A G E N D A 1. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE Ian Metcalfe 2 ...
A G E N D A 1. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE Ian Metcalfe 2 ... A G E N D A 1. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE Ian Metcalfe 2 ...
2 PrioritisationThis chapter sets out the prioritisation framework that we intend to follow to make sure Monitorfocuses on the issues that best enable us to meet our duties and to make use of our resources.2.1 Prioritisation frameworkMonitor intends to apply this prioritisation framework to decisions about whether to pursueenforcement action and to all other significant cases where Monitor has discretion over whether toact. We will use this framework to inform our decisions on whether or not to begin cases, and tocontinue with them once under way. In developing this framework, Monitor has considered theapproaches taken by other regulators, many of which also use prioritisation frameworks.When assessing priorities for enforcement action, we would expect to draw on a range ofinformation, including but not limited to: intelligence and information that Monitor may collectdirectly; information from patient representative bodies and commissioners; any complaints andrepresentations made to Monitor; and information from providers themselves, including, forexample, monitoring information supplied to us.In weighing up the benefits and costs of taking action, we will consider, amongst any otherrelevant factors:The likely benefits to health care service usersOur key consideration will be the expected benefit of our work for health care service users.When we decide whether to devote resources to a matter, we will consider all types of benefitsthat our actions may generate or protect. Such benefits may include:Direct benefits to health care service users. We intend to consider the impact of ouractions on the quality of health care services, access to care and value for money spenton health care. We will consider both the short and longer term impacts of our proposedinterventions.Indirect benefits to health care service users. We will consider whether a particularaction in one area may lead to a wider, more general, benefit to health care service users.This might arise by reducing the likelihood of future breaches by the provider in question.This might also arise, for example, by prompting positive changes in the generalbehaviour of providers, commissioners or health care service users. For example,enforcement action considered appropriate in relation to one provider’s breach of theprovider conditions may also:Page 13 of 50
o deter similar breaches by other providers;o help other providers understand how obligations apply in certain circumstances;o enable commissioners to obtain better information about the strengths andcapabilities of particular providers or effective ways to procure health careservices;o enable health care service users to become better informed about their rights andempowered to make choices;o increase confidence in the functioning of the health care sector more generallywhich may lead to more providers and expansion of the sector; ando help Monitor to identify that certain aspects of the sector may not be working wellfor health care service users, resulting in future policy improvements.In assessing how much an action may benefit health care service users, we will be mindful of thelikelihood of success. When we decide whether Monitor should take action about a suspectedbreach of a licence condition, we may assess, for example, whether there is a risk that Monitormight be unable to gather the evidence to be satisfied that a condition has been breached.In determining the potential benefits of an intervention by Monitor, we will also consider whetherwe can achieve the best outcome for health care service users by ourselves acting or actingtogether with another organisation, or whether another organisation has regulatory tools thatcould tackle an issue more effectively, or is already taking steps that are likely to address thepotential harm. For example, the Care Quality Commission, the Office of Fair Trading, the CharityCommission, the NHS Commissioning Board, the NHS Trust Development Authority, and theAdvertising Standards Authority are all also able to take action within the health care sector.If the breach relates to enabling integrated care, we will also consider the potential for action toreduce inequalities, in line with our duty under the Act.The likely costs of taking actionTo ensure that we make the best possible use of our resources, we will also consider the cost ofany action. We will think about the resources needed to take a particular course of action andcompare them to the potential benefits. We propose to consider staff and non-staff costs, and thelikely duration of the work.Page 14 of 50
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- Page 82 and 83: EnforcementGuidance28 March 2013Mon
- Page 84 and 85: ForewordThe Health and Social Care
- Page 86 and 87: 1 IntroductionThe Health and Social
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2 PrioritisationThis chapter sets out the prioritisation framework that we intend to follow to make sure Monitorfocuses on the issues that best enable us to meet our duties and to make use of our resources.2.1 Prioritisation frameworkMonitor intends to apply this prioritisation framework to decisions about whether to pursueenforcement action and to all other significant cases where Monitor has discretion over whether toact. We will use this framework to inform our decisions on whether or not to begin cases, and tocontinue with them once under way. In developing this framework, Monitor has considered theapproaches taken by other regulators, many of which also use prioritisation frameworks.When assessing priorities for enforcement action, we would expect to draw on a range ofinformation, including but not limited to: intelligence and information that Monitor may collectdirectly; information from patient representative bodies and commissioners; any complaints andrepresentations made to Monitor; and information from providers themselves, including, forexample, monitoring information supplied to us.In weighing up the benefits and costs of taking action, we will consider, amongst any otherrelevant factors:The likely benefits to health care service usersOur key consideration will be the expected benefit of our work for health care service users.When we decide whether to devote resources to a matter, we will consider all types of benefitsthat our actions may generate or protect. Such benefits may include:Direct benefits to health care service users. We intend to consider the impact of ouractions on the quality of health care services, access to care and value for money spenton health care. We will consider both the short and longer term impacts of our proposedinterventions.Indirect benefits to health care service users. We will consider whether a particularaction in one area may lead to a wider, more general, benefit to health care service users.This might arise by reducing the likelihood of future breaches by the provider in question.This might also arise, for example, by prompting positive changes in the generalbehaviour of providers, commissioners or health care service users. For example,enforcement action considered appropriate in relation to one provider’s breach of theprovider conditions may also:Page 13 of 50
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