Interim Stabilization Balancing Security and Development in Post ...
Interim Stabilization Balancing Security and Development in Post ...
Interim Stabilization Balancing Security and Development in Post ...
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AcknowledgementsThis study on <strong>Interim</strong> Stabilisation was commissioned by the Folke BernadotteAcademy, f<strong>in</strong>anced by the M<strong>in</strong>istry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden <strong>and</strong> undertakenby Nat J. Colletta, Hannes Berts <strong>and</strong> Jens Samuelsson Schjörlien of the Sthlm(Stockholm) Policy Group. The authors take sole responsibility for the analysis,f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> recommendations there<strong>in</strong>. The report does not necessarily representthe views of the FBA or the MFA as such.A special thank you is directed to the partners that prepared country casestudies as well as contributed to the conclud<strong>in</strong>g discussions on f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>recommendations: Colombia, Alex<strong>and</strong>ra Guáqueta <strong>and</strong> Gerson Arias of theFundación Ideas para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org); Cambodia, S<strong>in</strong>thay Neb <strong>and</strong>Sven Edquist of the Advocacy Policy Institute (www.api<strong>in</strong>stitute.org); <strong>and</strong>Ug<strong>and</strong>a, Justice Peter Onega <strong>and</strong> Fred Mugisha of the Amnesty Commission(www.amnestycom.go.ug). For the review of literature <strong>and</strong> relevant cases, thefollow<strong>in</strong>g persons have provided assistance: Calder Yates <strong>and</strong> Paolo Mastrangelo ofthe New College <strong>in</strong> Sarasota, Florida; Francis Musoni of the Rw<strong>and</strong>a Commissionfor Re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> their personal capacity; Rebecka Lundgren, JohanRutgersson, Fiona Rotberg <strong>and</strong> Anna Valve.The luxury of hav<strong>in</strong>g access to a competent <strong>and</strong> experienced network ofpractitio ners <strong>and</strong> academics with<strong>in</strong> the Stockholm Initiative of DDR has provento be an <strong>in</strong>valuable asset when discuss<strong>in</strong>g, writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> modify<strong>in</strong>g results <strong>and</strong>recommendations: Pablo de Greiff, International Center for Transitional Justice;Nita Yawanarajah, UN DPA; Kelv<strong>in</strong> Ong, UN DPKO; Sofie da Camara <strong>and</strong>Cornelis Steenken, UNDP BCRP; Hans Thorgren, Swedish National DefenceCollege; Inger Buxton, EU Commission <strong>and</strong> researcher Pierre-Anto<strong>in</strong>e Braud.The Chairs of the two additional SIDDR work<strong>in</strong>g groups, Virg<strong>in</strong>ia Gamba <strong>and</strong>Ambassador Jan Cedergren, deserves special mention for their ideas <strong>and</strong> guidance.The Folke Bernadotte Academy, which is a Swedish Governmental organizationwith a m<strong>and</strong>ate on tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> method development on <strong>in</strong>ternational conflict<strong>and</strong> crisis management, has served as a platform on which to present the ideas<strong>and</strong> recommendations of the study. The authors would like to recognize theconstructive collaboration with the Academy. In particular for the purpose of thisstudy: its conflict prevention unit, led by Ambassador Ragnar Ängeby <strong>and</strong> its SSRunit,led by Michaela Friberg-Storey. The Director General, Henrik L<strong>and</strong>erholm,<strong>and</strong> deputy Director General, Jonas Alberoth, have been <strong>in</strong>strumental, not onlyfor the realization of this project, but also for general Swedish efforts seek<strong>in</strong>g tomobilize the capacity of the <strong>in</strong>ternational community to collectively support peace<strong>and</strong> security.Lastly, we would be remiss if we did not especially acknowledge Ambassador
Lena Sundh at the MFA. Without her pioneer<strong>in</strong>g leadership <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>ternational knowledge base <strong>and</strong> experiences with<strong>in</strong> the field of peace, security<strong>and</strong> development this study would have never come to fruition. As Chairwomanof the Stockholm Initiative on DDR, she performed a balanced role as facilitatorof discussions, <strong>and</strong> at times moderator of contentious debates. We owe her ourthanks <strong>and</strong> admiration.Nat J. Colletta, Jens Samuelsson Schjørlien <strong>and</strong> Hannes BertsSthlm Policy GroupStockholm <strong>and</strong> Sarasota, December 2008
Table of ContentsAcronyms ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4.Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 111. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 13The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization Re<strong>in</strong>tegration ........................ 14Generative Dialogues <strong>in</strong> Promot<strong>in</strong>g Peace Processes ........................................................................................................... 16Rationale for a Study of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> (or “Hold<strong>in</strong>g Patterns”) ......................................... 162. Sett<strong>in</strong>g the Stage: Challenges <strong>in</strong> Early Transition <strong>and</strong> Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g .......................................... 19Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Key Contextual Factors .................................................................................................................................................. 19<strong>Balanc<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Development</strong> – Stability <strong>and</strong> Change ............................................................................ 20L<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g SSR <strong>and</strong> DDR <strong>in</strong> <strong>Post</strong> Conflict Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g ............................................................................................................. 223. Conceptualiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> ....................................................................................................................................................................... 23Clarify<strong>in</strong>g the Term<strong>in</strong>ology ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23Creat<strong>in</strong>g Space <strong>and</strong> Buy<strong>in</strong>g Time for Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g ..................................................................................................................... 24Strengthen<strong>in</strong>g Prospects for Durable Peace ................................................................................................................................................ 254. Study Objectives <strong>and</strong> Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................................... 27<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> as a Strategic Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g Measure ....................................................................................... 27The Methodology: From Desk Review to Fieldwork .............................................................................................................. 275. Review of Select <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> Approaches ............................................................................................................... 29Civil Service Corps ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30South African Service Corps ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30The Kosovo Protection Corps .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 33Military Integration ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
The DRC Brassage Process .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 36Angolan Ownership of the Military Integration Process ............................................................................40Nepal – Explor<strong>in</strong>g Opportunities for <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> ............................................................................ 43Transitional <strong>Security</strong> Forces ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 45The Transitional Afghan Militia Forces – a Necessary Initial Step ................................................... 45The Sunni Awaken<strong>in</strong>g ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 48Transitional Autonomy ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 49The Peshmerga <strong>in</strong> Kurdish Iraq – Autonomy <strong>in</strong> the Mak<strong>in</strong>g .......................................................................... 49Dialogue <strong>and</strong> Sensitization (Halfway-House arrangements) .............................................................................. 49The Rw<strong>and</strong>an Ing<strong>and</strong>o-process .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 496. Selected Country Fieldwork: Cambodia, Colombia <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a ..................................................... 55Cambodia ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 55Background <strong>and</strong> Rationale .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 55The Demise of the Khmer Rouge .................................................................................................................................................................................. 56The W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> Policy: Pragmatism Prevails <strong>in</strong> the Short Run ...................................................................... 58<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> Through Defacto Autonomy ............................................................................................................. 58Challenges, Issues <strong>and</strong> Key Lessons ........................................................................................................................................................................... 59Colombia .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61Background <strong>and</strong> Rationale .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61The Paramilitary (AUC) ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 62Corporación Democracia – a Transitional Institutional Arrangement ............................. 63Shareholder Agro Bus<strong>in</strong>ess as an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> Measure ..................................................... 64Individual DDR: Cooptation of Combatants .................................................................................................................................... 66The “Soft Polic<strong>in</strong>g” Track .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 67Challenges, Issues <strong>and</strong> Key Lessons ........................................................................................................................................................................... 67Ug<strong>and</strong>a ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 69Background <strong>and</strong> Rationale .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 69The Labora Farm Experiment – a Halfway-House Arrangement ................................................ 70Strategic Military Integration .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 72Ug<strong>and</strong>a National Rescue Front II ................................................................................................................................................................................... 72Challenges, Issues <strong>and</strong> Key Lessons ........................................................................................................................................................................... 73
7. Comparative Analysis:Contextual Factors Shap<strong>in</strong>g the Choice of IS Measures ........................................................................................... 75The Importance of Contextual Factors ................................................................................................................................................................... 751. The Nature <strong>and</strong> Duration of the Conflict ....................................................................................................................................... 76II. The Nature of the Peace .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 77III. Governance Capacity <strong>and</strong> Reach of the State .................................................................................................................... 79IV. The State of the Economy: Labor Absorption <strong>and</strong> Property Rights .......................... 79V. The Character of Communities <strong>and</strong> Combatants .................................................................................................... 80Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Social Cohesion <strong>and</strong> Control Structures ............................................................................................................ 81The Importance of Agency, Livelihood, <strong>and</strong> Legitimacy .................................................................................................. 81Establish<strong>in</strong>g Incentives through Transitional Institutional Arrangements .............................. 82Convert<strong>in</strong>g Potential Spoilers to Stakeholders ...................................................................................................................................... 83Manag<strong>in</strong>g Risks ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 848. Conclusions <strong>and</strong> Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................................ 87Buy<strong>in</strong>g Time <strong>and</strong> Space Dur<strong>in</strong>g Early Transition .................................................................................................................................. 8 7Gett<strong>in</strong>g the Transitional Incentives<strong>and</strong> Institutional Arrangements Right .......................................................................................................................................................................... 88Key Recommendations to Negotiators, Mediators,<strong>and</strong> DDR-SSR Program Planners .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 89ANNEX 1Def<strong>in</strong>itions of DDR term<strong>in</strong>ology established by the UN ............................................................................................... 91ANNEX 2Methodology: Interview Guide <strong>and</strong> Sample Thematic Questionaire .......................................... 93ANNEX 3Select Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 99
Executive SummaryIn the early phase of a transition from war to peace, numerous political aspirations<strong>and</strong> concerns of <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> groups must be carefully balanced. Mov<strong>in</strong>gfrom military conflict to susta<strong>in</strong>able peace requires a gradual adjustment by theconflict<strong>in</strong>g parties from a dependence on military sources of power to an abilityto operate as civilian actors <strong>in</strong> a peacetime society. Many DDR <strong>and</strong> SSR processesfail because the political environment (i.e. primarily the trust <strong>and</strong> confidence thateach party will stick to what have been agreed) are not ripe at the time of sign<strong>in</strong>gan agreement. Mediation efforts, program plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> even term<strong>in</strong>ology mustbe sensitive to cultural, economic, social <strong>and</strong> historical circumstances, allow<strong>in</strong>g forownership of a peace process, by its relevant stakeholders.The Stockholm Initiative on DDR recommended that “In order to avoidgaps between the short-term <strong>and</strong> the long-term focus, consideration might be given totemporarily ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ex-combatants, who are designated for a DDR programme, <strong>in</strong> amilitary structure, i.e. ‘hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern’. Such an <strong>in</strong>terim solution would provide the time<strong>and</strong> space for debrief<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> demilitarisation of the m<strong>in</strong>dset of ex-combatants.” (F<strong>in</strong>alReport, 2006). Further studies were recommended on “transitional mechanisms thatwould allow control over armed groups while await<strong>in</strong>g political solutions” (Test<strong>in</strong>g thePr<strong>in</strong>ciples, 2007).To better underst<strong>and</strong> such transitional mechanisms for balanc<strong>in</strong>g security <strong>and</strong>development, this study has been conducted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy<strong>and</strong> Sthlm Policy Group dur<strong>in</strong>g 2007/08. It elaborates on the idea of “hold<strong>in</strong>gpatterns”, as a possible means of deal<strong>in</strong>g with some of the obstacles to peace. Thestudy develops the concept of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> (IS), def<strong>in</strong>ed as measures thatMAY be used to keep former combatants’ cohesiveness <strong>in</strong>tact with<strong>in</strong> a military or civilianstructure, creat<strong>in</strong>g space for a political dialogue <strong>and</strong> the formation of an environmentconducive to social <strong>and</strong> economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration.In addition to a review of available literature, the study <strong>in</strong>cludes three <strong>in</strong>-countrycase studies where <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures have been put to the test:In Cambodia, we have studied the process <strong>in</strong> which former Khmer Rouge (KR)comm<strong>and</strong>ers were “de facto” provided an autonomous region with<strong>in</strong> the state11
<strong>in</strong> which <strong>in</strong>ternal re<strong>in</strong>tegration could be h<strong>and</strong>led without external <strong>in</strong>terference.(Study carried out by the Advocacy Policy Institute).In Colombia, our case study exam<strong>in</strong>es the processes of collective re<strong>in</strong>tegrationof paramilitaries, with comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control structures kept <strong>in</strong>tact, <strong>and</strong>simultaneous <strong>in</strong>dividual re<strong>in</strong>tegration of FARC <strong>and</strong> ELN rebels <strong>in</strong> civil-militaryroles dur<strong>in</strong>g ongo<strong>in</strong>g conflict/negotiations. (Study carried out by Fundación Ideaspara la Paz).In Ug<strong>and</strong>a, we have studied the example of the Labora farm, where LRA(Lord’s Resistance Army) troops were offered civilian alternatives <strong>in</strong> farm<strong>in</strong>gfor themselves <strong>and</strong> their families, with their military organization partly <strong>in</strong>tact.(Study carried out by the Kampala International School of Ethics <strong>and</strong> the Ug<strong>and</strong>aAmnesty Commission).The ma<strong>in</strong> rationale for IS-measures, common to all the cases exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> thisstudy, has been to help put an end to a situation of spiral<strong>in</strong>g violence <strong>and</strong> reducethe risk of resumption of hostilities by hold<strong>in</strong>g former combatants <strong>in</strong> formalstructures, thereby ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a critical level of security. We have identified atypology of five categories of arrangements that fall with<strong>in</strong> the IS-def<strong>in</strong>ition:1) creation of civilian service corps; 2) military <strong>in</strong>tegration arrangements; 3) creationof transitional security forces; 4) dialogue <strong>and</strong> sensitization programs <strong>and</strong> halfwayhousearrangements; 5) different forms of transitional autonomy. These categories arenot precise or mutually exclusive. In fact, <strong>in</strong> many cases <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>measures conta<strong>in</strong> elements resembl<strong>in</strong>g the characteristics of two or more of thesecategories.The objectives of <strong>in</strong>terim stabilization relate to the state level (to solveoutst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g issues relat<strong>in</strong>g to powers-shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional frameworks) as wellas to community- (to allow for <strong>in</strong>itial sensitization prepar<strong>in</strong>g for the return ofex-combatants, <strong>and</strong> a thorough analysis of transitional justice <strong>and</strong> reconciliationneeds) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual level (guarantee security through the ma<strong>in</strong>tenance ofcohesion through familiar structures, the sense of agency <strong>and</strong> legitimacy throughtransitional livelihood, <strong>and</strong>/or room for life skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> psycho-socialsupport).It is important to note that the concept of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> is not proposedas a m<strong>and</strong>atory first step <strong>in</strong> peace build<strong>in</strong>g, nor should it necessarily be conceivedas a new component of a DDR-SSR process. In fact, it may be considered a pre-DDR programme to manage security risks of premature demobilization. Theunderly<strong>in</strong>g assumption of the study, however, is that sometimes, conventionaltools are not sufficient to deal with security concerns <strong>in</strong> the immediate aftermathof violent conflicts. In such situations <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> could be <strong>in</strong>troduced toallow for other enabl<strong>in</strong>g factors to fall <strong>in</strong>to place.12
1.I. IntroductionThe necessity to <strong>in</strong>terl<strong>in</strong>k security <strong>and</strong> development oriented activities formsthe basis for contemporary <strong>in</strong>ternational peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g efforts. A number ofpeacebuild<strong>in</strong>g tools are available to facilitate the war to peace transition. Theconcepts of Disarmament, Demobilization <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration (DDR) <strong>and</strong><strong>Security</strong> Sector Reform (SSR) are two such tools. They can be employed tofacilitate the transfer of control over the security <strong>and</strong> military apparatus tocivilian authorities (i.e. break<strong>in</strong>g exist<strong>in</strong>g comm<strong>and</strong> structures) while cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>gthe political dialogue <strong>and</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g confidence between former rivals throughpower shar<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms. The concept of Transitional Justice (TJ), deal<strong>in</strong>gwith crimes committed by one or both sides to a conflict, is another key concept<strong>in</strong> peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g processes. Although TJ modalities are not the primary focusof this study, it is important to recognize <strong>and</strong> address justice concerns whenimplement<strong>in</strong>g DDR <strong>and</strong> SSR programs to ensure legitimacy <strong>and</strong> accountability,especially through the application of transparent vett<strong>in</strong>g processes.The successful employment of these peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g tools is dependent on acerta<strong>in</strong> level of stability, often lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the immediate aftermath of a violentconflict. This study sets out to explore ways <strong>in</strong> which m<strong>in</strong>imum levels of security<strong>and</strong> stability can be atta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the early phase after a peace agreement has beennegotiated <strong>and</strong> signed or when a cessation of hostilities is agreed. The work<strong>in</strong>ghypothesis is that political processes to build susta<strong>in</strong>able peace take time –often more than is available <strong>in</strong> the fragile period follow<strong>in</strong>g a peace agreement.Lack of quick results on the ground <strong>and</strong> impatience on both sides are oftenserious challenges. A rush to declare peace (<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the case of the <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommunity – to mark an exit strategy), <strong>in</strong> the absence of stability <strong>and</strong>opportunities for successful implementation of peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itiatives, is onemajor risk factor for relapse <strong>in</strong>to violence.This race aga<strong>in</strong>st time <strong>in</strong> early peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g is at the heart of the topic of thisstudy. The tool – or menu of options – that is proposed can be described as a time-13
out or a “hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern”, <strong>in</strong> order to allow for cont<strong>in</strong>ued political dialogue <strong>and</strong>measures to prepare <strong>in</strong>stitutions, communities <strong>and</strong> combatants for long-termpeacebuild<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration efforts. The term <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>(IS) is usedto conceptualize this phase of prepar<strong>in</strong>g for a susta<strong>in</strong>able transition. Unlike otherpeacebuild<strong>in</strong>g tools <strong>and</strong> concepts, <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> aims to describe a typeof measure def<strong>in</strong>ed by its tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> purpose, rather than a concrete measuredef<strong>in</strong>ed by its design. Hopefully this concept (<strong>and</strong> an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the keycontextual factors shap<strong>in</strong>g its use) can help broaden the range of options availableto negotiat<strong>in</strong>g parties, mediators <strong>and</strong> peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g program designers <strong>in</strong> thefield. Throughout the study, we will go through a number of possible designs ofIS-measures <strong>and</strong> analyze their respective strengths <strong>and</strong> weaknesses. The aim is todraw general lessons <strong>and</strong> conclusions from relevant cases <strong>and</strong> experiences whilema<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that no bluepr<strong>in</strong>t can be established that is universally applicable.The research stems from the Stockholm Initiative on DisarmamentDemobilization Re<strong>in</strong>tegration (SIDDR), <strong>and</strong> has been commissioned by theSwedish Government through the Folke Bernadotte Academy <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anced by theSwedish M<strong>in</strong>istry for Foreign Affairs. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g section, the background<strong>and</strong> purpose of the research project is outl<strong>in</strong>ed.The Stockholm Initiative on DisarmamentDemobilization Re<strong>in</strong>tegrationIn recent years, processes of Disarmament, Demobilization <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration(DDR) of former combatants have been placed at the center of the <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommunity’s support for peace processes (See for example SIDDR; UN IDDRS;the OECD/DAC CPDC-network; EU concept for support to Disarmament,Demobilization <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration; the AU Framework Document for <strong>Post</strong>Conflict Recovery <strong>Development</strong> – web pages provided <strong>in</strong> references). The DDRconcepthas gradually emerged from the lesson that a peace agreement <strong>and</strong>deployment of peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g operations does not automatically lead to long-termstability. It has become clear that <strong>in</strong> order to consolidate peace, these efforts mustbe coupled with longer-term peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itiatives. DDR l<strong>in</strong>ks the <strong>in</strong>itial postconflictphase of stabilization, disarmament <strong>and</strong> demobilization with programsfor more long-term social <strong>and</strong> economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration of combatants.However, <strong>in</strong> spite of this approach where the security <strong>and</strong> development nexus istaken <strong>in</strong>to account, many DDR-processes fail to susta<strong>in</strong> a peaceful development.Still, almost half of all conflicts that end through negotiated agreement relapse<strong>in</strong>to violence with<strong>in</strong> five years (see Uppsala University, Department of Peace <strong>and</strong>14
Conflict Research Database). All too often, DDR has been approached from aprimarily technical perspective, neglect<strong>in</strong>g the importance of the surround<strong>in</strong>gpolitical <strong>and</strong> social environment.1.In 2004, the Swedish M<strong>in</strong>istry for Foreign Affairs <strong>in</strong>itiated the StockholmInitiative on Disarmament Demobilization Re<strong>in</strong>tegration (see SIDDR BackgroundStudies, F<strong>in</strong>al Report <strong>and</strong> Test<strong>in</strong>g the Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples). Aware of the challenges<strong>and</strong> opportunities of DDR <strong>in</strong> post conflict peace processes, the aim was to createpredictable frameworks for successful implementation of such programs. TheSIDDR was organized as an <strong>in</strong>ternational work<strong>in</strong>g process, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g nongovernmental(NGO) <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-governmental (IGO) organizations as wellas government representatives. In 2006, a F<strong>in</strong>al Report was presented to theSecretary General of the United Nations. The Report states that the primary aimof DDR is to contribute to a secure <strong>and</strong> stable environment <strong>in</strong> which an overallpeace process <strong>and</strong> transition to susta<strong>in</strong>able development can be achieved. It is only<strong>in</strong> this k<strong>in</strong>d of ‘enabl<strong>in</strong>g’ environment that political <strong>and</strong> security oriented reforms,as well as social <strong>and</strong> economic reconstruction <strong>and</strong> longer-term development, cantake root.The Stockholm Initiative on DDR elaborated on the early phase of post-conflictsituations, where there might be a peace agreement signed at the high politicallevel, but where the options <strong>and</strong> opportunities for <strong>in</strong>dividual soldiers are oftenvery scarce. The SIDDR unbundled the concept of re<strong>in</strong>tegration, propos<strong>in</strong>g animmediate short-term focus on transitional re<strong>in</strong>tegration of former combatantsaimed at primarily stabiliz<strong>in</strong>g a fragile peace. This early re<strong>in</strong>tegration was referredto as Re<strong>in</strong>sertion, us<strong>in</strong>g the term<strong>in</strong>ology of the United Nations (see reference tothe UN IDDRS below). In fact, the term<strong>in</strong>ology <strong>and</strong> concept of “Re<strong>in</strong>sertion” was<strong>in</strong>itially <strong>in</strong>troduced as a “transitional safety net phase” <strong>in</strong> the 1996 multi-countrystudy on demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs undertaken by the WorldBank (Colletta, Kostner <strong>and</strong> Wiederhofer, 1996). Although the primary focuswould be to guarantee that former combatants do not need to return to violenceto make a liv<strong>in</strong>g, all <strong>in</strong>itiatives must be tied to a long-term plan for susta<strong>in</strong>ableeconomic <strong>and</strong> social development.In 2006, work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> parallel with the SIDDR process, the United Nations’<strong>in</strong>ter-agency work<strong>in</strong>g group on DDR established the Integrated DDR St<strong>and</strong>ards(IDDRS) as guidance for technical support, f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> implementation ofDDR programs. Through the IDDRS, common def<strong>in</strong>itions of the term<strong>in</strong>ology:Disarmament, Demobilization, Re<strong>in</strong>sertion <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration, were established(See www.unddr.org or Annex 1 for def<strong>in</strong>itions).15
Generative Dialogues <strong>in</strong> Promot<strong>in</strong>g Peace ProcessesThe SIDDR work<strong>in</strong>g process identified a need to further explore the relationshipbetween the DDR concept <strong>and</strong> the context <strong>in</strong> which DDR-programs wereimplemented. The Swedish Government Agency, Folke Bernadotte Academy,was m<strong>and</strong>ated to run a follow-up project; test<strong>in</strong>g the recommendations <strong>and</strong>conclusions of the SIDDR F<strong>in</strong>al Report. Whereas the SIDDR report focused onthe concept of DDR <strong>and</strong> its role <strong>in</strong> relation to parallel peace build<strong>in</strong>g concerns(e.g. SSR, justice, governance, <strong>and</strong> socio-economic recovery) the follow-up projectelaborated further on the political dynamics of the DDR-SSR <strong>in</strong>terface. Thef<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the SIDDR were brought to the field <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduced to parties <strong>and</strong>negotiators <strong>in</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g peace talks.The SIDDR had asserted that mediation efforts, program plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> eventerm<strong>in</strong>ology must be sensitive to cultural, economic, social <strong>and</strong> historicalcircumstances, allow<strong>in</strong>g for real ownership of the DDR-process by its relevantstakeholders. Experiences from the follow-up project suggest that deal<strong>in</strong>gwith disarmament <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration of former combatants under an adaptedterm<strong>in</strong>ology, such as ‘demilitarization <strong>and</strong> economic ma<strong>in</strong>stream<strong>in</strong>g’ (as <strong>in</strong>M<strong>in</strong>danao) or ‘management of armies <strong>and</strong> arms’ (as <strong>in</strong> Nepal), can help establishthe trust <strong>and</strong> confidence necessary to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a process of dialogue. For the sakeof consistency, this report will use the concept DDR as def<strong>in</strong>ed by the SIDDR<strong>and</strong> IDDRS, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g that the determ<strong>in</strong>ants of successful DDR, especiallyre<strong>in</strong>tegration, must be identified <strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> the context of each particularpeace process.Rationale for a Study of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>(or “Hold<strong>in</strong>g Patterns”)While the vast majority of available literature advocates that DDR programsshould be designed <strong>and</strong> implemented with<strong>in</strong> an overall peace strategy, there islittle precise guidance to be found on the topic. The determ<strong>in</strong>ants of effectivere<strong>in</strong>tegration among <strong>in</strong>dividual combatants are often difficult to p<strong>in</strong> down(Humphreys <strong>and</strong> We<strong>in</strong>ste<strong>in</strong>, 2005). This is particularly apparent <strong>in</strong> relation to theearly phase where the conditions might not yet be optimal for a DDR process.From an implementation po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the knowledge-gap regard<strong>in</strong>g theformative <strong>in</strong>itial stages of DDR program design <strong>and</strong> implementation leaves anumber of urgent questions unanswered. For example: How to deal with largenumbers of poorly educated <strong>and</strong> unskilled former combatants, <strong>and</strong> mid- <strong>and</strong>16
upper-level comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> an economy with very limited labor absorptioncapacity? How to restructure a security sector while simultaneously absorb<strong>in</strong>gcombatants <strong>in</strong>to that sector? How to guarantee that a “security vacuum” is not<strong>in</strong>advertently created? Unsettled issues of political power shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> position<strong>in</strong>goften further complicate the situation.1.The follow-up project noted that many DDR processes fail because the politicalcircumstances are not ripe at the time of sign<strong>in</strong>g an agreement. Often, what isprimarily lack<strong>in</strong>g is mutual trust <strong>and</strong> confidence between the parties. Furtherstudies were therefore recommended on “transitional mechanisms that would allowcontrol over armed groups while await<strong>in</strong>g political solutions” (SIDDR Test<strong>in</strong>g thePr<strong>in</strong>ciples p 35). This was <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the SIDDR F<strong>in</strong>al Report’s statement that“In order to avoid gaps between the short-term <strong>and</strong> the long-term focus, considerationmight be given to temporarily ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ex-combatants, who are designated for a DDRprogramme, <strong>in</strong> a military (or civil) 1 structure, i.e. ‘hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern’. Such an <strong>in</strong>terimsolution would provide the time <strong>and</strong> space for debrief<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> demilitarisation of the m<strong>in</strong>dsetof ex-combatants” (SIDDR F<strong>in</strong>al Report p 25).In light of these challenges <strong>in</strong> the early phase of war to peace transitions, thisstudy seeks to elaborate on the idea of “hold<strong>in</strong>g patterns”, referred to <strong>in</strong> this studyas <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>, as a possible means of deal<strong>in</strong>g with some of the obstaclesto peace outl<strong>in</strong>ed above. The work<strong>in</strong>g hypothesis is that reshap<strong>in</strong>g “comm<strong>and</strong>”structures, but keep<strong>in</strong>g former combatants <strong>in</strong> their exist<strong>in</strong>g organizational“control” structures (i.e. ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g their social cohesion) for a limited periodof time, before <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to the (reformed) security apparatus <strong>and</strong>/orre<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to productive civilian lives, might be a more effective <strong>in</strong>terimstabiliz<strong>in</strong>g strategy than poorly planned demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegrationprograms or premature <strong>Security</strong> Sector Reform.1. Author’s parenthesis added17
2.2. Sett<strong>in</strong>g the Stage:Challenges <strong>in</strong> Early Transition<strong>and</strong> Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>gUnderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the Key Contextual FactorsIn the early phase of a transition from war to peace, numerous political aspirations<strong>and</strong> concerns of <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> groups must be carefully balanced. Mov<strong>in</strong>gfrom military conflict to susta<strong>in</strong>able peace requires a gradual adjustment by theconflict<strong>in</strong>g parties from a dependence on military sources of power to an abilityto operate as civilian actors <strong>in</strong> a peacetime society. While adjust<strong>in</strong>g to a civilianpolitical arena may be imperative for the leadership level, a war to peace transitionoften entails serious implications for <strong>in</strong>dividual combatants as well. In a civiliansociety, they must f<strong>in</strong>d realistic alternative livelihoods, without the use of militaryforce. With an average implementation timeframe of 3–5 years, as suggested <strong>in</strong>a recent analysis from Escola de cultura de pau (Caramés, Fisas <strong>and</strong> Sanz, 2007),look<strong>in</strong>g at all active DDR programmes 2006; the rapid launch of a programmedoes not guarantee a shortened disarmament <strong>and</strong> demobilization period.Generally, peace-agreements cannot reflect the concerns <strong>and</strong> aspirations of everystakeholder <strong>in</strong> a war-torn society. Many stakeholders may not even have a seat atthe negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table. For the sake of long-term stability, it is crucial that peaceagreementsare formulated so that they create an environment <strong>and</strong> a platform forcont<strong>in</strong>ued political dialogue <strong>and</strong> a framework for a long-term augmented processtowards last<strong>in</strong>g peace.Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the key contextual factors that shape war to peace transitions helpsprepare the ground for a successful long-term peace process. Such factors are:19
1. Nature <strong>and</strong> duration of the conflict:› Underly<strong>in</strong>g causes of conflict <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>and</strong> agenda of the fight<strong>in</strong>gparties (i.e. ideological, cultural <strong>and</strong>/or economic etc.).› The level of trust <strong>and</strong> confidence <strong>in</strong> political commitments betweenconflict<strong>in</strong>g parties <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> society at large (is there a tradition to stick toagreements? Is there a war fatigue with<strong>in</strong> the communities etc.).II. Nature of the peace:› Manner <strong>in</strong> which the conflict ended (i.e. imposed, negotiated, or third partymediated peace);› Framework for deal<strong>in</strong>g with war-time trauma, reconciliation <strong>and</strong>accountability (Transitional Justice).III. Governance capacity <strong>and</strong> reach of the state:› Ability to provide security for communities <strong>and</strong> return<strong>in</strong>g combatants;› Possibilities for alternative livelihoods <strong>in</strong> the military services <strong>and</strong> other partsof the security sector;› Capacity to organize transitional employment such as labor <strong>in</strong>tensive publicworks <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the long run, to create opportunities for economic development.IV. The state of the economy:› The base of the economy <strong>and</strong> market opportunities (access to l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>/orproperty rights, capital, technology, natural resources etc.);› Capacity of the economy to absorb unskilled labour.V. Character <strong>and</strong> cohesiveness of communities <strong>and</strong> combatants:› Level of ethnic homogeneity <strong>in</strong> the country <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> communities (i.e. both <strong>in</strong>relation to the causes of the conflict <strong>and</strong> the opportunities of communities towork towards socio-economic development for all ethnic groups);› Local cultural norms toward arms bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> use;› Human capital of combatants (vocational <strong>and</strong> life skills);› Aspiration amongst the combatants <strong>and</strong> of their political <strong>and</strong> militaryleaderships as well as level of psychological capacity <strong>in</strong> the communities toabsorb <strong>and</strong> accept return<strong>in</strong>g combatants;› Nature of social cohesion among the combatants <strong>and</strong> the conflict affectedcommunities.<strong>Balanc<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Development</strong> – Stability <strong>and</strong> ChangeThere seems to be a general consensus amongst researchers <strong>and</strong> practitioners thatpost-conflict peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g is ideally to be seen as a multidimensional process,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g security, political <strong>and</strong> socio-economic aspects that re<strong>in</strong>force <strong>and</strong>strengthen each other (see for example UN Secretary General’s High Level PanelReport, 2004). These dimensions are not l<strong>in</strong>ear. They must be balanced at each20
po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> time. A ma<strong>in</strong> objective of peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g should be to improve the Human<strong>Security</strong> situation. Although it is still debated whether the Human <strong>Security</strong> conceptshould encompasses anyth<strong>in</strong>g beyond mere physical security, i.e. livelihoods<strong>and</strong> “social security” (Tadjbakhsh, 2005), the <strong>in</strong>troduction of the concept hasfacilitated the merger of the security <strong>and</strong> development agendas. The notion ofsecurity has been extended to <strong>in</strong>clude not only the security of state <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong>power structures, but also the security of <strong>in</strong>dividual citizens (see Human <strong>Security</strong>Report, 2005). This study rest upon this underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g.2.Downsiz<strong>in</strong>g the security apparatus too quickly, without f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g realisticalternatives, may threaten the peace process <strong>and</strong> the progress made <strong>in</strong> the politicalsphere. Ex-combatants cannot be re<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to communities lack<strong>in</strong>g sufficientcapacity for labor absorption without risk<strong>in</strong>g that these combatants return toviolence to secure their livelihoods. Likewise, attempt<strong>in</strong>g to establish DDRprograms without deal<strong>in</strong>g with issues of justice <strong>and</strong> reconciliation could lead tostigmatization <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the worst cases, persecution. Indeed, <strong>in</strong> the aftermath ofa peace agreement, overcom<strong>in</strong>g fear, mistrust <strong>and</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty amongst formercombatants is one of the most difficult challenges (Walter, 1997).Once the leaders agree to disarm <strong>and</strong> demobilize their troops they essentiallylose the barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power they have <strong>in</strong> the peace process. Should the other partyrenege on its agreements they can suffer grave consequences. Warr<strong>in</strong>g partiescan thus f<strong>in</strong>d themselves <strong>in</strong> the classical “prisoner’s dilemma”, where <strong>in</strong>dividualrationality trumps collective good. The parties have no way of overcom<strong>in</strong>gfundamental distrust <strong>and</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty. The risk – or perceived risk – of tak<strong>in</strong>g thefirst step is often simply too large.DDR-programs have a symbolic as well as a functional value. They can signal acessation of hostilities, thereby severely undercutt<strong>in</strong>g the legitimacy of warr<strong>in</strong>gmilitia, <strong>and</strong> re-establish a state monopoly over the use of force under a reasonablylegitimate government. They can also, if the potential of Transitional Justice <strong>and</strong>dialogue are properly <strong>in</strong>tegrated, contribute to a sensitization process <strong>in</strong> whichcombatants’ m<strong>in</strong>dsets are shifted towards a civilian life <strong>and</strong> the communities aresupported to deal with atrocities committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the conflict. However, thereare still gaps <strong>in</strong> our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of exactly what factors can create environmentsconducive to successful transitions. Establish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g trust betweenformer rival<strong>in</strong>g parties rema<strong>in</strong>s one of the key challenges.21
L<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g SSR <strong>and</strong> DDR <strong>in</strong> <strong>Post</strong> Conflict Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Security</strong> is often the number one concern <strong>in</strong> the immediate aftermath of a violentconflict. Even <strong>in</strong> cases where an <strong>in</strong>ternational peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g force is present, safety<strong>and</strong> security can rarely be provided <strong>and</strong> guaranteed for all groups <strong>and</strong> stakeholders.A premature disarmament <strong>and</strong> demobilization of a rebel group or militia, whichmay be the only provider of security <strong>in</strong> a community, risks creat<strong>in</strong>g a securityvacuum <strong>in</strong> which crim<strong>in</strong>al groups take over (Schnabel <strong>and</strong> Ehrhart, 2005).Crime waves may underm<strong>in</strong>e popular faith <strong>in</strong> the peace process <strong>and</strong> empowerauthoritarian actors (Call <strong>and</strong> Stanley, 2001). The dilemma becomes even morecomplicated <strong>in</strong> situations where the parties to a peace process are controll<strong>in</strong>gdifferent parts of a country. With a Human <strong>Security</strong> approach, there may be reasonsfor postpon<strong>in</strong>g a DDR process, <strong>and</strong> rely<strong>in</strong>g on exist<strong>in</strong>g security forces with paid<strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>dividuals for the provision of transitional security. Gradually giv<strong>in</strong>gformer rebels a share <strong>in</strong> the state-monopoly over the provision of security couldfurther be a valuable strategic <strong>in</strong>strument <strong>in</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>able peace.A thorough analysis of the entire security system – i.e. military <strong>and</strong> paramilitaryforces, <strong>in</strong>telligence services, security management <strong>and</strong> oversight bodies, justice <strong>and</strong>law enforcement <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> various civil <strong>and</strong> military <strong>in</strong>stitutions (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gboth civil society organizations <strong>and</strong> non-statutory security forces) – providesimportant <strong>in</strong>formation on the general security situation, the possibilities of thestate to provide security to its citizens <strong>and</strong> the capacity to absorb former irregularcombatants <strong>in</strong>to the national security apparatus. The concept of <strong>Security</strong> SystemReform (SSR), as def<strong>in</strong>ed by OECD/DAC, does not only aim at reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g thestate security <strong>and</strong> justice apparatus, but to achieve stability <strong>and</strong> security for boththe state <strong>and</strong> its citizens. This often entails <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g non-statutory securityforces <strong>and</strong> civil society groups as non-state oversight mechanisms with<strong>in</strong> theoverall reform framework. (OECD/DAC 2005).While conceptually different, DDR <strong>and</strong> SSR are synergistic (Brzoska, 2006)<strong>and</strong> can help us with at least two components of peace build<strong>in</strong>g; underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gthe macro determ<strong>in</strong>ants of demilitarization <strong>and</strong>; overcom<strong>in</strong>g obstacles tosuccessful long-term social <strong>and</strong> economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration. While the decision toreform the security system can sometimes be taken without a parallel process ofdemobilization <strong>and</strong> disarmament, the decision to undertake re<strong>in</strong>tegration of alarge number of ex combatants requires some clarity on the shape <strong>and</strong> size of thefuture security sector. DDR is normally dependent upon a function<strong>in</strong>g securitysystem – for general stability but also for capacity to absorb ex-combatants <strong>in</strong>to theregular security apparatus. Similarly, weaknesses <strong>in</strong> DDR-programs can often beexpla<strong>in</strong>ed by identify<strong>in</strong>g flaws <strong>in</strong> the exist<strong>in</strong>g security system.22
3.3. Conceptualiz<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>Clarify<strong>in</strong>g the Term<strong>in</strong>ologyFor the purposes of this study the concept of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> (IS) is def<strong>in</strong>ed as:› <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures that may be used to keep former combatants’ cohesiveness<strong>in</strong>tact with<strong>in</strong> a military or civilian structure, creat<strong>in</strong>g space <strong>and</strong> buy<strong>in</strong>g time fora political dialogue <strong>and</strong> the formation of an environment conducive to social <strong>and</strong>economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration.In study<strong>in</strong>g the potential of such measures as a means of ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>imumlevels of security <strong>in</strong> the immediate post-conflict period, it is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to takenote of a study by Hoddie <strong>and</strong> Hartzell (2003) show<strong>in</strong>g that one third of all peaceprocesses s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 have <strong>in</strong>cluded components of Military Integration (MI),i.e. <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g former rebels <strong>in</strong>to the national army. They go on to argue thatsuccessful MI <strong>in</strong>creases the chances for susta<strong>in</strong>able peace.Military <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> redeployment of armed groups as transitional securityforces (as mentioned above), present two options that may be suitable <strong>in</strong> somepost-conflict sett<strong>in</strong>gs. However, an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measure, as def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>this study, could also be shaped as a civilian program where <strong>in</strong>tact groups of formercombatants are given civilian duties or simply provided with life-skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong>/or socio-psychological support. An <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measure could thusbe employed as a military-, civilian-, or civil-military program. These choices areheavily dependent on the specific context <strong>and</strong> needs of each particular situation(see section on key contextual factors above).23
Presently, little literature exists on this type of military <strong>and</strong> similar civilian orcivil-military programs <strong>and</strong> the contextual factors, <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutionalarrangements condition<strong>in</strong>g their use <strong>and</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g their success orfailure. Similarly, there is no documented knowledge as to their organization,management <strong>and</strong> implementation arrangements, vett<strong>in</strong>g procedures, specificprogram activities, costs <strong>and</strong> degree of effectiveness. A recent work by Glassmyer<strong>and</strong> Sambanis (2007) h<strong>in</strong>t at some of the potential condition<strong>in</strong>g factors whichmay <strong>in</strong>form the strategic use of military <strong>in</strong>tegration or transitional civil/militarymechanisms, for example, economic opportunity; clear military victory ornegotiated peace settlement; <strong>and</strong> the existence of a broad multi-dimensional peaceprocess. The subject of the present study is broader <strong>in</strong> focus, aim<strong>in</strong>g to fill a gap <strong>in</strong>documentation <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of contextual factors, <strong>in</strong>stitutional modalities<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>centives shap<strong>in</strong>g the formative early post-conflict period.Creat<strong>in</strong>g Space <strong>and</strong> Buy<strong>in</strong>g Time for Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>gThe ma<strong>in</strong> objective, common to all variations of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures,is to help put an end to the violence <strong>and</strong> reduce the risk of resumption of hostilitiesby hold<strong>in</strong>g former combatants <strong>in</strong> formal cohesive structures; ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a criticallevel of security <strong>and</strong> social support <strong>in</strong> order to “buy time” <strong>and</strong> create a space for:› Cont<strong>in</strong>ued political dialogue <strong>and</strong> a settlement of outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g issues relat<strong>in</strong>gprimarily to the security sector <strong>and</strong> political power-shar<strong>in</strong>g;› Trust <strong>and</strong> confidence to emerge allow<strong>in</strong>g for political dialogue;› Formation of provisional bureaucratic structures <strong>and</strong> legal <strong>in</strong>struments;› Proper assessment of absorption capacity <strong>in</strong> different sectors of society <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>itial economic reconstruction (i.e. alterative options available for demobilizedcombatants);› Sensitization of communities, <strong>and</strong>;› Socio-psychological adjustment of combatants.This list <strong>in</strong>dicates that the primary objective of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>s – allow<strong>in</strong>gfor an environment conducive to social <strong>and</strong> economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration to emerge –relates to the state level as well as to community- <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual levels.At the state level a w<strong>in</strong>dow could be created to resolve outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g political issuesrelat<strong>in</strong>g to powers-shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional frameworks. This is central for theability to establish a susta<strong>in</strong>able post-peace-agreement process towards susta<strong>in</strong>ablepeace. Through ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a critical level of security, IS measures could also buytime for thorough needs-assessments <strong>and</strong> careful plann<strong>in</strong>g of SSR <strong>in</strong>itiatives (if24
needed) <strong>and</strong> DDR-programs. Unilateral defection by <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> groups fromthe peace process would also be made more costly as the benefits <strong>in</strong>herent already<strong>in</strong> the IS phase would be foregone.3.At community level, space is created for <strong>in</strong>itial sensitization prepar<strong>in</strong>g for thereturn of ex-combatants <strong>and</strong> a thorough analysis of Transitional Justice (especiallyvett<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>and</strong> reconciliation needs. The postponed return of combatants also givesprogram planners room for a careful assessment of the absorption capacity of localeconomies <strong>and</strong> labor markets as well as prepar<strong>in</strong>g community based programs <strong>and</strong>strategies for socio-economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration.From the <strong>in</strong>dividual’s po<strong>in</strong>t of view, an IS-phase could guarantee security throughthe ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of familiar group structures (even if the comm<strong>and</strong> is broken)<strong>and</strong> social cohesion, the sense of agency <strong>and</strong> legitimacy through transitionalemployment as a soldier on a wage <strong>and</strong>/or life skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> psycho-socialsupport prepar<strong>in</strong>g ex-combatants for life <strong>in</strong> a peace-time society <strong>and</strong> economy.More often than not ex-combatants feel excluded <strong>and</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized fromsociety. Their only bonds <strong>and</strong> support are their comrades <strong>in</strong> conflict <strong>and</strong> theircomm<strong>and</strong>ers. They often lack: a) An underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of a civilian economy;b) Hope <strong>and</strong> a sense of opportunity; c) The feel<strong>in</strong>g of agency through new foundeconomic <strong>and</strong> social skills <strong>and</strong>; d) Legitimacy <strong>and</strong> positive recognition to counternegative sterotypes .If carefully balanced, a period of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> could provide <strong>in</strong>dividualcombatants with the crucial basic elements of a successful long-term re<strong>in</strong>tegration;a sense of agency, transitional livelihoods, <strong>and</strong> the comfort of civic legitimacy <strong>and</strong>social acceptance.Strengthen<strong>in</strong>g Prospects for Durable PeaceIt is important to note that the concept of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> is not proposedas a m<strong>and</strong>atory first step <strong>in</strong> peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g; nor should it be conceived a necessaryelement of a DDR-SSR processes. The purpose of this study is not to offer a newprogram to be implemented <strong>in</strong> the peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g process; rather to conceptualize<strong>and</strong> learn more about the menu of stabiliz<strong>in</strong>g options available <strong>in</strong> the period oftransition between a peace agreement <strong>and</strong> its implementation. If the context ofa post-conflict situation allows for successful re<strong>in</strong>sertion packages or extendedperiods of encampment with<strong>in</strong> a conventional DDR-framework, there may notbe a need for additional mechanisms. The underly<strong>in</strong>g assumption of the study,however, is that sometimes, conventional tools are not sufficient to deal with25
security concerns <strong>in</strong> the immediate aftermath of violent conflicts; especially wherethere is no clear victor <strong>in</strong> the conflict, weak local governance persists (especially <strong>in</strong>the provision of security), <strong>and</strong> the labor absorption is limited. In such situationsa phase of <strong>Interim</strong> DRAFT <strong>Stabilization</strong> – NOT could FOR be <strong>in</strong>troduced CIRCULATION to the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g parties,with the purpose of prevent<strong>in</strong>g the recurrence of violent conflict <strong>and</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g forconditions <strong>and</strong> necessary the labor absorption for a susta<strong>in</strong>able is limited. In peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g such situations a phase process of <strong>Interim</strong> to fall <strong>in</strong>to place.<strong>Stabilization</strong> could be <strong>in</strong>troduced to the negotiat<strong>in</strong>g parties, with the purpose ofprevent<strong>in</strong>g the recurrence of violent conflict <strong>and</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g for conditions necessaryfor a susta<strong>in</strong>able peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g process to fall <strong>in</strong>to place.Figure 1 – <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> <strong>in</strong> ContextFigure 1 – <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> <strong>in</strong> ContextIntroduc<strong>in</strong>g a phase of<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>(Individual level)- Serious security concerns- Lack of trust & confidence- Low labor absorption- Weak state <strong>in</strong>stitutions –<strong>in</strong>sufficient SSR- Situation premature forDDR-programsIntroduc<strong>in</strong>g a phase of<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>(State- <strong>and</strong> Communitylevels)Ex-combatantstemporarilyabsorbedPositive <strong>in</strong>centive- Initial crediblelivelihood forex-combatants- Space for lifeskills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g- Conditions conducive to succeedwith both SSR <strong>and</strong> DDR are created- Communities sensitized- Individual ex-combatants prepared forre<strong>in</strong>tegrationRemov<strong>in</strong>g negative<strong>in</strong>centiveSpace forcont<strong>in</strong>uedpoliticalprocess <strong>and</strong>plann<strong>in</strong>gBasis for long-termalternativelivelihood <strong>and</strong>re<strong>in</strong>tegration forex- combatantsRelativestability isma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed orachievedCommunitysensitization<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itialeconomicreconstructionPositive <strong>in</strong>centiveThe figure 37. illustrates The figure illustrates how this how type this of <strong>Interim</strong> type of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>, or “hold<strong>in</strong>g or pattern”, pattern, could stabilizestabilize a fragile post-conflict situation, provide space for political dialogue <strong>and</strong>a fragile post-conflict program plann<strong>in</strong>g, situation, <strong>and</strong> remove provide negative space for <strong>in</strong>centive political thus dialogue turn<strong>in</strong>g potential <strong>and</strong> program spoilers plann<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>to <strong>and</strong>stakeholdersremove negative <strong>in</strong>centive thus turn<strong>in</strong>g potential spoilers <strong>in</strong>to stakeholdersIV. Study Objectives <strong>and</strong> Methodology<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> as a Strategic DDR-SSR Measure38. This study aims to identify, analyze, document <strong>and</strong> dissem<strong>in</strong>ate best practice <strong>and</strong>lessons learned <strong>in</strong> early post-conflict stabilization efforts to balance security <strong>in</strong> thenear term with medium- to long-term Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g under vary<strong>in</strong>g conditions. Acentral study objective has been to better underst<strong>and</strong> the underly<strong>in</strong>g, contextualfactors that strategically shape the choice, tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of re<strong>in</strong>tegration2615
4.4. Study Objectives<strong>and</strong> Methodology<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> as a Strategic Peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g MeasureThis study aims to identify, analyze, document <strong>and</strong> dissem<strong>in</strong>ate best practice <strong>and</strong>lessons learned <strong>in</strong> early post-conflict stabilization efforts to balance security <strong>in</strong> thenear term with medium- to long-term peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g under vary<strong>in</strong>g conditions.A central study objective has been to better underst<strong>and</strong> the underly<strong>in</strong>g contextualfactors that strategically shape the choice, tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of re<strong>in</strong>tegrationprograms, which conta<strong>in</strong> military <strong>and</strong> civilian dimensions.The conceptual framework <strong>and</strong> lessons that have emerged from this study shouldbe of value to peace negotiators, mediators, <strong>and</strong> DDR-program designers. Theultimate objective is to provide peace negotiators (negotiat<strong>in</strong>g parties, mediators<strong>and</strong> facilitators) <strong>and</strong> DDR program design teams with lessons <strong>and</strong> best practices<strong>in</strong> order to impact negotiations as well as the design, outcome <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>abilityof peace-mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> peace-build<strong>in</strong>g efforts. The report thereby also enforces theoverarch<strong>in</strong>g SIDDR recommendation that technical expertise on DDR, SSR orthe “management of arms <strong>and</strong> armies” as such, should be made available at earlystages of peace negotiations.The Methodology: From Desk Review to FieldworkThe work of this report is based on a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary desk study of select post-conflictcountries <strong>and</strong> programs resembl<strong>in</strong>g the type of IS measures described <strong>in</strong> previouschapters. Through the desk study, presented <strong>in</strong> summary fashion <strong>in</strong> this report,three particularly <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g cases were identified for deeper <strong>in</strong>-country fieldresearch: Cambodia, Colombia <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a.27
The fundamental aim of the field research was to underst<strong>and</strong>, evaluate <strong>and</strong>hopefully contribute to fill<strong>in</strong>g the knowledge-gap <strong>in</strong> relation to “Hold<strong>in</strong>gPatterns” <strong>and</strong> similar <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> programs. Teams of consultants<strong>and</strong> local lead researchers have carried out field studies focus<strong>in</strong>g on a numberof ongo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> past re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs that followed or <strong>in</strong>volved a visibletransitional element – thereby fall<strong>in</strong>g under the study-def<strong>in</strong>ition of <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong>. For the sake of sav<strong>in</strong>g space <strong>in</strong> this study report, the case studieshave been modified from their orig<strong>in</strong>al versions by the editors (full versions of thestudies can be downloaded at the Folke Bernadotte Academy’s web page;www.folkebernadotteacademy.se). One of the overarch<strong>in</strong>g aims has been toidentify gaps <strong>and</strong> obstacles <strong>in</strong> theses programs <strong>and</strong> to garner an <strong>in</strong>dication of howto address future cases. Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary best practices has been extracted <strong>and</strong> outl<strong>in</strong>ed.Primarily through <strong>in</strong>-depth <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> focal group <strong>in</strong>terview<strong>in</strong>g, the fieldresearch has aimed at develop<strong>in</strong>g a deeper underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the key elements <strong>and</strong>issues underp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g the programs studied (see Annex 2). The selection process of<strong>in</strong>terviewees has been ‘purposive’ rather than necessarily ‘scientific’ (r<strong>and</strong>omized).A broad spectrum of <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ions on the selected cases has beensurveyed – <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g, whenever possible <strong>and</strong> of substantive <strong>in</strong>terest, governmentofficials, army staff as well as representatives of paramilitary <strong>and</strong> rebel groups,representatives from bilateral <strong>and</strong> multilateral organizations, local <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational civil-society actors (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g media), ex-combatants themselves <strong>and</strong>local community leaders. The use of multiple sources of <strong>in</strong>formation from vary<strong>in</strong>gprogrammatic perspectives has allowed for ‘triangulat<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>and</strong> cross verify<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> the pursuit of relevant <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>and</strong> patterns of response.In February 2008, a sem<strong>in</strong>ar was held <strong>in</strong> Stockholm; discuss<strong>in</strong>g the prelim<strong>in</strong>aryf<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of the study <strong>and</strong> the conceptual framework on which it is build.Participants <strong>in</strong>cluded key members of the SIDDR-network, the UN IDDRS <strong>and</strong>other practitioners, policymakers <strong>and</strong> academics. Comments <strong>and</strong> contributionsfrom this sem<strong>in</strong>ar have been <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to this study report.28
5.5. Review of Select <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong> ApproachesIn this chapter a number of past cases, illustrative of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>-likemeasures (military-, civilian- <strong>and</strong> civil-military programs) along the l<strong>in</strong>e ofthe conceptual discussion above, are reviewed. The background <strong>and</strong> rationalof such programs – as well as the issues they have come across <strong>and</strong> lessons thathave emerged – are analyzed. The purpose of the review is to provide a basisfor a comparative analysis of the different approaches to <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>arrangements that have emerged throughout the research project.Five rough categories of arrangements have been identified: 1) Civilian servicecorps; 2) Military <strong>in</strong>tegration arrangements; 3) Transitional security forces; 4)Different forms of transitional autonomy; <strong>and</strong> 5) Dialogue <strong>and</strong> sensitizationprograms <strong>and</strong> halfway-house arrangements. These categories are not preciseor mutually exclusive. In fact, <strong>in</strong> many cases IS measures conta<strong>in</strong> elementsresembl<strong>in</strong>g the characteristics of two or more of these categories.Civil Service Corps – This category is demonstrated by the cases of the SouthAfrican Service Corps <strong>and</strong> to some extent the Kosovo Protection Corps <strong>in</strong> thesections below. Transform<strong>in</strong>g former military groups <strong>in</strong>to transitional civilianorganizations primarily addresses the need to employ former combatants, <strong>and</strong>potential spoilers of the peace, <strong>in</strong> some form of mean<strong>in</strong>gful activity. This type ofarrangements can prove effective both from a state- <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual perspective. Itmay allow the time <strong>and</strong> space needed for the political process <strong>and</strong> early recoveryefforts, while at the same time allow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividuals to ease <strong>in</strong>to the idea of civilianlife.Military Integration – The concept of Military Integration has been outl<strong>in</strong>ed above.Below, the strategy of Military Integration as a vessel for <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> is29
exemplified by the “brassage” process <strong>in</strong> the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)<strong>and</strong> the demobilization of rebel group UNITA <strong>in</strong> Angola. Variations of the MIstrategy has also been employed <strong>in</strong> many of the other cases exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this study;Afghanistan, Rw<strong>and</strong>a, South Africa, Ug<strong>and</strong>a (demobilization of rebel groups <strong>in</strong>the late 1980s <strong>and</strong> early 1990s).Transitional <strong>Security</strong> Forces – The creation of transitional security forces is oneof the most obvious IS measures; address<strong>in</strong>g the need for transitional security,mean<strong>in</strong>gful employment of former combatants, <strong>and</strong> the need for a temporarilyma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed cohesion that many former combatants experience. The AfghanMilitia Forces <strong>and</strong> the Sunni Awaken<strong>in</strong>g Movements <strong>in</strong> Iraq provide illustrativeexamples from which some lessons can be drawn.Transitional Autonomy – The effects sought by establish<strong>in</strong>g various IS mechanismscan also be obta<strong>in</strong>ed by allow<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> level of autonomy dur<strong>in</strong>g a transitionalperiod. The primary example of such schemes is the agreement between theGovernment of Cambodia <strong>and</strong> the Khmer Rouge <strong>in</strong> Cambodia, with Hun Sen’sw<strong>in</strong>-w<strong>in</strong>-policy. Certa<strong>in</strong> elements of this approach were also employed <strong>in</strong> the Laborafarm experiment <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. Both Cambodia <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a were subject to <strong>in</strong>-countrycase studies <strong>and</strong> will be discussed <strong>in</strong> Chapter VI. Another example provided <strong>in</strong> thislitterature review is the Peshmerga <strong>in</strong> Iraq.Dialogue <strong>and</strong> Sensitization Programs <strong>and</strong> Halfway-House Arrangements – Thiscategory is demonstrated below by the Rw<strong>and</strong>an Ing<strong>and</strong>o-process, through whichformer combatants were gathered <strong>in</strong> camps for dialogue <strong>and</strong> trust build<strong>in</strong>g afterthe deep trauma of the Genocide <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> summer of 1994. Many ofthe characteristics of this category can also bee seen <strong>in</strong> the cases of Labora farm<strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> the creation of a non-governmental organization for formerparamilitaries <strong>in</strong> Colombia. These cases are discussed <strong>in</strong>-depth <strong>in</strong> the next chapteron <strong>in</strong>-country case studies.Civil Service CorpsSouth African Service CorpsBackground <strong>and</strong> RationaleThe South African Service Corps, established <strong>in</strong> the aftermath of the abolishmentof apartheid, is an example of an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measure that addressedprimarily the community <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual levels. South Africa’s transition from30
apartheid was remarkable <strong>in</strong> that the two major parties, the ANC <strong>and</strong> theNational Party (NP), managed to agree on an entirely restructured politicalsystem, without an external mediator. It has been argued that the strong <strong>in</strong>clusionof grass roots dialogue parallel to formal negotiations was a key contribut<strong>in</strong>gfactor to the success. Potential spoilers were neutralized <strong>in</strong> the process <strong>and</strong>solutions could be found to difficult challenges of power shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> control overthe security apparatus.5.The new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was formed by severalformer rival groups; the former South African Defence Force (SADF) along with;the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) (of the Pan African Congress(PAC)); Umkhonto we Siswe (MK) (of the African National Party (ANC)) <strong>and</strong>the former homel<strong>and</strong> armies <strong>and</strong> various other forces. The process to form theSANDF <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>tegration of no fewer than eight different armed groups.(Bouckaert, 2001)Those who did not meet the requirements of the SANDF were to be demobilized<strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to communities. A re<strong>in</strong>tegration package consist<strong>in</strong>g of acash gratuity <strong>and</strong> a voluntary two-week counsel<strong>in</strong>g program was offered fordemobilized <strong>in</strong>dividuals. They were also offered to jo<strong>in</strong> the Service Corps for amaximum of 18 months.The Service Corps was <strong>in</strong>stituted with<strong>in</strong> the SANDF <strong>in</strong> September 1995. It’spurpose was to assist with the re<strong>in</strong>tegration of ex-service members <strong>in</strong>to civil society byupgrad<strong>in</strong>g the st<strong>and</strong>ard of education, vocational <strong>and</strong> life skills to enable members to f<strong>in</strong>demployment or start their own enterprise <strong>in</strong> the private sector, provide career guidance on acont<strong>in</strong>uous basis <strong>and</strong> assist with the social re<strong>in</strong>tegration of members where possible (SouthAfrican Defence Review, 1996). The Service Corp was designed to tra<strong>in</strong> close to22,000 combatants, primarily from APLA <strong>and</strong> MK, between 1995 <strong>and</strong> 2001.Challenges <strong>and</strong> IssuesThe Service Corps experienced a number of <strong>in</strong>ter-related challenges <strong>and</strong> problems(Williams, 2005). There were problems of gett<strong>in</strong>g the Service Corps operational.Poor plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> management of the Corps, at least <strong>in</strong>itially, produced an imageof a questionable organization with little to offer those who urgently needed ameans to move away from their life as a rebel <strong>and</strong> atta<strong>in</strong> skills necessary for acivilian life. This resulted <strong>in</strong> many of the demobilized combatants simply tak<strong>in</strong>gtheir demobilization gratuities <strong>and</strong> leav<strong>in</strong>g the assembly camps <strong>in</strong>stead of wait<strong>in</strong>gfor vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to commence.31
No credible evaluation of the rate of employment <strong>and</strong> unemployment amongformer Service Corps tra<strong>in</strong>ees was undertaken. Eventually, the impression becamewidespread that those who went through the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g were unable to secure asuccessful career or profitable employment afterwards; <strong>in</strong>evitably discourag<strong>in</strong>gpotential recruits (Mashike, 2006). The lack of evidence of participants hav<strong>in</strong>gprofited from the experience can surely expla<strong>in</strong> why few former combatantscompleted tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.There were also adm<strong>in</strong>istrative problems <strong>in</strong> h<strong>and</strong>l<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation concern<strong>in</strong>gresults <strong>and</strong> use of resources. An <strong>in</strong>dependent audit, presented <strong>in</strong> September 2000,concluded that despite the considerable budget of 30 million SA R<strong>and</strong> between1995 <strong>and</strong> 2000, the Service Corps had only tra<strong>in</strong>ed 604 ex-combatants. Officialfigures from the adm<strong>in</strong>istration of the Corps, however, estimated that the total ofsome 4,600 demobilized APLA <strong>and</strong> MK combatants had been tra<strong>in</strong>ed dur<strong>in</strong>g theperiod 1995 to 2004. (Mashike, 2006)The Corps focused on lower level combatants <strong>and</strong> did not actively engage seniorofficers. Thereby, some of the most critical personnel to any demobilizationprocess were left out. The lack of focus on upper level comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> post conflictrecovery programs may result <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g risk for such spoilers to <strong>in</strong>fluencethe outcome of events.This also created the perception that the Service Corps were merely a “dump<strong>in</strong>gground” for former guerrilla fighters with few chances of f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a role <strong>in</strong> acivilian community. Many former combatants were therefore reluctant to jo<strong>in</strong> theCorps (Williams, 2005). This perception was re<strong>in</strong>forced by the fact that only theleast educated soldiers were directed towards the Service Corps.The fact that the Corps was an <strong>in</strong>stitution under the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense <strong>and</strong> nota civilian oriented m<strong>in</strong>istry created the perception that it was <strong>in</strong> fact a part of themilitary. For many combatants, with a will to distance themselves from their formerroles <strong>and</strong> positions, this became a sign of stagnation <strong>and</strong> an obstacle to progress.Key LessonsDespite many difficulties, the South African Service Corps is an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>gexample of an effort to <strong>in</strong>clude former warr<strong>in</strong>g parties <strong>in</strong> one overall structurewith the dual aim of enhanc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividual capacities (<strong>in</strong>dividuallevel) <strong>and</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms for societies to receive return<strong>in</strong>g soldiers(community level) with limited skills of civilian livelihood. The Service Corps32
show that creat<strong>in</strong>g a halfway-house for those combatants who are not eligible, orwill<strong>in</strong>g, to jo<strong>in</strong> the national armed forces, can be used as a strategy to phase theentry <strong>in</strong>to civilian life.5.Cont<strong>in</strong>uous monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> qualitative evaluations are not just important tools toshow donors that their money is well spent – it can also re<strong>in</strong>force the effect of theprogram itself by showcas<strong>in</strong>g success <strong>and</strong> opportunities for beneficiaries (creat<strong>in</strong>ga positive perception).The South African experiences po<strong>in</strong>t to the importance of solid plann<strong>in</strong>g,organization <strong>and</strong> partnerships with all key stakeholders. Depend<strong>in</strong>g on thecontext, it may also be important to <strong>in</strong>volve all levels of former rebel groups <strong>in</strong> theprogram scheme. Involvement of comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> the Service Corps could haveameliorated the perception that the Corps was merely a “dump<strong>in</strong>g ground” forthose with weak prospects for the future. Rival parties that are negotiat<strong>in</strong>g onthe future size <strong>and</strong> shape of the security sector can draw from the experiences ofthe South African Service Corps. By learn<strong>in</strong>g from past mistakes they could f<strong>in</strong>dsolutions for redundant armed groups without risk<strong>in</strong>g loos<strong>in</strong>g either face or theirbarga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g power.The Kosovo Protection CorpsBackground <strong>and</strong> RationaleIn the spr<strong>in</strong>g of 1999, NATO launched a three-month air campaign to stopongo<strong>in</strong>g aggression by Yugoslav <strong>and</strong> Serbian forces aga<strong>in</strong>st the ma<strong>in</strong>ly KosovoAlbanian civilian population <strong>in</strong> Kosovo. When the war ended, there was a direneed for stabiliz<strong>in</strong>g measures <strong>in</strong> the area. <strong>Security</strong> Council Resolution 1244established <strong>in</strong>ternational civilian (UN) <strong>and</strong> military (NATO) presence <strong>in</strong> Kosovoto create <strong>and</strong> uphold a full adm<strong>in</strong>istration, pend<strong>in</strong>g a process determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g thef<strong>in</strong>al status of the area (Alex<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> Sabic-El-Rayess, 2005).The Kosovo Albanian non-state armed group KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army),who had been fight<strong>in</strong>g the (Serbian) Yugoslav National Army <strong>and</strong> Serbianparamilitary groups, was the ma<strong>in</strong> military <strong>and</strong> political power <strong>in</strong> Kosovo whenthe Serbian forces withdrew <strong>in</strong> June 1999. With the <strong>in</strong>itial agreement betweenComdr Hashim Thacis 2 , the representative of KLA, <strong>and</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong>er Jackson ofKFOR, former fighters of KLA were drawn <strong>in</strong>to the overall security scheme <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>to the much needed demilitarization process. Disarmament <strong>and</strong> demobilization2. Hashim Thaci is President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) <strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce November 2007Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Kosovo.33
was to be achieved through the creation of a civilian emergency responseorganization; the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).Neither the UN mission (UNMIK) nor the NATO led KFOR <strong>in</strong>tended for theKPC to be a cont<strong>in</strong>uation or legitimization of the KLA. Officially the KPC wasan entirely new civilian creation. The m<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>in</strong>cluded protection of citizensfrom natural disaster <strong>and</strong> abett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> reconstruction <strong>in</strong>itiatives, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gde-m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> rebuild<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>frastructure (for a summary of Legal Framework<strong>and</strong> Summary of Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, see Kosovo Internal <strong>Security</strong> Sector Review, 2006).Members of the KPC were precluded from hold<strong>in</strong>g public office or from activelyengag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> political affairs. All <strong>in</strong>habitants of Kosovo ethnic societies, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gKosovo Serbs, were eligible to jo<strong>in</strong> but <strong>in</strong>terest among groups other than theKosovo Albanians was weak. The formation was modeled after the French SécuritéCivile. In practice, however, the organization basically reta<strong>in</strong>ed the militarystructure of the KLA, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g military uniforms <strong>and</strong> ranks; a precondition ofthe KLA to accept the terms (Petersen, 2005).Challenges <strong>and</strong> issuesTo the chance observer, there was very little visual differences between the KPC<strong>and</strong> KLA. In many Kosovo towns uniformed KPC members appeared just as theydid when they were KLA <strong>and</strong> the KPC red-black shoulder emblem had strik<strong>in</strong>gsimilarities with the former KLA emblem (ICG, 2000). While <strong>in</strong>ternationalobservers viewed the KPC as a civil emergency service with no role <strong>in</strong> defence,law enforcement, or <strong>in</strong>ternal security, Kosovo Albanians viewed it as “an army<strong>in</strong> wait<strong>in</strong>g” (i.e. for the Future Status of Kosovo) (Rees). Serbs both <strong>in</strong>sideKosovo <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Serbia proper considered it a crim<strong>in</strong>al organization with terroristtendencies.Nevertheless, the KPC was the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal mechanism by which the KLA wouldbe drawn <strong>in</strong>to a domestic arms control regime. The Corps was to be allowed2,000 weapons of which 1,800 would be “held <strong>in</strong> trust” <strong>in</strong> KFOR secure weaponsfacilities. The rema<strong>in</strong>der would be available for the guard<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>stallations <strong>and</strong>security when units were deployed. (Human Rights First)While its role as a civilian emergency service fell partially with<strong>in</strong> the jurisdictionof the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Public Services <strong>and</strong> Department of Emergency Services as a“reserved power”, its cha<strong>in</strong> of comm<strong>and</strong> extended upwards to the Comm<strong>and</strong>erof KFOR. This meant that oversight of KPC was beyond the control of Kosovocivilians. (Kosovo St<strong>and</strong>ard Implementation Plan, 2004)34
The KPC’s exclusion from other general development programs of Kosovo createda problematic relationship with the donor community. The creation of the KPCalso underm<strong>in</strong>ed the faith, with<strong>in</strong> the Kosovo community, <strong>in</strong> the impartialityof KFOR <strong>and</strong> UNMIK. The two Serbs serv<strong>in</strong>g on the UN Transitional Councilwithdrew from the body <strong>in</strong> protest at the establishment of the KPC, argu<strong>in</strong>g thatit had violated the declared multi-ethnic nature of Kosovo. (Rees)5.The KLA itself justified the desire for the KPC structure on the grounds that theKosovo Albanians needed a deterrence force aga<strong>in</strong>st the Serbs. Symbolically, theretention of an organization resembl<strong>in</strong>g an army, irrespective of its effectiveness,would also represent an important affirmation of sovereignty <strong>and</strong> statehoodfurther represent<strong>in</strong>g a step along the path towards the KLA’s ultimate goal;<strong>in</strong>dependence from Serbia.The so called Ahtisaari plan of 2007 stipulated a transitional process <strong>in</strong> whichthe KPC would be dissolved <strong>and</strong> transitional self-governance supervised by the<strong>in</strong>ternational community would lead up to <strong>in</strong>dependence. In February 2008,Kosovo declared its <strong>in</strong>dependence with immediate recognition by many EUmembers <strong>and</strong> other states. The proclamation preceded a planned change ofm<strong>and</strong>ate from UNMIK to EULEX, leav<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo’s status hang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thefuture functions <strong>and</strong> role of the KPC unknown.Key LessonsThe KPC is illustrative of how the <strong>in</strong>terests of relative stability <strong>and</strong> alternativecivilian livelihoods can be comb<strong>in</strong>ed through transform<strong>in</strong>g one or more militarygroups <strong>and</strong> redirect<strong>in</strong>g them towards civilian tasks. The creation of KPC <strong>in</strong>to aCivil Service Corps, had both strengths <strong>and</strong> weaknesses. The <strong>in</strong>itial goal of theprogram was achieved <strong>and</strong> the dom<strong>in</strong>ant military unit <strong>in</strong> Kosovo was transformed<strong>in</strong>to a civilian entity. However, the ambiguity of the purpose <strong>and</strong> long-term aimof the KPC (civilian emergency response organization or nucleus of a futurearmy of an <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo) proved to be a major problem; lead<strong>in</strong>g toserious difficulties <strong>in</strong> recruit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividuals from m<strong>in</strong>ority groups, as well as toconsiderable <strong>in</strong>ternational skepticism.The creation of the KPC could be understood as an <strong>in</strong>tegral part of ademobilization process designed to create employment for former KLAcombatants who might otherwise return to violence or crime, as had been theexperience <strong>in</strong> other post-conflict demobilization processes. Additionally, one canargue that the creation of the KPC, alongside with other <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>in</strong> Kosovo,35
had the benefit of giv<strong>in</strong>g the KLA a stake <strong>in</strong> the reconstruction process; thustransform<strong>in</strong>g the former military organization <strong>in</strong>to a civilian actor. This providedthe <strong>in</strong>ternational community with a source of leverage over the KLA, someth<strong>in</strong>gthat it did not orig<strong>in</strong>ally have.The Kosovo experience also shows the importance of local or national ownership<strong>and</strong> the strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of civilian <strong>in</strong>stitutions as part of the overall strategy. Asnoted by Rees; the creation of the Office of the KPC Coord<strong>in</strong>ator (OKPCC)proved to be a successful move – although it could have been placed under<strong>in</strong>digenous civilian control, management <strong>and</strong> oversight. Similarly, the KPCDonors Conference <strong>in</strong> December 2003 successfully placed the KPC with<strong>in</strong>the general public security debate – but it could have been organized earlier<strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> a long-term strategic framework, <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g local communities <strong>and</strong>stakeholders. (Rees, 2005)Military IntegrationThe DRC Brassage ProcessThe “brassage” process <strong>in</strong> DR Congo is an example of an IS-measure <strong>in</strong>itiatedwhile await<strong>in</strong>g further political negotiations on a plan to strengthen <strong>and</strong> downsizethe security sector. The Military Integration (MI) strategy, i.e. <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g allforces under one national army, was chosen to establish a sense of power-shar<strong>in</strong>gbetween rival groups dur<strong>in</strong>g the transition period. The governance capacity <strong>and</strong>the reach of the state to provide security were weak <strong>and</strong> there was an urgent needfor a transitional security apparatus. Also, the communities <strong>in</strong> the war struckareas of the country had to recover to allow for return of combatants. Thus, the“brassage” process is an example of an attempt to establish <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>,<strong>in</strong> the form of MI, aim<strong>in</strong>g at the state-, as well as community- <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuallevels. Unfortunately, however, it also provides a warn<strong>in</strong>g example of the <strong>in</strong>evitablefailure deriv<strong>in</strong>g from a process lack<strong>in</strong>g political leadership.Background <strong>and</strong> RationaleDur<strong>in</strong>g the past decade, the DRC has experienced several outbursts of violence.The war between 1998 <strong>and</strong> 2002, known as “the African World War” <strong>in</strong>volvedseven African countries <strong>and</strong> has led to the death of approximately 4 million people(International Crisis Group , 2006). After four years of bitter <strong>and</strong> devastat<strong>in</strong>gconflict, a Global <strong>and</strong> All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed <strong>in</strong> December36
2002 <strong>in</strong> Pretoria, South Africa. In June 2003, a transitional government wasestablished, which <strong>in</strong>cluded both members of the former government <strong>and</strong> ofdifferent belligerent groups that had fought <strong>in</strong> the conflict. Two key components ofthe peace agreement was the disarmament demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>tocivilian life of former combatants <strong>and</strong> the reform of the security sector, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gthe creation of an <strong>in</strong>tegrated national army.5.The establishment of an operational national defence force was critical becauseaside from MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo)the national army, FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratiquedu Congo), would constitute the only legitimate deterrent to spoilers. Thema<strong>in</strong> armed groups to be <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the FARDC were the FAC (ForcesArmées Congolaises) from K<strong>in</strong>shasa (100 000 combatants) <strong>and</strong> the RCD-G(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma) based <strong>in</strong> Goma <strong>and</strong>backed by Rw<strong>and</strong>a (45 000 combatants). These <strong>and</strong> some other belligerent groupshave all signed the Pretoria peace agreement, but the militias <strong>in</strong> the Ituri regionwere excluded from the agreement. This led to cont<strong>in</strong>ued fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the easternparts of the DRC. (Boshoff, 2005)The transitional government requested the UNDP <strong>and</strong> the MDRP (the Multi-Country Demobilization <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration Program governed by the WorldBank) to work with them <strong>in</strong> the development of a national program for DDR. TheNational DDR Plan (PN-DDR) was developed <strong>in</strong> a consultative process betweenthe transitional government, the UNDP, MONUC, UNICEF, MDRP, the WorldBank <strong>and</strong> the Belgian mission. (Ball <strong>and</strong> Hendrickson, 2006)PN-DDR consisted of two differentiated tracks: One for c<strong>and</strong>idates for <strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>in</strong>to the FARDC. One for c<strong>and</strong>idates for demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration.However, these two tracks shared a number of activities m<strong>and</strong>atory to all<strong>in</strong>dividuals whether <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>in</strong>to the new army or to demobilize. Itwas therefore named the “tronc commun” (comb<strong>in</strong>ed core). The primary step ofthis process <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> sensitization activities, which also <strong>in</strong>cludedcivilian populations affected by the conflict. Thereafter, the combatants fromvarious armed forces were regrouped <strong>in</strong> military operated regroup<strong>in</strong>g centers, tobe followed by the disarmament, release, registration, safekeep<strong>in</strong>g or destructionof combatants’ weapons <strong>and</strong> the transfer of disarmed combatants for identificationto orientation centers operated by CONADER (Commission Nationale pour laDémobilisation et la Ré<strong>in</strong>sertion).At this stage <strong>in</strong> the process, the <strong>in</strong>dividual combatant would be regarded as37
either a potential c<strong>and</strong>idate for enrolment <strong>in</strong> the FARDC or for re<strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>in</strong>to society as a demobilized combatant. After a stay <strong>in</strong> the orientation centreof approximately two weeks, adults opt<strong>in</strong>g for a placement <strong>in</strong> the FARDC weremoved to <strong>in</strong>tegration centers (centres de brassage et de recyclage), operated by themilitary, for basic tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of around 45 days <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to a newly-formedFARDC brigade. (Boshoff, 2005 & Amnesty International, 2007) These werecalled mixed brigades as they would consist of representatives from severaldifferent former armed groups.The draft PN-DDR aimed to limit the FARDC to 130 000 people. In May 2005,the transitional government adopted a strategic plan for army <strong>in</strong>tegration,visualiz<strong>in</strong>g a three-step process: The first step was the creation of six light <strong>in</strong>fantrybrigades <strong>in</strong> the run up to the elections; step two was the creation of a rapid reactionunit <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally the formation of the ma<strong>in</strong> defence force by 2010. (Boshoff, 2005 &Sebahara, 2006)Delays suffered by the army reform process led to the formulation of an emergencyplan for the reform. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the emergency plan, all armed units would beregrouped under the <strong>in</strong>structions of the Chief of the General Staff. Activities <strong>in</strong>the regroup<strong>in</strong>g centers would <strong>in</strong>clude identification, lead<strong>in</strong>g to the separation ofeligible <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>eligible elements, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial selection <strong>and</strong> orientation. Combatantswould then be moved to centres de brassage where they would be <strong>in</strong>termixed <strong>and</strong>retra<strong>in</strong>ed. This would be followed by f<strong>in</strong>al selection <strong>and</strong> placement of the new units.The emergency plan was <strong>in</strong>tended to be a short-term solution to facilitate the<strong>in</strong>tegration of six <strong>in</strong>itial brigades prior to the elections <strong>in</strong> 2006. It was seen as asolution to the transitional government’s immediate need to stabilize the east ofthe DRC. The plan called for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g personnel from Belgium <strong>and</strong> South Africato be deployed <strong>in</strong> the DRC. Budget proposals were submitted, but met littleresponse. This re<strong>in</strong>forces the experience of the difficulties to secure donor fund<strong>in</strong>gfor <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> type programs adm<strong>in</strong>istered by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense.Challenges <strong>and</strong> IssuesThe DDR <strong>and</strong> army <strong>in</strong>tegration processes have made some significant progressworth not<strong>in</strong>g. The bodies responsible for the implementation of the PN-DDR are<strong>in</strong> place. The law on defence <strong>and</strong> armed forces was promulgated the 12 November2004. The first step of the strategic plan for army reform has been successfullyimplemented, through the formation of six brigades <strong>in</strong> the centres de brassagebefore the elections <strong>in</strong> July 2006.38
Yet, the processes have been plagued by severe delays <strong>and</strong> problems. At first, thesewere attributed to compet<strong>in</strong>g agendas <strong>and</strong> deep-seated distrust between theelements of the transitional government <strong>and</strong> an accompany<strong>in</strong>g unwill<strong>in</strong>gness tocompromise. (Sebahara, 2006)5.The coord<strong>in</strong>ation of the processes has been <strong>in</strong>efficient. Implementation of themultiple structures has been significantly delayed. The reasons were both a lack offunds for military <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> a lack of f<strong>in</strong>ancial control mechanisms with<strong>in</strong>the transitional government. The ma<strong>in</strong> reason for the shortfalls has, however,been a complete lack of political will with<strong>in</strong> the transitional government, <strong>and</strong> thesubsequent elected National Government, to deal with the issues.A contact group has been set up to establish a common donor position on SSR;<strong>and</strong> especially army <strong>in</strong>tegration. The EU also created the EUSEC <strong>in</strong> order tosupport the Congolese authorities <strong>and</strong> FARDC with coord<strong>in</strong>ation. These two<strong>in</strong>itiatives significantly improved the coord<strong>in</strong>ation between different role players.(Boshoff, 2005 II)Key LessonsDue to capacity constra<strong>in</strong>ts, CONADER was unable to set up orientationcenters for the identification of combatants for the DDR process. As a result, theorientation phase was left out <strong>and</strong> the combatants were immediately regrouped<strong>and</strong> transported to the centres de brassage. This process was implemented by theFARDC, supported by different donor countries. Mobile teams were set up toperform the functions that were to have taken place <strong>in</strong> the orientation centers toensure that this short cut did not affect the activities carried out <strong>in</strong> the centres debrassage. (Boshoff, 2005 & 2005 II )The centers, however, were severely under-funded <strong>and</strong> lacked basic hygiene <strong>and</strong>medical facilities as well ass food supplies <strong>and</strong> proper shelter. This resulted <strong>in</strong>dozens of soldiers dy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> thous<strong>and</strong>s desert<strong>in</strong>g. Irregular payment of salariesresulted <strong>in</strong> unpaid soldiers prey<strong>in</strong>g on the local population for survival. EUSEChas put much energy <strong>in</strong>to improv<strong>in</strong>g the conditions <strong>in</strong> the centres de brassage <strong>and</strong>the rout<strong>in</strong>es for payment of salaries. (Amnesty International, 2007 & Walters <strong>and</strong>Boshoff, 2006)The cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g poor socio-economic situation <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with the cultureof impunity, which has been rooted <strong>in</strong> the DRC over the past twenty years, has<strong>in</strong>fluenced the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> human rights violations committed by the FARDC39
soldiers. Civilians have been killed, raped <strong>and</strong> abducted <strong>and</strong> private propertyhas been looted <strong>and</strong> houses set on fire, especially <strong>in</strong> the eastern DRC where thewar with various rebel groups rages on. (Amnesty International, 2007) A graveobstacle to the military re<strong>in</strong>tegration process is the cont<strong>in</strong>uous fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the eastof the country. Recent conflict <strong>in</strong> the region of North Kivu has shown that the<strong>in</strong>tegrated FARDC brigades do not have the capacity to counter the rebels withoutthe support of MONUC. (Walters <strong>and</strong> Boshoff, 2006 & Boshoff 2007)Despite commitments made to a peace processes, recently <strong>in</strong> the Nairobi protocol,the Congolese presidency shows little s<strong>in</strong>cerity to end violence <strong>in</strong> the east. So far,<strong>in</strong>ternational players have not significantly criticized the use of violence by thegovernment of DRC or the supply of weapons to various armed groups. As part ofits m<strong>and</strong>ate to support stabilization <strong>and</strong> the democratically elected government,MONUC has even provided the national army with logistical assistance <strong>and</strong>tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. In practice this has meant that the <strong>in</strong>ternational force has backedoffensives, aga<strong>in</strong>st the rebel groups still operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the country. The ma<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational players have been considered as proxies, not as partners. At the timeof writ<strong>in</strong>g to the extent that they are directly threatned by rebel attacks <strong>in</strong> the cityof Goma.The DRC case demonstrates the importance of accountable, committed <strong>and</strong>legitimate national counterparts for <strong>in</strong>ternational actors support<strong>in</strong>g a war to peacetransition. Despite the limited success of <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g former rivall<strong>in</strong>g parties <strong>in</strong>toa unified comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control structure of the FARDC, the almost completelack of parallel military (<strong>and</strong> full <strong>Security</strong> Sector) reform <strong>in</strong>itiatives has <strong>in</strong> practicemade little difference to the civilian population targeted by the armed groups.With few alternatives to establish a civilian livelihood, these soldiers cont<strong>in</strong>ue to“make their way” by military means, this time under the umbrella of the nationalarmy. L<strong>in</strong>ger<strong>in</strong>g unresolved political conflicts risk tear<strong>in</strong>g the peace process apart.Angolan Ownership of the Military Integration ProcessBackground <strong>and</strong> RationaleAfter nearly four decades of war, Angola has come a long way towards achiev<strong>in</strong>glast<strong>in</strong>g peace. The two national resistance movements, Movimento Popular deLibertado de Angola (MPLA), <strong>and</strong> the Uniado Nacional para la IndependenciaTotal de Angola (UNITA), who had fought aga<strong>in</strong>st the colonial authority <strong>and</strong>liberated Angola from the Portuguese colonial authority <strong>in</strong> 1975, failed to form ajo<strong>in</strong>t transitional government as <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>and</strong> were fight<strong>in</strong>g each other for power.40
Two peace accords were signed <strong>in</strong> the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the 90’s. Both agreements werebreached by UNITA. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the Luena Memor<strong>and</strong>um of Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g (MoU)was signed <strong>in</strong> April 2002 (World Bank, 2002) as a result of a successful offensiveaga<strong>in</strong>st UNITA <strong>and</strong> the death of its leader; Jonas Savimbi. The Luena MoU wasessentially a modified version or cont<strong>in</strong>uation of the Lusaka agreement of 1994with slight modifications (Imogen, 2004). In August 2002 the military branch ofUNITA was formally dissolved (World Bank, 2002).5.In June 2002, over 80 000 ex-combatants from UNITA had presented themselvesto the quarter<strong>in</strong>g areas across Angola. By August, 5 017 of them were <strong>in</strong>tegrated<strong>in</strong>to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g UNITA combatants werealso <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to the FAA, but as a temporary Military Integration strategy,i.e. only <strong>in</strong> anticipation of be<strong>in</strong>g demobilized. The government of Angola assumedresponsibility for demobilization of the new caseload of the Luena MoU, withf<strong>in</strong>ancial support of the World Bank under the MDRP. (World Bank, 2002)In the Military Integration scheme, the ranks of UNITA combatants wereconsidered equal to those of FAA soldiers. The demobilization process started<strong>in</strong> September 2002. Given that all UNITA combatants had formally been<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to the national army before demobilization, the responsibility fordemobilization <strong>and</strong> related activities fell under the FAA. (Human Rights Watch,2003)Challenges <strong>and</strong> IssuesAlthough the MoU had anticipated approximately 50 000 UNITA combatants tobe demobilized, the f<strong>in</strong>al process showed a total of 138 000 combatants (105 000UNITA <strong>and</strong> 33 000 government forces). (Caramés, Fisas <strong>and</strong> Sanz, 2007 – Angola)In total it is estimated that 100 404 UNITA combatants were demobilized, butonly 5 000 posts were available to them <strong>in</strong> the national army. In the end, 5 007UNITA combatants were <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the national army <strong>and</strong> another 40 <strong>in</strong>to thenational police force. Eighteen UNITA generals were <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the nationalarmy.By prioritiz<strong>in</strong>g those UNITA members conceived as potential threats to the peaceprocess the government chose to “buy off” senior generals <strong>and</strong> officers <strong>and</strong> offerthem high ranks <strong>in</strong> the national army. In this manner the high ranked officers<strong>and</strong> generals were permanently cut off from their leaders, as well as low-levelcombatants, a strategy that proved effective. (Parsons, 2004) The Governmentof Angola used this approach as a strategy to neutralize spoilers. This strategy41
was not as successful <strong>in</strong> the DRC, where the president refused one general of<strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the national army only to realize that he later mobilized his oldsoldiers <strong>and</strong> resumed fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Kivu.To ensure an effective <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able demobilization <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration of UNITAcombatants <strong>in</strong>to the national army, the government outl<strong>in</strong>ed four fundamentalpr<strong>in</strong>ciples. The overall objective was to create trust <strong>in</strong> the process, someth<strong>in</strong>g thathad been lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the former two demobilization attempts. (Doria, 2004)› The “comm<strong>and</strong>ers first” pr<strong>in</strong>ciple meant that the comm<strong>and</strong>ers of UNITA were<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the national army before the other combatants. The purposewas to make sure that the UNITA combatants were received by their owncomm<strong>and</strong>ers when demobilized <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this way create trust.› With<strong>in</strong> the “no tails beh<strong>in</strong>d” pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, the families of UNITA combatants werealso gathered <strong>in</strong> quarter<strong>in</strong>g areas <strong>in</strong> order to make sure that UNITA combatantswould not see it as an opportunity or <strong>in</strong>citement to leave the demobilizationprocess as deserters.› “Availability of vacant posts” <strong>in</strong>dicated that the FAA had made sure that acerta<strong>in</strong> number of posts, both <strong>in</strong> the leadership <strong>and</strong> at lower level were vacant <strong>in</strong>order for the national army to effectively absorb the UNITA combatants.› “No foreigners <strong>in</strong> the process” referred to the fact that the whole process of armyreform was managed <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anced by the government <strong>in</strong> an attempt to show thegovernments genu<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>tentions to secure peace <strong>and</strong> create trust among variousactors.Key LessonsThe demobilization of UNITA <strong>in</strong> Angola is an example of a program whereMilitary Integration was successfully used as an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> strategy.It is also an illustrative example of how potential spoilers can be dealt with <strong>and</strong>neutralized through transitional programs. However, evaluations show thatobstacles to re<strong>in</strong>tegration have rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> Angola as a result of the delayedstart of the re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs, social stigma, persist<strong>in</strong>g poverty <strong>and</strong>lack of m<strong>in</strong>imal conditions for resettlement due to destruction <strong>and</strong> lack of<strong>in</strong>frastructure, etc. This further underl<strong>in</strong>es the need for parallel efforts to establishan environment conducive to re<strong>in</strong>tegration. <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> is not a goal <strong>in</strong>itself <strong>and</strong> cannot be undertaken <strong>in</strong> isolation.42
Nepal – Explor<strong>in</strong>g Opportunities for <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>The sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), <strong>in</strong> November 2006, isan evidence of the burgeon<strong>in</strong>g relationship between DDR <strong>and</strong> SSR <strong>in</strong> Nepal. TheCPA stipulated the formation of a special committee under the <strong>Interim</strong> Councilof M<strong>in</strong>isters to <strong>in</strong>spect, <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>and</strong> rehabilitate the Maoist combatants. Thiscommittee would also advise the Council <strong>in</strong> the preparation <strong>and</strong> implementationof a detailed action plan of democratization of the Nepali Army, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g taskssuch as determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the right number, prepar<strong>in</strong>g democratic structures reflect<strong>in</strong>gthe national <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>clusive character <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g them to perform democraticpr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>and</strong> values of human rights.5.Unlike the conventional language <strong>and</strong> process, the CPA established a separateagreement on “The Monitor<strong>in</strong>g of the Management of Arms <strong>and</strong> Armies” withoutreference to DDR or SSR term<strong>in</strong>ology as such. This agreement outl<strong>in</strong>ed theprocess of redeployment <strong>and</strong> concentration of forces <strong>in</strong> cantonments <strong>and</strong> barracks.It also provided an opportunity for weapons storage <strong>and</strong> control, similar to theNorthern Irel<strong>and</strong> “decommission<strong>in</strong>g process” (see for example de Chastela<strong>in</strong>,2004 for details), under the surveillance of a civilian UN mission. (For detailssee the “Full text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement held between theGovernment of Nepal <strong>and</strong> Community Party of Nepal (Maoist)”, November 22,2006. Also see “Monitor<strong>in</strong>g of the Management of Arms <strong>and</strong> Armies”, 2006,Peace Secretariat, Kathm<strong>and</strong>u, Nepal).The question of ownership is evident <strong>in</strong> the Nepal case where the partiesapparently drafted the CPA with little outside <strong>in</strong>put. The peace talks were <strong>in</strong>itiatedwithout a clear victor to the conflict <strong>and</strong> as a result a negotiated settlementhas emerged; cantonment <strong>and</strong> arms storage were part of the transitional firststeps to build confidence <strong>and</strong> trust. Despite the recent elections <strong>in</strong> April 2008,establish<strong>in</strong>g the new government, there are still some disagreements regard<strong>in</strong>g the“<strong>in</strong>tegration”. The details of the <strong>in</strong>tegration process are still far from agreed.The Maoists <strong>in</strong>terpretation was to “professionalize of the Maoist fighters <strong>and</strong>democratize the Nepali Army”. The top level of the national army could not,however, see Maoist fighters be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tegrated without hav<strong>in</strong>g completed theexpected tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> addition be<strong>in</strong>g placed <strong>in</strong> the “proper” positions of thehierarchy.43
The <strong>in</strong>terface between DDR <strong>and</strong> SSR 3 also allows for the critical application ofa transitional justice mechanism of “vett<strong>in</strong>g”. Here, vett<strong>in</strong>g can become a subtlebut powerful means of apply<strong>in</strong>g transitional justice, while keep<strong>in</strong>g the door openfor safeguard<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st impunity. This mechanism can help ensure that a truth<strong>and</strong> reconciliation process does not become an open-ended, immutable amnestyprogram.This re<strong>in</strong>forces the important lesson for negotiators <strong>and</strong> advisors alike that, whilekeep<strong>in</strong>g a holistic framework <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d as to how various component elements ofa war to peace transition relate, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the contextual factors (cultural,historical, political, economic <strong>and</strong> social) shap<strong>in</strong>g the nature of the war <strong>and</strong>the deriv<strong>in</strong>g of peace, is critical <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g actions, particularly security <strong>and</strong> development related matters.Aga<strong>in</strong>, balanc<strong>in</strong>g real political concerns (the distribution of power, particularly<strong>in</strong> the security sector) with economic realities (the ability to absorb labor <strong>in</strong>tothe fledg<strong>in</strong>g economy) provides an opportunity to explore IS <strong>in</strong>itiatives to ensurestability <strong>and</strong> security <strong>in</strong> the early stages of the war-to-peace transition.Utiliz<strong>in</strong>g lessons from the Service Corps <strong>and</strong> Military Integration cases, a shortterm IS measure prior to <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> DDR might be a way forward <strong>in</strong> Nepal,comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g military <strong>in</strong>corporation with civilian re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs of Maoistsforces. Special brigades such as build<strong>in</strong>g, conservation <strong>and</strong> border patrol unitswith<strong>in</strong> the formal Nepal Army structure may or may not be an attractive optionfor the Maoist fighters, but if it is utilized as a short-term remedy to limitedpossibilities for <strong>in</strong>tegration at higher ranks <strong>and</strong> or re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to a sunkeneconomy, then it may be acceptable <strong>and</strong> should be followed carefully. 4Two lessons are aga<strong>in</strong> confirm<strong>in</strong>g the SIDDR report recommendations: First,that each conflict requires its own discourse (language) <strong>and</strong> process to reflectthe objective conditions on the ground <strong>and</strong> aspirations of the key stakeholders.Second, that the phas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of conventional lockstep DDRapproaches may vary considerably depend<strong>in</strong>g upon the political-military manner<strong>in</strong> which the conflict ended (i.e. stalemate, clear victor etc.). Although the notion3. The concept of SSR is understood as much wider than merely military reform. Ideally a right siz<strong>in</strong>gof the Nepal army should be part of a more comprehensive strategy, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g police, justice <strong>and</strong>oversight issues.4. In discussions on social <strong>and</strong> economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration options <strong>in</strong> Nepal, several possibilities werementioned rang<strong>in</strong>g from agricultural based <strong>in</strong>dustries <strong>and</strong> non-timber forest based livelihoodactivities to contracted overseas employment. Given the state of the economy, it is highly unlikely thatskill tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> itself will ensure employment.44
of ownership <strong>in</strong> Nepal is very strong, the Nepali peace process has so far beensuccessful <strong>in</strong> adapt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational knowledge to cultural <strong>and</strong> historical concernsof the country’s own situation.5.Transitional <strong>Security</strong> ForcesThe Transitional Afghan Militia Forces– a Necessary Initial StepBackground <strong>and</strong> RationaleThe sign<strong>in</strong>g of the Bonn Agreement on 5 December 2001 created the structuralconditions for assembl<strong>in</strong>g, under a united comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control, the variousarmed factions that had participated <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternal fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Afghanistanfrom the Soviet <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>in</strong> 1979 to the fall of the Taliban <strong>in</strong> 2001. The BonnAgreement created the Afghan National Army (ANA), which would be placedunder the jurisdiction of the civilian Afghan <strong>Interim</strong> Authority (AIA). The ANAwould <strong>in</strong>corporate former Mujahedd<strong>in</strong>, the Afghan armed forces, <strong>and</strong> other armedgroups <strong>in</strong> the country.However, while the Bonn Agreement was be<strong>in</strong>g negotiated, the Afghan MilitiaForces (AMF) was created by unify<strong>in</strong>g various anti-Taliban faction to provide <strong>and</strong>control over the armed groups <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, under a loose but s<strong>in</strong>gle comm<strong>and</strong>(Thruelsen, 2006). This represents a form of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>, where a newtransitional military structure is created to establish <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imumlevels of security; keep<strong>in</strong>g armed units occupied while more permanent structures<strong>and</strong> programs are put <strong>in</strong>to place.Hav<strong>in</strong>g established the new ANA structure, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence would paythe salaries of the combatants embedded <strong>in</strong> the AMF until these combatantswere able to return to civil life <strong>and</strong> until the communities were ready for them.The AMF program hopefully precluded these combatants from <strong>in</strong>stigat<strong>in</strong>g an<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> the power vacuum that occurred between the fall of the Taliban <strong>and</strong>the creation of the ANA. The successful long-term establishment of a new nationalarmy, however, would require a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, <strong>and</strong>re<strong>in</strong>tegration program for the AMF.The United Nations Assistance Mission <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan (UNAMA) conducted anextensive survey to identify <strong>and</strong> assess the approximate quantity of combatantsto be disarmed. At the same time, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence (MOD) sent out45
some 1,500 officers to perform a similar survey. After roughly two months, theUN assessed that there were some 94,000 combatants to be disarmed, while theMOD survey found that an estimated 250,000 combatants needed to be <strong>in</strong>cluded<strong>in</strong> the programs. The difference <strong>in</strong> the identified number of combatants by thetwo <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> the problems concern<strong>in</strong>g the identification process <strong>in</strong> thefield turned out to be one of the biggest challenges for the Afganistan’s NewBeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs Programme (ANBP) (Thruelsen, 2006).When the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence identified a unit for disarmament, the regionalANBP office took over the verification of that unit. This was done through averification committee consist<strong>in</strong>g of ANBP staff <strong>and</strong> local senior leaders of thatparticular region. The extensive verification process was relatively successful. Thesystem enabled the program to exclude free riders from the process <strong>and</strong> gave itlegitimacy – someth<strong>in</strong>g all too often lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> DDR processes (Thruelsen, 2006).Challenges <strong>and</strong> IssuesThe program did experience a number of challenges. The subversive behavior oflocal comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> their unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to demobilize <strong>and</strong> disarm seems tohave been one of the ma<strong>in</strong> reasons for the delayed DDR process <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan.One contribut<strong>in</strong>g factor <strong>in</strong> this was that only the warlords <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ers whosupported the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Defense were enrolled <strong>in</strong>to the AMF (Thruelsen, 2006),leav<strong>in</strong>g a number of unaffiliated armed groups out of the process. This, naturally,compromised the legitimacy of the process as a whole.There also seem to have been a number of de facto dis<strong>in</strong>centives to demobilize <strong>and</strong>disarm built <strong>in</strong>to the ANBP program <strong>and</strong> the ANA <strong>and</strong> AMF structures. PeterThruelsen hypothesizes that the difficulties <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the actual number ofcombatants had to do with the mechanism for payment of salaries to the AMF.The salaries were channeled from the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defense to the combatantsthrough their respective comm<strong>and</strong>ers, giv<strong>in</strong>g comm<strong>and</strong>ers an <strong>in</strong>centive tokeep their soldiers mobilized as long as possible. The setup also enabled thecomm<strong>and</strong>ers to earn extra money by report<strong>in</strong>g artificially high numbers ofsoldiers <strong>in</strong> their units. The actual turn up at disarmament was only about 50percent of the total strength <strong>in</strong>itially stated by the comm<strong>and</strong>ers (Thruelsen, 2006).In the end of the summer 2004, almost three years s<strong>in</strong>ce beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g ANBP, theGovernment began to use the threat of sanctions aga<strong>in</strong>st the non-cooperativecomm<strong>and</strong>ers. Two k<strong>in</strong>ds of sanctions were used.46
The first sanction, a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of public announcements <strong>and</strong> the withhold<strong>in</strong>gof salaries, was directed aga<strong>in</strong>st the petty <strong>and</strong> middle comm<strong>and</strong>ers. The M<strong>in</strong>istryof Defence would first cut off money from the comm<strong>and</strong>ers who did not meet fordisarmament. Then the unit would be decommissioned <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual soldierswould loose the possibility of jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the re<strong>in</strong>tegration program. This pitted theprospect of re<strong>in</strong>tegration aga<strong>in</strong>st the soldiers’ loyalties to their comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong>gave soldiers an <strong>in</strong>centive to turn aga<strong>in</strong>st uncooperative comm<strong>and</strong>ers.5.The second type of sanctions <strong>in</strong>troduced followed from the constitution ofAfghanistan, stat<strong>in</strong>g that no leader of a political party with his own militia couldrun for public office <strong>in</strong> an election. This resulted <strong>in</strong> two of the more powerfulwarlords <strong>in</strong> the country jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the DDR program <strong>in</strong> order to be allowed toparticipate <strong>in</strong> the parliamentary election. It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that publicop<strong>in</strong>ion polls at the time showed that the number one priority of the Afghans wasdisarmament of the AMF <strong>in</strong> order to achieve security <strong>and</strong> economic development.The Afghan program has been subject to criticism. For example, the ma<strong>in</strong>tenanceof military structures is said to have helped comm<strong>and</strong>ers fortify positions <strong>in</strong>their respective regions <strong>and</strong> strengthen their role as middlemen <strong>in</strong> the opiumeconomy. Another issue is that the ANBP did not allow for a weapons-fordevelopmentor other community-based programs when disarm<strong>in</strong>g the AMF.After demobiliz<strong>in</strong>g a unit the process became <strong>in</strong>dividualized <strong>and</strong> each soldierwould enter re<strong>in</strong>tegration on their own. Some of the problems experienced <strong>in</strong> theimplementation process could perhaps have been remedied by experiment<strong>in</strong>g withcommunity-based programs. (Thruelsen, 2006)Close coord<strong>in</strong>ation between SSR <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>and</strong> the process of disarm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>demobiliz<strong>in</strong>g armed groups, such as the AMF, is critical. In many respectshowever, the Afghan <strong>Interim</strong> Authority viewed disarmament, demobilization <strong>and</strong><strong>Security</strong> Sector Reform as separate, autonomous activities. Only about 3 percentof the demobilized combatants from the AMF have actually jo<strong>in</strong>ed the ANA(Thruelsen, 2006).Key LessonsBy establish<strong>in</strong>g the AMF (i.e. an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> strategy) <strong>and</strong> pay<strong>in</strong>g thesalaries of the soldiers, the Government bought time for the <strong>in</strong>itiation of a formalDDR process. The system was designed to establish <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a critical levelof security while the political situation was sorted out. However, the Afghanexperience also further highlights the importance of <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g all stakeholders,47
especially potential spoilers, <strong>in</strong> the process. Armed groups, or disgruntledcomm<strong>and</strong>ers, left outside of the formal process will almost <strong>in</strong>evitably f<strong>in</strong>d ways tosabotage peace efforts.Much can also be learned from the apparent weakness of the system of pay<strong>in</strong>gex-combatant salaries through comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> local warlords. This lesson hasalso been learned the hard way <strong>in</strong> other DDR-processes. As always, a carefulbalance must be struck between the importance of a sense of real local <strong>and</strong>national ownership on one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> accountability <strong>and</strong> efficacy on the other.Once the process entered a phase where some groups were show<strong>in</strong>g tendenciesto leave or misuse the process, the <strong>in</strong>troduction of a system of carrots <strong>and</strong>sticks (<strong>in</strong>centives <strong>and</strong> sanctions), reduced the risk of <strong>in</strong>dividual combatants orcomm<strong>and</strong>ers turn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to spoilers. The successful disarmament was dependentupon a clear demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration strategy, antithetical to thetraditional view of disarmament occurr<strong>in</strong>g first.The Sunni Awaken<strong>in</strong>gWhile currently unfold<strong>in</strong>g, the emergence of the “Awaken<strong>in</strong>g Movements” <strong>in</strong>Iraq is a recent phenomenon worth not<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the context of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>.These are essentially coalitions between tribal Sheikhs <strong>and</strong> the Government (aswell as Coalition Forces) to ensure local security <strong>in</strong> the form of local armed militiaor ad hoc armed forces provid<strong>in</strong>g local or community protection under traditionalleadership structures. The Sunni tribes <strong>in</strong> Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce have been particularlysuccessful with this <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>-like model. As of September 2007 theleadership of 25 of the 31 Anbari tribes was cooperat<strong>in</strong>g with the governmentunder the aegis of the Anbar Salvation Council while six have been associated withal Qaeda <strong>in</strong> Iraq. Agency <strong>and</strong> livelihood <strong>in</strong> the form of wage <strong>in</strong>centives are be<strong>in</strong>gprovided for local guards. Cohesiveness <strong>and</strong> legitimacy (aged tribal bonds <strong>and</strong>leadership) are part of the arrangements.The outst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g risk factors are what will become of this local militia after peace<strong>and</strong> security has been restored. Will they be <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the formal Iraqi army,police <strong>and</strong> border forces? Provided tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> assets for re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to anormal productive civilian life? (Roggio)48
Transitional AutonomyThe two case studies on Cambodia <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a provide a deepened discussion ofexamples of transitional autonomy (see Chapter 6). In this section, the case of thePeshmerga <strong>in</strong> Kurdish Iraq is presented as a brief illustration.5.The Peshmerga <strong>in</strong> Kurdish Iraq – Autonomy <strong>in</strong> the Mak<strong>in</strong>gSimilar to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong> 1999, the Peshmerga– a regional guard <strong>in</strong> Iraqi Kurdistan – fought alongside American <strong>and</strong> Coalitionforces dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>vasion of Iraq <strong>in</strong> 2003. S<strong>in</strong>ce then the Peshmerga has beengiven full responsibilities for the provision of security <strong>in</strong> the region. There are anestimated 75 000 active Peshmerga <strong>and</strong> an unknown number has been <strong>in</strong>tegrated<strong>in</strong>to the reformed <strong>and</strong> coalition-tra<strong>in</strong>ed Iraqi <strong>Security</strong> Forces (Katzman <strong>and</strong>Prados, 2006).The “Transitional Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative Law”, agreed upon by the US <strong>and</strong> the IraqGovern<strong>in</strong>g Council <strong>in</strong> November 2003, allowed for “regional control overpolice forces <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal security” <strong>and</strong> this regional competence over <strong>in</strong>ternalsecurity matters was reta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the Iraqi Constitution, approved by a referendum<strong>in</strong> October 2005. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to article 121 of the Constitution the regionalgovernment shall be responsible for all the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative requirements of the region,particularly the establishment <strong>and</strong> organization of the <strong>in</strong>ternal security forces for the regionsuch as police, security forces <strong>and</strong> guards of the region(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/ iraqi_constitution.pdf). This provides thelegal basis for the Peshmerga to persist with<strong>in</strong> the new Iraqi security structure.The Peshmerga <strong>in</strong> Iraq thus represents a model of an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> evolv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to a more permanent part of a states reformed security structure. With thethreat of partition of the country loom<strong>in</strong>g on the horizon, the question of whetherthe Peshmerga will transform <strong>in</strong>to a national army <strong>and</strong> police or if a demobilizationof former Peshmerga fighters <strong>in</strong>to the civilian work force, is yet to be answered.Dialogue <strong>and</strong> Sensitization (Halfway-House arrangements)The Rw<strong>and</strong>an Ing<strong>and</strong>o-processMost of this section on the Ing<strong>and</strong>o-experiences <strong>in</strong> Rw<strong>and</strong>a is based on a paperprepared by Francis Musoni, senior DDR planner <strong>and</strong> chief re<strong>in</strong>tegration officer,Rw<strong>and</strong>a Demobilization <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration Commission. The paper was written49
for a sem<strong>in</strong>ar arranged to discuss the results <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of this research project.Lessons <strong>and</strong> analysis also take the sem<strong>in</strong>ar’s comments <strong>and</strong> critiques <strong>in</strong>to account,<strong>and</strong> does not necessarily reflect the views of Mr. Musoni.Background <strong>and</strong> RationaleThe Arusha protocols, signed <strong>in</strong> 1993 between the Government of the Republicof Rw<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> the Rw<strong>and</strong>ese Patriotic Front (later RPA), stipulated that bothforces should merge <strong>and</strong> form an <strong>in</strong>tegrated National Army after the conflict. OnApril 6 1994, follow<strong>in</strong>g the death of the President of Rw<strong>and</strong>a <strong>in</strong> a plane crash,ethnic extremists seized government power <strong>and</strong> launched a campaign of genocidethroughout the country. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the course of the follow<strong>in</strong>g three months, overone million Rw<strong>and</strong>ans, ma<strong>in</strong>ly Tutsis <strong>and</strong> moderate Hutus from oppositionparties, were massacred. In July 1994 the Rw<strong>and</strong>a Patriotic Army (RPA) defeatedthe national army “Forces Armées Rw<strong>and</strong>aises” (FAR) <strong>and</strong> formed a newgovernment. The FAR split <strong>in</strong>to three groups. One group comprised ma<strong>in</strong>ly forcesloyal to the genocide regime. This group fled to Congo with the <strong>in</strong>formal militias(<strong>in</strong>terahamwe) <strong>and</strong> civilian refugees. The second group comprised soldiers whosimply returned to their communities <strong>and</strong> either settled or went <strong>in</strong>to hid<strong>in</strong>g. Thethird group consisted of soldiers captured by or voluntarily surrendered to the RPA.Demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration of excess fighters had been adopted as apolicy already <strong>in</strong> the Arusha peace agreement <strong>in</strong> 1993. The security, political,social <strong>and</strong> economic realities, however, was significantly different immediatelyafter the genocide <strong>and</strong> civil war than at the time of sign<strong>in</strong>g the agreement. Theprotocols were articulated to provide for a gradual process of military <strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>and</strong> disarmament, demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration. After the cessation ofhostilities <strong>in</strong> mid-1994, there were thous<strong>and</strong>s of defeated soldiers show<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terestto <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>in</strong>to a new Rw<strong>and</strong>ese Army. Others were wait<strong>in</strong>g to be officiallydemobilized or hid<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>in</strong> communities unsure of their fate under the newadm<strong>in</strong>istration.The situation called for urgent attention. The RPA sought to establish atemporary, <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>-like program for the ex-FAR members whowere still <strong>in</strong> the country. All captured, surrender<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> hid<strong>in</strong>g members ofex-FAR were gathered <strong>in</strong> two separate camps for screen<strong>in</strong>g, sensitization <strong>and</strong>consultations on <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> DDR. The programs came to be called Ing<strong>and</strong>oafter a traditional method of solv<strong>in</strong>g difficult problems by gather<strong>in</strong>g to consult<strong>in</strong> isolation from everyday life. The RPA had <strong>in</strong>itiated Ing<strong>and</strong>o-processes alreadydur<strong>in</strong>g the war, as a strategy to deal with captured enemy combatants <strong>and</strong> sensitize50
communities to their cause. The Rw<strong>and</strong>ian Ing<strong>and</strong>o-process entailed the gather<strong>in</strong>gof former enemy combatants <strong>in</strong> camps for “problem solv<strong>in</strong>g” dialogue sessionsrecount<strong>in</strong>g the causes <strong>and</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g ownership of the tragedy, expos<strong>in</strong>g mutualmyths <strong>and</strong> stereotypes <strong>and</strong> endeavour<strong>in</strong>g to rebuild trust after the deep trauma ofthe Genocide (see Rusagera, 2004).5.All officers were gathered at Gako Military School <strong>in</strong> the Eastern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce whiletheir soldiers camped at Rubona <strong>in</strong> the Southern Prov<strong>in</strong>ce. When these campswere set up, <strong>in</strong> the early aftermath of the war, there was still a war-like situation.Institutions had been shattered <strong>and</strong> the security situation was very fragile. Boththe communities <strong>and</strong> the ex-FAR needed protection <strong>and</strong> assurance for their safety.The Ing<strong>and</strong>o-programs provided a sense of security, while also creat<strong>in</strong>g anopportunity for screen<strong>in</strong>g for skills (<strong>and</strong> of participation <strong>in</strong> the Genocide orother war crimes) among the ex-FAR; consultations on <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> DDR;workshops on government programs such as National Unity <strong>and</strong> Reconciliation,Economic Recovery <strong>and</strong> <strong>Development</strong>, National <strong>and</strong> Regional <strong>Security</strong>Challenges, rebuild<strong>in</strong>g government <strong>and</strong> social <strong>in</strong>stitutions etc; <strong>and</strong> sensitizationexercises <strong>and</strong> recreational activities such as sports, music <strong>and</strong> dance. Aftercomplet<strong>in</strong>g the Ing<strong>and</strong>o-process, each <strong>in</strong>dividual had a choice either to <strong>in</strong>tegrate<strong>in</strong>to the RPA or to go through formal DDR.Dur<strong>in</strong>g the process the ex-FAR were free to go home <strong>and</strong> visit their families <strong>and</strong> thecamps were open to visitors. In a way, this helped to build trust <strong>and</strong> confidence <strong>and</strong>helped attract some of the ex-FAR hid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the communities. When the registration<strong>and</strong> orientation program for ex-FAR closed <strong>in</strong> 2005, approximately 13,000 formercombatants had signed up for the demobilization <strong>and</strong> subsequent re<strong>in</strong>tegration.Challenges <strong>and</strong> IssuesProvid<strong>in</strong>g security <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terim between war <strong>and</strong> development, <strong>and</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g am<strong>in</strong>imum level of trust <strong>and</strong> confidence between former enemies, were the primaryconcerns when the Ing<strong>and</strong>o programs were conceived. In a broad sense, theseobjectives were achieved. A critical level of human security, for communities <strong>and</strong>former combatants, was ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> a basis for reconciliation was established.Alternatives were provided for ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict.The ex-FAR combatants with skill <strong>and</strong> a reasonably clean record could optfor <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to the RPA. The process also gave the moderate ex-FAR anopportunity to distance themselves from the extremists <strong>and</strong> architects of theGenocide.51
Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>itial stages, the program lacked sufficient resources. State<strong>in</strong>stitutions had broken down <strong>and</strong> looted by flee<strong>in</strong>g officials of the oustedgovernment. The donor community was <strong>in</strong>itially focused on refugees <strong>and</strong>Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Tax collection was generat<strong>in</strong>g only m<strong>in</strong>imalrevenues. This was remedied <strong>in</strong> part when the UNDP <strong>in</strong>tervened with fund<strong>in</strong>g forthe program. S<strong>in</strong>ce Ing<strong>and</strong>o is undertaken after disarmament of combatants, theprogram did not experience the same difficulty <strong>in</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational fund<strong>in</strong>gas some other <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> programs exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this study.While the Ing<strong>and</strong>o-process has helped Rw<strong>and</strong>a to stop further divisions <strong>and</strong> toform a basis for reconciliation <strong>in</strong> the country, the model is not uncomplicated.There is a natural temptation, built <strong>in</strong>to any sensitization scheme of thismagnitude, for the lead<strong>in</strong>g party to make use of the campaign for politicalpurposes. There have been serious allegations aimed at the Ing<strong>and</strong>o-process <strong>in</strong> thisregard (see for example Mgbako, 2005). These allegations will not be dealt with<strong>in</strong> depth here. For the purposes of the present study, it suffices to raise the issue ofpossible misuse as a risk factor <strong>in</strong> design<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures on thebasis of broad sensitization <strong>and</strong> political re-education programs.Key LessonsThe Rw<strong>and</strong>ese Ing<strong>and</strong>o model illustrates an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measure builtaround the need to form a basis for long-term reconciliation <strong>in</strong> a society ravagedby one of the most brutal civil wars <strong>and</strong> most effective genocides of our time. It isimpossible to underst<strong>and</strong> the dynamics of the current Ing<strong>and</strong>o process outside ofits unique context. However, it bears important lessons for the study of <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong> as a tool <strong>in</strong> post-conflict peace build<strong>in</strong>g.The Ing<strong>and</strong>o clearly aims at creat<strong>in</strong>g an environment <strong>in</strong> which return<strong>in</strong>gcombatants feel safe. This type of halfway house <strong>in</strong> which ex-combatants are givenspace to get used to the idea of return<strong>in</strong>g to communities proved to be an effectivepull factor for combatants <strong>in</strong> hid<strong>in</strong>g or still <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g. It also managed togenerate an <strong>in</strong>creased sense of confidence <strong>in</strong> the peace process.In undertak<strong>in</strong>g combatant focused programs it is essential to remember theneeds of communities <strong>and</strong> to balance efforts <strong>and</strong> support activities. Sensitizationprograms for receiv<strong>in</strong>g communities are key to form a basis for successfulre<strong>in</strong>tegration down the l<strong>in</strong>e. Reports vary significantly regard<strong>in</strong>g the success ofcommunity sensitization programs <strong>in</strong> Rw<strong>and</strong>a. Given the trauma suffered by theentire population of the country the task has been immense.52
However, <strong>in</strong> any program aim<strong>in</strong>g primarily at achiev<strong>in</strong>g reconciliation througha strengthened sense of national unity, there is a risk of misuse for political ga<strong>in</strong>by one or more parties. The l<strong>in</strong>e between unify<strong>in</strong>g history lessons <strong>and</strong> political<strong>in</strong>doctr<strong>in</strong>ation can be very th<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> post-conflict sett<strong>in</strong>gs. It is absolutely essentialto strike the right balance <strong>and</strong> allow for openness, critical exam<strong>in</strong>ation of facts <strong>and</strong>mutual dialogue throughout these processes.5.53
6.6. Selected Country Fieldwork:Cambodia, Colombia <strong>and</strong>Ug<strong>and</strong>aCambodiaThe case study on <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> experiences <strong>in</strong> Cambodia was conductedby S<strong>in</strong>thay Neb <strong>and</strong> Sven Edquist of the Advocacy Policy Institute(www.api<strong>in</strong>stitute.org) <strong>in</strong> Phnom Penh. Comments <strong>and</strong> reflections at theFebruary 2008 sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>in</strong> Stockholm have been taken <strong>in</strong>to consideration <strong>in</strong>edit<strong>in</strong>g the text below.Background <strong>and</strong> RationaleWhen, <strong>in</strong> January 1979, the Vietnamese army <strong>in</strong>vaded Cambodia <strong>and</strong> put anend to Pol Pot’s authoritarian regime, the Khmer Rouge fled westwards towardsThail<strong>and</strong>. In the decade that followed, Cambodia was engulfed by civil warbetween the Vietnamese <strong>in</strong>stalled government <strong>in</strong> Phnom Penh <strong>and</strong> the KhmerRouge, protected by Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a. Two additional guerrilla groups, theRoyalist group, FUNCINPEC, lead by K<strong>in</strong>g Sihanouk, <strong>and</strong> the Khmer People’sNational Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son San, formed the CoalitionGovernment of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to push oust the government,led by Hun Sen.Peace negotiations <strong>in</strong> the late 80-ies led to the “Comprehensive PoliticalSettlement of the Cambodia Conflict”, <strong>in</strong> October 1991; allow<strong>in</strong>g for the ParisPeace Agreement (PPA), which entrusted the United Nations TransitionalAuthority <strong>in</strong> Cambodia (UNTAC) to supervise the unification of the fight<strong>in</strong>gforces <strong>in</strong> the country <strong>and</strong> the subsequent demobilization from the unified army55
of approximately 140,000 soldiers. When the demobilization program wascompleted <strong>in</strong> May 1993, about 28,000 soldiers had officially been demobilized,ma<strong>in</strong>ly from the regular armed forces. The UNTAC plan did not encompass anycomprehensive re<strong>in</strong>tegration support. (http://www.khmer<strong>in</strong>stitute.org/docs/PPA1991.htm)As a result of the first national election, the new Cambodian Constitution waswritten <strong>and</strong> a coalition government was established with Co-Prime M<strong>in</strong>isters,Pr<strong>in</strong>ce Norodom Ranarriddh (FUNCINPEC), <strong>and</strong> Hun Sen’s Cambodia PeoplesParty (CPP) – from 1993–1998. Unconv<strong>in</strong>ced about their prospects <strong>in</strong> the 1993election, the Khmer Rouge had pulled out of the PPA <strong>in</strong> 1992 <strong>and</strong> retreated to theirsafe havens <strong>in</strong> the west of the country; the fight<strong>in</strong>g cont<strong>in</strong>ued.Unity with<strong>in</strong> the Government was needed to fight the Khmer Rouge <strong>and</strong> theGovernment managed, <strong>in</strong> July 1994, to adopt a bill officially outlaw<strong>in</strong>g themovement <strong>and</strong> call<strong>in</strong>g for severe penalties aga<strong>in</strong>st its members. However thecoalition <strong>and</strong> the power-shar<strong>in</strong>g agreement <strong>in</strong> Phnom Penh quickly collapsed<strong>and</strong> the two parties began battl<strong>in</strong>g for full power. Both parties had searched forweapons <strong>and</strong> allies <strong>and</strong> began separate negotiations with the Khmer Rouge.The CPP was by far the stronger of the two government parties <strong>and</strong> was thereforeable to offer the most concrete <strong>in</strong>centives for the KR defectors. Hun Sen seizedpower <strong>in</strong> a coup (claim<strong>in</strong>g that the action was merely a pre-emption of a coupplanned by the FUNCINPEC) <strong>and</strong> articulated his desire to put an end to thepolitical <strong>and</strong> military conflict <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g peace to Cambodia. As part of thisstrategy Hun Sen visited the KR areas Samlot, Pail<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Malai <strong>and</strong> announcedhis W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> policy (see below).On 23 February, 1996, a Khmer Rouge top leader, Keo Pong, defected to theGovernment <strong>in</strong> Phnom Oral, Kampong Speu prov<strong>in</strong>ce. This marked thebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the end of armed conflict between the Khmer Rouge <strong>and</strong> theCambodian Government. In August 1996 the Khmer Rouge-held zones of Pail<strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong> Phnom Malai <strong>in</strong> Cambodia’s northwest surrendered to the Government.This heralded a cha<strong>in</strong> of defections that ended <strong>in</strong> 1998 <strong>in</strong> the movement’s ultimatedemise. After three decades of conflict <strong>and</strong> violence, the war was f<strong>in</strong>ally over.The Demise of the Khmer RougeWhile Cambodia has faced numerous challenges <strong>in</strong> the decade s<strong>in</strong>ce the KhmerRouge defected, peace has been kept. It has been argued that the Khmer Rouge’s56
demise <strong>in</strong> 1998 was <strong>in</strong>evitable. The movement was <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly outdated,emaciated <strong>and</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alized <strong>and</strong> it was no longer able to face the rigors ofrebellion, let alone revolution.6.However, the Khmer Rouge had shown a remarkable resilience to survive <strong>and</strong>strike fear <strong>in</strong>to the hearts of its opponents over four decades of political <strong>and</strong> threedecades of military struggle. The KR’s barbarism had come to overshadow the factthat it received significant support from the weakest section of the Cambodiancommunity – the downtrodden rural peasantry who felt they were suffer<strong>in</strong>g severe<strong>in</strong>justices <strong>and</strong> that the Khmer Rouge would change th<strong>in</strong>gs for the better. Theideas of the Khmer Rouge are still today strongly held by people liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the KRstrongholds of Pail<strong>in</strong>, Phnom Malai <strong>and</strong> Samlot.There appears to be two ma<strong>in</strong> factors caus<strong>in</strong>g the Khmer Rouge to return tonegotiations <strong>in</strong> 1996–1998: First, there was an <strong>in</strong>ternal conflict between the hardl<strong>in</strong>eideologues based <strong>in</strong> Anlong Veng – who wanted to cont<strong>in</strong>ue the struggleunder the leadership of Pol Pot – <strong>and</strong> those under the leadership of Ieng Sary based<strong>in</strong> Pail<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Malai – who wanted to avoid persecution <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>and</strong>other benefits ga<strong>in</strong>ed dur<strong>in</strong>g the conflict.The Ieng Sary groups were based <strong>in</strong> an area rich <strong>in</strong> natural resources <strong>and</strong> withgreater economic prosperity <strong>and</strong> freedom. They were <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly reluctant tocont<strong>in</strong>ue fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> to take orders from the central Khmer Rouge control. Here,the concepts of democracy, freedom <strong>and</strong> private ownership were grow<strong>in</strong>g alongwith <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g trade across the border with Thail<strong>and</strong>. People were able to movefreely between their zones <strong>and</strong> Government-held towns as well as <strong>in</strong>to Thail<strong>and</strong>.In Thail<strong>and</strong> they were able to purchase goods unatta<strong>in</strong>able at home. Ieng Sary’sfaction saw the opportunity to break away when the Khmer Rouge leadership based<strong>in</strong> Anlong Veng attempted to re-impose ‘collectivization’ of property threatened<strong>in</strong>ternal repression. This co<strong>in</strong>cided with the deteriorat<strong>in</strong>g health of Pol Pot.Secondly, the political turmoil <strong>in</strong> Phnom Penh, <strong>and</strong> the success of Hun Sen’sCPP, had produced a powerful counterpart for negotiations, who could be trustedto deliver on offered <strong>in</strong>centives. The W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> policy offered an attractive exitstrategy for the KR leadership as well as for combatants.57
The W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> Policy: Pragmatism Prevails <strong>in</strong> the Short RunHun Sen’s W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> Policy states:› First- to guarantee personal <strong>and</strong> family safety for those will<strong>in</strong>g to end the war<strong>and</strong> return to live <strong>in</strong> the society.› Second- to guarantee people’s careers by provid<strong>in</strong>g enough opportunities toenable them to cont<strong>in</strong>ue their past professions.› Third- to guarantee the safety of people’s property from confiscation <strong>and</strong>alteration. 5In addition to these po<strong>in</strong>ts, the government passed the “Law to Outlaw theDemocratic Kampuchea Group” (<strong>in</strong> 1994), which codify<strong>in</strong>g the crim<strong>in</strong>alizationof acts committed by the Khmer Rouge, but also provided a six months amnestyperiod for defectors. The amnesty was <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>itely extended <strong>in</strong> 1995, someth<strong>in</strong>gthat certa<strong>in</strong>ly worked as an <strong>in</strong>centive for many Khmer Rough leaders hav<strong>in</strong>g beena part of Pol Pot’s regime <strong>in</strong> the 1970’s. However, there was no amnesty <strong>and</strong> nostatue of limitations to crimes of genocide (see Law to Outlaw the DemocraticKampuchea Group, preamble §8).FUNCINPEC, be<strong>in</strong>g traditionally closer to the KR, had fought <strong>in</strong> the jungleaga<strong>in</strong>st Hun Sen’s government alongside the KR <strong>and</strong> were partners <strong>in</strong> the UNrecognised government. The CPP saw its own political survival as dependentupon forg<strong>in</strong>g peace with the KR, mak<strong>in</strong>g them an ally <strong>and</strong> further isolat<strong>in</strong>gFUNCINPEC.<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> Through Defacto AutonomyThe W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> policies allowed the Khmer Rouge to keep everyth<strong>in</strong>g they alreadyhad; they could rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> their l<strong>and</strong>s; they reta<strong>in</strong>ed their military ranks <strong>and</strong>community positions <strong>in</strong> the civil adm<strong>in</strong>istration; <strong>and</strong> they were allowed to ownhouses <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>.Three levels of re<strong>in</strong>tegration was implemented:› Military <strong>in</strong>tegration – All defected KR soldiers were <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the RoyalCambodian Armed Forces. The mid-level comm<strong>and</strong>ers cont<strong>in</strong>ued to lead theirsoldiers under the Cambodian Armed Forces structure.› Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative re<strong>in</strong>tegration – The Khmer Rouge leaders were allowed toeither keep their old positions or accept alternative positions <strong>in</strong> their own5. Extract from a copy of Samdech Hun Sen’s speech for clos<strong>in</strong>g the Open Academic Forum on the15th Anniversary of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of Cambodia Conflict,organized by International Relations Institute of Cambodia (IRIC), October 21, 200658
communities. Pail<strong>in</strong> was established as a city; Samlot became a district with<strong>in</strong>Battambang prov<strong>in</strong>ce; <strong>and</strong> Malai, Kamreang, Sampov Loun, <strong>and</strong> Phnom Prekbecame districts with<strong>in</strong> Banteay Meanchey prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Today, ex-Khmer Rougeleaders still hold great sway <strong>in</strong> their former zones.› Socio-economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration – The Government granted these KR areasautonomous economic development zone status: no taxes for three-years <strong>and</strong>permission to open a number of ’Border Economic Gates’ with Thail<strong>and</strong> topromote trade.6.The economic development helped create social harmony, which was of crucialimportance <strong>in</strong> the re<strong>in</strong>tegration process. L<strong>and</strong> was fairly distributed with<strong>in</strong> theautonomous zones. Each combatant <strong>and</strong> his or her family were provided with twocows, five hectares of l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> 5,000 Baht. Many still live peacefully on this l<strong>and</strong>.Challenges, Issues <strong>and</strong> Key LessonsThe exact details of the agreement made between the CPP <strong>and</strong> the defect<strong>in</strong>gKhmer Rouge comm<strong>and</strong>ers are not known. Apparently, it was solid enough to stopthe violence <strong>and</strong> allow for a period of stability <strong>and</strong> peace. The amnesty that wasoffered the former leadership of Pol Pot’s genocide adm<strong>in</strong>istration, however, hasalso delayed a much-needed national reconciliation process.Some aspects of the process, which were considered successful at the time, may <strong>in</strong>retrospect seem counterproductive <strong>and</strong> detrimental to the democratic, social, <strong>and</strong>economic development. For example, the three-year tax exemption <strong>in</strong> KR areasled to a rush to exploit the natural resources <strong>in</strong> the areas with<strong>in</strong> this period. Theresults have been devastat<strong>in</strong>g from both economic governance <strong>and</strong> environmentalperspectives.Some of the <strong>in</strong>terlocutors <strong>in</strong>terviewed also held that the only reason thatCambodia had enjoyed a susta<strong>in</strong>ed peace was the dom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>and</strong> control of theCPP. The CPP controlled all state <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> the nation’s ma<strong>in</strong> resources. Ina properly function<strong>in</strong>g democracy, where govern<strong>in</strong>g parties come <strong>and</strong> go, it maynot have been possible to susta<strong>in</strong> peace.It may also be argued that by 1996 the Khmer Rouge, or at least its effectivefight<strong>in</strong>g forces, might have been prepared to concede defeat on a lot less generousterms than those offered by Hun Sen’s W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> policies. They were divided,undermanned <strong>and</strong> under-resourced. They had lost all <strong>in</strong>ternational support <strong>and</strong>practically all domestic credibility; they were exhausted.59
However, despite the seem<strong>in</strong>gly term<strong>in</strong>al state of the movement, the KhmerRouge was still <strong>in</strong> existence. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the past three decades they had shown anastonish<strong>in</strong>g resilience. This resilience <strong>and</strong> the KR leadership’s general disregardfor the lives of their countrymen, make case for the importance of the W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong>policies to end the fight<strong>in</strong>g.Due to the trade-off between justice <strong>and</strong> peace, Cambodia has never establisheda Truth <strong>and</strong> Reconciliation Commission. The W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> policies <strong>and</strong> theKhmer Rouge defections served peace but did not address the need for nationalreconciliation <strong>and</strong> justice. The government was content with grant<strong>in</strong>g amnesty<strong>in</strong> exchange for peace. In this rush the government failed to <strong>in</strong>volve civil societyactors <strong>and</strong> establish what role they would play <strong>in</strong> a democratic society.The program was not <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to a wider scheme to establish a culture ofrespect for human rights. Because the government’s primary concern was to endthe war – <strong>and</strong> for the CPP to boost its powerbase – no concrete system was put <strong>in</strong>place by the government to properly deal with the post-conflict reconciliation <strong>and</strong>re<strong>in</strong>tegration process.By offer<strong>in</strong>g a “w<strong>in</strong>-w<strong>in</strong> policy”, the Cambodia People’s Party was able to establishconcrete <strong>in</strong>centives to KR defectors. Defectors were ensured a guarantee ofpersonal <strong>and</strong> family safety, safety of property <strong>and</strong> opportunities to cont<strong>in</strong>ue theprofessions previously held. Provid<strong>in</strong>g these <strong>in</strong>centives with<strong>in</strong> the framework oftransitional autonomy allowed for the Khmer Rouge to rema<strong>in</strong> on their l<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong>reta<strong>in</strong> their military ranks <strong>and</strong> community positions (i.e. social cohesion).Be<strong>in</strong>g an (at least orig<strong>in</strong>ally) ideologically driven fight<strong>in</strong>g force, the Khmer Rougefollowers also susta<strong>in</strong>ed a strong common identify <strong>and</strong> social cohesiveness. Thetransitional process <strong>in</strong> which areas under former Khmer Rouge control havegradually been <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to national adm<strong>in</strong>istrational structures, may also havecontributed to a sensitization process. Many of the KR fighters <strong>and</strong> families knewnoth<strong>in</strong>g but the Khmer Rouge political propag<strong>and</strong>a.The plan did succeed <strong>in</strong> help<strong>in</strong>g to establish the foundation for susta<strong>in</strong>able peace <strong>in</strong>Cambodia. Nonetheless, it raises a number of issues. The KR <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>scheme illustrates the need to tie any transitional measures <strong>in</strong>to a longer-termpeacebuild<strong>in</strong>g strategy, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g, as appropriate, re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> nationalreconciliation programs. It also highlights the importance of not clos<strong>in</strong>g the dooron future justice processes deal<strong>in</strong>g with crimes committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the conflict. Thes<strong>in</strong>gl<strong>in</strong>g out of specific crimes of genocides as exceptions to the Law to Outlaw the60
Democratic Kampuchea Group has allowed for recent arrests of former KhmerRouge leaders. Another issue is the environmental impact of the total KR controlover the natural resources of the de facto autonomous areas.6.In the Cambodian context, it is also <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to ask whether <strong>in</strong>volvement of the<strong>in</strong>ternational community would have made a difference. It is likely that a numberof control- <strong>and</strong> safety functions would have been built <strong>in</strong>to the program, had<strong>in</strong>ternational actors been <strong>in</strong>volved. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, it is far from certa<strong>in</strong> thatthe m<strong>in</strong>imum conditions acceptable from an <strong>in</strong>ternational community perspective(i.e. democratic governance, judicial procedures to deal with <strong>in</strong>ternational crimes,environmental controls etc.), would have been accepted by the parties.ColombiaThe Colombian case study was undertaken by Alex<strong>and</strong>ra Guáqueta <strong>and</strong> GersonArias, Fundacion Ideas Para la Paz (www.ideaspaz.org). The prelim<strong>in</strong>ary results ofthe study were discussed at the February 2008 sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>in</strong> Stockholm <strong>and</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts raised <strong>in</strong> these discussions are reflected <strong>in</strong> the summary below.Background <strong>and</strong> RationaleThere are around 46,000 demobilized combatants <strong>in</strong> Colombia. Most of them,31.671, are right-w<strong>in</strong>g illegal paramilitary. This group demobilized betweenDecember 2003 <strong>and</strong> August 2006 as the result of negotiations between the ÁlvaroUribe government <strong>and</strong> the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The AUCclaimed to be a counter<strong>in</strong>surgent organization forced <strong>in</strong>to existence because of thefailure of the state to protect citizens from guerrilla harassment but many of itsmembers had close ties to drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g mafias <strong>and</strong> were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>alactivities, most notably extortion.The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 14.329, mostly guerrillas, deserted on their own. Of these socalled “<strong>in</strong>dividually” demobilized, 8.268 belonged to the Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 1.944 to the Ejército de LiberaciónNacional (ELN) <strong>and</strong> 435 are dissidents from other guerrilla groups. The FARC<strong>and</strong> the ELN, who embrace a left-w<strong>in</strong>g ideology, formed <strong>in</strong> the 60s claim<strong>in</strong>g toredress social <strong>and</strong> political grievances. They have shunned any peace agreementwith the Colombian government <strong>and</strong> are the ma<strong>in</strong> targets of the ColombianArmed Forces, particularly the FARC who <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly s<strong>in</strong>ce the 1980s resorted tothe illegal coca <strong>in</strong>dustry.61
The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 3.682 of the <strong>in</strong>dividually demobilized combatants are paramilitarywho did not demobilize <strong>in</strong> the “collective” negotiations but chose to re<strong>in</strong>tegrateaway from their blocs. Collective demobilized combatants (paramilitary groupswho struck a deal with the government) <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividually demobilized combatants(essentially guerrilla deserters), are two separate populations. They pose differentthreats to peace <strong>and</strong> security <strong>and</strong> they have followed different re<strong>in</strong>tegration paths.The Paramilitary (AUC)In May 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the presidency <strong>and</strong> soon thereafter, theparamilitary began reach<strong>in</strong>g out to the government. Besides war fatigue, those <strong>in</strong>favor of demobilization <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st ongo<strong>in</strong>g drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g feared <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g USpressure on Colombia to combat paramilitary drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> US extraditionrequests. Their only way out was a swift conversion <strong>in</strong>to a political organization.After much discussion among paramilitary comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> various <strong>in</strong>formalconversation with church clergy <strong>and</strong> government officials, they decided to issuethe Declaracion por la Paz de Colombia. The document formally announced a ceasefireeffective as of January 1 st , 2003 <strong>and</strong> the will<strong>in</strong>gness of the AUC to <strong>in</strong>itiateformal talks.In December the Uribe government created an Exploratory Commission <strong>in</strong> chargeof the talks. Meet<strong>in</strong>gs with the AUC, the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB) <strong>and</strong>Vencedores de Arauca <strong>and</strong> the Eastern Alliance began <strong>in</strong> January 2003. All alongthere had been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g pressure by the US, who had issued arrest warrants<strong>and</strong> extradition petitions for various paramilitary leaders. The exploratory talksdef<strong>in</strong>ed the ma<strong>in</strong> issues that had to be negotiated <strong>and</strong> formally ended on July15, 2003 with the publicly announced Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement. The exactcommitments as well as tacit underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs by the different parts are unknown.The official document is vague. The paramilitary commit to demobiliz<strong>in</strong>g all itsmembers, support the Government’s purpose of hav<strong>in</strong>g a Colombia without drugtraffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> will concentrate their comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> specially designated zones.In return, they expect the government to follow the Exploratory Commission’srecommendations: that the government f<strong>in</strong>ds “legal alternatives” to make thepeace agreement possible, gives priority to paramilitary regions of <strong>in</strong>fluence whenimplement<strong>in</strong>g development <strong>and</strong> security policies <strong>and</strong> adjusts the governmentre<strong>in</strong>tegration program.The government submitted to Congress a bill regard<strong>in</strong>g paramilitarydemobilization that proposed an “alternate judicial” regime (the so called “Leyde Alternatividad Penal”) allow<strong>in</strong>g combatants to forgo st<strong>and</strong>ard sentences for a62
variety of crimes, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g human rights abuses, crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity, drugtraffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> other economic illicit activities. The bill sparked a heated national<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational debate, as different actors were opposed to the concessions be<strong>in</strong>ggranted to the paramilitary <strong>in</strong> exchange for their demobilization. 66.In August 2006, president Uribe ordered all paramilitary comm<strong>and</strong>ers, who upuntil then had had special permits to move freely back <strong>and</strong> forth from the Santa Fede Ralito zone to other places, to transfer permanently to a detention center <strong>in</strong> LaCeja, nearby Medell<strong>in</strong> to beg<strong>in</strong> comply<strong>in</strong>g with their prison time. 60 comm<strong>and</strong>erscomplied but several others escaped.In December, the last major crisis of the process occurred when the comm<strong>and</strong>erswere transferred to the Itagüí prison. Báez, the paramilitary spokesman for thepeace process said the settlement was off <strong>and</strong> implied they still held sway over theirmen <strong>and</strong> could rearm the various groups. The threat never materialized but someargue there are new illegal counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency groups emerg<strong>in</strong>g, which are notnecessarily under the comm<strong>and</strong> of those who participated <strong>in</strong> the peace process.(Rub<strong>in</strong>i, 2008) All along there were ongo<strong>in</strong>g problems related to middle-rankcomm<strong>and</strong>ers that never turned themselves <strong>in</strong>.Corporación Democracia –a Transitional Institutional ArrangementThe Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) demobilization was the first paramilitarygroup to disarm. A tripartite agreement was negotiated <strong>and</strong> signed between theBCN, the national government <strong>and</strong> the Medell<strong>in</strong> Mayor’s Office. The agreementwas that local authorities would adm<strong>in</strong>istrate <strong>and</strong>, to an important extent, fundthe DDR program, which would last 18 months. The BCN was given some“assurances” <strong>in</strong> the form of a proactive role <strong>in</strong> the development <strong>and</strong> follow-up ofthe re<strong>in</strong>tegration process. 7For that purpose, a BCN-run non-for-profit organization, the CorporaciónDemocracia (CD), would be created. The real functions of CD as well as thetacit expectations by both combatants <strong>and</strong> official authorities are unclear. Wasthe government settl<strong>in</strong>g for disarmament <strong>and</strong> a sort of “ceasefire”, as opposedto dem<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g a full dismantlement of the organization <strong>and</strong> its function <strong>in</strong> thecrim<strong>in</strong>al world?6. Analyses of the different bills <strong>and</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ions by key actors can be found <strong>in</strong> FIP’s Siguiendo el Conclito:hechos y análisis de la semana, volumes 1–3, compiled <strong>in</strong> 2005–2007.7. See “Acta de Compromiso entre la Ofic<strong>in</strong>a del Alto Comisionado para la Paz y la Alcaldía deMedellín”, November 13, 2003.63
There were two key arrangements that implied the BCN would ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its cha<strong>in</strong>of comm<strong>and</strong>. One was jo<strong>in</strong>t polic<strong>in</strong>g by former BCN <strong>and</strong> Medellín police forcesof areas formerly controlled by the BCN. This was meant to provide securityguarantees to BCN members while at the same time allow<strong>in</strong>g greater policecontrol over the comunas to which it had no access <strong>in</strong> the past. Former combatantswould be given radios, no weapons, to patrol alongside police units. They wouldfacilitate the entry of police forces <strong>in</strong>to the neighborhoods <strong>and</strong> be <strong>in</strong> permanentcontact with the rest of the “boys” <strong>in</strong> order to receive <strong>in</strong>formation on the localsituation.The second arrangement was the appo<strong>in</strong>tment of BCN “zone coord<strong>in</strong>ators”,meant to liaise between the Mayor’s office <strong>and</strong> the boys. They would monitorwhether the combatants were attend<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sessions <strong>and</strong> appo<strong>in</strong>tments withthe social workers <strong>and</strong> psychologists, hear whether the local communities hadcompla<strong>in</strong>ts on the behavior of any of the boys, <strong>and</strong> communicate any news fromthe program. In addition to these arrangements, up until his own demobilization,Don Berna, the former BCN leader, still comm<strong>and</strong>ed the BCN <strong>and</strong> had “LaTerraza” b<strong>and</strong> at his service.The decl<strong>in</strong>e of violence more generally <strong>in</strong> Colombia was one of the majorachievements of the ceasefire commitments <strong>and</strong> the peace negotiations, whichhelped the Uribe government justify the process to Colombian <strong>and</strong> foreignaudiences. The BCN demobilization, however, has been strongly criticized by localNGOs, who argue that the “boys” still act as alternate authorities <strong>in</strong> the comunas,follow orders from Don Berna <strong>and</strong> have connections with the crim<strong>in</strong>al world. 8Shareholder Agro Bus<strong>in</strong>ess as an <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong> MeasureIn 1997, the BCB (Bloque Central Bolívar) emerged as a paramilitary group <strong>and</strong>by 2004 it had reached a force of 6000 combatants. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the agreements withthe government, <strong>and</strong> after the Justice <strong>and</strong> Peace Law passed through Congress, theBCB demobilized 8 regional groups between July 2005 <strong>and</strong> January 2006. For thegovernment, the BCB demobilization was crucial given their size <strong>and</strong> power. Thispo<strong>in</strong>t touches on some of the conundrums of the paramilitary peace process: onthe one h<strong>and</strong>, it was hard to justify a “peace” deal with organizations who were not8. For early reactions see “10 preguntas para pensar”, Revista Semana, December 1, 2003. Interviewsby FIP staff to local communities, clergy <strong>and</strong> NGOs <strong>in</strong> various visits <strong>in</strong> 2006 <strong>and</strong> 2007. See alsoInstituto Popular de Capacitación (IPC), “Narcotráfico desestabiliza a Medellín”, March 14, 2008;IPC, “Cartel del Norte del Valle tras la hegemonía armada en Medellín”, November 3, 2007; IPC,“En Medellín, re<strong>in</strong>sertados de las Auc venden propiedades expropiadas ilegalmente”, August 21, 2007.64
entirely politically-driven <strong>and</strong> should have been simply imprisoned; on the otherh<strong>and</strong>, such structures wielded great power <strong>and</strong> state authorities had not been ableto control them. A deal seemed to be the only viable option.6.Before disarm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> demobiliz<strong>in</strong>g, the BCB began sett<strong>in</strong>g up agro- bus<strong>in</strong>esseswhere they expected lower rank<strong>in</strong>g combatants to work. The ownership of thel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> who exactly would benefit from any profit accrued was unclear. Thegovernment suspected that at least one function of these farms was to launderparamilitary ill-gotten l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> monies. These farms would also enable leaders toma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> ties with the combatants, reward <strong>and</strong> help those whom they consideredimportant <strong>and</strong> preserve physical presence <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> territories.Fern<strong>and</strong>o Soto, from Busc<strong>and</strong>o Cam<strong>in</strong>os Buenos, argues that the projects had anadditional rationale; to pose as reparation <strong>and</strong> reconciliation <strong>in</strong>itiatives to ga<strong>in</strong>public acceptance of the peace process.For public op<strong>in</strong>ion, the possibility that comm<strong>and</strong>ers would enjoy economic wealthderived from crime <strong>and</strong> human rights abuses became morally unacceptable. Thefirst Santa Fe de Ralito agreement actually endorsed the idea of social <strong>in</strong>vestmentby the paramilitary leadership aimed at re<strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g its combatants. In favor ofsuch a model was the perception among some sectors <strong>in</strong> government <strong>and</strong> societythat it was unfair for tax payers to subsidize a resource-rich illegal armed group.There were also practical considerations; <strong>in</strong> many places the paramilitary hadbetter logistical capacity <strong>and</strong> local connections. Comm<strong>and</strong>ers could exercise controlto keep combatants from defect<strong>in</strong>g from the re<strong>in</strong>tegration process if necessary.The BCB made sure to make these projects appear as legitimate as possible <strong>and</strong>the BCB was effectively dismantled (by Colombian st<strong>and</strong>ards). When the blocdemobilized it created two NGOs; Busc<strong>and</strong>o Cam<strong>in</strong>os Buenos <strong>and</strong> Semillas de Paz.Both worked on economic projects for former combatants <strong>and</strong> other membersof the communities, as well as a variety of social projects usually embedded <strong>in</strong> apolitically-correct reconciliation discourse. The idea of creat<strong>in</strong>g an NGO withthese functions stemmed from the precedent set by Corporación Democracia <strong>and</strong>the “good” reputation that came along with the NGO status.It seems that <strong>in</strong> the case of the BCB, a real or perceived security dilemma (besidespersonal <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong> drug traffick<strong>in</strong>g) has underm<strong>in</strong>ed its commitment to thepeace process as well as <strong>in</strong>fluenced developments <strong>in</strong> other blocs. S<strong>in</strong>ce the DDRprocess began, BCB leader Macaco believed his security depended on keep<strong>in</strong>gother blocs, crim<strong>in</strong>al organizations or guerrillas from fill<strong>in</strong>g the vacuums left bythe BCB, not just <strong>in</strong> terms of territorial control but tak<strong>in</strong>g over illegal bus<strong>in</strong>esses.65
Individual DDR: Cooptation of CombatantsIn 2002 <strong>and</strong> 2003 desertions from FARC <strong>and</strong> ELN rose sharply. The newDemocratic <strong>Security</strong> Policy had launched a tough military offensive aga<strong>in</strong>st theguerrillas, especially FARC, thereby <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g security risks for the rebels. Warfatigue due to fierce paramilitary pressure s<strong>in</strong>ce 1997; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense propag<strong>and</strong>aby the government, which focused on the advantages of liv<strong>in</strong>g a normal life awayfrom “the bush”, <strong>in</strong>spired many to take part of the benefits offered by the newre<strong>in</strong>tegration program.Deserters had to spend up to three days <strong>in</strong> detention, be<strong>in</strong>g debriefed bymilitary <strong>in</strong>telligence, who would act as a first filter to confirm the identity ofthe combatant. After that, the deserter would enter the Programa de AtenciónHumanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD) run by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Defence. PAHDwould locate them <strong>in</strong> temporary homes <strong>and</strong> provide them with basic assistanceuntil they had passed the second filter, verification by the Attorney General’sOffice on their crim<strong>in</strong>al history. If the combatant had not committed war crimes,he or she would receive a special certification <strong>and</strong> go on to the Programa deRe<strong>in</strong>corporación a la Vida Civil (PRVC), run by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior <strong>and</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>a re<strong>in</strong>tegration program that lasted two years <strong>and</strong> that would end <strong>in</strong> the sett<strong>in</strong>g upof a bus<strong>in</strong>ess with a 4,000 USD grant.Even if not the sole <strong>and</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al purpose, deserters from the guerrilla groups<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly became a valuable source of <strong>in</strong>formation on the active rebel groups,whom the Armed Forces had to combat. The term of transit trough the M<strong>in</strong>istryof Defence’s PAHD program was lengthened to two months. Demobilizedcombatants, who would often turn themselves <strong>in</strong> to the nearest military brigadeor police station <strong>in</strong> rural zones, would not be sent to Bogotá accord<strong>in</strong>g to theestablished calendar. The military would keep him (or her), not aga<strong>in</strong>st his will<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> accordance with the law 9 , for weeks <strong>and</strong> months at the brigade to obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> collaboration.Very often, demobilized combatants accompanied operations as “guides”, attimes armed, to po<strong>in</strong>t at hidden weapon deposits or identify guerrilla members.Intelligence agents, police <strong>in</strong>vestigators <strong>and</strong> tax authorities work<strong>in</strong>g on terrorism,drug <strong>and</strong> weapons traffick<strong>in</strong>g or specific homicide cases, also found demobilizedcombatants useful sources. In exchange they were granted f<strong>in</strong>ancial compensation.The use of demobilized combatants <strong>in</strong> this particular security function was9. Decree 128 of 2003, the legal basis for the new re<strong>in</strong>tegration program <strong>in</strong>cluded language thatallowed such collaboration.66
criticized for be<strong>in</strong>g a means of war- not peace-build<strong>in</strong>g. It entailed serious risksto former combatants <strong>and</strong> could easily lead to distortions of the <strong>in</strong>formationprovided. Former combatants reported that often, military <strong>and</strong> civilian authoritiesthreatened not to grant the person the benefits he’s entitled to unless they provide<strong>in</strong>formation.6.The “Soft Polic<strong>in</strong>g” TrackIn late 2004, the High Peace Commissioner, the PRVC <strong>and</strong> the Director Generalof the Police created a new formula to occupy former combatants that respondedto several needs at the same time: the auxiliares cívicos en convivencia y seguridadciudadana, security civilian aides; a type of “soft polic<strong>in</strong>g” mostly <strong>in</strong> towns, cities<strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> roads. The idea was to offer former guerrilla <strong>and</strong> paramilitary, whether<strong>in</strong>dividually or collectively demobilized, to temporarily serve under the comm<strong>and</strong><strong>and</strong> supervision of the Police. In this way, they could rema<strong>in</strong> occupied <strong>and</strong> earnsome money while they completed vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> found other moresteady jobs <strong>in</strong> the market.In the case of former guerillas, the program would also help them build trusttowards the state <strong>and</strong> public security agencies – their old enemies. The functionwas also framed as “service to the community”, <strong>in</strong> which former combatantscould “repair” the harms <strong>in</strong>flicted on society. (Colprensa, 2005) The program<strong>in</strong>cludes tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g on citizenship competences, human rights, first aid, socialcommunication <strong>and</strong> basic polic<strong>in</strong>g. Combatants are not allowed to carry weapons<strong>and</strong> they can serve as forest rangers, road safety assistants, tourist guides <strong>and</strong>surveillance assistants <strong>in</strong> bus stations.Challenges, Issues <strong>and</strong> Key LessonsThe paramilitary DDR process <strong>in</strong> Colombia is different from most other similarprocesses for two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal reasons: 1) The paramilitary are not typical rebelorganizations; <strong>and</strong> 2) Colombia is a relatively developed democracy <strong>and</strong> thus notgo<strong>in</strong>g through the typical war to peace transition. The ultimate expected outcomesof the process are: An absolute dismantlement of the paramilitary phenomenon;a good dose of punishment for committed crimes <strong>and</strong> a power-shar<strong>in</strong>g agreementfacilitated by a transitional justice regime. The Justice <strong>and</strong> Peace Law <strong>and</strong> the DDRprograms were designed to move toward disarmament <strong>and</strong> demobilization of theparamilitary but stop short of achiev<strong>in</strong>g full dismantlement. This would have hadto entail neutraliz<strong>in</strong>g economic <strong>and</strong> political <strong>in</strong>fluence of the paramilitary groups.67
<strong>Interim</strong> stabilization <strong>in</strong> the case of Colombia has allowed flexibility <strong>in</strong> peacenegotiations <strong>and</strong> the demobilization process. The government was given a space<strong>in</strong> which it could establish legal <strong>in</strong>struments, bureaucracies <strong>and</strong> necessary budgetl<strong>in</strong>esfor a long-term re<strong>in</strong>tegration program. At the same time, however, there isa risk that complete demobilization of all the groups is endangered <strong>and</strong> that thedem<strong>and</strong>s by the groups will only <strong>in</strong>crease.Halfway-house arrangements, <strong>in</strong> which comm<strong>and</strong>ers are allowed to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>fluence over their troops but with a civilian focus of activities, can helpensure stability <strong>and</strong> control over ex-combatants. Combatants are not left alone<strong>and</strong> they become part of a wide range of <strong>in</strong>itiatives. This helps them ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>social cohesion while undergo<strong>in</strong>g a sensitization process, gradually adjust<strong>in</strong>g tocivilian roles. But the proximity of the demobilized troops to their networks <strong>and</strong>contacts with<strong>in</strong> the crim<strong>in</strong>al world can also expose them to a greater risk of be<strong>in</strong>gre-recruited.L<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g the demobilized personnel to transitional security forces, such as thesoft polic<strong>in</strong>g, under the supervision of civil authorities, <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>gthem <strong>in</strong>to the Armed Forces <strong>in</strong>creases legitimacy <strong>and</strong> facilitates the work of Statesecurity structure <strong>and</strong> helps ex-combatants trust the system.Break<strong>in</strong>g the l<strong>in</strong>ks to old comm<strong>and</strong> structures may be a crucial factor <strong>in</strong> there<strong>in</strong>tegration of combatants who are exposed to recruitment by crim<strong>in</strong>alorganizations. If combatants are somewhat isolated from crim<strong>in</strong>al contacts <strong>and</strong>networks <strong>and</strong> located <strong>in</strong> relative safe places, they may st<strong>and</strong> a chance to <strong>in</strong>itiatea new life with a legitimate livelihood. Such combatants need, however, steadyemployment that fulfils his or her expectations with regards to salary <strong>and</strong> status.Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ex-combatants for work <strong>in</strong> private security companies regulated by theState is an alternative to hav<strong>in</strong>g them jo<strong>in</strong> public forces. However, given that <strong>in</strong>general the control over these companies <strong>in</strong> the countries <strong>in</strong> conflict is weak, therisks seem greater than the possible benefits.The paramilitary are not a conventional rebel army, but a coalition of groupsthat may ally or compete depend<strong>in</strong>g on their needs. Each group is a mix betweena crim<strong>in</strong>al organization <strong>and</strong> a counter<strong>in</strong>surgent army. On the one h<strong>and</strong>, it canbe argued that allow<strong>in</strong>g the groups to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> some cohesion, <strong>in</strong> the absenceof strong economic projects that could compete with salaries offered <strong>in</strong> thedrug bus<strong>in</strong>ess, has been counterproductive <strong>and</strong> that it has so far prevented there<strong>in</strong>tegration of many combatants. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, it may be argued that this68
was a necessary transitional trade-off, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g security, while mov<strong>in</strong>g towardmore competitive (with crim<strong>in</strong>al options) <strong>and</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able re<strong>in</strong>tegration options(livelihoods).6.The case of <strong>in</strong>dividual guerrilla deserters is very different, as they have not demobilizedall <strong>in</strong> one block. In Colombia’s past guerrilla demobilizations, the groups made arelatively smooth transition from be<strong>in</strong>g combatants to becom<strong>in</strong>g political parties<strong>and</strong> NGOs. The temporary <strong>in</strong>tegration of demobilized guerrilla combatants <strong>in</strong>tonational security structures is performed dur<strong>in</strong>g an ongo<strong>in</strong>g conflict but couldbecome a model for Military Integration <strong>in</strong> an eventual peace deal. At the momentany political agreement between the rebels <strong>and</strong> the Government seems far away<strong>and</strong> the future of FARC <strong>and</strong> ELN, <strong>and</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which these combatants will bebrought back <strong>in</strong>to the fabric of society, is still an open question.Ug<strong>and</strong>aThis section is based on a case study undertaken by Fred Mugisha, <strong>and</strong> apresentation by the chairman of the Ug<strong>and</strong>a Amnesty Commission, Justice PeterOnega, at the February 2008 sem<strong>in</strong>ar <strong>in</strong> Stockholm organized to discuss thef<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of this research project. The analysis is also <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>impressions from a field visit <strong>in</strong> Northern Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>in</strong> the summer of 2007. Theconclusions <strong>in</strong> the section are therefore the sole responsibility of the research team.Background <strong>and</strong> RationaleUg<strong>and</strong>a has a complicated political history of <strong>in</strong>ternal violence <strong>and</strong> powerstruggles. S<strong>in</strong>ce President Yoweri Museveni consolidated power <strong>in</strong> 1986, at least22 separate groups have taken up arms aga<strong>in</strong>st the government <strong>and</strong> a numberof separate peace deals have been made over the years. Re<strong>in</strong>tegration programstherefore have a fairly long history <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, dat<strong>in</strong>g back to the late eighties. Yetthe scope <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of re<strong>in</strong>tegration efforts have often been <strong>in</strong>sufficient.One clear example is transitional economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration. After ex-combatantscome out of rehabilitation centers (part of formal programs) they often end up <strong>in</strong>low opportunity environments such as IDP camps. In this context, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terms of buy<strong>in</strong>g-time through transitional programs for former-combatants, <strong>and</strong>creat<strong>in</strong>g opportunities to address short-term needs, such as a public-works corps,might be a viable alternative.The two decade long <strong>in</strong>surgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) <strong>in</strong> northernUg<strong>and</strong>a, however, still awaits a durable resolution. Us<strong>in</strong>g bases <strong>in</strong> neighbor<strong>in</strong>g69
countries, the LRA have raided villages <strong>and</strong> refugee camps <strong>in</strong> northern Ug<strong>and</strong>ato plunder <strong>and</strong> abduct new recruits for their struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st the Ug<strong>and</strong>a PeoplesDefence Forces (UPDF). At the height of the conflict, over 80% of the population<strong>in</strong> northern Ug<strong>and</strong>a was displaced liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> refugee camps across the north.To provide <strong>in</strong>centives for LRA fighters to surrender, the Ug<strong>and</strong>an Amnesty Actwas enacted <strong>in</strong> 2000. The law grants immunity to any combatant or collaboratorwho returns <strong>and</strong> renounces the rebellion. Those who return are called reporters, asmost of the combatants have been forcefully recruited or kidnapped at very youngages. The reporters are entered <strong>in</strong>to re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs, adm<strong>in</strong>istered by theUg<strong>and</strong>a Amnesty Commission. To date, a total of 23 000 reporters have passedthrough the Amnesty Commission programs.S<strong>in</strong>ce 2006, the Government of Ug<strong>and</strong>a (GoU) is engaged <strong>in</strong> peace negotiationswith the LRA <strong>in</strong> Juba, southern Sudan. Dur<strong>in</strong>g these negotiations, thesecurity situation <strong>in</strong> the north has improved considerably. As there are fewerconfrontations, <strong>and</strong> thereby fewer opportunities for combatants <strong>and</strong> abductees toescape from the LRA or be captured by Ug<strong>and</strong>an forces, the number of reportersreturn<strong>in</strong>g has decreased s<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the peace talks. There are, however,still an estimated 2000–3000 people (combatants <strong>and</strong> families), who are expectedback to Ug<strong>and</strong>a if the peace negotiations are successful.Strategies resembl<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures subject to this studyhave been employed <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>in</strong> the past. One of the most <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g of theseexamples is the Labora farm pilot case <strong>in</strong> Gulu, where the GoU provided farml<strong>and</strong>for cultivation by former LRA combatants. The Labora farm pilot was based onthe notion of a need to let LRA-soldiers ease <strong>in</strong>to a civilian life, while allow<strong>in</strong>gnearby communities get use to the thought of the combatants return<strong>in</strong>g. It thusmostly resembles the category of “Dialogue <strong>and</strong> Sensitization Programs <strong>and</strong>Halfway-house Arrangements”, described above.The Labora Farm Experiment– a Halfway-House ArrangementThe former LRA brigadier-general Kenneth Banya <strong>and</strong> his cont<strong>in</strong>gents wereprovided with plows, seeds, <strong>and</strong> tools <strong>and</strong> left to themselves at the farm. TheUg<strong>and</strong>an authorities did not meddle <strong>in</strong> the leadership- <strong>and</strong> social structures at thefarm. This was left to the LRA-comm<strong>and</strong>ers.The project was funded through the Northern Ug<strong>and</strong>a Social Action Fund(NUSAF), under the World Bank; US$ 100 million worth of ODA-funds were70
<strong>in</strong>vested. An important factor <strong>in</strong> the Labora farm project was also that the securityof the former rebels at the farm was guaranteed by the UPDF. Information varies,but at the height of the project about 1,000 persons reportedly commuted dailyfrom the nearby town of Gulu to the farm. They were not permanently resettledon the farm, not returned to their communities of orig<strong>in</strong>, nor placed <strong>in</strong> IDPcamps.The purpose was to provide temporary alternative livelihoods for formerLRA combatants, await<strong>in</strong>g a last<strong>in</strong>g settlement of the dispute <strong>and</strong> prepar<strong>in</strong>gcombatants for re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to their communities. In a way, the Laborafarm was a reception center function<strong>in</strong>g as a hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern for former LRAcomm<strong>and</strong>ers, combatants <strong>and</strong> bush families.6.A range of op<strong>in</strong>ions on the Labora farm project was offered to our fieldresearchers.One central issue, on which most <strong>in</strong>terlocutors were <strong>in</strong> agreement, wasthe fact that the military ranks <strong>and</strong> cha<strong>in</strong>s of comm<strong>and</strong> of the LRA were allowedto be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed on the farm; recreat<strong>in</strong>g the oppressive structures that haddeveloped <strong>in</strong> the bush. This had particularly adverse affects on the lives of women<strong>and</strong> children on the farm.The critics of the Labora farm pilot project, among them many of the humanrights groups active <strong>in</strong> the area, argue that the experiment not only grantedimpunity to the LRA-comm<strong>and</strong>ers, but also allowed for a cont<strong>in</strong>uation of theabuse. There were serious accusations exploitation of children <strong>and</strong> women on thefarm <strong>and</strong> reports of despotism of General Banya. After some years General Banyawas replaced by Ray Apire (former LRA Bishop), who led the Farm <strong>in</strong> a somewhatsofter style. It was argued, <strong>and</strong> this turns out to be one of the ma<strong>in</strong> lessons of theproject, that the Labora experiment could only work <strong>in</strong> a civilian structure.Some members of nearby communities also criticized the project for focus<strong>in</strong>gon the needs of the ex-combatants rather than help<strong>in</strong>g the community to getback on its feet. They felt as if the combatants were awarded for the crimes theyhad committed. This type of criticism is not uncommon <strong>in</strong> relation to projectssupport<strong>in</strong>g return<strong>in</strong>g combatants <strong>and</strong> it represents a risk that must alwaysbe considered when design<strong>in</strong>g support programs. The SIDDR suggested adual w<strong>in</strong>dow fund<strong>in</strong>g mechanism, where the second w<strong>in</strong>dow would focus oncommunities balanc<strong>in</strong>g whatever support is provided for return<strong>in</strong>g combatants.There were also positive sides to the experiment. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the ParamountChief of the Acholi, the Labora farm enabled the follow<strong>in</strong>g important transitions:(a) it provided a secure place for the LRA to rest their m<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>and</strong> to clarify theirfeel<strong>in</strong>gs; (b) it allowed for rehabilitation through productive farm labor, an71
alternative to armed violence as a means of subsistence; (c) it facilitated a senseof self reliance as they produced their own food, not re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g the dependencysyndrome of the IDP-camps; <strong>and</strong> (d) it created an alternative attraction to othersto come <strong>in</strong> from the bush free of fear, community stigmatization, <strong>and</strong> reprisals.A general conclusion seems to be that the Labora farm project was a good idea thatwas poorly executed. A key lesson learned is that any program under which a rebelgroup, or parts thereof, is kept <strong>in</strong>tact, some form of accountable, civilian authoritymust be established.Strategic Military IntegrationThe case study also established that some of the return<strong>in</strong>g LRA-combatantsopt to jo<strong>in</strong> the national armed forces. By <strong>and</strong> large, the process of jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g theUPDF is voluntary. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the fourth Division Comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>in</strong> Gulu,“These ex-combatants are given full military tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> passed out <strong>in</strong> variouscategories. Some as part of the Ug<strong>and</strong>a People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) <strong>and</strong> othersas Local Para-militias”.This case study did not exam<strong>in</strong>e the merits of this process. Nevertheless, it is clearthat the practice of MI <strong>in</strong> a way has addressed the security issue <strong>in</strong> some partsof the country, particularly <strong>in</strong> Eastern Ug<strong>and</strong>a were these militias were able torepulse the LRA advances <strong>in</strong> the Teso region.This practice has also drawn serious criticism from domestic as well as<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> commentators. Allegations are based on thecontention that the government is us<strong>in</strong>g the ex-combatants as human shields<strong>in</strong> the process of military confrontation with the LRA. The option of MilitaryIntegration dur<strong>in</strong>g an ongo<strong>in</strong>g conflict is always difficult (as the case on Colombiahas also confirmed) <strong>and</strong> the risk of coercion <strong>and</strong> exploitation must be carefullymonitored.Ug<strong>and</strong>a National Rescue Front IIAnother example of a Ug<strong>and</strong>an experience resembl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> isthe peace agreement with, <strong>and</strong> the re<strong>in</strong>tegration of, the Ug<strong>and</strong>a National RescueFront II (UNRF II) – a rebel group from the West-Nile sub-region. In December2002, a peace agreement was signed between the GoU <strong>and</strong> the group. At the timeof the sign<strong>in</strong>g, the UNRF II was based <strong>in</strong> the DRC. The agreement provided for agradual return of the group to Ug<strong>and</strong>a – <strong>in</strong> total approximately 2 500 combatants.72
The group was allowed to stay <strong>in</strong>tact, step-by-step re-establish<strong>in</strong>g contacts withrelatives <strong>and</strong> communities of orig<strong>in</strong>. It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that the agreementwas implemented without <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>and</strong> without thoroughprogram plann<strong>in</strong>g. Th<strong>in</strong>gs were left to unfold as the process moved forward.Problems were dealt with as they arose.6.The process satisfied the dual needs of avoid<strong>in</strong>g a stream of restless formercombatants <strong>in</strong>to communities that were not ready to receive them, <strong>and</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g azone of comfort <strong>in</strong> which combatants could start adjust<strong>in</strong>g to lives <strong>in</strong> peace.Around 700 of the UNRF II fighters were eventually <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the UPDF,while the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 1 800 were re<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to West-Nile communities. Theagreement stipulated that the UNRF II should establish a liaison office with<strong>in</strong>the Office of the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister to monitor implementation of the peace. Whilevoices have been raised concern<strong>in</strong>g the pace of implementation, the process hasbeen largely successful.Challenges, Issues <strong>and</strong> Key LessonsThe lessons drawn from the Ug<strong>and</strong>a case study will focus on the experiences ofthe Labora farm pilot project. The project is an example of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>by keep<strong>in</strong>g former combatants occupied with civilian tasks, but separated fromcivilian communities, for an <strong>in</strong>itial period of time. On paper, the project seemsvery attractive – keep<strong>in</strong>g demobiliz<strong>in</strong>g ex-combatants <strong>in</strong>to safe <strong>and</strong> productivefarm labor rather than the destructive, dangerous <strong>and</strong> frustrat<strong>in</strong>g environmentof the IDP-camps. However it experienced serious problems <strong>and</strong> has drawn heavecriticism from domestic as well <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational actors.Some members of nearby communities have criticized the project for focus<strong>in</strong>gon the needs of the ex-combatants rather than help<strong>in</strong>g the community to getback on its feet. They felt as if the combatants were awarded for the crimes theyhad committed. This is a common objection aga<strong>in</strong>st post-conflict reconstructionefforts aimed at former combatants. This br<strong>in</strong>gs us back to one of the centralrecommendations of the SIDDR Report that there is a need for parallel w<strong>in</strong>dowsof fund<strong>in</strong>g, target<strong>in</strong>g communities as well as return<strong>in</strong>g combatants(see Recommendations page 44, SIDDR F<strong>in</strong>al Report).The heavy criticism by human rights groups, that the LRA-comm<strong>and</strong>ers wereeffectively awarded impunity <strong>and</strong> that they were allowed to recreate the sameoppressive structures at the farm as <strong>in</strong> the bush, is highly relevant. The key lesson73
of the Labora pilot therefore, is that there is a need for a truly accountable, civilianauthority, even if the aim of the program is to temporarily keep the structure ofthe group <strong>in</strong>tact. Transparent communication to surround<strong>in</strong>g communities aboutthe purpose of the program <strong>and</strong> ideally parallel sensitization <strong>and</strong> reconciliation<strong>in</strong>itiatives would also be helpful <strong>in</strong> ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g support for such <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong><strong>in</strong>itiatives.The balance that needs to be struck is far from easy. Grass roots <strong>and</strong> lower levelcombatants need to be empowered without severely tilt<strong>in</strong>g the social cohesionof the group <strong>in</strong> question. Stakeholder ownership must be balanced aga<strong>in</strong>streasonable dem<strong>and</strong>s for respect of fundamental values. If another attempt ata similar program were to be undertaken, it would therefore be necessary tocarefully monitor the implementation <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a preparedness to <strong>in</strong>tervene ifoppressive structures are recreated.If anyth<strong>in</strong>g should be taken from the Labora farm experiment it is primarilythe general idea of engag<strong>in</strong>g former combatants <strong>in</strong> productive labor buys timefor other important th<strong>in</strong>gs to happen while await<strong>in</strong>g properly planned longtermprograms. As noted above – such programs hold the potential to providecombatants with the much needed sense of security, socio-psychologicalrehabilitation form physical <strong>and</strong> productive labor, a transitional alternativelivelihood, <strong>and</strong> it may create an attraction for other ex-combatants to jo<strong>in</strong> theprogram. The potential positive effects on the general peace process are enormous.In design<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g such a program – the Labora experience providesample illustration of potential pitfalls.74
7.7. Comparative Analysis:Contextual Factors Shap<strong>in</strong>g theChoice of IS MeasuresIn this chapter, the results of the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary overview of relevant experiences<strong>in</strong> chapter V, <strong>and</strong> the three country case studies, are critically exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong>compared. The first part of this comparative analysis is built around a numberof key contextual factors <strong>and</strong> strategic choices <strong>in</strong> the formation of <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong> measures. This is followed by brief discussions on the establishmentof <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional arrangements to turn potential spoilers <strong>in</strong>tostakeholders <strong>in</strong> the peace process <strong>and</strong> the management of risks <strong>in</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> (IS) measures.The Importance of Contextual FactorsAs previously noted, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the contextual factors <strong>in</strong> which a violentconflict is or has been fought, is vital for anyone <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g. Thefollow<strong>in</strong>g contextual factors are <strong>in</strong>strumental <strong>in</strong> shap<strong>in</strong>g war to peace transitions,<strong>and</strong> must be carefully analyzed by stakeholders <strong>in</strong> peace processes:1. The nature <strong>and</strong> duration of the conflict;2. Nature of the Peace (i.e. the manner <strong>in</strong> which the conflict ended <strong>and</strong> nature ofthe peace process);3. Governance capacity <strong>and</strong> reach of the state;4. The state of the economy, especially labor absorptive capacity <strong>and</strong> propertyrights; <strong>and</strong>5. Character <strong>and</strong> cohesiveness of communities <strong>and</strong> combatants;75
1. The Nature <strong>and</strong> Duration of the ConflictThe type of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measure suitable <strong>in</strong> each given situation dependsvery much on the nature of the war – whether it is predom<strong>in</strong>antly driven by ideology,identity, or a struggle for resources. In an ideological driven conflict such as thatof the Maoists <strong>in</strong> Nepal or the FARC <strong>and</strong> ELN <strong>in</strong> Colombia, political power <strong>and</strong>territorial control are overrid<strong>in</strong>g objectives. When asked about the demobilization<strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration of Maoist combatants, the leadership simply replied that nosuch th<strong>in</strong>g was go<strong>in</strong>g to happen. What they sought <strong>in</strong>stead was a merger, <strong>in</strong>which the Maoist army was made more professional, while the national army wasdemocratized. This would not imply either a subsidiary relationship <strong>in</strong> a reformedsecurity sector, nor demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration of their combatants <strong>in</strong>toa normal productive civilian life. The Maoists seek a cont<strong>in</strong>ued comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>control of forces <strong>and</strong> territory <strong>and</strong> a gradual <strong>in</strong>tegration of the two forces.Sub-national conflicts, such as that of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)<strong>in</strong> M<strong>in</strong>danao, tend to be more identity driven. Groups are often seek<strong>in</strong>g someform of de facto if not de jure territorial control or regional autonomy. Suchaspirations could be met with<strong>in</strong> an IS-framework which comb<strong>in</strong>es a mix of<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> control over a regional security (military <strong>and</strong> or police) force <strong>and</strong>re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to a productive civilian life. Indeed, this is a current issue <strong>in</strong> thedeposition of forces <strong>in</strong> the ongo<strong>in</strong>g peace negotiations between the Governmentof the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> the MILF. An earlier agreement with the Moro NationalLiberation Front (MNLF) actually resulted <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tegration of some 3,000 plusex-combatants, comb<strong>in</strong>ed with an unsystematic demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegrationof rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g forces without formal disarmament as such. The absence of acomplete DDR program <strong>in</strong> parallel with the military <strong>in</strong>tegration program for theMNLF might very well have been the factor that helped fuel the MILF armedstruggle. (This case is elaborated <strong>in</strong> a report from one of the fact f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g missionsthat were undertaken <strong>in</strong> the plann<strong>in</strong>g for this study, the report can be obta<strong>in</strong>edfrom the Folke Bernadotte Academy.)In Cambodia, the struggle of the Khmer Rouge started out as ideology drivenconflict <strong>and</strong> gradually transformed <strong>in</strong>to a resource based struggle. Claims forlimited control over territory <strong>and</strong> resources became a basis for an IS-like situationwhen de facto autonomy was granted to the Khmer Rouge <strong>in</strong> the northwest of thecountry, which comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a self-organized demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegrationprogram for the KR <strong>in</strong> that area. Note that formal disarmament was not a partof this process. The situation <strong>in</strong> Colombia, especially with the FARC, share someof the Cambodia characteristics as ideology blends with resource <strong>and</strong> territorialcontrol reflect<strong>in</strong>g features of both armed conflict <strong>and</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>ality.76
In protracted conflicts, combatants often lack even the basic life skills necessaryto lead productive civilian lives. After years, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> some cases decades, <strong>in</strong> thebush these combatants are particularly vulnerable to recruitment <strong>in</strong>to crim<strong>in</strong>algangs or spl<strong>in</strong>ters of their former rebel movements. IS-measures, provid<strong>in</strong>g a senseof safety, agency, legitimacy <strong>and</strong> temporary alternative livelihoods, may serveas the lifel<strong>in</strong>e needed for them to stay committed to peace. This was one of thema<strong>in</strong> rationales beh<strong>in</strong>d the Labora farm experiment described <strong>in</strong> the Ug<strong>and</strong>a caseabove.7.Similar dynamics characterize extremely brutal conflicts where combatants,as well as communities, have suffered severe trauma. The challenge <strong>in</strong> thesecases, as <strong>in</strong> post-Genocide Rw<strong>and</strong>a, is to prepare the ground for br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g theseex-combatants back <strong>in</strong>to the fabric of society as an <strong>in</strong>itial step <strong>in</strong> reach<strong>in</strong>g abroader based societal reconciliation. This task requires parallel efforts target<strong>in</strong>gcombatants as well as communities. The process often takes time <strong>and</strong> a periodof IS may create the stability <strong>and</strong> space needed to plan, organize <strong>and</strong> kick-startrecovery <strong>and</strong> reconciliation programs.II. The Nature of the PeaceIn cases where there is a “clear victor” Military Integration (MI) can be usedas a first step towards the establishment of <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>and</strong> reformed nationalarmed forces. Through such <strong>in</strong>terim solutions, similar to the notion of <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong>, a w<strong>in</strong>dow is created for properly planned DDR <strong>and</strong> for plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>launch<strong>in</strong>g a comprehensive <strong>Security</strong> Sector Reforms, which is usually needed butdifficult to <strong>in</strong>itiate at the early stages of a peace process.With the African National Congress (ANC) <strong>in</strong> power follow<strong>in</strong>g the fall ofapartheid <strong>in</strong> South Africa, the various rebel factions were <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>in</strong>tegrated<strong>in</strong>to the overall South African Defence Force <strong>and</strong> later demobilized under thenomenclature of a “military rationalization program”, not under a classicalDDR program. In Ug<strong>and</strong>a, the major demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration programoccurred some four years after the Museveni government had consolidated power.The government had by then absorbed various rebel factions <strong>in</strong>to the militarybefore gradually downsiz<strong>in</strong>g the national army essentially for economic reasons;free<strong>in</strong>g up public expenditure from security to development. In Rw<strong>and</strong>a, formerForces Armades Rw<strong>and</strong>ese (FAR) combatants were cont<strong>in</strong>ually <strong>in</strong>tegrated forperiods of time before be<strong>in</strong>g vetted, re-socialized <strong>and</strong> demobilized. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong>Afghanistan, the multiple warlord armies were <strong>in</strong>itially nom<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>toan overarch<strong>in</strong>g Afghan Militia Forces <strong>and</strong> paid monthly salaries <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>formal77
hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern before the formal launch of the “New Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs” DDR program.Studies show that such IS-measures, <strong>in</strong> the form of Military Integration, without(or before) the launch of any broad effort to reform the security sector, is ahallmark of over half of the peace agreements that stick. However, <strong>in</strong> all of thesecases, the war ended with a clear victory by one party.The MI option was also utilized <strong>in</strong> Cambodia <strong>and</strong> is currently used for someof the FARC <strong>and</strong> ELN ‘defectors’ <strong>in</strong> Colombia. In Ug<strong>and</strong>a today, the processalso appears to be mov<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this direction as LRA defectors often emerge asfrontl<strong>in</strong>e Ug<strong>and</strong>an army fighters <strong>and</strong> local militia under government auspices. TheUg<strong>and</strong>an situation is not unlike the soft or civil polic<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence optionsfor the former Colombian AUC <strong>and</strong> FARC combatants <strong>in</strong> urban areas. Thereare of course a number of problematic issues coupled with this type of strategicmilitary <strong>in</strong>tegration of ex-combatants <strong>in</strong>to the national armed forces dur<strong>in</strong>g anongo<strong>in</strong>g violent conflict (see section on ‘Manag<strong>in</strong>g Risks’ below).A second type of situation is when a peace settlement has been negotiated,<strong>and</strong> there is no clear victor. In these situations other IS-options may be moreviable (even though MI strategies have also been employed as part of negotiatedsettlements – for example the DRC – <strong>and</strong> could be a solution for the currentsituation <strong>in</strong> Nepal). The Labora farm example, with the previously <strong>in</strong>dicatednecessary modifications, could serve as a model <strong>in</strong> situations where time is neededto get the necessary reconstruction <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs <strong>in</strong> place.A third type of situation is illustrated by the case of Kosovo, where the peace wasforced by an <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>tervention. The primary aim for the <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommunity after the armed <strong>in</strong>tervention was to establish m<strong>in</strong>imum levels ofsecurity (for Kosovo Albanians <strong>and</strong> Serbs alike) <strong>and</strong> achieve a peaceful dialogue<strong>and</strong> negotiation on the future status of Kosovo. At the same time, someth<strong>in</strong>gneeded to be done about the large number of heavily armed fighters of the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA). In effect, balance was struck between the <strong>in</strong>terests of theparties to the conflict – the KLA formally disarmed <strong>and</strong> demobilized tak<strong>in</strong>g onthe face of a civilian emergency response organization (Kosovo Protection Corps).On the other h<strong>and</strong> they were de facto allowed to reta<strong>in</strong> important elements of theirorganizational structure <strong>and</strong> cohesiveness with the hope of one day becom<strong>in</strong>gthe national armed forces of an <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo. The level of consciousnessof this strategy by the <strong>in</strong>ternational community is difficult to determ<strong>in</strong>e. In anyevent, the model did allow for a w<strong>in</strong>dow of number of years dur<strong>in</strong>g which thenegotiations on the future status of Kosovo could cont<strong>in</strong>ue <strong>in</strong> search for a peacefulresolution.78
III. Governance Capacity <strong>and</strong> Reach of the StateThe capacity of the State to ensure security <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>ister justice, as well asprovid<strong>in</strong>g other basic services, for ex-combatants <strong>and</strong> communities, was weak<strong>in</strong> all three countries where <strong>in</strong>-depth case studies were conducted. This wasespecially so at the sub-national level where territorial control was often disputed,the legitimacy of the state itself was contested <strong>and</strong> the duration <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensityof conflict had been greatest. In this regard, <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> or similararrangements could allow for the provision of security for combatants <strong>and</strong>communities, while some form of vett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> transitional justice materializes.7.The Cambodian KR de facto autonomous zone, the Labora Farm <strong>in</strong> NorthernUg<strong>and</strong>a, <strong>and</strong> the Colombian agro-bus<strong>in</strong>esses <strong>and</strong> ‘soft polic<strong>in</strong>g’ units (like theKosovo Protection Corps, the South African <strong>Development</strong> Corps, the AfghanMilitia, <strong>and</strong> the Pesh Merga) all represent IS-like measures, buy<strong>in</strong>g time <strong>and</strong>allow<strong>in</strong>g for other economic <strong>and</strong> social psychological adjustments to take place,<strong>and</strong> for legal <strong>and</strong> bureaucratic structures to be developed <strong>and</strong> strengthened. Ineffect, <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures can compensate, temporarily, for weak statecapacity to provide security <strong>and</strong> basic services.At the time of the sign<strong>in</strong>g of a peace agreement, there is usually no comprehensiveagreement on long-term power shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> state <strong>in</strong>stitutional arrangements.In situations where there is a lack of patience <strong>in</strong> society <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the variousfight<strong>in</strong>g groups, a phase of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> might provide the time-outneeded to sort out difficult political disagreements. The Kosovo ProtectionCorps is an illustrative example, where the f<strong>in</strong>al status of the former KLA was tobe determ<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> the framework of the negotiations over the f<strong>in</strong>al status ofKosovo.IV. The State of the Economy:Labor Absorption <strong>and</strong> Property RightsAs previously noted, one of the ma<strong>in</strong> challenges of post-conflict peacebuild<strong>in</strong>gis secur<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>able livelihoods for return<strong>in</strong>g combatants. Re<strong>in</strong>tegrationprograms thus tend to be more successful <strong>in</strong> situations where the number ofcombatants has been very low or where the agricultural economy has been strongenough to effectively absorb return<strong>in</strong>g soldiers without creat<strong>in</strong>g new conflicts.In environments where these conditions are lack<strong>in</strong>g, a thorough analysis ofmarket potential <strong>and</strong> alternative livelihoods is even more needed. All too often,compensation or micro-credit programs have been launched with little connectionto local economic realities.79
As noted <strong>in</strong> the Cambodia case, access to l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> assurance of property rightsmay be one of the most fundamental assets <strong>in</strong> an economy with limited capacityfor labor absorption. It has been held that the availability of arable l<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a<strong>and</strong> Mozambique <strong>and</strong> northwest Cambodia, as well as easy market access toneighbor<strong>in</strong>g countries such as Kenya, South Africa <strong>and</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong>, have been thekey conditions for successful re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> these countries.Obviously, <strong>in</strong> a conflict where access to the economic assets is one of the causesit is even more important to asses the available opportunities or market forces atplay; from l<strong>and</strong> to credit. The illegal drug trades <strong>in</strong> countries like Afghanistan <strong>and</strong>Colombia provides attractive <strong>in</strong>centives for combatants <strong>and</strong> warlords to cont<strong>in</strong>uelife as they know it. Simply offer<strong>in</strong>g them a re<strong>in</strong>tegration package of money orallowances will doubtfully suffice. Creat<strong>in</strong>g platforms, such as NGOs or civilianservice corps, could become components of a transformational process, <strong>in</strong> whichthe m<strong>in</strong>dset of combatants are gradually shifted <strong>and</strong> some sense of legitimacy oracceptance <strong>in</strong> the broader society is valued over purely material <strong>in</strong>centives. Initialstabilization measures that can help develop the possibilities for a society based onthe rule of law may change aspirations when combatants notice the lower risk ofenter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to political life or be<strong>in</strong>g a part of the legal economy.V. The Character of Communities <strong>and</strong> CombatantsMost cases exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this study have displayed the follow<strong>in</strong>g commoncharacteristics: Negligible asset bases (poverty); low levels of education amongcombatant; limited vocational <strong>and</strong> life-skills (even the ability to <strong>in</strong>terview for a jobor open a bank account) comb<strong>in</strong>ed with a weak capacity for labor absorption <strong>in</strong> theeconomy.In such environments, <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> could provide an opportunity toraise vocational skill levels through proper tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, strengthen life skills throughcounsell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> advisory services <strong>and</strong> build an opportunity/asset base throughefforts to create opportunities, ensure property rights, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>spire <strong>and</strong> facilitateentrepreneurship.Fac<strong>in</strong>g a negligible asset base, the risk of combatants turn<strong>in</strong>g to ‘illegitimate’activities such as crim<strong>in</strong>ality or re-recruitment to rebel groups is exacerbated. Aperiod of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> could effectively provide an acceptable transitionalalternative.80
Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Social Cohesion <strong>and</strong> Control StructuresIn addition to the political factors shap<strong>in</strong>g the transition from war to peace,the nature <strong>and</strong> extent of social bonds <strong>and</strong> trust (i.e. social capital) are extremelyimportant. Especially the bonds between former combatants <strong>and</strong> theircomm<strong>and</strong>ers may engender a form of <strong>in</strong>ternal cohesiveness of the fight<strong>in</strong>g units,which <strong>in</strong> turn provides social <strong>and</strong> psychological comfort. However, such <strong>in</strong>wardlook<strong>in</strong>g bonds of survival among combatants can be transformed <strong>in</strong>to crosscutt<strong>in</strong>g bridges of opportunity between combatants <strong>and</strong> communities if a newsocial compact is created. In this process time <strong>and</strong> space is essential to allowfor alternative leadership (civil rather than military), organizational <strong>and</strong> legalpeacetime structures to be established <strong>and</strong> social psychological adjustmentsto take place. The timely provision of counsell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> life skills socializationfor combatants becomes as important as vocational skills <strong>in</strong> terms of theiradaptability to a normal civilian life.7.In Colombia, with<strong>in</strong> the Medell<strong>in</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration program, an IS-like solutionevolved <strong>in</strong> the form of life skills tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g program comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the mix<strong>in</strong>g ofregular police with unarmed former AUC combatants (so called security civilianaids or soft polic<strong>in</strong>g) <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>tegrated units.The counter factual to this approach is perhaps the poor outcome of the Laborafarm <strong>in</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a, where LRA structures where kept <strong>in</strong>tact but totally isolated fromthe normal civilian structures of surround<strong>in</strong>g communities <strong>and</strong> the political lifeof Ug<strong>and</strong>a. <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> agricultural <strong>in</strong>puts were provided at arms length by theGovernment, but the former LRA-comm<strong>and</strong>ers were, <strong>in</strong> effect, allowed to recreatethe same oppressive structures on which their control <strong>in</strong> the bush was based. Oneof the key lessons here, for the purposes of the present study, is that ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gsocial cohesion of the rank <strong>and</strong> file combatants may be an effective <strong>in</strong>strumentfor ‘control <strong>and</strong> social support’ dur<strong>in</strong>g the transition (a time bound period); butthat some form of civilian authority is essential <strong>in</strong> order to provide legitimacy <strong>and</strong>manage such risks.The Importance of Agency, Livelihood, <strong>and</strong> LegitimacyIn addition to cohesiveness or social support dur<strong>in</strong>g the transition, agency (i.e.,a sense of efficacy <strong>and</strong> self management or control), livelihood, <strong>and</strong> legitimacybecome the operative constructs <strong>in</strong> a successful social <strong>and</strong> economic re<strong>in</strong>tegrationframework. These elements constitute a carefully considered <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>program as part <strong>and</strong> parcel of an unbundled <strong>and</strong> phased re<strong>in</strong>tegration program.One Khmer Rouge comm<strong>and</strong>er took on the civilian status as prov<strong>in</strong>cial81
adm<strong>in</strong>istrator, ga<strong>in</strong>ed three years of de facto autonomy by negotiat<strong>in</strong>g a pledge ofsupport from the national government <strong>in</strong> exchange for a pledge of loyalty <strong>and</strong> nonresistance.The KR provided each family <strong>in</strong> the autonomous area with the material<strong>in</strong>centives of two cows, five hectares of agricultural l<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> five thous<strong>and</strong> Baht;thereby ensur<strong>in</strong>g their livelihood. They ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed a cohesive organizationalstructure with ranks <strong>in</strong> the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces <strong>and</strong> positions <strong>in</strong>the local government. They shared (though the extent of shar<strong>in</strong>g is unknown)the lucrative ‘asset base’ of logg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g concessions conceded to the KR.Provid<strong>in</strong>g a sense of agency, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g organizational cohesion, ensur<strong>in</strong>g accessto l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> livelihood, <strong>and</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g legitimacy became the key <strong>in</strong>gredients of theCambodian Hun Sen Government’s “W<strong>in</strong>-W<strong>in</strong> policy”.The Paramount Chief of the Acholi noted that, despite the drawbacks of theLabora farm experiment, the farm allowed for the LRA to: (i) Experiencerehabilitation through productive farm labor; (ii) ga<strong>in</strong> a sense of agency <strong>and</strong>self reliance as they produced their own food, not re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g the dependencysyndrome of the IDP camps; (iii) establish a secure, legitimate place for themto rest their m<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>and</strong> clarify their feel<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong>; (iv) the Farm also created analternative attraction to others to come <strong>in</strong> from the bush free of fear, communitystigmatization, <strong>and</strong> destitution. These are all important constructive functionscontribut<strong>in</strong>g to stability. The key th<strong>in</strong>g to do differently, as noted above, would beto place the project under civilian authority, strengthen<strong>in</strong>g the legitimacy of thefarm <strong>and</strong> its leaders by provid<strong>in</strong>g a transparent <strong>and</strong> accountable local governancestructure for the program.Establish<strong>in</strong>g Incentives through TransitionalInstitutional ArrangementsThe conventional economic mantra espouses that if one gets the prices <strong>and</strong> wagesright then everyth<strong>in</strong>g else <strong>in</strong> the economy will fall <strong>in</strong>to place. With regard to thesuccessful transition from a war to a peace economy, gett<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>centives right becomes paramount.The <strong>in</strong>stitutional arrangements <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>centives are at the heart of achiev<strong>in</strong>ga successful <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>. Regard<strong>in</strong>g transitional <strong>in</strong>stitutionalarrangements, the country case studies brought out some <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g examples.The Khmer Rouge (KR) <strong>in</strong> Cambodia negotiated a de facto autonomous zone.The Government of Ug<strong>and</strong>a sponsored the Labora agricultural farm for theLRA, provid<strong>in</strong>g what could have been a similar organizational hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern<strong>in</strong> Northern Ug<strong>and</strong>a. In Colombia, the Auxiliares civicos en convivencia y seguridad82
ciudadana (i.e. security civilian aides or soft polic<strong>in</strong>g) under the Mayor’s office <strong>in</strong>Medell<strong>in</strong>, the NGO Corporacion Democracia (CD) <strong>and</strong> the Busc<strong>and</strong>ao Cam<strong>in</strong>osBuenos (BCB) agri-bus<strong>in</strong>esses, were also all legitimate transitional <strong>in</strong>stitutionalarrangements for para military groups. The same is true for the transformation ofarmed groups <strong>in</strong>to civilian service corps <strong>and</strong> similar organizations <strong>in</strong> South Africa<strong>and</strong> Kosovo.7.The <strong>in</strong>centives are similar <strong>in</strong> all case studies <strong>and</strong> most of the other relevantexperiences surveyed, that is: (i) agency or a sense of efficacy <strong>and</strong> control;(ii) mean<strong>in</strong>gful alternative work <strong>and</strong> material sustenance <strong>and</strong>; (iii) conferredlegitimacy with<strong>in</strong> a framework of social cohesion <strong>and</strong> mutual support. Asexpressed by an Acholi Paramount Chief <strong>in</strong> discuss<strong>in</strong>g the redeem<strong>in</strong>g benefitsof the Labora farm: “It allowed their m<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>and</strong> bodies to rest under acceptableconditions of security <strong>and</strong> rehabilitation through productive labor”. When are<strong>in</strong>tegration package, or a civil servant wage, cannot compete with the offersfrom warlords or crim<strong>in</strong>al gangs, some form of societal legitimacy when com<strong>in</strong>gout from the shadows can be a powerful additional <strong>in</strong>centive.Whether these <strong>in</strong>stitutional arrangements were conceived as measures of <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong> or not is a moot po<strong>in</strong>t. They all provide some form of agency(social cohesion <strong>and</strong> efficacy), livelihood, <strong>and</strong> legitimacy whereby time, space,<strong>and</strong> stability is provided for adjustment <strong>and</strong> preparation of broader transitionalprograms <strong>and</strong> reform <strong>in</strong>itiatives.Of course, freedom from prosecution or extradition is the f<strong>in</strong>al desire of rebel ormilitia groups such as KR, LRA, <strong>and</strong> AUC alike. This br<strong>in</strong>gs the importance oftransitional or restorative justice <strong>in</strong>to play. A means of address<strong>in</strong>g past crimesshort of blanket amnesty needs to be balanced with some form of justice, acceptedby perpetrators <strong>and</strong> victims alike. As mentioned above, a key function of <strong>Interim</strong><strong>Stabilization</strong> <strong>in</strong> this respect would be the provision of time <strong>and</strong> space to undertakeproper vett<strong>in</strong>g for crimes committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the conflict <strong>and</strong> to put <strong>in</strong>to place thenecessary <strong>in</strong>stitutional framework for deal<strong>in</strong>g with such crimes.Convert<strong>in</strong>g Potential Spoilers to StakeholdersTransform<strong>in</strong>g spoilers <strong>in</strong>to stakeholders is the crux of the war to peace transition.Re<strong>in</strong>tegration is a complex, slow <strong>and</strong> long process comprised of political, economic<strong>and</strong> social psychological dimensions. It cannot simply be reduced to a set of quicktechnical fixes (e.g. provid<strong>in</strong>g skill tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> micro-credit) or rearrang<strong>in</strong>g of theparts (target<strong>in</strong>g communities rather than combatants). In effect, the Cambodia83
case further breaks these processes down <strong>in</strong>to the pragmatics of:(i) Military Integration; (ii) adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to public structures <strong>and</strong>services, <strong>and</strong>; (iii) socio-economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration or access <strong>and</strong> participation ofgroups <strong>in</strong>to the civilian social <strong>and</strong> economic life of the local, regional <strong>and</strong> nationalcommunities.Taken <strong>in</strong> their totality, the social (<strong>in</strong>stitutional) <strong>and</strong> psychological aspects may <strong>in</strong>the end be more important than the economic <strong>and</strong> political dimensions, especiallyfor groups which have experienced long st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g patterns of marg<strong>in</strong>alization. TheKR, the FARC, <strong>and</strong> the LRA particularly fall <strong>in</strong>to this category. Attend<strong>in</strong>g to thesocial compact between the combatants <strong>and</strong> their communities, between the State<strong>and</strong> its citizens, particularly at the edges or <strong>in</strong> sub-national areas or ungovernedterritories is one of the ma<strong>in</strong> current challenges to contemporary war-to-peacetransitions.As has been shown by a number of the cases exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this study, <strong>in</strong>clusion of allpotential spoilers <strong>in</strong> the peace process is crucial to avoid a relapse <strong>in</strong>to conflict.Manag<strong>in</strong>g RisksThere are a number of risks associated with <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures.As we have seen <strong>in</strong> the cases discussed above, for example, IS measures runthe risks of reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g oppressive structures, provid<strong>in</strong>g impunity fromjustice, facilitat<strong>in</strong>g crim<strong>in</strong>ality <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g illegal networks (drugs, moneylaunder<strong>in</strong>g, etc.) <strong>and</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>uation of illegitimate control overnatural resources. Like other peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g efforts, IS measures also run the riskof creat<strong>in</strong>g new dependencies, or becom<strong>in</strong>g isolated from other ma<strong>in</strong> pillars of thepeacebuild<strong>in</strong>g process. These are valid concerns that need to be managed. Plac<strong>in</strong>gany IS-program under civilian authority (transparent <strong>and</strong> accountable governancestructures) may be a key to manag<strong>in</strong>g such risks. Establish<strong>in</strong>g clear time framesor sunset clauses for such transitional arrangements or hold<strong>in</strong>g patterns, may beanother risk management approach.Strengthen<strong>in</strong>g socialization programs through promot<strong>in</strong>g social-psychologicalassistance, <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g courses on “citizenship competencies”, <strong>and</strong> generallyrais<strong>in</strong>g the focus on life skills as well as vocational skills (as was done <strong>in</strong> Colombia)can also contribute to manag<strong>in</strong>g the risks of reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g pernicious comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>control structures dur<strong>in</strong>g the transition.84
The case studies have illustrated a number of difficulties <strong>and</strong> risks connected tothe implementation of IS-measures. However, it can be argued that this is merely<strong>in</strong>dicative of the difficulties <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> all war-to-peace transitions. Innovative,high risk <strong>and</strong> high ga<strong>in</strong> measures such as the establishment of temporaryIS-measures, or hold<strong>in</strong>g patterns, may <strong>in</strong> some cases be just the trade-off needed toaddress weak state <strong>in</strong>stitutions, falter<strong>in</strong>g economy <strong>and</strong> potential security vacuumimmediately after a peace agreement.7.85
8.8. Conclusions <strong>and</strong>RecommendationsBuy<strong>in</strong>g Time <strong>and</strong> Space Dur<strong>in</strong>g Early Transition<strong>Post</strong>-conflict periods <strong>in</strong> war-torn countries are often beleaguered by ongo<strong>in</strong>goccurrences of violence among warr<strong>in</strong>g parties. Even when large-scale peaceoperations are <strong>in</strong> place (as <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>and</strong> Kosovo) distrust is rife among formerenemies, often mak<strong>in</strong>g it impossible to demilitarize <strong>and</strong> disarm (Colletta <strong>and</strong>Nezam, 1999). F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g means to end cycles of violence through disarmament,demobilization <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration (DDR) of combatants back <strong>in</strong>to theircommunities is therefore a prerequisite for build<strong>in</strong>g susta<strong>in</strong>ed peace (Annan,2006). DDR programs can fill a number of important functions <strong>in</strong> a post-conflictsett<strong>in</strong>g: Signall<strong>in</strong>g a cessation of hostilities; downsiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> undercutt<strong>in</strong>g thelegitimacy of warr<strong>in</strong>g militia; <strong>and</strong> if successful re-establish<strong>in</strong>g a monopoly overthe use of force by a legitimate government. However, DDR-programs must bemeticulously planned <strong>and</strong> implemented <strong>in</strong> an environment with at least a m<strong>in</strong>imallevel of stability <strong>and</strong> security.This study has aimed at provid<strong>in</strong>g support to negotiators, facilitators <strong>and</strong>mediators <strong>in</strong> peace processes who face the challenges of balanc<strong>in</strong>g the needfor security <strong>and</strong> stability with longer-term demilitarization, <strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>and</strong>economic reconstruction, transitional justice <strong>and</strong> development efforts. Theabstract notion of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> has emerged as a more sharply def<strong>in</strong>edconcept, provid<strong>in</strong>g alternative options <strong>in</strong> situations where there is a need for atime-out or hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern <strong>in</strong> order to buy time <strong>and</strong> space to prepare the groundfor the cont<strong>in</strong>ued peace process.87
Putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> to use, as a transitional peace-build<strong>in</strong>g tool, requiresnegotiators <strong>and</strong> mediators to have a firm underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the contextual factorsshap<strong>in</strong>g the tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of such measures <strong>in</strong> relationship to otherpeace-build<strong>in</strong>g elements: The nature of the war <strong>and</strong> the nature of the peace;the governance capacity of the state; the condition of the economy; the humancapital <strong>and</strong> the labor market; <strong>and</strong> the social organization <strong>and</strong> cohesiveness of theparties to the conflict. These are all critical variables to be weighed <strong>in</strong> the plann<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> design of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures, preferably already dur<strong>in</strong>g thenegotiation process.Gett<strong>in</strong>g the Transitional Incentives <strong>and</strong>Institutional Arrangements RightInstitutional arrangements <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>centives are critical variables <strong>in</strong> the equationof susta<strong>in</strong>able peace. Negotiators could therefore, as an alternative to stalemate,consider transitional organizational arrangements such as semi-autonomouszones of control, the creation of non-governmental bodies, civilian service corps,<strong>and</strong> public sector employment under civil control, reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for a limited periodof time the organizational <strong>and</strong> social cohesiveness of former rebel factions butunder civilian authority. Such transitional <strong>in</strong>stitutional arrangements may holdthe keys to transform<strong>in</strong>g “perverted” social capital <strong>in</strong>to “virtuous” or bridg<strong>in</strong>gsocial capital 10 , <strong>and</strong> l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g this shift with effective, transparent <strong>and</strong> accountablegovernance.The <strong>in</strong>centives need to address agency (i.e., a sense of efficacy or control) <strong>and</strong> socialcohesion as well as economic (asset transfer <strong>and</strong> livelihoods) <strong>and</strong> political (powershar<strong>in</strong>g) requisites <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g a durable peace. Agency <strong>and</strong> Legitimacy are centralconstructs <strong>in</strong> the renegotiation of the social compact between communities <strong>and</strong>rebels – States <strong>and</strong> citizens. Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g organizational coherence, position <strong>and</strong>structure, as comm<strong>and</strong>ers become foremen <strong>and</strong> warlords become governors withcombatants becom<strong>in</strong>g employees or shareholders <strong>in</strong> economic enterprises, may bean essential compromise <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g stakeholders out of potential spoilers, end<strong>in</strong>gthe bloodshed <strong>and</strong> enabl<strong>in</strong>g conditions for peace <strong>and</strong> development to take hold.Already <strong>in</strong> the early transition period, greater attention needs to be given to amore customized re<strong>in</strong>tegration program focus<strong>in</strong>g on the social <strong>and</strong> psychologicalneeds, <strong>and</strong> the citizenship <strong>and</strong> life skills of former combatants. Re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>tegration should not simply be reduced to vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> political power10. For an elaboration on these concepts, see Colletta, Nat J. <strong>and</strong> Michelle Cullen, (2000) ViolentConflict <strong>and</strong> the Transformation of Social Capital, The World Bank: Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, D.C.88
shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the military. In this regard, buy<strong>in</strong>g time may be essential for both thehuman <strong>and</strong> the market dimensions to adjust from wartime to a peacetime economy.All this is not to say that justice should be swept under the carpet of stability,allow<strong>in</strong>g those who have committed crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity to go unpunishedthrough a blanket amnesty. Aga<strong>in</strong>, it is a question of tim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sequenc<strong>in</strong>g.Leav<strong>in</strong>g the door open for justice (a central recommendation of the SIDDRF<strong>in</strong>al Report), is essential. This was done <strong>in</strong> the Cambodian law abolish<strong>in</strong>g theKhmer Rouge, through an explicit exemption of crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity fromthe general amnesty. As illustrated by the cont<strong>in</strong>uous revision of the ColombianPeace <strong>and</strong> Justice Law, strik<strong>in</strong>g a balance between amnesty <strong>and</strong> justice is a work <strong>in</strong>progress. Justice delayed does not necessarily have to result <strong>in</strong> justice denied.8.Key Recommendations to Negotiators, Mediators,<strong>and</strong> DDR-SSR Program PlannersIn conclusion, the follow<strong>in</strong>g general <strong>and</strong> prelim<strong>in</strong>ary recommendations areoffered to peace negotiators, mediators, <strong>and</strong> program planners:› Assess the contextual factors (e.g. nature of war; nature of peace; labor market;state capacity <strong>and</strong> reach; etc.) shap<strong>in</strong>g the needs <strong>and</strong> opportunities <strong>in</strong> each givensituation, <strong>and</strong> consider the feasibility of an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measures (or“hold<strong>in</strong>g pattern”).› Provide options for relevant <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g organizationalarrangements (e.g. NGO front, political party, semi-autonomous zone ofcontrol, rural agri-bus<strong>in</strong>ess or other commercial enterprise, urban public servicedelivery, military, police, customs, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence service <strong>in</strong>tegration, etc.),<strong>in</strong>centives <strong>and</strong> concrete destigmatiz<strong>in</strong>g activities as means for cont<strong>in</strong>ued trustbuild<strong>in</strong>g.› The <strong>in</strong>centives need to address agency (i.e. a sense of efficacy or control) <strong>and</strong>social cohesion (social psychological support) as well as economic (asset transfer<strong>and</strong> livelihoods) <strong>and</strong> political (power shar<strong>in</strong>g) requisites <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g a durablepeace.› Include all stakeholders <strong>and</strong> potential spoilers <strong>in</strong> the process to strengthenthe support of agreements <strong>and</strong> the provision of accountable, committed, <strong>and</strong>legitimate national counterparts for <strong>in</strong>ternational actors; friends <strong>and</strong> supportersof the peace process.89
› Place the <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> measure under a transparent <strong>and</strong> accountablecivilian authority; respect for basic human rights should always be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed.› Do not close the door for deal<strong>in</strong>g with crimes committed dur<strong>in</strong>g the conflictfurther down the l<strong>in</strong>e, for example by offer<strong>in</strong>g a complete blanked amnesty forcrimes aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity.› Consider the fit of the <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the DDR-SSR nexus <strong>in</strong>particular, <strong>and</strong> the overall peacemak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> peacebuild<strong>in</strong>g framework, e.g.security, justice, elections <strong>and</strong> governance, economic reconstruction, etc, <strong>in</strong>general.› Identify f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g requirements <strong>and</strong> sources for an <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong>measure.› Establish coord<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms for the preparation <strong>and</strong>implementation <strong>and</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> preparedness at the level of the civilian authorityto <strong>in</strong>tervene if the IS arrangement derails.For peace negotiators, the concept of <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> may prove vital whenattempt<strong>in</strong>g to simultaneously f<strong>in</strong>d political solutions, manage the armies <strong>and</strong>arms – the fear <strong>and</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty of thous<strong>and</strong>s of former combatants <strong>and</strong> affectedcommunities dur<strong>in</strong>g the re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> recovery process – <strong>and</strong> eventuallyreform the entire security sector. Provid<strong>in</strong>g further detailed guidel<strong>in</strong>es emanat<strong>in</strong>gfrom this study to peace negotiators <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration program designers wouldmake an important contribution to the field <strong>and</strong> practice of peace build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>post conflict reconstruction.90
Annex 1Def<strong>in</strong>itions of DDR term<strong>in</strong>ology established by the UNDisarmament is the collection, documentation, control <strong>and</strong> disposal of small arms,ammunition, explosives <strong>and</strong> light <strong>and</strong> heavy weapons of combatants <strong>and</strong> oftenalso of the civilian population. Disarmament also <strong>in</strong>cludes the development ofresponsible arms management programmes. Demobilization is the formal <strong>and</strong> controlled discharge of active combatants fromarmed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extendfrom the process<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>dividual combatants <strong>in</strong> temporary centres to the mass<strong>in</strong>gof troops <strong>in</strong> camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments,assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses thesupport package provided to the demobilized, which is called re<strong>in</strong>sertion. Re<strong>in</strong>sertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants dur<strong>in</strong>g demobilizationbut prior to the longer-term process of re<strong>in</strong>tegration. Re<strong>in</strong>sertion is a form oftransitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants <strong>and</strong> theirfamilies <strong>and</strong> can <strong>in</strong>clude transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter,medical services, short-term education, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, employment <strong>and</strong> tools.While re<strong>in</strong>tegration is a long-term, cont<strong>in</strong>uous social <strong>and</strong> economic process ofdevelopment, re<strong>in</strong>sertion is a short-term material <strong>and</strong>/or f<strong>in</strong>ancial assistance tomeet immediate needs, <strong>and</strong> can last up to one year.Re<strong>in</strong>tegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status <strong>and</strong>ga<strong>in</strong> susta<strong>in</strong>able employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>come. Re<strong>in</strong>tegration is essentially a social<strong>and</strong> economic process with an open time-frame, primarily tak<strong>in</strong>g place <strong>in</strong>communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country<strong>and</strong> a national responsibility, <strong>and</strong> often necessitates long-term external assistance.(Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).91
Annex 2Methodology: Interview Guide <strong>and</strong>Sample Thematic Questionnaire<strong>Balanc<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> Re<strong>in</strong>tegration:A Study of Military Transitional Programs for Address<strong>in</strong>g the Re<strong>in</strong>tegrationof Former Combatants 11Interviewer GuideIn-depth <strong>in</strong>terviews are meant to draw specific <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> lessons, as wellas to <strong>in</strong>itiate dialog with key-<strong>in</strong>formants. Each <strong>in</strong>terview should start with an<strong>in</strong>troduction to set the tone of the <strong>in</strong>terview <strong>and</strong> to def<strong>in</strong>e the vocabulary that weare us<strong>in</strong>g. Cogently def<strong>in</strong>e a military transitional program so that the respondentshave complete certa<strong>in</strong>ty of the concept. Then reiterate its relationship with earlyre<strong>in</strong>tegration.Interviewers may utilize the follow<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>ition:Military transitional programs, MTPs, are programs that keep the former combatants’ cha<strong>in</strong> ofcomm<strong>and</strong> generally <strong>in</strong>tact with<strong>in</strong> a military or civilian structure, while provid<strong>in</strong>g early <strong>and</strong> shortterm re<strong>in</strong>tegration assistance such as transitional economic safety net, job tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, counsel<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>general <strong>in</strong>formation to the vast majority of these combatants.Yet <strong>in</strong> many cases we <strong>in</strong>troduce the concept of an MTP only as a heuristic to helpexpla<strong>in</strong> our aim of manag<strong>in</strong>g early transitional re<strong>in</strong>tegration phases.Key-Informant Interviews (sample frame)The protocol questions for the key- <strong>in</strong>formants are very similar. The questionsmove <strong>in</strong> sections designed to elicit an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the problem at h<strong>and</strong>(contextual factors), the response it received through program specifics (program11. This was the work<strong>in</strong>g title of the research project. The term “Military Transitional Programs” wassubsequently ab<strong>and</strong>oned for <strong>Interim</strong> <strong>Stabilization</strong> (IS).93
design), its implementation, costs <strong>and</strong> sources of f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> impact on thesecurity environment/ re<strong>in</strong>tegration.The crux of these <strong>in</strong>terviews – especially with key <strong>in</strong>formants that have a h<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong> design<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g programs – is to: (i) get a clear sense of how theconflict ended <strong>and</strong> what programmatic features def<strong>in</strong>ed early <strong>and</strong> transitionalre<strong>in</strong>tegration attempts, <strong>and</strong> ii) underst<strong>and</strong> how these features addressed or didnot address security sector issues <strong>and</strong> the preparation for long-term social <strong>and</strong>economic re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> the future.Figure 1.Relationship Between Transitional <strong>and</strong> Long Term Re<strong>in</strong>tegrationI. Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g Phase II. Mid- to Late- PhasesEarly <strong>and</strong> Transitional Re<strong>in</strong>tegration Susta<strong>in</strong>able Re<strong>in</strong>tegrationFocusStability/<strong>Security</strong>FocusLivelihood/Social AcceptanceOnce key <strong>in</strong>formants are identified <strong>in</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration processes, one can gatherthe above <strong>in</strong>formation through the <strong>in</strong>terviews. Key <strong>in</strong>formants <strong>in</strong>clude programdesigners, monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> evaluation supervisors (teams), key members ofagencies who implemented the programs, leaders who were either responsible foraspects of the program or dealt first h<strong>and</strong> with the effects <strong>and</strong> implementation ofre<strong>in</strong>tegration programs, donors who f<strong>in</strong>anced the program, <strong>and</strong> the excombatantsthemselves.Four sections of protocol questions comprise the “key-<strong>in</strong>formant” <strong>in</strong>terviews.1. Problem Identification: What were the Key Contextual Factors that Shape theEmergence of early transitional re<strong>in</strong>tegration?This focus of this section is to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> evaluate socio-economicconditions shap<strong>in</strong>g the post-conflict environment, the nature of politicalsettlement after violence, <strong>and</strong> the capacity of the state vis a vis militarycapacity, <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally labor market structure. This is perhaps the most important<strong>in</strong>formation if we are to give political advice to peace negotiators <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong>deal<strong>in</strong>g with former combatants <strong>in</strong> the moment’s right after violent conflict hasceased.94
2. The Program: What’s the Program Rationale, Objectives, Activities, <strong>and</strong> Costs?(Design Characteristics <strong>and</strong> Details)This section should seamlessly move from the contextual questions <strong>in</strong>toprogram specifics. The protocol questions are formulated to get “quick-<strong>and</strong>dirty” responses <strong>in</strong> regards to the form <strong>and</strong> content of re<strong>in</strong>tegration programsthat we identify, their cost <strong>and</strong> resource <strong>in</strong>formation, <strong>and</strong> the important societalactors associated with their creation.3. Implementation Arrangements: How, who, what was implemented?For implementation the protocol questions should guide dialog about theobstacles that different re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs face when they are set <strong>in</strong>motion. So while the prior section might identify a particular design strategy –community based approach, public works programs, etc – the implementation ofthem is just as crucial.4. Program Impact <strong>and</strong> Effectiveness: What were the major impacts(positive <strong>and</strong> negative), Effectiveness, <strong>and</strong> Lessons Learned?In the clos<strong>in</strong>g section the protocol questions are devised to close the gap betweenearly transitional re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> long-term (susta<strong>in</strong>able) re<strong>in</strong>tegration(Figure 1): this <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> set of responses are <strong>in</strong>valuable <strong>in</strong> help<strong>in</strong>gto def<strong>in</strong>e early transitional programs as a viable policy alternative <strong>in</strong> theearly phases of re<strong>in</strong>tegration. Thus question<strong>in</strong>g should seek to evaluate ifclear l<strong>in</strong>kages <strong>and</strong> causal associations can be made between the content <strong>and</strong>implementation of transitional re<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> the “preparedness” for longtermre<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> the future.Former Combatant Interviews (Individual)Interviews with the ex-combatants have a different focus than the key-<strong>in</strong>formantones. In these, the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal aim is to evaluate ex-combatant perceptions of theeffectiveness of the re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs <strong>in</strong> early phases that they were a partof, e.g., what was useful <strong>and</strong> why? Other background <strong>in</strong>formation is still essential.The sections move as follow<strong>in</strong>g: (i) Demographic characteristics, (ii) Needsassessment, (iii) Aspirations, <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally (iv) program perceptions. Note thatthis is an opportunity to assess combatants’ propensity to take voluntary part <strong>in</strong>disarmament <strong>and</strong> re<strong>in</strong>tegration programs <strong>in</strong> order to overcome distrust <strong>and</strong> fear(Walter 1997).95
Sample Thematic QuestionnaireKey Informant InterviewProblem Identification <strong>and</strong> Program Objectives1. Nature of the settlement:a. What problems were most press<strong>in</strong>g regard<strong>in</strong>g the combatants: Stability?<strong>Security</strong>? Management of a peace agreement / ceasefire? Reduction <strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>tensity of conflict? Ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the status quo?b. What specifically did the peace agreement / negotiations specify to do withthe combatants / groups of combatants? Why?2. State Capacity:a. Generally, what was the state capacity at the time of the settlement?b. How much of a role did the state play <strong>in</strong> the peace agreement?3. Economic conditions:a. What as the state of the economy with regards to labor market stability, i.e.,can labor markets absorb waves of ex-combatants?4. How was the program <strong>in</strong>tended to address these problems?Program Design1. Targeted groups:a. Who were the combatants to be managed / what groups of combatants wereto be managed?b. How did the program def<strong>in</strong>e “combatants?”c. Was there a “vett<strong>in</strong>g” element of identify<strong>in</strong>g combatants who might later betried under transitional justice mechanisms?d. Approximately how many ex-combatants were served?e. Which groups were left out?2. Implementers:a. Which actors were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g this program?b. Are these the same actors charged with implementation?c. What was the level of <strong>in</strong>teraction between those implement<strong>in</strong>g the program<strong>and</strong> the state?3. Needs of ex-combatants:a. Which needs of these combatants did the program address?b. How were these needs identified?96
c. In retrospect, were there other needs that also should have been addressed?4. Programs Activities:a. Describe the services or other assistance offered through the program <strong>in</strong>preparation for formal / susta<strong>in</strong>able re<strong>in</strong>tegration?b. How were economic needs addressed?c. How were health <strong>and</strong> psychosocial needs addressed?d. How were educational/tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g needs addressed?e. What other needs were addressed?f. Were other ex-combatant populations treated differently (egg. Gender, Age)?g. What organizations delivered these services?h. What was the duration of assistance?5. How much did the program cost? Who funded it? Were the costs enough? Ifnot, why, <strong>and</strong> how could the program have been funded differently <strong>and</strong> or moreeffectively?6. What k<strong>in</strong>d of resources existed for the transitional program (i.e., source,amount, duration)?a. Staffb. Personnelc. Equipmentd. Locations / spacee. Were the resources sufficient?i. If no, what resources were miss<strong>in</strong>g or lack<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what programmaticarea?f. What trade-offs were made due to limited resources <strong>in</strong> terms of determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gwhat type of assistance to provide? How were these decisions made?7. As far as sequenc<strong>in</strong>g of programs went: was there an adequate dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween short- medium- <strong>and</strong> long- term goals?a. If so, what variables were these dist<strong>in</strong>ctions based off of? How did thedist<strong>in</strong>ctions translate <strong>in</strong>to different programmatic aspects?b. If not, why?ImplementationIn plann<strong>in</strong>g the transitional program, what were the work<strong>in</strong>g relationships withother Government actors?International organizations?Local NGO’s?97
Local communities?How was success def<strong>in</strong>ed?Was the program a success?What were the biggest obstacles encountered?Were they overcome <strong>and</strong> if so how?In retrospect, how could the obstacles have been h<strong>and</strong>led differently?What were the “lessons learned?”Impact1. How many ex-combatants took part <strong>in</strong> the program?2. Did a formal / susta<strong>in</strong>able re<strong>in</strong>tegration program follow the transitionalprogram?a. If yes, what did / does it look like?3. To what extent did the transitional program affect the success of long-termre<strong>in</strong>tegration?a. How many ex-combatants from the transitional program took part <strong>in</strong>susta<strong>in</strong>able re<strong>in</strong>tegration efforts?b. Did the ex-combatants view the program as a success?4. What were the work<strong>in</strong>g relationships with othera. Government actorsb. International organizationsc. Local NGOsd. Local communities5. How was success def<strong>in</strong>ed?6. Was the program a success?7. What were the unforeseen factors affect<strong>in</strong>g the success of the program?a. <strong>Security</strong> factorsb. Societal factorsc. Economic factorsd. Political factors98
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