A treatise on comforting afflicted consciences - The Digital Puritan

A treatise on comforting afflicted consciences - The Digital Puritan A treatise on comforting afflicted consciences - The Digital Puritan

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XINTRODUCTION.of the island, the lover of virtue. The water is inperpetual agitation. The slightest zeph}'T wafts itinto billows. It then covers the inscription : we nolonger see the characters : we no longer hear conscienceread them. But the calm soon rises from thebosom of the ocean. The island reappears as before,and conscience resumes its employment*." It seemstherefore no valid objection against the existence of themoral instinct to urge that it is liable to counteraction.A further objection is derived from the fact, that itscarcely operates at all in infancy, and from its graduallybecoming stronger with advancing age, a circumstancewhich would seem to favour the idea of itsbeing an acquired rather than an original principle.It may however be replied, that this is nothing morethan is true respecting other of our susceptibilities,which have ever been deemed to be instinctive. Theinstinct of self-preservation, for instance, which causesthe eye to close upon the near approach to it of a dangerousobject, and the hands to be raised when we arein danger of falling, scarcely operates at all in infancy.It begins to operate when it is needed, when the augmentedstrength of the child renders it less dependentupon the parents, and when therefore it is more exposedto personal danger. So the moral instinct maybe imagined to remain dormant, without inducing anydoubt as to its existence, till the maturity of ourpowers generally may have prepared us to enter uponthe period of our responsibility.It has been further oljected, that if there had been

INTRODUCTION.xisuch an original power in the mind, there must alsohave been implanted within us an idea of the object towhich it was to be directed. The possession of theinstinct supposes the possession of ideas of the actionsto be approved or disapproved by it : but we possess nosucli ideas, and therefore have no such instinct *.The same objection, however, would lie against theexistence of every power of the human mind, asoriginal. It is acknowledged upon all hands that wepossess a capacity of intuitively perceiving the relationof numbers, as soon as we understand the terms inwhich the proposition is stated. There is no nation inwhich it could not be true, and perceived to be so bythe inhabitants, that four are to twenty as twenty to ahundred. Yet though all mankind perceive this truthintuitively, no one contends as necessary to intuitionthat we should also possess an idea of all the possiblepropositions in numbers to which it is to be directed.In this respect the human eye and the natural conscienceare similar. The human eye is adapted to theperception of objects. It is so equally whether theseobjects may or may not have been presented to it : itwould perceive and distinguish them if they were. Sothe susceptibility of conscience to derive pleasure orpain from good or evil actions may exist independentlyof being exercised. It is however ready to operate,true to its office, whenever they may be presented byexperience or observation.It has also been objected against the doctrine thatconscience is a native and original faculty, that ourperceptions of right and wrong, upon this supposition,* Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, book i, ch.iv, 5 19.

XINTRODUCTION.of the island, the lover of virtue. <strong>The</strong> water is inperpetual agitati<strong>on</strong>. <strong>The</strong> slightest zeph}'T wafts itinto billows. It then covers the inscripti<strong>on</strong> : we nol<strong>on</strong>ger see the characters : we no l<strong>on</strong>ger hear c<strong>on</strong>scienceread them. But the calm so<strong>on</strong> rises from thebosom of the ocean. <strong>The</strong> island reappears as before,and c<strong>on</strong>science resumes its employment*." It seemstherefore no valid objecti<strong>on</strong> against the existence of themoral instinct to urge that it is liable to counteracti<strong>on</strong>.A further objecti<strong>on</strong> is derived from the fact, that itscarcely operates at all in infancy, and from its graduallybecoming str<strong>on</strong>ger with advancing age, a circumstancewhich would seem to favour the idea of itsbeing an acquired rather than an original principle.It may however be replied, that this is nothing morethan is true respecting other of our susceptibilities,which have ever been deemed to be instinctive. <strong>The</strong>instinct of self-preservati<strong>on</strong>, for instance, which causesthe eye to close up<strong>on</strong> the near approach to it of a dangerousobject, and the hands to be raised when we arein danger of falling, scarcely operates at all in infancy.It begins to operate when it is needed, when the augmentedstrength of the child renders it less dependentup<strong>on</strong> the parents, and when therefore it is more exposedto pers<strong>on</strong>al danger. So the moral instinct maybe imagined to remain dormant, without inducing anydoubt as to its existence, till the maturity of ourpowers generally may have prepared us to enter up<strong>on</strong>the period of our resp<strong>on</strong>sibility.It has been further oljected, that if there had been

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