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MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

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Davout's overriding consideration was to join forces with Lefebvre before engaging the enemy. Charles still had the advantage at this point inthe campaign. He had over 67,000 men moving againstDavout and the V and I1 Reserve Corps protecting his flankfrom Lefebvrets forces. Charles planned to defeat Davoutthen turn south to defeat Massena. Strategically, thesituation would have been desperate for the French had itnot been for superior soldiers and Marshal Louis N.Davout.Later that same morning Charles set his three columns into motion in an attempt to intercept Davout's movement. Hohenzollern's I11 Corps moved toward Saal. Rosenbergls IV Corps supported by twelve grenadier battalions formed the second column and advanced on Dinzling. The third column marched northward on the Ratisbon-Eckmuehl highway. lgThis powerful stream of Austrians soon became three dribbles. Instead of converging on Davout they separated and began to dispatch small detachments. These detachments were sent out to perform various unimportant missions such as garrisoning towns or protecting lines of communications. They were reducing their effective combat power as they moved closer to enemy contact. Instead of having 67,000 men to conduct the attack, they had reduced themselves to less than 38,000 by the time they met Davout.

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