My Life

My Life - Oswald MosleyWas the Second World War preferable to having Germany in her old coloniespending a new and permanent settlement of the colonial question giving a fair deal toall, rather than to retreat through chaos to the present condition of Africa? Willideological fervour go so far as to affirm this? Was the present status quo in thatcontinent worth 25,000,000 European dead and the division and bondage of our owncontinent? In any case, a united European policy, inevitably inspired in this particularby British experience and outlook, would undoubtedly in time have evolved areasonable settlement in these regions, which would have combined opportunity forthe creative genius of the Europeans with the right of others to a full life in their owndevelopment. There is more than room for all in Africa, and the German presence, inco-operation with British experience, would have been another and powerful factor ina sane and orderly evolution.Was it really worth sowing more seeds of another war by keeping Italy out ofAbyssinia and Japan out of Manchuria? Was the financial and industrial exploitationof southern China, until it was thrown inevitably as a present to communism,absolutely necessary? Was it really so desirable to frustrate Japan's immense capacityfor organisation in an orderly development of northern China, which would havegiven it an outlet and peaceful occupation for generations? In short, was the operationof handing all China over to a militant communism really worth the sacrifice ofEurope in the Second World War? How far can madness push the values of bedlam?If this be morality, the world is upside down. The sum total of all these policiestogether undoubtedly produced the war, and a comprehensive alternative wascertainly available which had at least a reasonable chance of preserving peace.At this point arises the second objection, that the Axis powers and Hitler in particularwould have turned down proposals which were inadequate to satisfy their ambitions,and that the strain to the moral susceptibilities of Western statesmanship wouldtherefore have been in vain. He would certainly not have turned these ideas down flat,for I have already described his reaction after a detailed study of them. Ininternational affairs nothing should be taken at its face value and verbal protestationsmust be measured against the real interests involved. Subject to that reservation, andto the strenuous rearmament of our country in any event, my own estimate is that anattempt to settle outstanding differences between Britain, France and Germany and tosecure the peace of Western Europe would have succeeded on some such basis. I amnot so confident that the further attempt of this policy to prevent a bloody clashbetween Germany and Russia would have succeeded, for in my interviews with himin 1935 and 1936 Hitler appeared to regard such an encounter between nationalsocialism in Germany and communism in Russia as quite possible; not probable, sofar as he was concerned, because he desired only the union of the Germans. He knewfrom our interviews, as well as from my writing in Geopolitik, that I desired to avoidthis clash and to keep the peace, but that for my part I would not intervene againstGermany if it occurred; there was therefore no point in trying to deceive me on thissubject. What was interesting was the apparent enthusiasm with which he greeted theproposed accord in Western Europe, and his agreement with my essay's general visionof a world settlement. Some will regard the whole thing as a trick, but in that event itwas a singularly pointless trick.Thus we return to the main argument; everything that Hitler did was a subterfuge tomask his real design, which was world domination. He meant to do on an enormous325 of 424