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Download - Society of Economic Geologists

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12 SEG NEWSLETTER No 65 • APRIL 2006... from 11The Mineral Exploration Business: Innovation Required (Continued)budget in 2004, created eight separate“Discovery Sites” and a CentralDevelopment Site in 2000 with a viewto maintaining the excitement <strong>of</strong> asmall discovery unit (http://pfizer.com/pfizer/main.jsp). GlaxoSmithKline, thesecond pharmaceutical company with a2004 R&D budget <strong>of</strong> £2.8 billion ($5.0billion), also restructured their R&D in2001 into six “international biotechnologycompanies” which would competefor resources and operate autonomously.These are called “Centres <strong>of</strong> Excellencefor Drug Discovery” (CEDDs). The unitsare divided along therapeutic or diseaselines (equivalent to commodities).Their job is to deliver drugs with“pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> concept” to GSK’s drug developmentorganization—in other words,their role is discovery. They describe theidea as being to maintain agility,entrepreneurial spirit, and individualaccountability. The parent companywill then carry out the high cost development(clinical trials, equivalent toreserve definition and feasibility studyin the mining sector) in theirDevelopment Organization. At thattime, GSK had a “less-than-ideal latestagepipeline”—i.e., a lack <strong>of</strong> new discoveries—with50 drugs at the trialstage. In a mining company, thisequates to depletion <strong>of</strong> reserves andlack <strong>of</strong> new projects. By 2004 they wereable to claim substantial R&D growthfrom 118 to 140 projects in clinicaldevelopment between 2001 and 2004,including an 80% increase in “NewChemical Entities” in their pipeline.Building on the success <strong>of</strong> theCEDDs, they introduced six MedicineDevelopment Centres (MDCs) in 2004to integrate R&D with manufacturingand marketing in order to speed up thedelivery <strong>of</strong> new products to the market(i.e., patients; GlaxoSmithKline, 2005).However, in spite <strong>of</strong> high spendingand innovative management <strong>of</strong> R&D,many <strong>of</strong> the big pharmaceutical companiesare failing to deliver significantnew products (Wood Mackenzie,2005a), leading some analysts to questionthe current R&D focus on blockbusterdrugs (those with sales <strong>of</strong> over $1billion per year—read, world-classmines).Yet there is a strong “junior” sector,well-funded biotech companies developingnew ideas. Why should biotechnologycompanies share their ideas andpotential development with companiesthat could be seen as competitors? Itcomes down basically to survival, andalso that a major corporate partner providescredibility to that biotechnologyfirm’s research.Typical biotechnology/big pharmaceuticalcompany deals include the following(Robbins-Roth, 2000):• An up-front licensing fee that givesthe big pharmaceutical partnerrights to use the technology;• R&D funding for the life <strong>of</strong> the agreement(typically 3 to 5 years, initially),which covers the people andsupplies used by the biotechnologypartner to carry out the work;• Milestone payments that give thebiotechnology partner rewards formoving the project forward andreaching benchmarks that are significantfor product commercialization(for example, filing for FDA permissionto start clinical testing, startingPhase I / II / III trials, filing for marketingpermission, product launch);• A purchase <strong>of</strong> equity in the biotechnologypartner by the big pharmaceuticalpartner.The last point is not always included.Robbins-Roth (2000) points out that thebig pharmaceutical companies do notalways see stock as useful commodity,and usually buy shares only becausethe biotechnology firm wants them to.The amount <strong>of</strong> money a biotechnologycompany can command for each <strong>of</strong>these points is very dependent on theperceived quality <strong>of</strong> the company andits technology; i.e., whether the technologyis seen as “cutting edge” or thethird runner-up in an area, how crucialthe technology is to the big pharmaceutical’sinternal strategy, and how hungrythe big pharmaceutical partner isfor new product candidates to fill itspipeline.Although associations betweenmajor mining companies and explorationcompanies are becoming morecommon, there is a need for innovativefinancing models that require less capitalto get to discovery, which meansthat we need management teams thatcan do more with less.The oil business is in a similar situationto mining, with a decline inreserves considered to be partly responsiblefor the oil price reaching over $70per barrel recently. Oil companies areno longer replacing reserves throughnew discoveries (Wood Mackenzie,2005b). Exploration spending is at twothirds<strong>of</strong> the 1998 level, resulting in a50% decline in reserve replacement. Thereduction in exploration spending hasbeen caused by growing technical risksand uncertain oil prices, and while thishas resulted in good returns for thecompanies, it has been at the cost <strong>of</strong>reserve depletion. This is due to the philosophy<strong>of</strong> “capital discipline” whichhas been in vogue since at least 1998when the oil price last crashed(Brethour, 2004). This is a conservativestrategy <strong>of</strong> risk-avoidance which focuseson the short-term returns <strong>of</strong> quarterlyresults at the expense <strong>of</strong> buildingreserves. As a result, exploration spendingis 73% <strong>of</strong> six years ago in the top 10listed oil companies, down from $11 billionin 1998 to $8 billion in 2003. In relativeterms, the fall has been evengreater, with the average annual explorationexpenditure per unit <strong>of</strong> productionfalling from US$1.70/barrel <strong>of</strong> oilequivalent (boe) to US$1.00/boebetween 1998 and 2003. This is at amuch lower level than the mid-cap peergroup where relative spends have fallenfrom US$2.80 to US$2.50/boe (WoodMackenzie, 2004).THE BUSINESS OFEXPLORATION:MANAGING FOR SUCCESSMany articles have been written on theingredients required for success inexploration (e.g., Miller, 1976; Bailly,1979; Frost, 1980; Eggert, 1993; Sillitoe,1995; Stevens, 1996). Sillitoe (1995), inanalyzing the case histories <strong>of</strong> the 54most important discoveries made in theCircum-Pacific region from 1970 to1995, concluded that the most importantelements were the following: longtermexploration, systematic and wellplanned,scientifically groundedprograms, quality <strong>of</strong> the geologicalteam; competitive remuneration toattract and retain the right people, androck contact time <strong>of</strong> those quality people.Yet from our experience, manycompanies pay only lip service to theseingredients.The importance <strong>of</strong> people is a recurringtheme in analysis <strong>of</strong> explorationsuccess. Stevens (1996, p. 37) wrote that“... best people, in my experience are

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