MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

troops coming from Ratisbon were arriving and that his troops were too fatigued to carry the positions. Davout was now facing an Austrian army that had three times the infantry and artillery he possessed.21 These statements show that Davout had a clear grasp of the situation. He was facing a numerically superior force that was occupying a good defensive position. This force's numbers would swell during the night by Kollowrath's Corps arriving from north of the Danube. Bellegarde was not far behind with another 20,000 men. Napoleon had committed the same mistake he did at Jena. He thought he faced the main force while Davout had "but a screen of three regiments to his front." Such a mistake could have easily spelled disaster to anyone less capable than ~avout.~~ His duty was simply to contain the Austrian right wing and cover Napoleon's open flank. Had Davout not been able to do this Napoleon would likely have been defeated. Charles could have easily moved southward falling on Napoleon's exposed left flank. If in fact Davout had only three regiments to his front it would have been easy. Instead he had three corps to his front. To prevent the destruction of Napoleon, Davout conducted an all out attack against a superior force. It is interesting to note that Davout applied most of the principles of war in this fight. He achieved initial surprise by initiating the attack. Rosenberg was