MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

second tactical error of the campaign. However, his men were exhausted and Napoleon had told him to simply hold what was to his front. On the next day, Davout was to continue his fight against Charles and Austrian right wing. This time he had only two divisions in his corps. On 21 April Napoleon planned for Davout to continue to Ratisbon and cross the Danube. He was then to push Kollowrath into Bohemia. The Emperor and Vandamme were to finish their pursuit of the Austrian left to Landshut. Massena was to cut of the Austrian retreat at Landshut. Napoleon's decision to march on Landshut was based on four incorrect assumptions: that on the nineteenth Charlesr right wing had been destroyed, that in the battle of Abensberg he had destroyed two corps, that the bridge at Ratisbon had been destroyed, finally that Massena was already at Landshut.15 To Davout- he wrote; You have but a screen of three regiments before you. . . . If you hear cannon fire confronting Lefebvreyou will support him . . . . Once your rear iscleaned up you will march on Ratisbon; You will attack Bellegarde and Kollowrat. You will pursue and drive them into the Bohemian Mountains. 16 Davout had more than three regiments to his front. What he had was three corps with two more pouring through Ratisbon to link up with Charles. Davout would continue to save the French army form defeat on the twenty-first. Napoleon, with the main French army, pushed the Austrian left wing to Landshut. They continued their 80