the franco-prussian war - Strategy & Tactics

the chances of obtaining a negotiated peacewould have been greatly enhanced, as isevidenced by the Solomon Island Campaignwhich took better than 1 % years to advance amere 400 miles toward Tokyo. [Note: thehighly successful "leap frog" techniques usedlater on was only possible due to complete airand naval superiority, superiority which wewould not have been able to mount nearly soreadily had it not been for Midway, et al.).5. Pg. 16. Java Sea was a battle of severalphases which took place over a seven hourperiod, not three as is stated, from 1615 whenthe first broadsides were exchanged to 2350when DE RUYTER and JAVA were torpedoedby NACHI and HAGURO. The Japanese didnot use their training or torpedos to their full,often firing long lances at impossible rangesand improbable angles. It was only the chancelucky hit on EXETER which threw the alliedbattle line into the path of Tanaka's torpedoes.The two heavies did not redeem the fleet thatnight with their attack on the allied cruisersthough.6. Pg 76 (again): What carrier attack on theMarianas??? The extent of the early war raidswere Kwajelien (ENTERPRISE 1 Feb 42).Rabaul (LEXINGTON 20 Feb 421, and. Lae-Salamua (YORKTOWN 10 Mar 42). Anyraid into the Marianas would have been met byMihoro Air Group (36 G3M 8iG4M) and 2ndAir Group (48 A6M2) plus some assortedsearch units of Yokohama Air Group.7. Pg. 16 once more. People have a tendencyto attribute human qualities to inanimateobjects. The US CVs were not fearful of airattacks, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was verymuch so. The strain of constant combat fornine months was showing very much, andhaving had two carriers sunk from underneathhim in as many months certainly did not helpthings along. No, if you must put the blame forthat little piece of lunacy, which cost 1024lives, put it on F.J.F.8. Pg. 18. The discussion of Cape Esperanceshows a singular lack of understanding of that: action. Scott strictly forbade the use SC radari by those ships that had it, Intelligence reportshad indicated that the Japanese had a radardetection capability (a device similar to theGerman Naxos) which could sense metricwave length radar. He had planned to useaircraft (4) but those that finally got airbornewere forgotten about in the heat of the battle.Only HELENA had SG radar which picked upGoto at 28,000 yards. . .the only problem wasthat this was not reported to Scott until therange was down to 12,000 yards, at whichpoint in time the US column was in the processof making a 180° turn. It was only pure luckthat LAFFEY continued through the turnrather than following DUNCAN after Goto, forhad she and the remainder of the force doneso, it would have been almost a mirror imageof the 13 Nov action with both lines rammingeach other head on. As it was, Scott was soconfused that he thought he was firing atfriendly ships (as did Goto) and ordered ceasefire repeatedly after HELENA opened up. It1 was luck more than anything else that carriedScott through that action. As far as Japanesetorpedos not being very effective, both AOBAand FURUTAKA were knocked out very early,FUBUKI was smashed as she was turning tounmask her tubes (sinking in three minutes).KINUGASA and HATSUYUKI had turned toport which gave them a trailing shot throughwater occupied by their own flagship, although Other Warships. Morrison credits a torpedo hittorpedoes from KINUGASA passed ahead of on FURUTAKA by either DUNCAN orBOISE at midnight. On top of that the force FARENHOLT during Cape Esperance, whichcommander was killed and there was no helps to save face for our DDs in thatdirection or control for coordinated torpedo campaign, albeit only slightly.attacks. At any rate, the main point is thatradar played little part in Cape EsperanceTabulation. South Dakota carried a 12-inchexcept to help HELENA to be more aware of main belt' 18' This was a mythwhat was going on than anyone else, including perpertrated wartime propaganda whichwas not dispelled until 1970 when BreyersScott' Also' map Of Cape Esperance Schlachtschiff und Schlachtkreuzer publishedshows the lead making the the accurate figures. Note also that Janes forKINUGASA, the trailing CA actually made thatthe year that NEW JERSEY operated off Vietturn' leading turned Nam rated her at her proper belt thickness, i.e.,starboard.310mm (12%"1.The same data can be found8. DESCRIPTIVE MODULESin the revised edition of the Lenton seriespocketbook.1. Ships of Guadalcanal.BBs. If as claimed, the Japanese fastbattleships were unsuccessful in their nightbombardment role, then 14 Oct 42 must havebeen the work of some very strange force.Actually KONGO and HARUNA conducted a1 '/i hour long shoot, placing 918 projectiles intothe Henderson field area with what can only beconsidered devastating effect. Some differenceof opinion exists as to whether the ammoused was type 0 high capacity or type 3incendiary, but the fact remains thatHenderson lost nearly 60% of its aircraft thatnight and six transports unloaded threebattalions off Tassafaronga. The myth of ourPT's driving off the bombardment group isanother bunch of hogwash that is oftenperpetuated (although not by your article). Forboth bombardment missions (14 Oct and 13Nov) the Kongos carried 60 rounds per gun forthat purpose making a total of 960 shells.Simple mathematics indicated that by the endof the second pass by Henderson there wereonly four broadsides of these rounds left so theshoot was ended.CLs. All Japanese destroyer squadrons had alight cruiser attached as flotilla flagship. This isthe reason for the size of Japanese lightcruisers, ships large enough to pack aconsiderable punch when backing up adestroyer flotilla and yet not so large as tobecome an expensive liability that commanderswould not be willina to exDose to danaer.Probably one of the besfexamples of this Gpewas the Dutch TROMP class which wereOnly two of the Takao class CAs were rebuiltalong lines shown (ATAGO and TAKAO).MAYA was rearmed in 1942 with twin 5/40cal AA replacing the single 4.7's but still carriedonly 8 tubes. Chokai was never rebuilt andcarried 4~4.7" and 8x24" TT to the day shewas sunk. This can be referenced in Watts &Gordon's The Imperial Japanese Navy.Tenryu class were never armed with 24" tubes,carried 6x21" (Type 81 torpedo) with noreloads. YUBARI also did not carry anyreloads.2. Naval OrdnanceSomewhere someone has his wires crossed.AP shells pass through unarmored shipswithout exploding. . .(Coggins is wrong). . .HC shells have contact fuses (as do incendiaryshells) which explode instantaneously todamage thin skinned vessels. AARON WARDsurvived only because she was hit by AP whichpassed right through her without exploding,much the same as FANSHAW BAY at Leyte fwhen she took a 16" AP hit from NAGATO '..which passed right through the engine roomwithout detonating. During the 13 Nov battle,Adm Abe had eight minutes from first sightingof the US van to the time he opened fire, duringwhich time he was able to change over frombombardment to AP, although 'they did usesome during the action.No Japanese CLs carried a 6" gun. OnlyOYODO carried 6.1" artillery, and those wererelatively cheap and expendable, as cruisers the9th and 10th turrets removed from the firstgo, and yet which was nimble enough asset to two Mogamis. The Aganos carried a hand .;any destroyer flotilla which she served. loaded 5.9" weapon.ORDNANCE:Some corrections to the gunnery figures:-iapolis and earlier 1