MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

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supporting distance. Planning for possible battle, Davout rode in the van of St Hilaire's division. Not only did he perceive the proper movement, his intuition extended through to the outcome of possible contact. Davout's tactical abilities and his personalleadership came into play as he shortly encounteredCharles' Army. Davout believed that a set piece battleagainst Charles' superior force would be a difficultendeavor. He therefore developed an alternate plan thatwould force the Austrians to fight the battle on histerms. At eleven o'clock in the morning Davout receivedword from his scouts that Hohenzollern's column wasdirectly to his front. Davout acted quickly and developeda plan that would eliminate the Austrian threat with thesmallest force possible. This plan had to protect themovement of his artillery and baggage advancing throughthe Saal defile, as well as allow the majority of hisforces to effect juncture with Lefebvre (see Appendix A,Figure 2) .Davout developed a tactical plan that would make Charlesr attack against him a strike in the air. Montbrun and his cavalry continued to screen Davoutrs left flank. They would play a critical role and perform in a manner that was simply outstanding. He continued to push his first column of artillery and baggage southward along the river road. Davout then sent the divisions of Morand and
Gudin to support the movement of his artillery and trains. This would enable them to protect the artillery as well as swing the majority of his corps southwestward to join forces with Lefebvre. Davout would then face the bulk of the Austrians with the divisions of St Hilaire and Friant. This was a difficult decision because Davout had now sent seventy percent of his combat power away from the battle. He had two divisions left to face a large Austrian force. Montbrun was the first unit to contact the Austrians at about 9:00 A.M.He was engaged nearly the entire day in a delaying action with the center Austrian column, under Rosenberg, which was vastly superior in numbers to Montbrunts small column of two-thousand. Luckily Rosenberg had frittered away a large part of his column into several small detachments garrisoning villages and protecting his rear area. By the time they engaged Montbrun, Rosenberg had reduced his force from sixteen battalions to only eight. However, this force was still twice that of ~ontbrun.~ Davout's use of Montbrun proved to be a critical factor in his success. Davout knew that Montbrun was a skilled commander and capable of conducting such an operation with little guidance. In fact, Montbrun 'would perform similar functions throughout the next three days, continually protecting Davoutls flank. ISt Hilaire and Friant continued southward in column. Davout directed them through Teugen along the
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ABSTRACT MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AN
Page 5 and 6:
TABLE OF CONTENTS ?&%slsAPPROVALPAG
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CHAPTER 1 BUT WHAT ARE WE TO UNDERS
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the study of simple strategy and ta
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This fact becomes even more obvious
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the grand tactic. Operational warfa
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Burgundian countryside. He was born
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In1803 Davout was given command of
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then launch a major offensive into
Page 21 and 22: This attack'then ensured victory fo
Page 23 and 24: would actually go to war. However,
Page 25 and 26: Bluecher made four unsuccessful att
Page 27 and 28: fight entirely on his own. The batt
Page 29 and 30: title until two years after the bat
Page 31 and 32: Without hesitation Davout pushed fo
Page 33 and 34: most of his marshals, generals, the
Page 35 and 36: CHAPTER 3 THE AUSTRIANS ARE OUR WOR
Page 37 and 38: Finally, with Davout's information
Page 39 and 40: Austrian influence in Germany and I
Page 41 and 42: organization, always slow to act. M
Page 43 and 44: course of action. They now had a be
Page 45 and 46: elieved Prince Eugene and Marshal A
Page 47 and 48: 22 March Davout had sent a message
Page 49 and 50: were designated VII Corps and consi
Page 51 and 52: and intelligence at the strategic l
Page 53 and 54: across the Danube. The Austrians al
Page 55 and 56: transmitted from Napoleon to Berthi
Page 57 and 58: Normally, the message dispatched by
Page 59 and 60: me that the best maneuver would be
Page 61 and 62: Berthier chose to overlook this cor
Page 63 and 64: Landshut were only one corps and no
Page 65 and 66: destroy him. On the eighteenth Char
Page 67 and 68: critical for the French. Napoleon r
Page 69 and 70: Throughout these ten days before th
Page 71: CHAPTER 5 YOU ONLY HAVE A CURTAIN O
Page 75 and 76: well. They bought Davout the necess
Page 77 and 78: The remainder of the Austrians then
Page 79 and 80: His tactical leadership was at its
Page 81 and 82: Napoleon's vision of the battlefiel
Page 83 and 84: against the French. His troops succ
Page 85 and 86: to surrender at 5:00 P.M. Now Charl
Page 87 and 88: pursuit on two parallel roads leadi
Page 89 and 90: important part in Davout's decision
Page 91 and 92: orders and directions. While Davout
Page 93 and 94: Corps. He received no reply from th
Page 95 and 96: convinced he was being attacked by
Page 97 and 98: CHAPTER 6 THE DUKE OF AUERSTAEDT IS
Page 99 and 100: eginning to feel the fatigue of con
Page 101 and 102: Just as the Austrians began to move
Page 103 and 104: effect, Davoutfs forces became the
Page 105 and 106: The French carabiniers fired a volZ
Page 107 and 108: Charles would lose his desire to st
Page 109 and 110: The ~re'nch prevailed over the Aust
Page 111 and 112: CHAPTER 7 IN BATTLE MEN ARE NOTHING
Page 113 and 114: counter orders did nothing but conf
Page 115 and 116: doctrine, and most importantly the
Page 117 and 118: The art of war on land is an art of
Page 119 and 120: Maintaining this vision or coup d'o
Page 121 and 122: internal fears rather than obstinac
Page 123 and 124:
who never made a mistake. The key i
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too seemed only to be small diversi
Page 127 and 128:
helped to provide definition to the
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Figure 1.Theater of Operations.
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INITIALACTIONSABOUT 1500Counteratta
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Figure 5.Davout's Running Fight on
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N1- 'LABER RIVER' SCHlERLlNGLANNESI
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Reserve Division: Demont' (3,215) 2
Page 139 and 140:
APPENDIX C ORDER OF BATTLE CHANGES
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ll~avidG. Chandler, The Cam~aians o
Page 143 and 144:
3~hisis noted in Napoleon's corresp
Page 145 and 146:
20~his is from correspondence numbe
Page 147 and 148:
WORKS CITED Primarv Sources Bonapar
Page 149 and 150:
Arnold, James R. Crisis on The Danu
Page 151 and 152:
ackground material and specifics on
Page 153 and 154:
secondary source but all informatio
Page 155 and 156:
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. , Comb
Page 157:
STATEMENT A: Approved for public re
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