My Life

My Life - Oswald Mosleypromote that explosion than by the dual policy of denying Germany colonial outletand of circumscribing her in the East by a menacing democratic-Soviet alliance.'Pursuing this same line of thought, I contended that in the occupation of Abyssinia'Italy now has not only an outlet for her population but profitable access to rawmaterials', and that she should be left in undisturbed possession of this acquisition.The essay was at some pains to controvert any suggestion that Italy from this positioncould be any menace to the vital interests of the British Empire. 'A glance at a child'smap of the world would show that a hostile Italy could be 'a much greater menace toBritish trade routes from the base of Sicily than from any base in Abyssinia'.Furthermore, 'Italy will have enough to do in the development of Abyssinia for somegenerations'. In relation to Egypt and the Sudan, why should 'Italy abandon thedevelopment of the territories she already possesses in order to indulge in a savagefight with the greatest naval power in the world for extra territories which provide notgreater but lesser sustenance? ... Even his worst enemy does not describe the leader ofItaly as a fool.' Rather, Italy's every interest was 'to join with the British Empire tomaintain the stability and peace of the Eastern Mediterranean and of North Africa'.I dealt next with the suspicion of 'an intention which does not in fact exist, toprosecute the expansion of a fascist and national socialist Europe at the expense ofRussia . . . the solution here suggested is not the partition of Russia, not merelybecause it is the first interest of Europe and should be the first objective of Britishpolicy to keep the peace, but also because the solution of the European problem interms both economic and political is possible on the lines already indicated withoutany offensive action against Russia'. I suggested that 'Russia should be told to mindher own business and to leave Europe and Western civilisation alone to manage theirown affairs', and concluded that it rested with 'Russia herself to decide whether bywithdrawal from incessant aggression and effort to promote communist revolution shewill live at peace with her neighbours'. Russia might be persuaded to become a goodneighbour by the consideration that otherwise she could find herself between the'crackers of united Europe in the West and Japan in the East'.On the question of Japan, I observed again: 'British Government, having used Sovietpower in Europe, was in turn used by the Soviets in the East,' and added, 'once we arefreed from the Soviet entanglement we need no longer oppose the natural expansionof Japan in northern China where she seeks an outlet for her surplus goods andpopulation'. This is certainly not a policy I would recommend today, but at that timechaos reigned in China, to which any form of order and peace was preferable. I havein the present period quite different proposals for affording Japan a full life. At thattime and in the circumstances of the period I was suggesting in the East exactly thesame basic principle of building peace: satisfaction of the primary needs of all thegreat powers. British statesmen dealing with the Soviets at that time mostconveniently forgot that Japan was not only an old friend but a traditional andremaining ally. It was strongly in our interest to give Japan such an outlet because shecould then accept exclusion from our home, Indian and colonial markets. Thereby weserved both peace and Britain's vital trading interests, and would frustrate the Sovietpolicy of promoting 'in the anarchy of northern China a breeding-ground for orientalcommunism'.I concluded the argument in relation to Japan: 'The decision that she should be323 of 424