My Life

My Life - Oswald Mosleyencouraged in northern China is reinforced by the fact that pressure in the Pacificmenacing Australia and New Zealand would thereby be relieved, and America, too,becomes an interested party in that settlement not only in southern China but also bythe lifting of the menace to the Philippines and relief from the general pressure on herPacific interests'. I asked 'those who speak of the Yellow Peril' to 'explain how thatperil can be surmounted by a policy of dividing and enfeebling European civilisationin the interests of Soviet policy? In the alternative, we can envisage the conception ofEuropean union extending to embrace and to combine with American policy inregions which closely affect the interests of that continent. In the final synthesis,white civilisation can discover a comprehensive policy which rests on the reality ofmutual interests. . . .'The essence of the policy was that we should 'build upon the basic fact of economicsettlement and justice for individual nations'. My argument in particular was that thiswould not endanger the safety of Britain and France, but would secure it. This was afeasible policy whatever system of government prevailed in the individual nations, fornational sovereignty was rigorously preserved. I believed, of course, passionately inthe dynamic and creative influence of a new spiritual impulse which I had alreadystriven to describe, but the four-power bloc of Britain, France, Germany and Italy wasquite possible without any similarity of political system, if we had agreed in mutualinterest on this common policy in foreign affairs. A common spiritual purpose isdesirable but not essential if certain limited practical aims are held together. Arenaissance can work wonders, but a hard-headed business deal too can get results. Itstill seems to me that in cold, realistic terms this policy could have maintained thepeace of the world.This political thinking will of course be rejected out of hand by all who prefer worldwar to the slightest deviation from their favourite ideologies or pet notions, howeverdisastrous they have now been proved in practice. From my experience ofcontemporary hysteria their objection is likely to take three main forms: the policy isimmoral, because it would have reduced the risk of war by satisfying three more greatpowers by exactly the same process which had satisfied Britain and France for over acentury; Hitler would have turned the idea down flat, because his ambition was muchmore inordinate than this modest plan; even if he had accepted it, this would merelyhave been a trick to gain time for attainment of his real objective, which is alleged tohave been world domination.Let us examine the first question of immorality, with the preliminary observation thatall things are relative in the real world. Was this policy more immoral than a warwhich killed twenty-five million Europeans? Was it more immoral than a war whichkilled 286,000 Americans and 1,506,000 Japanese? Was it more immoral thanHiroshima, the incineration of a whole population after the war was virtually over in aworld still suffering the mania of war passion? Was it more immoral than the coldbloodedkilling of prisoners in German concentration camps on a vast scale? Was itmore immoral than burning alive with phosphorous bombs in the open town ofDresden a civilian population which included some of our own men who were warprisoners? None of these things could have happened without the Second World War.Were they not immoral? Were they less immoral than giving Germany, Italy andJapan an outlet and opportunity to develop a peaceful life in regions remote from anypossibility of a clash with Britain or any other European power?324 of 424