MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

there were other bridges across the Danube atKellheim and Straubing and to destroy all of them would not be possible. So in his mind the destruction of the Ratisbon bridge really would not have mattered greatly. Also the bridge was a very massive stone structure built hundreds of years earlier. It was an impossibility to destroy the bridge and even if a span was dropped it could have been easily repaired. On the other hand Davout may have committed a tactical error. Massena and Oudinot were to concentrate on Pfaffenhofen. From there they would move toward Landshut and attack Charles1 rear. He was asking Davout to execute a march due south exposing his flank to the enemy. This was an enemy of which Napoleon knew little. Additionally, he was unsure of its size or exact positioning. It was a most difficult mission to accomplish. As it happened the concentration did not take place as planned on the eighteenth. Massena was slow to move and never reached Pfaffenhofen. It was also impossible for Davout to collect all of his forces and execute the southern movement in only one day's time. Friant was still twenty miles further north of Ratisbon and St Sulpice another ten miles to the west of the city. These were the dispositions that Berthier had dictated. While the French were making their concentrations Charles was determined to find Davoutfs isolated Corps and 58