MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

failure to ensure I11 Corps was properly supported at Auerstaedt. Davout's controlling personality and his distrust of Berthier did nothing to help the tactical problems created by Napoleon's letters and Berthier's failure to adjust. Davoutls intelligence gathering and his ability to synthesize all the information available led him to believe that Charles had a sizeable force north of the river. Davout was correct that Charles could now pinch Davoutts exposed corps between his two wings and then turn south to face Massena and Lefebvre and defeat them in detail. Davout foresaw the problems that would be encountered with his positioning at Ratisbon. Davout also understood the necessity to concentrate forces in the face of the enemy and not separate them. This was communicated to his superior, Berthier, who chose to ignore its significance. Finally on 16 April, Berthier received Napoleon's much belated Paris dispatch. This was the first dispatch sent by semaphore to Strassbourg and then by horseback to the front. This correspondence pointed out that if the attack came before the fifteenth the concentration should be behind the Lech River. However, taken out of order Berthier became even more confused. He still had in his mind that Napoleon wanted Davout at Ratisbon whether or not the Austrians attacked before the fifteenth. So