe group intact. Transparent communication to surrounding communities aboutthe purpose of the program and ideally parallel sensitization and reconciliationinitiatives would also be helpful in gaining support for such Interim Stabilizationinitiatives.The balance that needs to be struck is far from easy. Grass roots and lower levelcombatants need to be empowered without severely tilting the social cohesionof the group in question. Stakeholder ownership must be balanced againstreasonable demands for respect of fundamental values. If another attempt ata similar program were to be undertaken, it would therefore be necessary tocarefully monitor the implementation and maintain a preparedness to intervene ifoppressive structures are recreated.If anything should be taken from the Labora farm experiment it is primarilythe general idea of engaging former combatants in productive labor buys timefor other important things to happen while awaiting properly planned longtermprograms. As noted above – such programs hold the potential to providecombatants with the much needed sense of security, socio-psychologicalrehabilitation form physical and productive labor, a transitional alternativelivelihood, and it may create an attraction for other ex-combatants to join theprogram. The potential positive effects on the general peace process are enormous.In designing and implementing such a program – the Labora experience providesample illustration of potential pitfalls.74

7.7. Comparative Analysis:Contextual Factors Shaping theChoice of IS MeasuresIn this chapter, the results of the preliminary overview of relevant experiencesin chapter V, and the three country case studies, are critically examined andcompared. The first part of this comparative analysis is built around a numberof key contextual factors and strategic choices in the formation of InterimStabilization measures. This is followed by brief discussions on the establishmentof incentives and institutional arrangements to turn potential spoilers intostakeholders in the peace process and the management of risks in implementingInterim Stabilization (IS) measures.The Importance of Contextual FactorsAs previously noted, understanding the contextual factors in which a violentconflict is or has been fought, is vital for anyone involved in peacebuilding. Thefollowing contextual factors are instrumental in shaping war to peace transitions,and must be carefully analyzed by stakeholders in peace processes:1. The nature and duration of the conflict;2. Nature of the Peace (i.e. the manner in which the conflict ended and nature ofthe peace process);3. Governance capacity and reach of the state;4. The state of the economy, especially labor absorptive capacity and propertyrights; and5. Character and cohesiveness of communities and combatants;75

1. The Nature and Duration of the ConflictThe type of Interim Stabilization measure suitable in each given situation dependsvery much on the nature of the war – whether it is predominantly driven by ideology,identity, or a struggle for resources. In an ideological driven conflict such as thatof the Maoists in Nepal or the FARC and ELN in Colombia, political power andterritorial control are overriding objectives. When asked about the demobilizationand reintegration of Maoist combatants, the leadership simply replied that nosuch thing was going to happen. What they sought instead was a merger, inwhich the Maoist army was made more professional, while the national army wasdemocratized. This would not imply either a subsidiary relationship in a reformedsecurity sector, nor demobilization and reintegration of their combatants intoa normal productive civilian life. The Maoists seek a continued command andcontrol of forces and territory and a gradual integration of the two forces.Sub-national conflicts, such as that of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)in Mindanao, tend to be more identity driven. Groups are often seeking someform of de facto if not de jure territorial control or regional autonomy. Suchaspirations could be met within an IS-framework which combines a mix ofintegration and control over a regional security (military and or police) force andreintegration into a productive civilian life. Indeed, this is a current issue in thedeposition of forces in the ongoing peace negotiations between the Governmentof the Philippines and the MILF. An earlier agreement with the Moro NationalLiberation Front (MNLF) actually resulted in an integration of some 3,000 plusex-combatants, combined with an unsystematic demobilization and reintegrationof remaining forces without formal disarmament as such. The absence of acomplete DDR program in parallel with the military integration program for theMNLF might very well have been the factor that helped fuel the MILF armedstruggle. (This case is elaborated in a report from one of the fact finding missionsthat were undertaken in the planning for this study, the report can be obtainedfrom the Folke Bernadotte Academy.)In Cambodia, the struggle of the Khmer Rouge started out as ideology drivenconflict and gradually transformed into a resource based struggle. Claims forlimited control over territory and resources became a basis for an IS-like situationwhen de facto autonomy was granted to the Khmer Rouge in the northwest of thecountry, which combined with a self-organized demobilization and reintegrationprogram for the KR in that area. Note that formal disarmament was not a partof this process. The situation in Colombia, especially with the FARC, share someof the Cambodia characteristics as ideology blends with resource and territorialcontrol reflecting features of both armed conflict and criminality.76

In protracted conflicts, combatants often lack even the basic life skills necessaryto lead productive civilian lives. After years, and in some cases decades, in thebush these combatants are particularly vulnerable to recruitment into criminalgangs or splinters of their former rebel movements. IS-measures, providing a senseof safety, agency, legitimacy and temporary alternative livelihoods, may serveas the lifeline needed for them to stay committed to peace. This was one of themain rationales behind the Labora farm experiment described in the Uganda caseabove.7.Similar dynamics characterize extremely brutal conflicts where combatants,as well as communities, have suffered severe trauma. The challenge in thesecases, as in post-Genocide Rwanda, is to prepare the ground for bringing theseex-combatants back into the fabric of society as an initial step in reaching abroader based societal reconciliation. This task requires parallel efforts targetingcombatants as well as communities. The process often takes time and a periodof IS may create the stability and space needed to plan, organize and kick-startrecovery and reconciliation programs.II. The Nature of the PeaceIn cases where there is a “clear victor” Military Integration (MI) can be usedas a first step towards the establishment of integrated and reformed nationalarmed forces. Through such interim solutions, similar to the notion of InterimStabilization, a window is created for properly planned DDR and for planning andlaunching a comprehensive Security Sector Reforms, which is usually needed butdifficult to initiate at the early stages of a peace process.With the African National Congress (ANC) in power following the fall ofapartheid in South Africa, the various rebel factions were initially integratedinto the overall South African Defence Force and later demobilized under thenomenclature of a “military rationalization program”, not under a classicalDDR program. In Uganda, the major demobilization and reintegration programoccurred some four years after the Museveni government had consolidated power.The government had by then absorbed various rebel factions into the militarybefore gradually downsizing the national army essentially for economic reasons;freeing up public expenditure from security to development. In Rwanda, formerForces Armades Rwandese (FAR) combatants were continually integrated forperiods of time before being vetted, re-socialized and demobilized. Finally, inAfghanistan, the multiple warlord armies were initially nominally integrated intoan overarching Afghan Militia Forces and paid monthly salaries in an informal77

holding pattern before the formal launch of the “New Beginnings” DDR program.Studies show that such IS-measures, in the form of Military Integration, without(or before) the launch of any broad effort to reform the security sector, is ahallmark of over half of the peace agreements that stick. However, in all of thesecases, the war ended with a clear victory by one party.The MI option was also utilized in Cambodia and is currently used for someof the FARC and ELN ‘defectors’ in Colombia. In Uganda today, the processalso appears to be moving in this direction as LRA defectors often emerge asfrontline Ugandan army fighters and local militia under government auspices. TheUgandan situation is not unlike the soft or civil policing and intelligence optionsfor the former Colombian AUC and FARC combatants in urban areas. Thereare of course a number of problematic issues coupled with this type of strategicmilitary integration of ex-combatants into the national armed forces during anongoing violent conflict (see section on ‘Managing Risks’ below).A second type of situation is when a peace settlement has been negotiated,and there is no clear victor. In these situations other IS-options may be moreviable (even though MI strategies have also been employed as part of negotiatedsettlements – for example the DRC – and could be a solution for the currentsituation in Nepal). The Labora farm example, with the previously indicatednecessary modifications, could serve as a model in situations where time is neededto get the necessary reconstruction and reintegration programs in place.A third type of situation is illustrated by the case of Kosovo, where the peace wasforced by an international intervention. The primary aim for the internationalcommunity after the armed intervention was to establish minimum levels ofsecurity (for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike) and achieve a peaceful dialogueand negotiation on the future status of Kosovo. At the same time, somethingneeded to be done about the large number of heavily armed fighters of the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA). In effect, balance was struck between the interests of theparties to the conflict – the KLA formally disarmed and demobilized taking onthe face of a civilian emergency response organization (Kosovo Protection Corps).On the other hand they were de facto allowed to retain important elements of theirorganizational structure and cohesiveness with the hope of one day becomingthe national armed forces of an independent Kosovo. The level of consciousnessof this strategy by the international community is difficult to determine. In anyevent, the model did allow for a window of number of years during which thenegotiations on the future status of Kosovo could continue in search for a peacefulresolution.78

III. Governance Capacity and Reach of the StateThe capacity of the State to ensure security and administer justice, as well asproviding other basic services, for ex-combatants and communities, was weakin all three countries where in-depth case studies were conducted. This wasespecially so at the sub-national level where territorial control was often disputed,the legitimacy of the state itself was contested and the duration and intensityof conflict had been greatest. In this regard, Interim Stabilization or similararrangements could allow for the provision of security for combatants andcommunities, while some form of vetting and transitional justice materializes.7.The Cambodian KR de facto autonomous zone, the Labora Farm in NorthernUganda, and the Colombian agro-businesses and ‘soft policing’ units (like theKosovo Protection Corps, the South African Development Corps, the AfghanMilitia, and the Pesh Merga) all represent IS-like measures, buying time andallowing for other economic and social psychological adjustments to take place,and for legal and bureaucratic structures to be developed and strengthened. Ineffect, Interim Stabilization measures can compensate, temporarily, for weak statecapacity to provide security and basic services.At the time of the signing of a peace agreement, there is usually no comprehensiveagreement on long-term power sharing and state institutional arrangements.In situations where there is a lack of patience in society and within the variousfighting groups, a phase of Interim Stabilization might provide the time-outneeded to sort out difficult political disagreements. The Kosovo ProtectionCorps is an illustrative example, where the final status of the former KLA was tobe determined within the framework of the negotiations over the final status ofKosovo.IV. The State of the Economy:Labor Absorption and Property RightsAs previously noted, one of the main challenges of post-conflict peacebuildingis securing sustainable livelihoods for returning combatants. Reintegrationprograms thus tend to be more successful in situations where the number ofcombatants has been very low or where the agricultural economy has been strongenough to effectively absorb returning soldiers without creating new conflicts.In environments where these conditions are lacking, a thorough analysis ofmarket potential and alternative livelihoods is even more needed. All too often,compensation or micro-credit programs have been launched with little connectionto local economic realities.79

As noted in the Cambodia case, access to land and assurance of property rightsmay be one of the most fundamental assets in an economy with limited capacityfor labor absorption. It has been held that the availability of arable land in Ugandaand Mozambique and northwest Cambodia, as well as easy market access toneighboring countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Thailand, have been thekey conditions for successful reintegration in these countries.Obviously, in a conflict where access to the economic assets is one of the causesit is even more important to asses the available opportunities or market forces atplay; from land to credit. The illegal drug trades in countries like Afghanistan andColombia provides attractive incentives for combatants and warlords to continuelife as they know it. Simply offering them a reintegration package of money orallowances will doubtfully suffice. Creating platforms, such as NGOs or civilianservice corps, could become components of a transformational process, in whichthe mindset of combatants are gradually shifted and some sense of legitimacy oracceptance in the broader society is valued over purely material incentives. Initialstabilization measures that can help develop the possibilities for a society based onthe rule of law may change aspirations when combatants notice the lower risk ofentering into political life or being a part of the legal economy.V. The Character of Communities and CombatantsMost cases examined in this study have displayed the following commoncharacteristics: Negligible asset bases (poverty); low levels of education amongcombatant; limited vocational and life-skills (even the ability to interview for a jobor open a bank account) combined with a weak capacity for labor absorption in theeconomy.In such environments, Interim Stabilization could provide an opportunity toraise vocational skill levels through proper training, strengthen life skills throughcounselling and advisory services and build an opportunity/asset base throughefforts to create opportunities, ensure property rights, and inspire and facilitateentrepreneurship.Facing a negligible asset base, the risk of combatants turning to ‘illegitimate’activities such as criminality or re-recruitment to rebel groups is exacerbated. Aperiod of Interim Stabilization could effectively provide an acceptable transitionalalternative.80

Maintaining Social Cohesion and Control StructuresIn addition to the political factors shaping the transition from war to peace,the nature and extent of social bonds and trust (i.e. social capital) are extremelyimportant. Especially the bonds between former combatants and theircommanders may engender a form of internal cohesiveness of the fighting units,which in turn provides social and psychological comfort. However, such inwardlooking bonds of survival among combatants can be transformed into crosscutting bridges of opportunity between combatants and communities if a newsocial compact is created. In this process time and space is essential to allowfor alternative leadership (civil rather than military), organizational and legalpeacetime structures to be established and social psychological adjustmentsto take place. The timely provision of counselling and life skills socializationfor combatants becomes as important as vocational skills in terms of theiradaptability to a normal civilian life.7.In Colombia, within the Medellin reintegration program, an IS-like solutionevolved in the form of life skills training program combined with the mixing ofregular police with unarmed former AUC combatants (so called security civilianaids or soft policing) into integrated units.The counter factual to this approach is perhaps the poor outcome of the Laborafarm in Uganda, where LRA structures where kept intact but totally isolated fromthe normal civilian structures of surrounding communities and the political lifeof Uganda. Security and agricultural inputs were provided at arms length by theGovernment, but the former LRA-commanders were, in effect, allowed to recreatethe same oppressive structures on which their control in the bush was based. Oneof the key lessons here, for the purposes of the present study, is that maintainingsocial cohesion of the rank and file combatants may be an effective instrumentfor ‘control and social support’ during the transition (a time bound period); butthat some form of civilian authority is essential in order to provide legitimacy andmanage such risks.The Importance of Agency, Livelihood, and LegitimacyIn addition to cohesiveness or social support during the transition, agency (i.e.,a sense of efficacy and self management or control), livelihood, and legitimacybecome the operative constructs in a successful social and economic reintegrationframework. These elements constitute a carefully considered Interim Stabilizationprogram as part and parcel of an unbundled and phased reintegration program.One Khmer Rouge commander took on the civilian status as provincial81

administrator, gained three years of de facto autonomy by negotiating a pledge ofsupport from the national government in exchange for a pledge of loyalty and nonresistance.The KR provided each family in the autonomous area with the materialincentives of two cows, five hectares of agricultural land, and five thousand Baht;thereby ensuring their livelihood. They maintained a cohesive organizationalstructure with ranks in the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and positions inthe local government. They shared (though the extent of sharing is unknown)the lucrative ‘asset base’ of logging and mining concessions conceded to the KR.Providing a sense of agency, maintaining organizational cohesion, ensuring accessto land and livelihood, and giving legitimacy became the key ingredients of theCambodian Hun Sen Government’s “Win-Win policy”.The Paramount Chief of the Acholi noted that, despite the drawbacks of theLabora farm experiment, the farm allowed for the LRA to: (i) Experiencerehabilitation through productive farm labor; (ii) gain a sense of agency andself reliance as they produced their own food, not reinforcing the dependencysyndrome of the IDP camps; (iii) establish a secure, legitimate place for themto rest their minds and clarify their feelings and; (iv) the Farm also created analternative attraction to others to come in from the bush free of fear, communitystigmatization, and destitution. These are all important constructive functionscontributing to stability. The key thing to do differently, as noted above, would beto place the project under civilian authority, strengthening the legitimacy of thefarm and its leaders by providing a transparent and accountable local governancestructure for the program.Establishing Incentives through TransitionalInstitutional ArrangementsThe conventional economic mantra espouses that if one gets the prices and wagesright then everything else in the economy will fall into place. With regard to thesuccessful transition from a war to a peace economy, getting the institutions andincentives right becomes paramount.The institutional arrangements and incentives are at the heart of achievinga successful Interim Stabilization. Regarding transitional institutionalarrangements, the country case studies brought out some interesting examples.The Khmer Rouge (KR) in Cambodia negotiated a de facto autonomous zone.The Government of Uganda sponsored the Labora agricultural farm for theLRA, providing what could have been a similar organizational holding patternin Northern Uganda. In Colombia, the Auxiliares civicos en convivencia y seguridad82

ciudadana (i.e. security civilian aides or soft policing) under the Mayor’s office inMedellin, the NGO Corporacion Democracia (CD) and the Buscandao CaminosBuenos (BCB) agri-businesses, were also all legitimate transitional institutionalarrangements for para military groups. The same is true for the transformation ofarmed groups into civilian service corps and similar organizations in South Africaand Kosovo.7.The incentives are similar in all case studies and most of the other relevantexperiences surveyed, that is: (i) agency or a sense of efficacy and control;(ii) meaningful alternative work and material sustenance and; (iii) conferredlegitimacy within a framework of social cohesion and mutual support. Asexpressed by an Acholi Paramount Chief in discussing the redeeming benefitsof the Labora farm: “It allowed their minds and bodies to rest under acceptableconditions of security and rehabilitation through productive labor”. When areintegration package, or a civil servant wage, cannot compete with the offersfrom warlords or criminal gangs, some form of societal legitimacy when comingout from the shadows can be a powerful additional incentive.Whether these institutional arrangements were conceived as measures of InterimStabilization or not is a moot point. They all provide some form of agency(social cohesion and efficacy), livelihood, and legitimacy whereby time, space,and stability is provided for adjustment and preparation of broader transitionalprograms and reform initiatives.Of course, freedom from prosecution or extradition is the final desire of rebel ormilitia groups such as KR, LRA, and AUC alike. This brings the importance oftransitional or restorative justice into play. A means of addressing past crimesshort of blanket amnesty needs to be balanced with some form of justice, acceptedby perpetrators and victims alike. As mentioned above, a key function of InterimStabilization in this respect would be the provision of time and space to undertakeproper vetting for crimes committed during the conflict and to put into place thenecessary institutional framework for dealing with such crimes.Converting Potential Spoilers to StakeholdersTransforming spoilers into stakeholders is the crux of the war to peace transition.Reintegration is a complex, slow and long process comprised of political, economicand social psychological dimensions. It cannot simply be reduced to a set of quicktechnical fixes (e.g. providing skill training and micro-credit) or rearranging of theparts (targeting communities rather than combatants). In effect, the Cambodia83

case further breaks these processes down into the pragmatics of:(i) Military Integration; (ii) administrative integration into public structures andservices, and; (iii) socio-economic reintegration or access and participation ofgroups into the civilian social and economic life of the local, regional and nationalcommunities.Taken in their totality, the social (institutional) and psychological aspects may inthe end be more important than the economic and political dimensions, especiallyfor groups which have experienced long standing patterns of marginalization. TheKR, the FARC, and the LRA particularly fall into this category. Attending to thesocial compact between the combatants and their communities, between the Stateand its citizens, particularly at the edges or in sub-national areas or ungovernedterritories is one of the main current challenges to contemporary war-to-peacetransitions.As has been shown by a number of the cases examined in this study, inclusion of allpotential spoilers in the peace process is crucial to avoid a relapse into conflict.Managing RisksThere are a number of risks associated with Interim Stabilization measures.As we have seen in the cases discussed above, for example, IS measures runthe risks of reconstructing oppressive structures, providing impunity fromjustice, facilitating criminality and maintaining illegal networks (drugs, moneylaundering, etc.) and promoting the continuation of illegitimate control overnatural resources. Like other peacebuilding efforts, IS measures also run the riskof creating new dependencies, or becoming isolated from other main pillars of thepeacebuilding process. These are valid concerns that need to be managed. Placingany IS-program under civilian authority (transparent and accountable governancestructures) may be a key to managing such risks. Establishing clear time framesor sunset clauses for such transitional arrangements or holding patterns, may beanother risk management approach.Strengthening socialization programs through promoting social-psychologicalassistance, introducing courses on “citizenship competencies”, and generallyraising the focus on life skills as well as vocational skills (as was done in Colombia)can also contribute to managing the risks of retaining pernicious command andcontrol structures during the transition.84

The case studies have illustrated a number of difficulties and risks connected tothe implementation of IS-measures. However, it can be argued that this is merelyindicative of the difficulties involved in all war-to-peace transitions. Innovative,high risk and high gain measures such as the establishment of temporaryIS-measures, or holding patterns, may in some cases be just the trade-off needed toaddress weak state institutions, faltering economy and potential security vacuumimmediately after a peace agreement.7.85

8.8. Conclusions andRecommendationsBuying Time and Space During Early TransitionPost-conflict periods in war-torn countries are often beleaguered by ongoingoccurrences of violence among warring parties. Even when large-scale peaceoperations are in place (as in Bosnia and Kosovo) distrust is rife among formerenemies, often making it impossible to demilitarize and disarm (Colletta andNezam, 1999). Finding means to end cycles of violence through disarmament,demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants back into theircommunities is therefore a prerequisite for building sustained peace (Annan,2006). DDR programs can fill a number of important functions in a post-conflictsetting: Signalling a cessation of hostilities; downsizing and undercutting thelegitimacy of warring militia; and if successful re-establishing a monopoly overthe use of force by a legitimate government. However, DDR-programs must bemeticulously planned and implemented in an environment with at least a minimallevel of stability and security.This study has aimed at providing support to negotiators, facilitators andmediators in peace processes who face the challenges of balancing the needfor security and stability with longer-term demilitarization, institutional andeconomic reconstruction, transitional justice and development efforts. Theabstract notion of Interim Stabilization has emerged as a more sharply definedconcept, providing alternative options in situations where there is a need for atime-out or holding pattern in order to buy time and space to prepare the groundfor the continued peace process.87

Putting Interim Stabilization to use, as a transitional peace-building tool, requiresnegotiators and mediators to have a firm understanding of the contextual factorsshaping the timing and sequencing of such measures in relationship to otherpeace-building elements: The nature of the war and the nature of the peace;the governance capacity of the state; the condition of the economy; the humancapital and the labor market; and the social organization and cohesiveness of theparties to the conflict. These are all critical variables to be weighed in the planningand design of Interim Stabilization measures, preferably already during thenegotiation process.Getting the Transitional Incentives andInstitutional Arrangements RightInstitutional arrangements and incentives are critical variables in the equationof sustainable peace. Negotiators could therefore, as an alternative to stalemate,consider transitional organizational arrangements such as semi-autonomouszones of control, the creation of non-governmental bodies, civilian service corps,and public sector employment under civil control, retaining for a limited periodof time the organizational and social cohesiveness of former rebel factions butunder civilian authority. Such transitional institutional arrangements may holdthe keys to transforming “perverted” social capital into “virtuous” or bridgingsocial capital 10 , and linking this shift with effective, transparent and accountablegovernance.The incentives need to address agency (i.e., a sense of efficacy or control) and socialcohesion as well as economic (asset transfer and livelihoods) and political (powersharing) requisites in creating a durable peace. Agency and Legitimacy are centralconstructs in the renegotiation of the social compact between communities andrebels – States and citizens. Maintaining organizational coherence, position andstructure, as commanders become foremen and warlords become governors withcombatants becoming employees or shareholders in economic enterprises, may bean essential compromise in making stakeholders out of potential spoilers, endingthe bloodshed and enabling conditions for peace and development to take hold.Already in the early transition period, greater attention needs to be given to amore customized reintegration program focusing on the social and psychologicalneeds, and the citizenship and life skills of former combatants. Reintegration andintegration should not simply be reduced to vocational training and political power10. For an elaboration on these concepts, see Colletta, Nat J. and Michelle Cullen, (2000) ViolentConflict and the Transformation of Social Capital, The World Bank: Washington, D.C.88

sharing in the military. In this regard, buying time may be essential for both thehuman and the market dimensions to adjust from wartime to a peacetime economy.All this is not to say that justice should be swept under the carpet of stability,allowing those who have committed crimes against humanity to go unpunishedthrough a blanket amnesty. Again, it is a question of timing and sequencing.Leaving the door open for justice (a central recommendation of the SIDDRFinal Report), is essential. This was done in the Cambodian law abolishing theKhmer Rouge, through an explicit exemption of crimes against humanity fromthe general amnesty. As illustrated by the continuous revision of the ColombianPeace and Justice Law, striking a balance between amnesty and justice is a work inprogress. Justice delayed does not necessarily have to result in justice denied.8.Key Recommendations to Negotiators, Mediators,and DDR-SSR Program PlannersIn conclusion, the following general and preliminary recommendations areoffered to peace negotiators, mediators, and program planners:› Assess the contextual factors (e.g. nature of war; nature of peace; labor market;state capacity and reach; etc.) shaping the needs and opportunities in each givensituation, and consider the feasibility of an Interim Stabilization measures (or“holding pattern”).› Provide options for relevant Interim Stabilization, including organizationalarrangements (e.g. NGO front, political party, semi-autonomous zone ofcontrol, rural agri-business or other commercial enterprise, urban public servicedelivery, military, police, customs, and intelligence service integration, etc.),incentives and concrete destigmatizing activities as means for continued trustbuilding.› The incentives need to address agency (i.e. a sense of efficacy or control) andsocial cohesion (social psychological support) as well as economic (asset transferand livelihoods) and political (power sharing) requisites in creating a durablepeace.› Include all stakeholders and potential spoilers in the process to strengthenthe support of agreements and the provision of accountable, committed, andlegitimate national counterparts for international actors; friends and supportersof the peace process.89

› Place the Interim Stabilization measure under a transparent and accountablecivilian authority; respect for basic human rights should always be maintained.› Do not close the door for dealing with crimes committed during the conflictfurther down the line, for example by offering a complete blanked amnesty forcrimes against humanity.› Consider the fit of the Interim Stabilization within the DDR-SSR nexus inparticular, and the overall peacemaking and peacebuilding framework, e.g.security, justice, elections and governance, economic reconstruction, etc, ingeneral.› Identify financing requirements and sources for an Interim Stabilizationmeasure.› Establish coordination and monitoring mechanisms for the preparation andimplementation and maintain preparedness at the level of the civilian authorityto intervene if the IS arrangement derails.For peace negotiators, the concept of Interim Stabilization may prove vital whenattempting to simultaneously find political solutions, manage the armies andarms – the fear and uncertainty of thousands of former combatants and affectedcommunities during the reintegration and recovery process – and eventuallyreform the entire security sector. Providing further detailed guidelines emanatingfrom this study to peace negotiators and reintegration program designers wouldmake an important contribution to the field and practice of peace building andpost conflict reconstruction.90

Annex 1Definitions of DDR terminology established by the UNDisarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms,ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and oftenalso of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development ofresponsible arms management programmes. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants fromarmed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extendfrom the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massingof troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments,assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses thesupport package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilizationbut prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form oftransitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and theirfamilies and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter,medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process ofdevelopment, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance tomeet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status andgain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a socialand economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place incommunities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a countryand a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.(Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).91

Annex 2Methodology: Interview Guide andSample Thematic QuestionnaireBalancing Security and Reintegration:A Study of Military Transitional Programs for Addressing the Reintegrationof Former Combatants 11Interviewer GuideIn-depth interviews are meant to draw specific information and lessons, as wellas to initiate dialog with key-informants. Each interview should start with anintroduction to set the tone of the interview and to define the vocabulary that weare using. Cogently define a military transitional program so that the respondentshave complete certainty of the concept. Then reiterate its relationship with earlyreintegration.Interviewers may utilize the following definition:Military transitional programs, MTPs, are programs that keep the former combatants’ chain ofcommand generally intact within a military or civilian structure, while providing early and shortterm reintegration assistance such as transitional economic safety net, job training, counseling, andgeneral information to the vast majority of these combatants.Yet in many cases we introduce the concept of an MTP only as a heuristic to helpexplain our aim of managing early transitional reintegration phases.Key-Informant Interviews (sample frame)The protocol questions for the key- informants are very similar. The questionsmove in sections designed to elicit an understanding of the problem at hand(contextual factors), the response it received through program specifics (program11. This was the working title of the research project. The term “Military Transitional Programs” wassubsequently abandoned for Interim Stabilization (IS).93

design), its implementation, costs and sources of financing, and impact on thesecurity environment/ reintegration.The crux of these interviews – especially with key informants that have a handin designing and implementing programs – is to: (i) get a clear sense of how theconflict ended and what programmatic features defined early and transitionalreintegration attempts, and ii) understand how these features addressed or didnot address security sector issues and the preparation for long-term social andeconomic reintegration in the future.Figure 1.Relationship Between Transitional and Long Term ReintegrationI. Beginning Phase II. Mid- to Late- PhasesEarly and Transitional Reintegration Sustainable ReintegrationFocusStability/SecurityFocusLivelihood/Social AcceptanceOnce key informants are identified in reintegration processes, one can gatherthe above information through the interviews. Key informants include programdesigners, monitoring and evaluation supervisors (teams), key members ofagencies who implemented the programs, leaders who were either responsible foraspects of the program or dealt first hand with the effects and implementation ofreintegration programs, donors who financed the program, and the excombatantsthemselves.Four sections of protocol questions comprise the “key-informant” interviews.1. Problem Identification: What were the Key Contextual Factors that Shape theEmergence of early transitional reintegration?This focus of this section is to understand and evaluate socio-economicconditions shaping the post-conflict environment, the nature of politicalsettlement after violence, and the capacity of the state vis a vis militarycapacity, and finally labor market structure. This is perhaps the most importantinformation if we are to give political advice to peace negotiators interested indealing with former combatants in the moment’s right after violent conflict hasceased.94

2. The Program: What’s the Program Rationale, Objectives, Activities, and Costs?(Design Characteristics and Details)This section should seamlessly move from the contextual questions intoprogram specifics. The protocol questions are formulated to get “quick-anddirty” responses in regards to the form and content of reintegration programsthat we identify, their cost and resource information, and the important societalactors associated with their creation.3. Implementation Arrangements: How, who, what was implemented?For implementation the protocol questions should guide dialog about theobstacles that different reintegration programs face when they are set inmotion. So while the prior section might identify a particular design strategy –community based approach, public works programs, etc – the implementation ofthem is just as crucial.4. Program Impact and Effectiveness: What were the major impacts(positive and negative), Effectiveness, and Lessons Learned?In the closing section the protocol questions are devised to close the gap betweenearly transitional reintegration and long-term (sustainable) reintegration(Figure 1): this information and set of responses are invaluable in helpingto define early transitional programs as a viable policy alternative in theearly phases of reintegration. Thus questioning should seek to evaluate ifclear linkages and causal associations can be made between the content andimplementation of transitional reintegration and the “preparedness” for longtermreintegration in the future.Former Combatant Interviews (Individual)Interviews with the ex-combatants have a different focus than the key-informantones. In these, the principal aim is to evaluate ex-combatant perceptions of theeffectiveness of the reintegration programs in early phases that they were a partof, e.g., what was useful and why? Other background information is still essential.The sections move as following: (i) Demographic characteristics, (ii) Needsassessment, (iii) Aspirations, and finally (iv) program perceptions. Note thatthis is an opportunity to assess combatants’ propensity to take voluntary part indisarmament and reintegration programs in order to overcome distrust and fear(Walter 1997).95

Sample Thematic QuestionnaireKey Informant InterviewProblem Identification and Program Objectives1. Nature of the settlement:a. What problems were most pressing regarding the combatants: Stability?Security? Management of a peace agreement / ceasefire? Reduction in theintensity of conflict? Maintaining the status quo?b. What specifically did the peace agreement / negotiations specify to do withthe combatants / groups of combatants? Why?2. State Capacity:a. Generally, what was the state capacity at the time of the settlement?b. How much of a role did the state play in the peace agreement?3. Economic conditions:a. What as the state of the economy with regards to labor market stability, i.e.,can labor markets absorb waves of ex-combatants?4. How was the program intended to address these problems?Program Design1. Targeted groups:a. Who were the combatants to be managed / what groups of combatants wereto be managed?b. How did the program define “combatants?”c. Was there a “vetting” element of identifying combatants who might later betried under transitional justice mechanisms?d. Approximately how many ex-combatants were served?e. Which groups were left out?2. Implementers:a. Which actors were involved in planning this program?b. Are these the same actors charged with implementation?c. What was the level of interaction between those implementing the programand the state?3. Needs of ex-combatants:a. Which needs of these combatants did the program address?b. How were these needs identified?96

c. In retrospect, were there other needs that also should have been addressed?4. Programs Activities:a. Describe the services or other assistance offered through the program inpreparation for formal / sustainable reintegration?b. How were economic needs addressed?c. How were health and psychosocial needs addressed?d. How were educational/training needs addressed?e. What other needs were addressed?f. Were other ex-combatant populations treated differently (egg. Gender, Age)?g. What organizations delivered these services?h. What was the duration of assistance?5. How much did the program cost? Who funded it? Were the costs enough? Ifnot, why, and how could the program have been funded differently and or moreeffectively?6. What kind of resources existed for the transitional program (i.e., source,amount, duration)?a. Staffb. Personnelc. Equipmentd. Locations / spacee. Were the resources sufficient?i. If no, what resources were missing or lacking, and in what programmaticarea?f. What trade-offs were made due to limited resources in terms of determiningwhat type of assistance to provide? How were these decisions made?7. As far as sequencing of programs went: was there an adequate distinctionbetween short- medium- and long- term goals?a. If so, what variables were these distinctions based off of? How did thedistinctions translate into different programmatic aspects?b. If not, why?ImplementationIn planning the transitional program, what were the working relationships withother Government actors?International organizations?Local NGO’s?97

Local communities?How was success defined?Was the program a success?What were the biggest obstacles encountered?Were they overcome and if so how?In retrospect, how could the obstacles have been handled differently?What were the “lessons learned?”Impact1. How many ex-combatants took part in the program?2. Did a formal / sustainable reintegration program follow the transitionalprogram?a. If yes, what did / does it look like?3. To what extent did the transitional program affect the success of long-termreintegration?a. How many ex-combatants from the transitional program took part insustainable reintegration efforts?b. Did the ex-combatants view the program as a success?4. What were the working relationships with othera. Government actorsb. International organizationsc. Local NGOsd. Local communities5. How was success defined?6. Was the program a success?7. What were the unforeseen factors affecting the success of the program?a. Security factorsb. Societal factorsc. Economic factorsd. Political factors98

Annex 3Select BibliographyAlexander, Jessica & Amra Sabic-El-Rayess; “Disarmament, Demobilization, and ReintegrationEvolution: Learning from the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in Fitz-Gerald, Ann M. & Mason,Hilary (eds.); “From Conflict to Community: A Combatants Return to Citizenship”, Shrivenham,Cranfield University, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), UnitedKingdom, 2005Amnesty International; “Democratic Republic of Congo – Disarmament, Demo bilization andReintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army”, January 2007Annan, Kofi; “UN Secretary General’s Foreword to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization,Reintegration Standards” (http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/foreword.pdf), December 2006Ball, Nicole & Hendrickson, Dylan; “Review of International Financing Arrangements forDisarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Phase 2”, in Sundh, Lena & SamuelssonSchjørlien, Jens (eds.); “Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration,Background Studies”, The Swedish Government Offices, Sweden, 2006Boshoff, Henri; “Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration in the Demo cratic Republic ofCongo: Pretext for a Successful Transition”, in Fitz-Gerald, Ann M. & Mason, Hilary (eds.); “FromConflict to Community: A Combatants Return to Citizenship”, Shrivenham, Cranfield University,Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), United Kingdom, 2005Boshoff, Henri (2005 II); “Update on the status of army integration in the DRC”, Situation Report,Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, September 2, 2005Boshoff, Henri; “Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration in the Democratic Republic ofCongo: A never-ending story”, African Security Review 16.2, Institute for Security Studies, SouthAfrica, July 2, 2007Bouckaert, Peter; “South Africa: The Negotiated Transition from Apartheid to Non-racialDemocracy”, in “Words Over War”, the Carnegie Corporation of New York(http://peacemaker.unlb.org/doc_view.php?d=388&q=Bouckaert)99

Brzoska, Michael; “Embedding DDR Programmers in Security Sector Reconstruction” in Bryden,Alan & Hänggi, Heiner (eds.); “Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peace building”, GenevaCentre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 2006Call, Charles T. & Stanley, William; “Civilian Security” in Stedman, Rotchild & Cousens (eds.);“Ending Civil Wars: The implementation of peace agreement”, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2001Caramés, Albert, Fisas, Vicenç & Sanz, Eneko; “Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration (DDR) programs existing in the world during 2006”, Escola de Cultura de Pau, March2007Castaño, Carlos, Duque, Iván Roberto, Mancuso, Salvatore, Castaño, Vicente et al.; “Las AUC siguensiendo políticas y legítimamente válidas como interlocutores del conflicto colombiano”(www.colombialibre.org), October 8, 2002de Chastelain, John; ”The Northern Ireland Peace Process and the impact of decommissioning” inBric, Maurice J. & Coakley, John (eds); “From political violence to negotiated settlement”, UniversityCollege Dublin Press, 2004Colletta, Nat J., Kostner, Markus & Wiederhofer, Ingo; “The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Directions in Development, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1996Colletta, Nat J. & Nezam, Taies; “From Reconstruction to Reconciliation”, Development Outreach,The World Bank Group, 1999Colletta, Nat J. & Cullen, Michelle; “Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital:Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia”, The World Bank Group, 2000Colprensa; “2.000 ex AUC serán policías cívicos”, Bogotá, September 29, 2005Cooper, Robert Neil; “Demilitarization and (Lack of?) Transformation in Kosovo”, Geneva Centerfor Security Policy, 2000Doria, José; “Angola, a case study in the challenges of achieving peace and the question of amnesty orprosecution of war crimes in mixed armed conflicts”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law,2004Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert; “Swords into ploughshares: Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa”, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Paper120, January 2006.DRC – Presidential Decree 003/042 of December 2003 on the creation of CONANDERDRC – Presidential Decree 004/014 of January 2004 on the creation and operation of the SMIEveratt, David (ed.); “Only Useful Until Democracy? Reintegrating ex-combatants in South Africa”,Atlantic Philanthropies, South Africa, 2007Fearon, James D.; “Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?”, Journal of PeaceResearch 41 (3), p 275–301, 2004100

Fitz-Gerald, Ann M. & Mason, Hilary (eds.); “From Conflict to Community: A Combatants Return toCitizenship”, Shrivenham, Cranfield University, Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform(GFN-SSR), United Kingdom, 2005Glassmyer, Katherine & Sambanis, Nicholas; “Rebel-Military Integration and Civil WarTermination”, Yale University – Political Science, 2007Hartzell, Caroline & Hoddie, Matthew; “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-CivilWar Conflict Management”, American Journal of Political Science 47 (2)Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas & Paes, Wolf-Christian; “Wag the Dog: the Mobilization andDemobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army”, BICC brief 20, BICC, Friedrich NaumannStiftung, August 2001Hethy, Lajos; “Employment and Workers’ Protection in Kosovo”, 2/2000 South-East Europe Review,2000Hoddie, Matthew & Hartzell, Caroline; “Civil War Settlement and the Implementation of Militarypower-Sharing Agreements”, Journal of peace Research 40 (3), 2003Human Rights First; “A Fragile Peace: Laying the Foundation for Justice in Kosovo”(http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/kosovofull1099.htm)Human Rights Watch; “Angola Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola”, “Chapter V ChildSoldiers in Angola Following the conflict”(http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/angola0403/Angola0403-04.htm), 2003Humphreys, Macartan & Weinstein, Jeremy; “Disentangling the Determinants of SuccessfulDemobilization and Reintegration” Unpublished Manuscript, 2005Hänggi, Heiner; “Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peace building”, Geneva Center for theDemocratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 2005International Center for Transitional Justice, de Greiff, Pablo & Duthie, Roger; “Transitional Justiceand Social Reintegration” in “SIDDR Background Studies”, 2006International Crisis Group; “What Happened to the KLA?”, Balkans Report 88: Pristina/Washington, ICG (www.crisisgroup.org), 2000International Crisis Group; “Security Sector Reform in the Congo”, Africa Report 104, February2006International Peace Academy; “A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, andReintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations”, IPA, New York, December 2002ISS; “Case Study of Demobilization in Cambodia” in “Demobilization and its Aftermath – A profileof South Africa’s Demobilized Military Personnel”(www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No59/Chap5.html), Monograph No 59, August 2001101

Katzman, Kenneth & Prados, Alfred B.; “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, CRS Reports forCongress” (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 44128.pdf14 March), 2005Kusovac, Zoran; “Interview with General Agim Ceku”, James Defence Weekly, 20 October 1999di Lellio, Anna; “A Civil Alternative: An Evaluation of the IOM KPC Program”, BeyondIntractability Version II, University of Chicago, July 2005Makinda, Samuel M.; “Disarmament and Reintegration of Combatants”, in Maley, William (ed);“From Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States”, UnitedNations University Press, New York, 2003Malan, Mark; “Disarming and Demobilizing Child Soldiers: The Underlying Challenges”, AfricanSecurity Review Vol. No. 5/6, Pretoria, South Africa, 2000Mashike, Leophotho; “Some of us know nothing except military skills’: South Africa’s formerguerrilla combatants”, in Buhlungu, Sakhela, Daniel, John, Southall, Roger & Lutchman, Jessica(eds); “State of the Nation: South Africa 2007”, HSRC PressMcMullin, Jeremy; “Far From Spontaneous: Namibia’s Long Struggle with Ex-CombatantReintegration”, in Fitz-Gerald, Ann M. & Mason, Hilary (eds.); “From Conflict to Community: ACombatants Return to Citizenship”, Shrivenham, Cranfield University, Global Facilitation Networkfor Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), United Kingdom, 2005MDRP Quarterly Report, January – March 2005 (www.mdrp.org)MDRP Quarterly Report, July–September 2005 (www.mdrp.org)Mgbako, Chi; “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol.18, pp. 201–224Mills, Greg; “BMATT and Military Integration in southern Africa”, South Africa Defence ReviewNo. 2, 1992Muggah, Robert; “No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa”, Zed Books, New York,2006OECD/DAC; “Security System Reform and Governance”, OECD Publishing, 2005Ohta, Itaru & Gebre, Yntiso; “Displacement Risks in Africa: Refugees, Resettlers, and Their HostPopulation”, Kyoto University Press and Trans Pacific Press, Melbourne, Australia, 2005Parsons, Imogen; ”Beyond the silencing of guns: demobilization, disarmament and reintegration”,Conciliation Resources(http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/ demobilization-reintegration.php), 2004Petersen, Erik; “The Kosovo Protection Corps in Search of a Future”, Center for European Studies,September 2005Pouligny, Beatrice; “The Politics and Anti-politics of Contemporary ‘Disarmament, Demobilization,102

and Reintegration’ Programs”, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, September 2004Rees, Edward; “Public Security Management and Peace Operations: Kosovo and UNMIK –Never Land”, in Ebnöther, Anja H. & Fluri, Philipp (eds.); “After Intervention: Public SecurityManagement in Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership”, Bureaufor Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, National Defence Academy, Vienna &Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed ForcesRoggio, Bill; “The Sunni Awakening”, The Long War Journal(www.longwarjournal.org/archives/s007/05/the_sunni_awakening.php)Rubini, Juan; ” Las autodefensas desmovilizadas de Colombia, ¿volverían al monte en son de paz?”,Punto y Aparte, January 2008Rusagara, Brig. Gen. Frank K.; “Military Integration as an Integral Part of the Peacebuilding Processin Transition to Democratic Governance”, unpublished memo, Kigeli, Rwanda, 2004Schedler, Andreas; “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections”, International PoliticalScience Review 23, No. 1, pp. 103–122, 2002Schnabel, Albrecht & Ehrhart, Hans-Georg; “Security Sector reform and Post-ConflictPeacebuilding” United Nations University Press, 2005Scott, W. Richard; “Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems”, Prentice Hall, 5thedition, New Jersey, 2003Sebahara, Pamphile; “La réforme du secteur de la sécurité en RD Congo”, Groupe de recherche etd’information sur la paix et la sécurité, Brussels, March 13, 2006South African Defence Review; Chapter 10, § 126, Pretoria, 1996Sundh, Lena & Samuelsson Schjørlien, Jens (eds.); “Stockholm Initiative on DisarmamentDemobilisation Reintegration, Background Studies”, The Swedish Government Offices, Sweden,2006Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou; “Human Security: Concepts and implications”, Les Etudes du CERI No117–118, September 2005Theidon, Kimberly; “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ofFormer Combatants in Colombia”, The International Journal of Transitional Justice Vol. 1, 2007, p55–90, 2007Thruelsen, Peter Dahl; “From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegrationin Afghanistan”, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, Report 2006:7Tsebelis, George; “Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics”, University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley and LA, California, 1990Walter, Barbara; “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”, International Organization Volume103

51, No. 3, 1997Walter, Barbara; “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, andCommitments to Peace”, International Security Volume 24, No. 1, 1997Walters, Stephanie & Boshoff, Henri; “The impact of slow military reform on the transition processin the DRC”, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, July 10, 2006Williams, Rocky; “Demobilization and Reintegration: The Key to the South African DefenceTransformation”, in Fitz-Gerald, Ann M. & Mason, Hilary (eds.); “From Conflict to Community:A Combatants Return to Citizenship”, Shrivenham, Cranfield University, Global FacilitationNetwork for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), United Kingdom, 2005World Bank; “Angola – Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration”,Project report no PID11534, 2003Reports & Web PagesAfrican Union; “Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa (PCRD)”;www.africa-union.org/PCRD.HTMEuropean Union; ”Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration”;http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU_Joint_concept_DDR.pdfGlobal Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR);www.ssrnetwork.netHigh-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; “A more secure world: our sharedresponsibility”, Report (A/59/565) addressed to the UN Secretary-General; www.un.org/secureworld,2 December 2004Human Security Centre, the University of British Columbia, Canada; “Human security report 2005”(www.humansecurityreport.info), Oxford University press Inc, 2005Iraq Constitution; www.uniraq.org/documents/ iraqi_constitution.pdfKosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR);http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_ver2.pdf, 2006http://www.khmerinstitute.org/docs/PPA1991.htmOECD, the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC);www.oecd.org/dac/conflictStockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (SIDDR);“Final Report”, “Background Studies” & “Testing the Principles” (Sudh & Samuelsson eds.);www.sweden.gov.se/siddrUnited Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS); www.unddr.orgUppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research Database;www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.phpWorld Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP); www.mdrp.org