MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

left.1t13Again Davout had a good appreciation for the big picture. Operationally he knew where the Austrians were and knew best how to defend against their advance. However, at the same time he was well aware that Berthier was in charge and to disobey his orders was not appropriate. Davout would have to make the best of his precarious situation. During the course of events Napoleon began his trek from Paris to the theater of operations in Germany. . He departed on the thirteenth and at five in the morningand by the seventeenth he was in Donauwoerth. By the endof the day he had reviewed the currentsituation anddevised a plan of operations. He first ordered Lefebvreto slow the Austrian advance out of Landshut. Then heordered Davout to move south and concentrate atIngolstadt. This was the same disposition that Davout hadmoved to five days earlier and the same position that herecommended to Berthier. This order confirmed that Davoutwas correct in his initial decision to move on Ingolstadt.Napoleon's plan of operations was to take theinitiative from Charles and pin his front while hemaneuvered against Charles1 rear. Initially Napoleonplanned to use the eighteenth as a day of preparation andadvance to destroy Charles on the nineteenth. This wasnot a bad plan, however, it was based on bad information.Napoleon thought that the Austrians in the vicinity of