MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

uildup of Austrian forces and their movement south but also he had determined that Russia could not be relied on for any assistance. Strategically he was right, whereas Napoleon had lost sight of the true situation. According to the plan all forces were to be assembled by 20 March, with the army's center at Donauwoerth. The four divisions of Legrand, Carra St Cyr, Molitar and Boudet were to move from France to Ulm. Davout was to continue to assemble his forces around Bamberg. Bavaria was to assemble her forces around Landshut and the Wurttembergers at Neresheim. On 17 March Berthier was formally appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Germany. Napoleon still believed that Austria would not make war until her ambassador had been withdrawn from Paris or until she had made a formal declaration of war. He also assumed that the Austrians would not-begin their attack until late April and the main attack would come north of the Danube. l2 Thus he planned to carry his headquarters forward to Ratisbon. Napoleon was wrong on both accounts. Davoutrs vision and analysis of the strategic situation were more accurate than those of the Emperor. Davout's intelligence network provided accurate and timely information. His interpretation of the data then painted a clear picture of the enemy situation. As early as