MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

Napoleon did not expect the campaign to begin until after 15 April. He believed this because the Austrian government failed to show the normal indications of war. All diplomatic relations remained intact and their ambassador remained in Paris. In addition, Napoleon . .did not believe that the Austrians were capable of mounting an assault before that time. On 30 March he issued instruction to Berthier about the disposition of forces. Napoleon planned to remain initially on the defensive. After concentrating his forces, he would conduct a quick offensive thrust. Napoleon's order directed that if the attack by the Austrians was to occur before 15 April the concentration of forces was to be around Ingolstadt. Davout was already moving toward that disposition. Napoleon also stipulated that if the attack occurred after the fifteenth then the army was to assemble around ~atisb0n.l' ThTs set of instructions was to cause many problems inthe weeks to follow. The initial disposition of forces in the Danubian theater of operations favored the Austrians in the numbers of infantry and artillery. On 1 April 1809 the French and allied troops in Germany consisted of the following: I1 Corps under General Nicholas Oudinot (14,000); I11 Corps under Marshal Davout (60,000); and IV Corps with Marshal Andre Massena as its commander (40,000). The Bavarians were placed under Marshal Francois Joseph Lefebvre. They