My Life

My Life - Oswald Mosleyinept intervention of the British Government at Suez that the Soviets committed theirlast overt crime on a large scale in the savage repression of the Hungarian people. Theattention of world opinion was effectively deflected by the costly inanity at Suez fromthe reality of Budapest; an adventure of no real interest to Britain and Europe enabledthe sacrifice of an heroic European people.Suez was not a British interest which justified war; it had ceased to be the 'life-line ofEmpire' since we had given the Empire away at the other end of the line, and the SuezCanal in the event of war could be closed any afternoon by a single nuclear weaponfrom any source. The military mind is often imprisoned within the conditions definedby the last creative genius in its sphere. Bonaparte reckoned correctly in his time thatthe Middle East was the key to the world, but nuclear weapons brought to an end theepoch in which this thought was valid. Yet British statesmen, whose forebears hadfrustrated him in this region, remained, by a curious paradox, imprisoned within thecircle of his thinking as effectively as a chicken held fast by a chalk line on the floor.In time of peace the Canal is open, and in time of war with the Arabs or anyone elsethe Canal is closed. The answer in modern terms is to rely with proper preparation onthe Cape route in all contingencies, and to cultivate good relations with the Arabs fornormal times. The British Government responded to this reality by picking a quarrelwith South Africa and throwing the Arabs as a present to the Soviets by thesuccessive performances at Suez and Aqaba. I opposed this policy throughout withthe addendum upon the Suez affair: don't start—but if you must start, don't stop.It was a tragedy thus to throw away the fruits of years of long and successful work bymen like Lawrence and Glubb, and this wasteful failure must be ascribed to theinability to think out policy clearly in terms of British interest and European reality.British statesmen at this point were not only incapable of thinking as Europeans, butalso of thinking as modern Britons. Following my own injunction to think, feel, act asEuropeans, in Europe: Faith and Plan (1958) I approached the whole complex of thisquestion from the standpoint of an European. I contended that in modern termssupport for the French position in Algeria was far more important than pursuit of ourown past through the irrelevance of Suez. A reasonable settlement backed by thestrength of united Europe in northern Africa could have secured us a safe bridgeheadto Africa, where lay enormous possibilities for the whole European future. Historymoves on beyond all blunders and creates new situations. A united Europe could havesecured oil and a bridgehead to Africa, while retaining close friendship with the Arabworld; instead, our division and weakness lost the essentials, and later Britainquarrelled with the Arabs about inessentials. These are errors that can be repaired, andEuropean friendship with the Arab peoples will be restored.We could also have secured our British position within Europe by thinking and actingas Europeans. The failure of Europe at that time to unite lost us an opportunity both tosave Africa from subsequent events and to promote the union of Europe. A fraction ofthe energy directed to the disastrous folly of Suez would not only have saved many ofour own interests in particular and those of humanity in general, but also would haveforged in a common loyalty the links of the European community. The division andacrimony of this period would never have arisen.The failure to think, feel and act as Europeans has brought trouble and immense loss.The statesmen of Europe never sat round a table and decided together what to hold395 of 424