MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

Gudin to support the movement of his artillery and trains. This would enable them to protect the artillery as well as swing the majority of his corps southwestward to join forces with Lefebvre. Davout would then face the bulk of the Austrians with the divisions of St Hilaire and Friant. This was a difficult decision because Davout had now sent seventy percent of his combat power away from the battle. He had two divisions left to face a large Austrian force. Montbrun was the first unit to contact the Austrians at about 9:00 A.M.He was engaged nearly the entire day in a delaying action with the center Austrian column, under Rosenberg, which was vastly superior in numbers to Montbrunts small column of two-thousand. Luckily Rosenberg had frittered away a large part of his column into several small detachments garrisoning villages and protecting his rear area. By the time they engaged Montbrun, Rosenberg had reduced his force from sixteen battalions to only eight. However, this force was still twice that of ~ontbrun.~ Davout's use of Montbrun proved to be a critical factor in his success. Davout knew that Montbrun was a skilled commander and capable of conducting such an operation with little guidance. In fact, Montbrun 'would perform similar functions throughout the next three days, continually protecting Davoutls flank. ISt Hilaire and Friant continued southward in column. Davout directed them through Teugen along the