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MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

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CHAPTER 4 <strong>THE</strong> ARMY MUST BE CONCENTRATED AROUND INGOLSTADT The first of many opportunities had passed by the Austrians. Charles lost an excellent opportunity when he did not attack in March as originally planned. However, the French dispositions were such that the Austrians could still bring about a resounding victory. Finally, on 10 April the Austrians crossed the border without a formal declaration of war and without any allies. Six corps were now moving directly toward Davout and his I11 Corps. At this point Davout was not yet prepared for the Austrian attack. He was still moving his forces southward toward the Danube. Davout's analysis was correct, the Austrians' main force attacked south of the river. However, Davout had not yet deployed to meet their attack and was dangerously positioned with his forces stretched from Amberg to Ratisbon.' Austrian General Heinrich Bellegarde controlled the two Austrian corps north of the Danube. Charles planned to unite his main army with these forces around Ratisbon or at Kellheim (see Appendix A, Figure 1). It was therefore essential for Charles to move forward and secure either one of these two towns and their bridges 46

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