MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

egan to split his army apart. This was a tactical blunder of the first order. This shows that even after thirteen years with the Emperor, Berthier still did not grasp the main principles of tactics and ~trategy.~ Even Jomini stated "twenty campaigns had impressed no comprehension of strategy on Berthier.lf7 Davout reported to Berthier on 12 April that his disposition was now perfect for the advance of the Austrians. He wrote "It is impossible to imagine better disposition of the troops.3f8 Davout went on to say that he saw clearly the intentions of the enemy. He was well aware that Charles was attempting to drive a wedge between his forces and the remainder of the French army. By uniting at Ingolstadt Davout had put his troops in a position to prevent this from happening. Davout knew the desires of the Emperor and could view the strategic and operational situation much better than Berthier. Unfortunately, Berthier was in charge and he read the situation incorrectly. He ordered Davout to Ratisbon and Massena to Augsburg. This separated the two wings of the French army by seventy-five miles in the face of the advance by an enemy twice their size. Upon receipt of Berthier's orders Davout realized that the disposition was tantamount to committing treason. He immediately protested Berthier's orders. He sent the following message at 7:00 P.M. on 14 April: "It seems to