MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

course of action. They now had a better and safer base of operations linked by the Danube to Vienna. Charles1 army was now closer to Archduke John in Italy and could affect communications in the Tyrol. On the other hand, it gave Davout time to react and reorient his forces toward the south. It also proved beneficial to the French because Charles left two corps north of the Danube. These two Austrian corps would become isolated and unable to effectively participate in the upcoming battles. The Austrian dispositions: left 58,000 attacking north of the Danube under Generals Heinrich Bellegarde and Karl Kollowrath. South of the Danube was Charles with about 127,000 men under Generals Friedrich Hohenzollern, Franz Rosenberg, Johannes Lichtenstein, Johann Hiller, Michael Kienmayer and Archduke Louis (see Appendix B, Order of Battle). This new plan required speed and audacity on the part of the Austrian army. A fast attack which could defeat the widely scattered French was essential for their success. In February after many letters from Davout, Napoleon finally comprehended the threat from Austria. He then began to organize the Army of the Rhine. With over 200,000 men and his best leaders tied down in Spain Napoleon would have to work quickly to gather a force substantial enough to face Austria. Davout's I11 Corps would form the backbone of this new army. To this he 37