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MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

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confuse this idea. These messages provided for two scenarios. Scenario one was that the French concentrations should be around Ingolstadt, behind the Lech River, provided the Austrians attack before the fifteenth. Scenario two was that the assembly of the French forces should be around Ratisbon if the Austrians attack after the fifteenth. This disposition made a great deal of sense. Napoleon wanted to concentrate his forces to face the Austrians. The concentration depended on the Austrian date of attack. Napoleon wanted to concentrate at a location out of touch with the enemy. At the same time he wanted this point to be as far forward as possible. If the enemy was late, or moving slowly, that point was to be ~atisbon.~ The armies had to concentrate, a fact Berthier missed. Napoleon's normally infallible Chief-of-Staff did not realize that he was separating Davout from the remainder of the French forces around Ingolstadt. Davout understood Napoleon's concept of concentration prior to the arrival of the enemy. Davout also knew that should the Austrians attack the French before concentration they could defeat each element in detail. It was easy to see that the Emperor wanted a forward concentration of his forces. Davout understood this fact, unfortunately he was no longer the senior man on the scene.

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