MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

me that the best maneuver would be to concentrate atIngolstadt . . . if Your Highness persists in theexecution of his orders, I will execute them and fear notthe results.1f9 This shows that Davout knew what needed tobe done whereas Berthier remained ignorant of thesituation. Davout repeated his displeasure withBerthier's orders no less than four times. lo Davout wenton to explain that to concentrate at Ratisbon would be tototally expose his corps to an Austrian attack from boththe south and the north. Threatened by 100,000 Austrianson the south and 40,000 the north Davout seemed destinedfor the same fate as that of General Mack four yearsearlier at ulm.ll Fortunately Davoutfs tactical abilitiesfar exceeded those of General Mack. Many authors including Davout's English biographer, John G. Gallaher, tout Davout's action in this instance. H~wever, Davout's personality and his enmity toward Berthier certainly did not make the situation any less volatile. Davout was a very stern and stubborn individual. When Davout knew he was correct he woula press his point to the extreme as he did with Berthier. Had Davout beenless demanding and more sympathetic with the confused Berthier he may well have straightened out the tactical mess before it became a problem. This, however, was not Davout's way of operating. Davout had also developed a certain dislike for Berthier after his