My Life

My Life - Oswald Mosleyintervening sea and invade in face of such fire-power. It would indeed be a forlornenterprise.The reinforcement of our position by nuclear submarines based on Australia iscertainly desirable, but it is dubious whether we require any screen of bases in front ofAustralia. When the only serious risk of attack comes from nuclear weapons it wouldappear that the dispersed bases made possible in a great land mass are preferable tobases concentrated in the confined spaces of islands, within range of the attackers; butintermediate island bases between Britain and Australia would of course be necessaryfor purposes of supply.Close friendship and at least a working arrangement between Europe and SouthAfrica is important to the whole network of defence between that country andAustralia. Now that folly has presented the whole Suez area to the influence ofcommunism, all communication with the Indian-Pacific oceans depends on SouthAfrica, and the wisdom of those who foresaw this inevitable development andmaintained the necessary relationships is justified up to the hilt. These are questionsof detail in which we should not be lost, but I challenge a clear answer to theproposition that the right place to defend Australia is from Australia.While we have continually risked lives and spent money in regions remote from ourtrue interests, we have so far been notable absentees from arrangements to defend theDominions. The reasons are again that so large an enterprise as the defence of thesegreat countries is beyond the individual strength of Britain, now a relatively small andisolated country. It is possible to adopt largely meaningless postures for the purposeof satisfying the nostalgia of the imperial tradition in smaller positions which areobsolete or of little importance and therefore require no large effort of defence, butthe heavy burden of defending Australia or Canada is beyond us without the aid offellow Europeans, while our moral inhibitions have stimulated the South Africans toreplace our assistance with their own strength. Britain, which rejected the unitedpower of the European community, is thus reduced to watching the defence of ourown Dominions pass to America, with the inevitable result of their absorption into theAmerican system.The task of reuniting the Dominions with Britain requires a great policy. Economics isthe basis of all, and we have neither the capital for their development nor the marketfor their outlet. Again we are driven by facts to turn to united Europe. The marriage ofBritain and the Dominions to Europe could be an enormous advantage to theEuropean future. Great Europe is the natural market for the Dominions today, and theDominions are the natural living space of Europe tomorrow. At once comes themyopic objection: the trouble in Europe already is a surplus of foodstuffs, and anycomplete union of the Dominions with Europe would pile surplus on surplus andmake confusion worse confounded. This of course is quite true of small policies, butnot of great designs. If we raise our sights to a larger and further target we can turn aneconomic difficulty into an immense political advantage. There is no reason whyunited Europe should not carry on a combined budget the quite supportable charge ofa large surplus of foodstuffs deliberately created by maximum production both inEurope and the Dominions. That surplus could be used both as an act of charity and asa weapon in real policy. We have talked about feeding the hungry; in this way it couldbe done. Such a policy would give both Europe and the Dominions the strong roots of400 of 424