MARSHAL LOUIS N. DAVOUT AND THE ART OF COMMAND A ...

protect its communications and 'Iforce an enemy to abandon his strategic pointu by menacing his rear areas.7 This. was similar to Napoleon's technique of Le Maneuvre a les arriers. Charles fully believed that to succeed he had to avoid the main force and maneuver to the enemy army rear. In other words the Austrians had fully accepted the idea of maneuver warfare. Davout had become keenly aware of all these facts during late 1808 and early 1809. He knew of the Austrian reforms and their impending build up of forces. He was also well aware that Austria had established the Landwehr and begun intensified training. This Landwehr, or national guard, enabled Austria to field a much larger army. It was also an indication that Austria was starting to understand the concept of total war. Instead of relying on a permanent dynastic army, Austria was willing to mobilize her general population to defeat France. All this information was relayed on to Napoleon through a series of correspondence. However, the Emperor was too involved in the Spanish affair to devote any attention to Central Europe. On 12 February 1809 the Aulic Council made the decision to go to war. This council was a group of Austrian diplomats and former military men who were formed to advise the Emperor on matters of state. It was a left over from the Holy Roman Empire and was a conservative