MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

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would have had Davoutls Corps isolated between his forces and Kollowrat to the north. Thanks to Davout the French forces were now united across a broad front and it was the Austrians who were spread from Landshut to Ratisbon. Napoleon returned his army to the positions planned before Berthier scattered them. Napoleon then felt the climax would occur on 20 April. Napoleon's plan was for Davout and Lefebvre to hold the Austrians to their front in check. Then Lannes ad-hoc Corps along with the German Corps would smash the Austrian center. Massena's Corps would follow this with a thrust on Landshut. However, this plan was based on the false assumption that Charles' main army was in front of Napoleon blocking the road to Landshut.' Napoleon assumed that after his defeat on the 19th, Charles would retreat on his line of communications through Landshut. He was certain that Charles could not possibly be willing to stand and fight against him. General Bonnal stated ttNapoleonts view was obscured by a cloud of pride which led him to overestimate his own strength and underestimate that of the enemy." Napoleon was now splitting his forces which he had just united. Bonnal suggests that this attempt to "hunt two hares at the same timew might have ended the war in ~avaria.~
Napoleon's vision of the battlefield was clouded. Many writers support the notion that Napoleon knew he was only facing one wing of the Austrian army. Napoleon also supports this idea in his bulletin following the battle. However, Napoleon's official correspondence indicates that he thought it was the entire Austrian army. lo Davout knew that Charles' main force was still to his front and not to the south as Napoleon claimed. This fixation with Landshut would hamper Napoleon's tactical decision making for the next two days. To lead his assault on Landshut, Napoleon placed Marshal Jean Lannes in charge of an ad-hoc corps composed of the division of Gudin and Morand as well as Nansouty's and St Sulpicels Cui,rassier Divisions. This left Davout with only two divisions and Montbrun's cavalry brigade for the next three days of fighting. That morning Davout again tried to convince Napoleon that he was still facing the main Austrian army. Davoutts operational and tactical view of the battlefield was again correct. Only this time instead of it just being Berthier who was confused it was the Emperor himself. As Napoleon was transfixed with this push on Landshut it would be up to Davout to hold the main Austrian army in place. He had already saved the French army on the 19th now he was to continue with that mission for the next two days.
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ABSTRACT MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AN
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ?&%slsAPPROVALPAG
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CHAPTER 1 BUT WHAT ARE WE TO UNDERS
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the study of simple strategy and ta
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This fact becomes even more obvious
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the grand tactic. Operational warfa
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Burgundian countryside. He was born
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In1803 Davout was given command of
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then launch a major offensive into
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This attack'then ensured victory fo
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would actually go to war. However,
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Bluecher made four unsuccessful att
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fight entirely on his own. The batt
Page 29 and 30: title until two years after the bat
Page 31 and 32: Without hesitation Davout pushed fo
Page 33 and 34: most of his marshals, generals, the
Page 35 and 36: CHAPTER 3 THE AUSTRIANS ARE OUR WOR
Page 37 and 38: Finally, with Davout's information
Page 39 and 40: Austrian influence in Germany and I
Page 41 and 42: organization, always slow to act. M
Page 43 and 44: course of action. They now had a be
Page 45 and 46: elieved Prince Eugene and Marshal A
Page 47 and 48: 22 March Davout had sent a message
Page 49 and 50: were designated VII Corps and consi
Page 51 and 52: and intelligence at the strategic l
Page 53 and 54: across the Danube. The Austrians al
Page 55 and 56: transmitted from Napoleon to Berthi
Page 57 and 58: Normally, the message dispatched by
Page 59 and 60: me that the best maneuver would be
Page 61 and 62: Berthier chose to overlook this cor
Page 63 and 64: Landshut were only one corps and no
Page 65 and 66: destroy him. On the eighteenth Char
Page 67 and 68: critical for the French. Napoleon r
Page 69 and 70: Throughout these ten days before th
Page 71 and 72: CHAPTER 5 YOU ONLY HAVE A CURTAIN O
Page 73 and 74: Gudin to support the movement of hi
Page 75 and 76: well. They bought Davout the necess
Page 77 and 78: The remainder of the Austrians then
Page 79: His tactical leadership was at its
Page 83 and 84: against the French. His troops succ
Page 85 and 86: to surrender at 5:00 P.M. Now Charl
Page 87 and 88: pursuit on two parallel roads leadi
Page 89 and 90: important part in Davout's decision
Page 91 and 92: orders and directions. While Davout
Page 93 and 94: Corps. He received no reply from th
Page 95 and 96: convinced he was being attacked by
Page 97 and 98: CHAPTER 6 THE DUKE OF AUERSTAEDT IS
Page 99 and 100: eginning to feel the fatigue of con
Page 101 and 102: Just as the Austrians began to move
Page 103 and 104: effect, Davoutfs forces became the
Page 105 and 106: The French carabiniers fired a volZ
Page 107 and 108: Charles would lose his desire to st
Page 109 and 110: The ~re'nch prevailed over the Aust
Page 111 and 112: CHAPTER 7 IN BATTLE MEN ARE NOTHING
Page 113 and 114: counter orders did nothing but conf
Page 115 and 116: doctrine, and most importantly the
Page 117 and 118: The art of war on land is an art of
Page 119 and 120: Maintaining this vision or coup d'o
Page 121 and 122: internal fears rather than obstinac
Page 123 and 124: who never made a mistake. The key i
Page 125 and 126: too seemed only to be small diversi
Page 127 and 128: helped to provide definition to the
Page 129 and 130: Figure 1.Theater of Operations.
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INITIALACTIONSABOUT 1500Counteratta
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Figure 5.Davout's Running Fight on
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N1- 'LABER RIVER' SCHlERLlNGLANNESI
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Reserve Division: Demont' (3,215) 2
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APPENDIX C ORDER OF BATTLE CHANGES
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ll~avidG. Chandler, The Cam~aians o
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3~hisis noted in Napoleon's corresp
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20~his is from correspondence numbe
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WORKS CITED Primarv Sources Bonapar
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Arnold, James R. Crisis on The Danu
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ackground material and specifics on
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secondary source but all informatio
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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. , Comb
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STATEMENT A: Approved for public re
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