My Life

My Life - Oswald Mosleyconsensus not only of parties but of the whole people is necessary, in peace as in war,to meet a grave crisis. In 1930 the attempt failed because the sense of danger wasinsufficient. In 1931 I turned to other methods and measures when a consensus hadfailed, because I still felt deeply that we must prepare to meet a crisis which coulddestroy our country's position.The failure to secure a consensus in 1930 was a tragedy, because nearly all the ablestmen in British public life had in varying degree foreseen the coming crisis and theleading figures in all generations had come together. In broad outline they were in twogroups, the old and the young. Once again I found myself to some extent the linkbetween two communities. After my resignation speech, most of the young men in theHouse of Commons who counted for anything expressed to me a large measure ofagreement with it. Harold Macmillan was the boldest in that he wrote a letter to TheTimes which much assisted me, and was rebuked for his unorthodoxy by a subsequentletter signed by R. A. Butler and two other young Conservative M.P.s. I did not knowButler at all and he was inconspicuous at that time. Oliver Stanley was closer to methan any other Conservative M.P. and led the discussions with me. Macmillan, if Iremember rightly, did not take part in the regular discussions, but met me from timeto time, as he recounts in his memoirs. It was always to me a mystery why Eden wasso assiduously groomed for leadership by the Conservative Party, as his abilities weremuch inferior to the abilities of Stanley and Macmillan.Mr. Anthony Eden had a fine war record, good looks and a generally distinguishedappearance. In my early days in Parliament he delivered from the back benches, in thestyle of a sixth-form boy at the annual prize-giving, dull little set pieces which nobodynoticed. Later, he was built up by the whole force of the machine into Conservatism'sfavourite son of the Baldwin epoch. As Foreign Secretary he was an architect of thedivision of Europe, and as Prime Minister he was the main opponent of the union ofEurope, which he publicly stated he 'felt in his bones' Britain should not join. Heowed nearly everything to his photogenic looks, which the Conservative managersmay have thought would overcome the initial difficulties of their appeal to thehousewife. This picture-postcard of the Tory slot-machine finally became a soggypiece of waste paper in the Suez Canal, after failing completely under the first test ofhis statesmanship in real action. Mr. Anthony Eden and I had no attraction for eachother, and I leave him floating on the smooth waters of the Avon.Walter Elliott, on the Conservative side, took part frequently in our discussions. Headded to an exceptionally good war record and social experience as a doctor a wideerudition and a fascinating capacity for conversation. His power of exposition did notextend so successfully to debate, where he was too diffuse with an argumentinsufficiently concentrated, often a fault in those who delight others and themselvesdelight in conversation. Walter Elliott, too, wrote a letter to The Times which washelpful to me. Sir Colin Coote notes in his life of Elliott; 'Baldwin was seriouslyannoyed. He administered what Walter called a "lambasting". A horrified Waltermade his peace.' The incident showed just what we were up against in face of the stillunshaken power of the party machines, and Macmillan in his memoirs records thatsimilar pressure was put on other Conservative M.P.s not to join in my effort to meetthe unemployment problem.Bob Boothby, too, was much in our company. He combined a brilliant capacity for227 of 424