Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts
Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts
Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts
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TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 3I APPROACHING PRECEDENT ........................................................................................................................ 4A. <strong>Precedent</strong> broadly understood ...................................................................................................................... 4B. Comparative puzzles .................................................................................................................................... 5C. Def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the questions ................................................................................................................................. 6II. THE US SUPREME COURT: STARE DECISIS AND THE CONSTITUTION ............................................. 7A. The <strong>Supreme</strong> Court only says what the Constitution is; it does not make it ................................................ 7B. Who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed? ..................................................................................................................................... 81. Vertical precedent .................................................................................................................................. 82. Horizontal precedent .............................................................................................................................. 93. <strong>Precedent</strong> beyond the judicial branch ................................................................................................... 10C. The nature of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court precedent’s constra<strong>in</strong>t: centrality of the case ........................................ 101. The importance of the case for precedent ............................................................................................ 102. The real-life context of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g ......................................................................................... 113. The constra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g function of the case ................................................................................................... 124. Emancipat<strong>in</strong>g precedent from the conf<strong>in</strong>es of the case ........................................................................ 14III. THE COUR DE CASSATION: JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CIVIL CODE .............................................. 15A. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as a creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Civil Code ............................................................. 151. Do French judges make law? ............................................................................................................... 152. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as a creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Civil Code ....................................................... 173. The Cour de cassation as the secular arm of legislated law ................................................................. 18B. Who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed? ................................................................................................................................... 191. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between “lawmak<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> the question of who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed ................................... 192. The vertical level: below the Cour de cassation ................................................................................... 203. The horizontal level: the Cour de cassation <strong>and</strong> the problem of revirements ....................................... 214. Jurisprudence <strong>and</strong> the legislator ........................................................................................................... 21C.The nature of jurisprudence’s constra<strong>in</strong>t: legislative precedent .................................................................... 221. The absence of a ‘workable case-law technique’ ................................................................................. 222. Brevity constra<strong>in</strong>s................................................................................................................................. 233. Legislative precedent <strong>and</strong> the prudence of the law .............................................................................. 244. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PROBLEMS OF AN INCOMPLETE TRANSLATION ............ 25A. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> the Court of Justice’s supremacy ................................ 261. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> the US <strong>and</strong> France ................................................................. 262. The absence of competition over the foundational document’s mean<strong>in</strong>g ............................................ 27B. Who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed? ................................................................................................................................... 281. Other courts <strong>and</strong> the Court of Justice’s expositional exclusivity ......................................................... 292. The arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess of horizontal precedent ............................................................................................. 303. The nature of the Court of Justice’s precedent: say<strong>in</strong>g too much <strong>and</strong> too little at the same time .............. 321. The importance of a case ...................................................................................................................... 322. The nature of cases before the Court of Justice <strong>and</strong> the relevance of facts .......................................... 323. Comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g without a sanction .......................................................................................................... 33CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................. 342
I also argue that a particular conception of a case before the two courts is important forunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the nature of precedential constra<strong>in</strong>t, firstly s<strong>in</strong>ce it limits the precedent court’slawmak<strong>in</strong>g power, <strong>and</strong> secondly because it br<strong>in</strong>gs elements of “real life” <strong>in</strong>to lawmak<strong>in</strong>gthrough adjudication (<strong>in</strong> contrast to lawmak<strong>in</strong>g by legislatures). The two systems have dist<strong>in</strong>ctmechanisms to achieve this.Part IV applies these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs to the function<strong>in</strong>g of the European Court of Justice’s case law. Isuggest that while <strong>in</strong> some respects the function<strong>in</strong>g resembles the two systems, it does notconta<strong>in</strong> (or does not employ <strong>in</strong> practice) the elements which would allow other actors – lowercourts <strong>and</strong> political branches – to constra<strong>in</strong> the Court or moderate its lawmak<strong>in</strong>g activity. TheCourt enjoys expositional supremacy <strong>and</strong> exclusivity, with regard to both political <strong>in</strong>stitutions<strong>in</strong> the EU <strong>and</strong> other courts.Nor does the case play the central role <strong>in</strong> the reason<strong>in</strong>g with the Court’s precedent. In itsdecisions the Court says too much when compared with the French Cour de cassation, whichmust respond strictly to the legal grounds of an appeal <strong>in</strong> cassation, <strong>and</strong> too little whencompared with the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court, which must persuade other courts to follow itsprecedents <strong>in</strong> the way it wants them to. However, the European Court of Justice cannotcomm<strong>and</strong> other courts <strong>in</strong> the same way as the Cour de cassation, s<strong>in</strong>ce it does not have aneffective sanction to enforce their obedience.The conclud<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong>dicates directions for further research of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>precedent, address<strong>in</strong>g problems identified <strong>in</strong> this article.IAPPROACHING PRECEDENTA. <strong>Precedent</strong> broadly understoodI propose a broad def<strong>in</strong>ition of precedent: a prior judicial decision which has normativeimplications beyond the context of the particular case <strong>in</strong> which it was delivered. I use thenotion of precedent as a generic term which, for the purposes of this article, covers both thecommon law doctr<strong>in</strong>e of stare decisis (or precedent) 3 <strong>and</strong> the French concept ofjurisprudence. 4That someth<strong>in</strong>g has normative implications does not imply strict formal b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g force whichwould require the court to choose between recognis<strong>in</strong>g a relevant prior judicial decision asb<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g it, or overrul<strong>in</strong>g it (or possibly break the law if the court is not entitledto overrule prior judicial decisions it does not want to follow). 5 This is how “legally b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g”is sometimes understood, <strong>and</strong> I am <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the wider effects precedent has. Another3 F Schauer, Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reason<strong>in</strong>g (HUP, Cambridge, Mass. <strong>and</strong>London 2009) at 37 reserves the term ‘stare decisis’ only for horizontal precedent (concern<strong>in</strong>g the same court)<strong>and</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guishes it from precedent. The term ‘vertical stare decisis’ is nevertheless also used, <strong>and</strong> I do not makethis dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>in</strong> this article. I use stare decisis <strong>and</strong> precedent synonymously.4 I italicise the term “jurisprudence” to make clear its dist<strong>in</strong>ctiveness from the common law underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g ofprecedent <strong>and</strong> also, to dist<strong>in</strong>guish it from the English use of the term. For different underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs of the word“jurisprudence,” which has its orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Lat<strong>in</strong> word iurisprudentia, see Christophe Grzegorczyk,‘Jurisprudence: phénomène judiciaire, science ou méthode?’, (1985) 30 APD 35.5 See Aleks<strong>and</strong>er Peczenik, ‘The B<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Force of <strong>Precedent</strong>’, <strong>in</strong> N MacCormick <strong>and</strong> RS Summers (eds),Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong>s. A Comparative Study (Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997) [here<strong>in</strong>after Interpret<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Precedent</strong>s] at 478, who notes that ‘formal b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gness may be regarded as a non-graded concept, like“pregnant”’ <strong>and</strong> then expla<strong>in</strong>s that it is too narrow a view.4
eason I use the term ‘normative implications’ <strong>in</strong>stead of the more common terms used <strong>in</strong>relation to precedent (for example ‘strictly b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g,’ contrasted with ‘persuasive’) 6 is the verypeculiar nature of precedential constra<strong>in</strong>t, which resists such b<strong>in</strong>ary classifications. It is one ofthis article’s aims to explore the nature of precedential constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> each of the systems. Thedifficulties of such an enterprise can be illustrated by the controversy surround<strong>in</strong>g the debateon the convergence between the civil <strong>and</strong> common law legal traditions as regards theirtreatment of precedent.B. Comparative puzzlesInterpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong>s, 7 the product of a group of lead<strong>in</strong>g legal theorists thoroughlyexam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a number of legal systems on the basis of a set of agreed questions, claims ‘thatprecedent counts for a great deal <strong>in</strong> civilian countries’ <strong>and</strong> even asserts that ‘[t]he tendency toconvergence between systems of two types is a salient fact of the later twentieth century,although there rema<strong>in</strong> real differences, some of great importance.’ 8 Adams, on the other h<strong>and</strong>,notes <strong>in</strong> his critical review of Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong> that ‘despite academic arguments to thecontrary, Belgian courts mostly cite precedents or case-law, if at all, <strong>in</strong> an opportunisticmanner – [i.e.], when they confirm the position taken by a court.’ 9 Therefore ‘to conclude thatthe civil <strong>and</strong> common law are significantly converg<strong>in</strong>g is [accord<strong>in</strong>g to Adams] surely anexaggeration.’ 10Another comparatist, Mauro Cappelletti, also takes a rather cautious approach: ‘[s]tare decisisis still an important difference, even though, admittedly, a dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g one.’ 11 Cappellettihighlights three ‘still important differences:’ a) the organization of higher courts (<strong>in</strong>todifferent hierarchies, which leads to ‘more diffuse authority of both the organs themselves <strong>and</strong>their decisions’), b) their lack of discretion to select cases that they want to hear (which, apartfrom a huge workload, has an impact on judges’ underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of their task <strong>in</strong> the legalsystem – which is not to create precedents but rather to control the application of the law bylower courts <strong>in</strong> thous<strong>and</strong>s of cases) <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally c) the k<strong>in</strong>d of people who sit on the bench <strong>in</strong>the highest courts. 12 He illustrates his thesis with the example of judicial review <strong>in</strong> the civillaw tradition, which is centralized <strong>in</strong> the h<strong>and</strong>s of one court, <strong>and</strong> argues that the absence ofprecedent was one of the reasons for its centralization. 13The question of the difference between the two traditions’ approach to precedent is far fromtheoretical: as I mentioned, the European Union br<strong>in</strong>gs the two traditions together <strong>and</strong> we canexpect each to treat the Court’s decisions somewhat differently. It can seem that Adams was6 See e.g. the classic, R Cross <strong>and</strong> JW Harris, <strong>Precedent</strong> <strong>in</strong> English Law (4 th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991)at 4.7 Supra note 5.8 Neil MacCormick <strong>and</strong> Robert S Summers, ‘Introduction’, <strong>in</strong> Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong>s (supra note 5) at 2. Seealso ibid., ‘Further General Reflections <strong>and</strong> Conclusions’, <strong>in</strong> Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong>s (supra note 5) at 546-547.9 See Maurice Adams, ‘The Rhetoric of <strong>Precedent</strong> <strong>and</strong> Comparative Legal Research’, (1999) 62 Mod. L. Rev.464, 465-466.10 Ibid. at 465. See also Maurice Adams, ‘<strong>Precedent</strong> versus Gravitational Force of Court Decisions <strong>in</strong> Belgium:Between Theory, Law <strong>and</strong> Facts’, <strong>in</strong> E Hondius (ed), <strong>Precedent</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Law at 151 (Bruylant, Brussels 2007)[here<strong>in</strong>after <strong>Precedent</strong>].11 ‘The Doctr<strong>in</strong>e of Stare Decisis <strong>and</strong> the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference - or no Difference at All?’, <strong>in</strong> HBernste<strong>in</strong>, U Drobnig <strong>and</strong> H Kötz (eds), Festschrift für Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburstag (Mohr, Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen1981) at 392.12 Ibid. at 383-388.13 Ibid. 389-392. Cappelletti gives an example of Italy, where a diffuse (decentralized) model was adopted for ashort period (1948-1956) <strong>and</strong> did not work.5
justified <strong>in</strong> criticiz<strong>in</strong>g Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong>s as regards the “convergence thesis.” 14 But Ith<strong>in</strong>k much depends on what one sees to be important about precedent. In the follow<strong>in</strong>gsection I try to discuss at least some of the features of precedent which seem to be important<strong>in</strong> relation to the work<strong>in</strong>g of the EU judicial system. The US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofstare decisis <strong>in</strong> the context of constitutional adjudication <strong>and</strong> the concept of jurisprudence asemployed by the French Cour de cassation or, more precisely, the French civil lawscholarship will assist me <strong>in</strong> this <strong>in</strong>quiry.I want to emphasise at the outset that I am aware of the challenge of any such widecomparative exercise: there is no s<strong>in</strong>gle underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the concept of stare decisis orjurisprudence with<strong>in</strong> the legal systems which I am go<strong>in</strong>g to study. So <strong>in</strong> the course of my<strong>in</strong>quiry I make conscious choices, based on the purpose of this article: among the variousplausible underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> theories I focus on those which can say someth<strong>in</strong>g relevantabout the practice of the Court of Justice (while of course, I am try<strong>in</strong>g to do justice – or ratherto avoid do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>justice – to their alternatives). My attempt is to take what William Ewaldcalled the ‘jurisprudential approach to comparative law’ 15 - to dig deeper <strong>in</strong>to the m<strong>in</strong>ds oflawyers, <strong>and</strong> particularly legal th<strong>in</strong>kers, <strong>in</strong> the two selected legal systems to see how theyunderst<strong>and</strong> their practice <strong>and</strong> its place with<strong>in</strong> their legal systems. As will become apparentparticularly <strong>in</strong> relation to my analysis of the concept of the jurisprudence of the Cour decassation, much of its widespread underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g (especially <strong>in</strong> Anglophone writ<strong>in</strong>gs) is basedon a failure to approach it with the French conceptual framework <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d.What are the features of precedent which I propose to exam<strong>in</strong>e?C. Def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the questionsThe first question can be labelled the “hermeneutics of precedent.” It seeks to underst<strong>and</strong>what the normative basis for precedent’s effects beyond a particular case is. It is related to the(once popular) question whether the court “makes” or “creates” law or merely “f<strong>in</strong>ds” or“declares” it. An <strong>in</strong>tuitive - <strong>and</strong> too fast a - response to this question would be that of coursethe US judges (like all common law judges) create law, <strong>and</strong> their French counterpartsvigorously deny this. However, we will see that the response to this question is not sostraightforward <strong>and</strong> is l<strong>in</strong>ked to the (ever popular <strong>and</strong> I am afraid never to be answered)question of what law is. Happily, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with the comparative jurisprudential approach, Ido not exam<strong>in</strong>e this question <strong>in</strong> the abstract as a legal philosopher, which I am not. I wantonly to underst<strong>and</strong> how the participants <strong>in</strong> the two legal systems be<strong>in</strong>g exam<strong>in</strong>ed, the US <strong>and</strong>the French, tend to respond to it, <strong>in</strong> order to throw light on my <strong>in</strong>quiry.The second question asks who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed (<strong>in</strong> the widest sense of the word) by precedent. Iexam<strong>in</strong>e it on three different levels: vertical, which refers to the courts <strong>in</strong>ferior to the twoexam<strong>in</strong>ed courts; horizontal, that is the precedent court itself; <strong>and</strong>, f<strong>in</strong>ally, I look at therelationship between the two courts’ precedents <strong>and</strong> other branches of government.14 On the other h<strong>and</strong>, Peczenik’s contribution to the volume (supra note 5) makes an elaborate[d] effort todist<strong>in</strong>guish between various types of ‘b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gness,’ reflect<strong>in</strong>g the treatment of precedent <strong>in</strong> different legalsystems <strong>and</strong> Neil MacCormick <strong>and</strong> Robert S Summers, ‘Further General Reflections <strong>and</strong> Conclusions’, <strong>in</strong>Interpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Precedent</strong>s (supra note 5) 531, 536-542 carefully analyse ‘significant rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g differences.’15 See William Ewald, ‘The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to “Rats”’, (1998) 46Am. J. Comp. L. 701.6
F<strong>in</strong>ally, I ask about the nature of the effects which precedent produces. How does precedentconstra<strong>in</strong>? To make it more concrete: precedential reason<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> common law is dist<strong>in</strong>guishedfrom reason<strong>in</strong>g on the basis of legislation s<strong>in</strong>ce the constra<strong>in</strong>ed court (the one which is toapply the precedent rule) has comparatively greater freedom <strong>in</strong> moderat<strong>in</strong>g the rule on thebasis of the facts which underlie the precedent decision. I exam<strong>in</strong>e two more specific <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>terrelated problems: firstly, what role the factual context of the case – a “real life” situation– plays <strong>in</strong> reason<strong>in</strong>g from precedent, <strong>and</strong>, secondly, how is the case – as opposed to theabstract context <strong>in</strong> which the legislator makes law - relevant for the extraction of the normimplied <strong>in</strong> the precedent decision.Necessarily, these questions do not exhaust all problems of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> precedent<strong>in</strong> each of the systems. I do not explore here how judicial decisions are reported <strong>and</strong> whatconsequences publication practices have for the normative implications of precedent. I alsoleave unexam<strong>in</strong>ed the role of other actors, particularly academics, who <strong>in</strong> France – <strong>in</strong> the formof la doctr<strong>in</strong>e - play a more important role <strong>in</strong> the function<strong>in</strong>g of jurisprudence than theircounterparts <strong>in</strong> the US. However, the often emphasised differences between the common law<strong>and</strong> civil law traditions do not seem so sharp when we move from large scale studies of thetwo traditions to particular legal systems. As with the <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to precedent <strong>in</strong> the twotraditions the extent of the difference depends on what questions one has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. 16II. THE US SUPREME COURT: STARE DECISIS AND THECONSTITUTIONA. The <strong>Supreme</strong> Court only says what the Constitution is; it doesnot make itThere is a fundamental difference between common law adjudication <strong>and</strong> constitutionaladjudication. The view that it is ‘no longer especially controversial to <strong>in</strong>sist that common lawjudges make law’ 17 concerns just common law <strong>and</strong> not the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Constitution.In constitutional adjudication, all creative power of the Court is justified by its task of<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> apply<strong>in</strong>g the Constitution. At the dawn of US constitutionalism Chief JusticeMarshall expressed the view that ‘It is emphatically the prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>and</strong> duty of the judicialdepartment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must ofnecessity expound <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret that rule.’ 18 Many (surely not all) theories of constitutional16 Philippe Jestaz <strong>and</strong> Chrisophe Jam<strong>in</strong>, ‘The Entity of French Doctr<strong>in</strong>e: Some Thoughts on the Community ofFrench Legal Writers’, (1998) 18 Leg. Stud. 415, 427 for example contend that ‘the countries us<strong>in</strong>g common lawdo not feel the need for rational constructions <strong>and</strong> only show mistrust of the creators of systems like [theFrench]. Thus, their best jurists stopped writ<strong>in</strong>g treatises at least thirty years ago.’ The same authors present theUS academic scholarship as an ‘anti-model’ to the French doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> La doctr<strong>in</strong>e (Dalloz, Paris 2004) at 265-306. But one may ask, for example, whether the Restatements are not ‘rational constructions’ of common lawdoctr<strong>in</strong>es, or what one is to make of this statement by James Gordley: ‘Before the 19th century, the common lawwas not organized by doctr<strong>in</strong>es or even by areas of law such as contract <strong>and</strong> tort. It was organized accord<strong>in</strong>g toforms of action, each with its own rules. In the 19th <strong>and</strong> 20th centuries, treatise writers rationalized <strong>and</strong>systematized these rules’ (‘The Common Law <strong>in</strong> the Twentieth Century: Some Unf<strong>in</strong>ished Bus<strong>in</strong>ess’, (2000) 88Cal. L. Rev. 1815, 1817), or wonder what Laurence Tribe was writ<strong>in</strong>g about only few years ago <strong>in</strong> his ‘TheTreatise Power’, (2005) 8 Green Bag 2d 291. I do not want to underm<strong>in</strong>e the differences which do exist;however, I th<strong>in</strong>k that such generalized statements are not very helpful if not directed to particular problemswhich one seeks to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> possibly compare <strong>in</strong> different legal systems – be it precedent or academicdoctr<strong>in</strong>e.17 Schauer (Cases), supra note 2 at 886.18 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 177 (1803).7
<strong>in</strong>terpretation are based on this premise: the Court does not make the Constitution, but merelygives mean<strong>in</strong>g to it, no matter how creative this process is. 19 Rubenfeld’s defence of theCourt’s ‘judicial revolutions,’ which he qualifies as ‘radical re<strong>in</strong>terpretations’ of theConstitution, illustrates this. 20The controversy concerns the question of what constitutes an <strong>in</strong>terpretation m<strong>and</strong>ated by theConstitution <strong>and</strong> how far this <strong>in</strong>terpretation is, or ought to be, limited by the text of theConstitution or other norms <strong>and</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>es. 21 It is clear that the Court’s <strong>in</strong>terpretationdeterm<strong>in</strong>es the real obligations which flow from the Constitution <strong>and</strong> that <strong>in</strong> some sense the<strong>Supreme</strong> Court “makes” constitutional law (sometimes the expression ‘constitutionalcommon law’ is used). But it rema<strong>in</strong>s an <strong>in</strong>terpretation, dist<strong>in</strong>ct from the Constitution itself. 22B. Who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed?With<strong>in</strong> the judicial branch, we must dist<strong>in</strong>guish between vertical precedent, concern<strong>in</strong>g courtson lower levels of the judicial hierarchy, <strong>and</strong> horizontal precedent, concern<strong>in</strong>g courts at thesame level of the judicial hierarchy.1. Vertical precedentThere are two separate judicial hierarchies below the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court: federal courts 23 <strong>and</strong>state courts. Both the federal courts <strong>and</strong> the state courts are subject to the appellatejurisdiction of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court. In practice, however, this control is very limited, if onlybecause of the limited number of cases the Court hears. 24 At present the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court grantsreview <strong>in</strong> little more than 1% of all petitions; of these granted petitions, even fewer comefrom state courts. 25 Thus the federal <strong>and</strong> state courts, particularly the latter, reta<strong>in</strong> a highdegree of autonomy, similar to that of the courts of EU Member States, which escape direct19 It is possible to f<strong>in</strong>d a few authors who do not deny that the Court has full-blown constitution-mak<strong>in</strong>g poweroutside (or alongside) the written constitution. See e.g. RH Fallon, Implement<strong>in</strong>g the Constitution (HUP,Cambridge, Mass. <strong>and</strong> London 2001) at 111-126. But Fallon also defends this by say<strong>in</strong>g (at 111-112): ‘I know ofno case <strong>in</strong> which the unwritten constitution calls for results that cannot at least be reconciled with the language ofthe written Constitution, even if reconciliation sometimes depends on tenuous or even specialized<strong>in</strong>terpretations.’20 See J Rubenfeld, Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American Constitutional Law (HUP, Cambridge,Mass. <strong>and</strong> London 2005).21 It is difficult to provide a “neutral” reference to some general treatment of constitutional <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> theUS, s<strong>in</strong>ce it is perhaps the most contested topic <strong>in</strong> constitutional scholarship. But see Robert Post, ‘Theories ofConstitutional Interpretation’, (1990) 30 Representations 13.22 As I said before, this is by no means an uncontested position. But note how e.g. David A Strauss, ‘CommonLaw Constitutional Interpretation’, (1996) 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 878, <strong>in</strong>troduces his defence of a common lawapproach to constitutional <strong>in</strong>terpretation: ‘the terms of debate <strong>in</strong> American constitutional law cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be setby the view that pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of constitutional law must ultimately be traced to the text of the Constitution, <strong>and</strong> bythe allied view that when the text is unclear the orig<strong>in</strong>al underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs must control. An air of illegitimacysurrounds any alleged departure from the text or the orig<strong>in</strong>al underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs.’23 For the purposes of this article, I do not dist<strong>in</strong>guish between the so-called “Article III federal courts” (createdby the Congress directly on the basis of Article III, § 1 of the US Constitution), <strong>and</strong> “Article I (or alsolegislative) tribunals” (which have their basis <strong>in</strong> legislation adopted by the Congress <strong>in</strong> accordance with Article I<strong>and</strong> not the Constitution itself). See James E Pf<strong>and</strong>er, ‘Article I Tribunals, Article III <strong>Courts</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Judicial</strong>Power of the United States’, (2004) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643.24 Barry Friedman, ‘Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocat<strong>in</strong>g Cases Between Federal <strong>and</strong> State <strong>Courts</strong>’,(2004) 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211, 1216-21 with further references particularly <strong>in</strong> fn. 22.25 For the years 1998 to 2002 it was approximately 17% of cases. See James E Pf<strong>and</strong>er, ‘Köbler v Austria:Expositional Supremacy <strong>and</strong> Member State Liability’, (2006) 27 Eur. Bus<strong>in</strong>ess L. Rev. 275, 297.8
control by the Court of Justice. 26 Despite the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s limited control, ‘the doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofhierarchical precedent appears deeply <strong>in</strong>gra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> judicial discourse - so much so that itconstitutes a virtually undiscussed axiom of adjudication.’ 27The role direct appellate review plays <strong>in</strong> the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of precedent is well illustrated by theattitude of state courts to decisions of lower federal courts. S<strong>in</strong>ce there is no direct control byfederal courts 28 <strong>and</strong> appeal is possible only from state supreme courts to the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court,many state courts ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that they are not bound by prior decisions of lower federalcourts. 29 Therefore only the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court is considered to have unquestionable authority byvirtue of its be<strong>in</strong>g the ultimate authority as regards federal law <strong>and</strong> the Constitution. 302. Horizontal precedentHorizontal precedent at the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court 31 became particularly controversial when theCourt refused to overrule Roe v. Wade 32 rely<strong>in</strong>g on the special status of precedent <strong>in</strong> the USConstitution. 33 The <strong>Supreme</strong> Court expressly considered the criteria for overrul<strong>in</strong>g, which are‘customarily <strong>in</strong>formed by a series of prudential <strong>and</strong> pragmatic considerations designed to testthe consistency of overrul<strong>in</strong>g a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, <strong>and</strong> to gaugethe respective costs of reaffirm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> overrul<strong>in</strong>g a prior case.’ 34 The criteria were:whether the rule has proven to be <strong>in</strong>tolerable simply <strong>in</strong> defy<strong>in</strong>g practical workability;whether the rule is subject to a k<strong>in</strong>d of reliance that would lend a special hardship tothe consequences of overrul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> add <strong>in</strong>equity to the cost of repudiation; whetherrelated pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no morethan a remnant of ab<strong>and</strong>oned doctr<strong>in</strong>e; or whether facts have so changed, or come tobe seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application orjustification. 35Casey provoked a lively debate. Most reactions focused on the question whether horizontalstare decisis was required by the US Constitution. 36 More radical critiques of Casey26 I stress direct control, s<strong>in</strong>ce there are possibilities of enforc<strong>in</strong>g Member States’ courts’ compliance (throughMember States’ liability <strong>and</strong> also <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gement actions), although they are very limited. See the discussionaccompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fra note 195.27 Evan H Cam<strong>in</strong>ker, ‘Why Must Inferior <strong>Courts</strong> Obey Superior Court <strong>Precedent</strong>s?’, (1994) 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817,820 (who shows at length that ‘while the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of hierarchical precedent is ultimately defensible, it is not asobviously defensible as the doctr<strong>in</strong>e’s strength would suggest’ – quotation from the abstract).28 I leave aside here an important issue of habeas corpus review, a special form of ‘a postconviction remedy forprisoners claim<strong>in</strong>g that error of federal law - almost always of federal constitutional law - <strong>in</strong>fected the judicialproceed<strong>in</strong>gs [before state courts] that resulted <strong>in</strong> their detention.’ See RH Fallon, Jr et al, Hart <strong>and</strong> Wechsler’sThe Federal <strong>Courts</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Federal System (5th ed, Foundation Press, New York 2003) at 1285.29 See e.g. William W Schwarzer, Nancy E Weiss <strong>and</strong> Alan Hirsch, ‘<strong>Judicial</strong> Federalism <strong>in</strong> Action: Coord<strong>in</strong>ationof Litigation <strong>in</strong> State <strong>and</strong> Federal <strong>Courts</strong>’, (1992) 78 Va .L. Rev. 1689, 1746-1747.30 See generally Cam<strong>in</strong>ker, supra note 27.31 I leave the question of mutual relationships between lower federal courts or state courts unexplored <strong>in</strong> thisarticle.32 410 U.S. 113 (1973), an iconic precedent grant<strong>in</strong>g the constitutional right to abortion.33 Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).34 Ibid., at 854-855, <strong>in</strong>ternal references omitted.35 Ibid.36 See particularly Michael S Paulsen, ‘Abrogat<strong>in</strong>g Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the<strong>Precedent</strong>ial Effect of Roe <strong>and</strong> Casey?’, (2000) 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (aga<strong>in</strong>st horizontal stare decisis as aconstitutional requirement) <strong>and</strong> Richard H Fallon, ‘Stare Decisis <strong>and</strong> the Constitution: An Essay onConstitutional Methodology’, (2001) 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570 (respond<strong>in</strong>g to Paulsen <strong>and</strong> argu<strong>in</strong>g the opposite).9
Context of the case dist<strong>in</strong>guishes reason<strong>in</strong>g from precedent from that based on rules enacted<strong>in</strong> an abstract context of the legislative procedure. 44 As Neil Duxbury puts it:S<strong>in</strong>ce the recorded case [i.e. the precedent case] is not a strict verbal formulation of apr<strong>in</strong>ciple, only exceptionally will judges conceive their task to be one of <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>gspecific words or phrases with<strong>in</strong> a case rather as they might focus on the preciseword<strong>in</strong>g of a statute. Instead, they will consider if the case is factually similar to ordifferent from the case to be decided. Case-law, we might say, unlike statute law,tends to be analogized rather than <strong>in</strong>terpreted. 45In the classical common law adjudication – which lies <strong>in</strong> the background of most theoreticalstudies of precedent – cases are analogized through their facts. It is on the basis of the facts ofthe precedent case that subsequent courts identify b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g elements of the precedent decision– its ratio (‘hold<strong>in</strong>gs’ <strong>in</strong> the American parlance), or dist<strong>in</strong>guish the precedent case from theone before them <strong>in</strong> order to expla<strong>in</strong> that they are not bound by the precedent rule. 46 Thischaracteristic of precedent led Raz to observe that ‘judge-made law’ (as he calls it) isrevisable, constantly open to the possibility of be<strong>in</strong>g dist<strong>in</strong>guished. 47 As we will see below,the constitutional <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court differs from this traditional (commonlaw) underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of precedent, particularly because facts play a less significant role. But thecase – def<strong>in</strong>ed otherwise than through its underly<strong>in</strong>g facts - rema<strong>in</strong>s important forprecedential reason<strong>in</strong>g.Two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal reasons are offered to expla<strong>in</strong> why the context of the case matters <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the extent to which a prior [previous] decision constra<strong>in</strong>s a later one. One stressesthe importance of a “real-life situation” for creat<strong>in</strong>g an optimal rule implicated <strong>in</strong> theprecedent decision; the other concerns limitations on the lawmak<strong>in</strong>g power of judges.2. The real-life context of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>gMany people believe that the case gives a judge a special <strong>in</strong>sight not available to thelegislator. ‘Treat<strong>in</strong>g the resolution of concrete disputes as the preferred context <strong>in</strong> which tomake law ... is the hallmark of the common law approach,’ says Schauer. 48 This view isprevalent <strong>in</strong> much of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s case law <strong>and</strong> is not limited to questions ofprecedent. The Court for example stated that ‘a concrete factual context [is] conducive to arealistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.’ 49 The emphasis on some “reallife”disputes, <strong>in</strong> contrast to the abstract context <strong>in</strong> which legislators take their decisions, isperhaps best illustrated by Justice Holmes’ famous statement that ‘The life of the law has not44 On the dist<strong>in</strong>ction between the two modes of lawmak<strong>in</strong>g see Jeffrey J Rachl<strong>in</strong>ski, ‘Bottom-Up versus Top-Down <strong>Lawmak<strong>in</strong>g</strong>’, (2006) 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933.45 N Duxbury, The Nature <strong>and</strong> Authority of <strong>Precedent</strong> (CUP, Cambridge 2008) at 59, emphasis added, referencesomitted.46 Among numerous accounts on precedential reason<strong>in</strong>g see Schauer (Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g), supra note 3 at 44-60 <strong>and</strong> 180-184 <strong>and</strong> Duxbury, supra note 45 at 58-110.47 J Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law <strong>and</strong> Morality (OUP, Oxford 1979) at 195.48 See Schauer (Cases), supra note 2 at 883 with further references.49 Valley Forge Christian Coll v. Americans United for Separation of Church <strong>and</strong> State, Inc 454 U.S. 464, 472(1982), quoted by Schauer (Cases), supra note 2 <strong>in</strong> fn. 48, where he gives further examples.11
een logic: it has been experience.’ 50 <strong>Lawmak<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> the context of decid<strong>in</strong>g concrete disputeskeeps the development of law <strong>in</strong> contact with reality. 51However, Schauer has recently questioned this fundamental premise of common lawadjudication by reference to another of Holmes’ dicta: ‘[g]reat cases like hard cases make badlaw’ 52 <strong>and</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ted to the many distortive effects of a concrete situation <strong>in</strong> front of a courtwhich faces it. 53 The answer to Schauer’s concerns can be the adaptability of the commonlaw, which can be greater than he himself admits, 54 <strong>and</strong> also the fact that judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>gis not exclusive, but operates <strong>in</strong> mutual communication with the legislator. 553. The constra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g function of the caseAnother reason why a case should be relevant for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g hold<strong>in</strong>gs is a desire to constra<strong>in</strong>judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g activity. If creat<strong>in</strong>g law is seen as only a corollary to the courts’ ma<strong>in</strong> taskof decid<strong>in</strong>g disputes, then law creation will occur only <strong>in</strong> this context. One can therefore <strong>in</strong>sistthat only what has been said <strong>in</strong> this context (decid<strong>in</strong>g the concrete dispute) matters. However,this view relies on an assumption that it is the primary role of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court to decidedisputes. Is the assumption correct?To a great extent, it is still Marbury v. Madison 56 which cont<strong>in</strong>ues to shape the vision of whatthe <strong>Supreme</strong> Court should be do<strong>in</strong>g, apart from the textual limitations of Article III of the USConstitution. 57 There are two conflict<strong>in</strong>g views: the ‘dispute resolution’ (or ‘private right’)model on the one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the ‘public rights model’ on the other. 58The first, dispute-resolution model reflects the traditional conception of adjudication as theresolution of disputes between two parties <strong>and</strong> the enforcement of their rights. It ischaracterized by Marshall <strong>in</strong> Marbury: ‘the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of the Court is, solely, to decide on therights of <strong>in</strong>dividuals.’ 59 Rule-mak<strong>in</strong>g is a mere co<strong>in</strong>cidence <strong>in</strong> the course of the resolution of adispute. 60This does not necessarily mean that the case <strong>in</strong> this model must be def<strong>in</strong>ed by factualcircumstances. Especially <strong>in</strong> constitutional adjudication, but also when <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g statutes,concrete facts do not matter. 61 The case can be def<strong>in</strong>ed by a legal issue presented to the Court50 OW Holmes, The Common Law (Little, Brown, Boston, Mass. 1881) at 1.51 This assumption lies at the heart of MA Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (HUP, Cambridge, Mass.<strong>and</strong> London 1988), conceptualized as ‘social propositions.’52 Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes dissent<strong>in</strong>g) quoted by Schauer(Cases), supra note 2 at 884.53 See Schauer (Cases), supra note 2 at 890-911 <strong>and</strong> also Schauer (Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g), supra note 3 at 110-112. SeeRachl<strong>in</strong>ski, supra note 44 for an evaluation of the relative merits of the two modes of lawmak<strong>in</strong>g (legislative <strong>and</strong>judicial).54 See Emily Sherw<strong>in</strong>, ‘Judges as Rulemakers’, (2006) 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919.55 Which is of course harder, but not impossible, to design <strong>in</strong> the context of constitutional adjudication. Seeparticularly Dev<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> Fisher, supra note 43 at 217-239.56 Supra note 18.57 The ‘case or controversy requirement.’58 See Fallon et al., supra note 28 at 67-73 with further references.59 Marbury v. Madison, supra note 18, at 170.60 See also a quotation from Marshall’s op<strong>in</strong>ion, supra note 18.61 See Shawn J Bayern, ‘Interpret<strong>in</strong>g Case’, (2009) 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 125, 169-170. There are <strong>in</strong>stances,however, when facts do matter <strong>in</strong> constitutional <strong>in</strong>terpretation, for example when the Court crafts a rule based onsome actual situation or empirical evidence submitted to it. But aga<strong>in</strong>, the particular case before the Court (<strong>and</strong>its facts) is not what matters. These facts represent a wider (factual) phenomenon, <strong>and</strong> that matters. See DL12
for its decision. 62 Consider the Court’s rule: ‘[o]nly the questions set forth <strong>in</strong> the petition [forcertiorari], or fairly <strong>in</strong>cluded there<strong>in</strong>, will be considered by the Court.’ 63 It is true that theCourt can be quite flexible <strong>in</strong> what it considers to be ‘fairly <strong>in</strong>cluded’ <strong>in</strong> the questions setforth <strong>in</strong> the petition, but, as Hartnett notes, ‘the lead<strong>in</strong>g treatise urges counsel not to phrasetheir questions presented <strong>in</strong> terms of error correction.’ 64 So, for example, <strong>in</strong> Roper v. Simmonsone of the questions presented for review was: ‘Is the imposition of the death penalty on aperson who commits a murder at age seventeen “cruel <strong>and</strong> unusual,” <strong>and</strong> thus barred by theEighth <strong>and</strong> Fourteenth Amendments?’ 65 Although the factual circumstances of the case arequite shock<strong>in</strong>g - Simmons was a m<strong>in</strong>or who, at the age of 17, together with one accomplice,broke <strong>in</strong>to the home of their victim (an older woman), tied her up, <strong>and</strong> threw her off a bridgeso that she drowned (all this hav<strong>in</strong>g been planned beforeh<strong>and</strong>), the question before the Courtwas fairly abstract <strong>and</strong> general <strong>and</strong> the Court addressed it <strong>in</strong> that manner. 66 But it might stillbe possible to dist<strong>in</strong>guish elements of the decision which are more relevant for the Court’sconclusion than others, albeit only imprecisely. 67In contrast, the second, public-rights model implies that what the court is do<strong>in</strong>g hassignificance beyond the particular dispute before it. The <strong>Supreme</strong> Court is not ‘a mere settlerof disputes, but rather ... an <strong>in</strong>stitution with a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive capacity to declare <strong>and</strong> explicatepublic values.’ 68 This role of the Court is re<strong>in</strong>forced by its power to select the cases it wants tohear. Clearly, the <strong>in</strong>terests of the parties or the need to resolve their particular dispute are onlysecondary to the Court’s ma<strong>in</strong> aim: to set a uniform rule which will be b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on other courts<strong>and</strong> possibly also on other actors. From that perspective, whatever the Court says matters.Especially <strong>in</strong> the hierarchical context, as Schauer observes, ‘the advocate <strong>in</strong> a lower courturg<strong>in</strong>g a result pla<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong>consistent with the language <strong>in</strong> the higher court op<strong>in</strong>ion has a steepuphill climb, <strong>and</strong> arguments that the obstruct<strong>in</strong>g language is mere dicta, or not part of the ratiodecidendi, are usually unavail<strong>in</strong>g.’ 69 But even if such model is adopted, it does not necessarilymean that the case becomes irrelevant for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the scope of the hold<strong>in</strong>g. What differsis the def<strong>in</strong>ition of the case—the case is not the dispute between the parties, but rather anabstract issue presented to the Court.The relevance of the case <strong>in</strong> which the precedent court adopted its decision establish<strong>in</strong>g thenorm ‘implicated’ <strong>in</strong> it gives subsequent courts a flexibility which legislative rules do notFaigman, Constitutional Fictions. A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts (OUP, New York 2008), particularlyat 63-86.62 See particularly Michael Dorf, ‘Dicta <strong>and</strong> Article III’, (1994) 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997 for such an approach.63 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 14.1(a), 28 U.S.C.A. See particularly Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535-538(1992) for rationales beh<strong>in</strong>d this rule.64 ‘Question<strong>in</strong>g Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after the Judges’ Bill’, (2000) 100 Colum. L.Rev. 1643.65 543 U.S. 551 (2005).66 Justice Kennedy writ<strong>in</strong>g for the Court started his analysis <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way: ‘The prohibition aga<strong>in</strong>st “cruel<strong>and</strong> unusual punishments,” like other expansive language <strong>in</strong> the Constitution, must be <strong>in</strong>terpreted accord<strong>in</strong>g to itstext, by consider<strong>in</strong>g history, tradition, <strong>and</strong> precedent, <strong>and</strong> with due regard for its purpose <strong>and</strong> function <strong>in</strong> theconstitutional design.’ (543 U.S. 551, 560).67 Schauer (Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g), supra note 3 at 181-182 (<strong>and</strong> also at 54-56) is somewhat sceptical about the ability toidentify reasons which were “necessary” for the court to adopt a particular outcome, but himself asserts that ‘thisidea should not be taken too far,’ provid<strong>in</strong>g examples of statement made by judges which can be clearlycharacterized as dicta.68 Fallon et al., supra note 28 at 68.69 Schauer (Cases), supra note 2 at 57-58.13
allow. 70 I mentioned that the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s supervision of lower courts is relativelylimited. 71 The Court cannot correct every mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation of law, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its ownprecedents. Scholars have noted that <strong>in</strong> order to know “what the law is” one must look atdecisions made by federal <strong>Courts</strong>of Appeal, s<strong>in</strong>ce they are authoritative pronouncements offederal law <strong>in</strong> the absence of a clear precedent of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court. 72 Not only do lowercourts effectively fill <strong>in</strong> the gaps left by the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s precedents, but they can alsosubstantively reformulate their orig<strong>in</strong>al scope <strong>and</strong> function as authentic expositions of federallaw. Sometimes they can effectively resist them, without rebell<strong>in</strong>g openly. It can be illustratedby the title of a recently published article: ‘what if the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court held a constitutionalrevolution <strong>and</strong> nobody [mean<strong>in</strong>g the lower <strong>and</strong> state courts] came?’ 734. Emancipat<strong>in</strong>g precedent from the conf<strong>in</strong>es of the caseHowever, the importance of the case seems to dim<strong>in</strong>ish <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> contexts. James Pf<strong>and</strong>er hasrecently observed that the US federal courts <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly tend to say what the law isregardless of the context of a dispute <strong>and</strong> calls this ‘the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of expositionalsupremacy.’ 74 For example, when federal courts decide on the liability of state officials, theymust identify the applicable constitutional st<strong>and</strong>ard of officials’ conduct before they addressthe question of official immunity, which would prevent any suit from succeed<strong>in</strong>g regardlessof the applicable constitutional st<strong>and</strong>ard of official behaviour. <strong>Courts</strong> are therefore required tolay down a constitutional st<strong>and</strong>ard (if the st<strong>and</strong>ard was not clear before) <strong>and</strong> only then todecide whether it is relevant for decid<strong>in</strong>g the case at h<strong>and</strong>. The Court justifies such approach<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way: ‘Decid<strong>in</strong>g the constitutional question before address<strong>in</strong>g the qualifiedimmunity question also promotes clarity <strong>in</strong> the legal st<strong>and</strong>ards for official conduct, to thebenefit of both the officers <strong>and</strong> the general public.’ 75A different phenomenon which has the same effect - giv<strong>in</strong>g the Court more control over thesubsequent application of its precedent - concerns the dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g importance of thehold<strong>in</strong>g/dicta dist<strong>in</strong>ction. Now I do not mean its flexibility (or malleability), which weakensthe control exercised by the precedent court over subsequent decision makers. I mean theassumption that whatever the precedent court says matters. Some federal courts of appealrequire lower courts to follow not only hold<strong>in</strong>gs, but also the dicta of their precedents - a trendwhich has recently provoked thorough criticism by a circuit court of appeal judge. 76 As Inoted above, this approach is based on the public rights model.F<strong>in</strong>ally, the way <strong>in</strong> which the Court drafts its decisions also underm<strong>in</strong>es the case-boundconception of precedent. As Frederick Schauer observed <strong>in</strong> 1995, ‘[i]t is a rout<strong>in</strong>e chargeaga<strong>in</strong>st contemporary judicial op<strong>in</strong>ions that they read more like statutes than like op<strong>in</strong>ions of a70 It is not suggest that legislated rules are more determ<strong>in</strong>ate or that they allow less flexibility. But, contrary toprecedent, their <strong>in</strong>terpretation is not <strong>in</strong>extricably <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed with to a particular case.71 See the text accompany<strong>in</strong>g supra note 24.72 See Barry Friedman, ‘The Politics of <strong>Judicial</strong> Review’, (2005) 84 Texas L. Rev. 257, 302-308.73 Glenn H Reynolds <strong>and</strong> Brannon P Denn<strong>in</strong>g, ‘Lower Court Read<strong>in</strong>gs of Lopez, or What if the <strong>Supreme</strong> CourtHeld a Constitutional Revolution <strong>and</strong> Nobody Came?’, (2000) Wis. L. Rev. 369. For a discussion of state courts’freedom not to follow the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s precedent see Frederic M Bloom, ‘State <strong>Courts</strong> Unbound’, (2008) 93Cornell L. Rev. 501.74 See Pf<strong>and</strong>er, supra note 25 at 291-95. For a critique of unnecessarily wide judgments which deal withquestions unrelated to the disputes <strong>in</strong> which they are delivered see Thomas Healy, ‘The Rise of UnnecessaryConstitutional Rul<strong>in</strong>gs’, (2005) 83 N.C. L. Rev. 847. Healy even contends that such rul<strong>in</strong>gs can breach theconstitutional prohibition aga<strong>in</strong>st advisory op<strong>in</strong>ions (at 895-921).75 Wilson v Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).76 Pierre N Leval, ‘Judg<strong>in</strong>g Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta’, (2006) 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249.14
court.’ 77 Defend<strong>in</strong>g this approach, Schauer highlights the function of a judicial op<strong>in</strong>ion to‘guid[e] lower courts <strong>and</strong> legally advised actors’ 78 <strong>and</strong> submits that ‘it may be appropriate toth<strong>in</strong>k of op<strong>in</strong>ion writ<strong>in</strong>g as (at least <strong>in</strong> part) a conscious process of rule mak<strong>in</strong>g.’ 79 Schauercontends that ‘judicial rule mak<strong>in</strong>g is no less important than rule mak<strong>in</strong>g by other bodies, <strong>and</strong>no less likely to be constra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>formed by the k<strong>in</strong>ds of considerations we would employwith respect to any other rule-mak<strong>in</strong>g enterprise.’ 80But here we reach the difficult question of the democratic legitimacy of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g.Legal certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>and</strong> predictability provided by op<strong>in</strong>ions drafted <strong>in</strong> this way is not the onlyconsideration that matters. Michael Dorf argues:Schauer is surely correct that, other th<strong>in</strong>gs be<strong>in</strong>g equal, whenever notice is animportant value, statute-like judicial op<strong>in</strong>ions will be preferable to vaguer, morepr<strong>in</strong>ciple-like judicial op<strong>in</strong>ions. But other th<strong>in</strong>gs are rarely equal. There are legitimacycosts that arise out of a court’s attempt to emulate a legislature, because legislatures<strong>and</strong> courts derive their legitimacy from different sources. 81Dorf’s concern is precisely what I discussed above: the possibility of later courts to modifythe rule implicated <strong>in</strong> the precedent decision. Dorf expla<strong>in</strong>s that ‘more statute-like op<strong>in</strong>ionentails more particular commitments’ 82 <strong>and</strong> contends that Schauer does not ‘expla<strong>in</strong> why wewould want our courts to commit themselves <strong>in</strong> the future to the concrete applications thepresent judges happen to favor <strong>in</strong> cases not currently before them.’ 83In sum, precedent unbound from the particular case <strong>in</strong> which the judicial decision form<strong>in</strong>g itsbasis was made gives more control to the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court – the court which pronounces ruleswhich are relatively <strong>in</strong>dependent of the cases before it. The traditional common law conceptof precedent is significantly redrawn.III. THE COUR DE CASSATION: JURISPRUDENCE AND THECIVIL CODEA. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as a creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the CivilCode1. Do French judges make law?Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Lasser, ‘[t]he most basic foundational idea of the French legal <strong>and</strong> politicalorder has traditionally been that the legislature, <strong>and</strong> the legislature alone, is supposed to havelaw-mak<strong>in</strong>g power.’ 84 This idea goes back to the French revolution, which learned from theAncien Régime’s Parlements’ usurpation of power, <strong>and</strong> is duly reflected <strong>in</strong> all st<strong>and</strong>ard77 Frederick Schauer, ‘Op<strong>in</strong>ions as Rules’, (1995) 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1455, 1455.78 Ibid. at 1469.79 Ibid. at 1470.80 Ibid. at 1470-1471.81 Michael C Dorf, ‘<strong>Courts</strong>, Reasons, <strong>and</strong> Rules’, (2000) 19 Qu<strong>in</strong>nipiac L. Rev. 483, 490.82 Ibid. at 495.83 Ibid. at 499.84 M De S-O-L’E Lasser, <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of <strong>Judicial</strong> Transparency <strong>and</strong>Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) [here<strong>in</strong>after <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations] at 168-169.15
comparative accounts. 85 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Lasser, the republican ideology <strong>in</strong>sists that ‘[j]udges <strong>in</strong>some important sense cannot usurp [the] legislative law mak<strong>in</strong>g power because law is def<strong>in</strong>edcategorically as legislative <strong>in</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>.’ 86 This does not mean that the French are ‘bl<strong>in</strong>d to thefact that judges play a significant role <strong>in</strong> the elaboration, development, <strong>and</strong> modification ofnormative rules.’ 87 This awareness is ‘hardly recent’ <strong>and</strong> Lasser recalls Portalis, the primaryauthor of the French Civil Code, who highlighted the <strong>in</strong>ability ‘to predict <strong>and</strong> settleeveryth<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>and</strong> referred to ‘the judge <strong>and</strong> the jurisconsults, penetrated by the general spirit ofthe [codified] laws, to direct their application.’ 88 Still, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Lasser the Frenchconception of law is ‘above all a legal rule (or a set of legal rules) that has been formallyadopted by the legislature <strong>in</strong> the form of “loi” (legislation).’ 89Lasser considers the American approach to comparative law parochial, argu<strong>in</strong>g that it is basedon the ‘American realist def<strong>in</strong>ition of law, [which] when applied uncritically to a civilian -<strong>and</strong> especially to the French - legal system, leaves little or no possibility of encounter<strong>in</strong>g thatsystem.’ 90 In a series of works culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations, 91 Lasser stresses that theFrench legal system employs a concept of law <strong>and</strong> legality which is fundamentally differentfrom the American realist account of law. While his account is <strong>in</strong>sightful, I th<strong>in</strong>k thepresentation of the French doctr<strong>in</strong>e of sources of law is <strong>in</strong>correct. 92Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan write that ‘the majority of authors recognize jurisprudence as a sourceof law.’ 93 Whilst this statement may be an exaggeration (s<strong>in</strong>ce considerable debate aboutjurisprudence rema<strong>in</strong>s) 94 it is certa<strong>in</strong>ly not taboo to ‘accord [jurisprudence] the exaltedstatues of a true “source of law,”’ as Lasser suggests. Jestaz, another renowned Frenchcivilist, <strong>in</strong>troduces his book on the sources of law <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way: ‘For centuries, thedesignation ‘sources of law’ serves to mark la loi, la jurisprudence, la coutume, etc.’ 95 Thisspeaks for itself.Much depends on how we def<strong>in</strong>e “the law.” 96 The real debate <strong>in</strong> France turns on this, togetherwith the place of jurisprudence <strong>and</strong> the judiciary <strong>in</strong> general with<strong>in</strong> the French legal system.The debate considers the legitimacy of judicially created norms <strong>and</strong> their normative effects85 See e.g. John H Merryman, ‘The French Deviation’, (1996) 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 109 at 109-110 <strong>and</strong> JPDawson, The Oracles of the Law (The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor 1968) at 373.86 <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations (supra note 84) at 169.87 Ibid.88 Ibid. at 171, quot<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong> Lasser’s translation) Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Discours prélim<strong>in</strong>aire du premierprojet de Code civil (1801). The complete Discours(ed), Le discours et le code: Portalis deux sièclesaprès le Code Napoléon (LexisNexis Litec, Paris 2004) [here<strong>in</strong>after Le Discours].89 <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations (supra note 84) at 169.90 ‘Comparative Read<strong>in</strong>gs of Roscoe Pound’s Jurisprudence’, (2002) 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 719.91 Apart from Lasser, supra note 90 see also ‘<strong>Judicial</strong> (Self-) Portraits: <strong>Judicial</strong> Discourse <strong>in</strong> the French LegalSystem’, (1995) 104 Yale L.J. 1325 <strong>and</strong> ‘Do Judges Deploy Policy?’, (2001) 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 863.92 For a more thorough evaluation of <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations see my review article, ‘Question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Judicial</strong>Deliberations’, (2009) 29 Ox. J. Leg. Stud. 805.93 P Malaurie <strong>and</strong> P Morvan, Droit civil: <strong>in</strong>troduction générale (2 nd ed, Defrénois, Paris 2005) at 265, withfurther references. See also J Ghest<strong>in</strong>, G Goubeaux <strong>and</strong> M Fabre-Magnan, Traité de droit civil. Introductiongénérale / sous la direction de Jacques Ghest<strong>in</strong> (4 th ed, LGDJ, Paris 1994) at 192-204, P Jestaz, Les sources dudroit (Dalloz, Paris 2005).94 See J Carbonnier, Droit civil. Introduction 263-282 (21 st ed, PUF, Paris 1992) (1 st ed <strong>in</strong> 1955).95 Jestaz, supra note 93 at 1.96 See Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 264-266 (these authors note that the debate is often a ‘dialogue ofthe deaf,’ s<strong>in</strong>ce each participant has a different conception of law <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d), Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 451,Jestaz, supra note 93 at 1-8.16
eyond particular cases; <strong>in</strong> this respect the French debate is not so very different from thedebates tak<strong>in</strong>g place <strong>in</strong> other legal systems. It is true that ‘[o]ne need hardly call judicialdecision-mak<strong>in</strong>g ‘law’ <strong>in</strong> order to stress that judges make normative choices <strong>and</strong> thus exercisehighly significant normative authority.’ 97 But that is exactly how it is termed <strong>in</strong> French - lacréation du droit par le juge. 98 This can safely be translated as ‘judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g.’2. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as a creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the CivilCode<strong>Judicial</strong> creative activity is based on different premises from those put forward by Lasser.These premises can be found <strong>in</strong> Portalis’s Discours prélim<strong>in</strong>aire:There is a science for the legislator, as there is one for the judges; <strong>and</strong> the one does notresemble the other. The science of the legislator consist <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> each matter, thepr<strong>in</strong>ciples most favourable to the common good; the science of the judge is to putthese pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>in</strong> action, to develop them, to extend them, by a wise <strong>and</strong> reasonedapplication, to private relations; to study the spirit of the law when the letter kills, <strong>and</strong>not to expose himself to the risk of be<strong>in</strong>g alternatively slave <strong>and</strong> rebel, or to disobeybecause of a servile spirit. 99<strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g (création du droit) is put forward as a creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Code;an <strong>in</strong>terpretation which may go well beyond the Code’s word<strong>in</strong>g, while reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its spirit.This creativity exceeds mere clarification; occasionally fill<strong>in</strong>g the gaps; or reconcil<strong>in</strong>gpossible ant<strong>in</strong>omies. <strong>Judicial</strong> creation extends to adapt<strong>in</strong>g law to meet societaldevelopments. 100At the same time, judicial creativity is presented as circumscribed by the Code or, moreprecisely, its spirit. Judges cannot ‘rebel’ aga<strong>in</strong>st the Code <strong>and</strong> become completely free. ThusTunc contends that experience contradicts the statement of Justice Holmes <strong>in</strong> Lochner that‘general propositions do not decide concrete cases,’ 101 ‘a phrase which [accord<strong>in</strong>g to Tunc]seems to be self-evident, but which is <strong>in</strong> no way justified by reality <strong>and</strong> which unfortunately<strong>in</strong>spires thous<strong>and</strong>s of common law lawyers to distrust of regards codification which lacks anygrounds.’ 102 While Tunc’s view seems to be a naïve endorsement of the Code’s power toconstra<strong>in</strong> the judges (but only at first sight), a similar foundational belief (or argumentsaga<strong>in</strong>st it) surrounds the debate about <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the US Constitution <strong>and</strong> freedom it97 Ibid.98 Which is a title of (2007) 50 APD.99 Le Discours (supra note 88) at xxix. The translation was taken from AT von Mehren, JR Gordley, The CivilLaw System: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (2 nd ed, Little, Brown, Boston, Mass.; Toronto1977) at 55. See on this part of Le Discours Bernard Teyssié, ‘Corpus juris’, <strong>in</strong> Le Discours (supra note 88).100 See e.g. André Tunc, ‘La méthode du droit civil: analyse des conceptions françaises’, (1975) RTD comp. 817,821, Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al, supra note 93 at 434-442 (both expressly referr<strong>in</strong>g to Portalis), Jean Foyer, ‘Loi etjurisprudence’, <strong>in</strong> Le Discours (supra note 88) at 28, Teyssié, supra note 99 at 50-52, F Zénati, La jurisprudence(Dalloz, Paris 2001) [here<strong>in</strong>after La jurisprudence] at 221-224 <strong>and</strong> particularly Pascale Deumier, ‘Création dudroit et rédaction des arrêts par la Cour de cassation’, (2007) 50 APD 49. It also true, however, that Portalisadded: ‘We leave to [jurisprudence] the rare <strong>and</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>ary cases that do not enter <strong>in</strong>to the plan of a rationallegislation, the very variable <strong>and</strong> very disputed details that should not occupy the legislator at all, <strong>and</strong> all theth<strong>in</strong>gs that it would be futile to try <strong>and</strong> foresee or that a premature foresight could not provide for withoutdanger’: Le Discours (supra note 88) at xxix (translation von Mehren <strong>and</strong> Gordley, supra note 99). Subsequentdevelopments showed that the cases not presupposed by the legislator were far from “rare <strong>and</strong> extraord<strong>in</strong>ary.”101 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent<strong>in</strong>g).102 Tunc, supra note 100 at 822.17
gives to [the] judges. 103 Holmes’ position is a neat slogan, but by no means universallyaccepted <strong>in</strong> the US context. 104The force with which the (spirit of the) Code constra<strong>in</strong>s judges is relative. This is more soonce general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of law are accepted, s<strong>in</strong>ce these pr<strong>in</strong>ciples enable judicial creativity to‘acquire[] a very particular autonomy.’ 105 The Cour de Cassation does not pretend to groundthe general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>in</strong> a specific provision of the Code but relies on them as the sole basisfor its decisions. 106 However, the central idea rema<strong>in</strong>s: it is on the basis of the (spirit of the)Code that the judges formulate the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples.The prohibition on deny<strong>in</strong>g justice on grounds of silence, obscurity or <strong>in</strong>sufficiency of thelegislation, 107 at the time of the Code’s <strong>in</strong>ception the expression of its creators’ belief <strong>in</strong> itscompleteness, 108 has become a source of the normative power of courts <strong>and</strong> is now read as aduty to say what the law is. 1093. The Cour de cassation as the secular arm of legislated lawThe notion of a judge who would be ‘no more than the mouth that pronounces the words ofthe law’ 110 was, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Zénati, ab<strong>and</strong>oned much earlier than is generally believed;référé legislatif, a symbol of distrust of the judiciary, was dysfunctional long before it wasformally abolished <strong>in</strong> 1828. 111 As Zénati argues, it is a mistake to consider the Cour decassation as a judicial body. Instead it is a body outside the judiciary, the mission of which is103 Perhaps the best US counterpart (I stress, far from uncontroversial) would be Ronald Dwork<strong>in</strong>, or, improbableas it may [it] seem, Roscoe Pound. See R Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence. A Critical Introduction toLegal Philosophy (2 nd ed, OUP, Oxford 2003, who at 162 compares Dwork<strong>in</strong> to Pound, <strong>in</strong> that the former ‘seesthe judge as deriv<strong>in</strong>g both the authority to develop law <strong>and</strong> the resources to do so from with<strong>in</strong> law itself.’104 See the text accompany<strong>in</strong>g supra note 21.105 Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 470. Jestaz, supra note 93 at 23-26 lists the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples among ‘the sourcescom<strong>in</strong>g from the top,’ where he puts revelation, enacted law (la loi), <strong>and</strong> judgments (he uses this term to denote amore general category than jurisprudence), but autonomous from the Code.106 See Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 459-465, Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 276-277, <strong>and</strong> ChristianAtias, ‘L’ambiguïté des arrêts dits de pr<strong>in</strong>cipe en droit privé’, (1984) JCP G, I, 3145.107 Article 4 of the Civil Code: ‘A judge who refuses to give judgment on the pretext of legislation be<strong>in</strong>g silent,obscure or <strong>in</strong>sufficient, may be prosecuted for be<strong>in</strong>g guilty of a denial of justice’ (translation from Legifrance, anofficial website of the French Government, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr - all other translations of the Frenchlegislation are from this source).108 See supra note 100.109 Obligation ‘de dire le droit.’ See Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 278 <strong>and</strong> also Philippe Malaurie, ‘Lesprécédents et le droit: rapport français’, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Precedent</strong> (supra note 10) at 143.110 Baron Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, AM Cohler, BC Miller <strong>and</strong> HS Stone (eds <strong>and</strong> trans), The Spirit ofthe Laws (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989) (1748) at 163. As KM Schönfeld, ‘Rex, Lex et Judex:Montesquieu <strong>and</strong> la bouche de la loi revisited’, (2008) 4 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 274 shows, however, this phrasewas taken out of the context of The Spirit of the Laws <strong>and</strong> Montesquieu did not mean it <strong>in</strong> the sense generallyascribed to it today.111 Référé legislatif was a procedure <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> 1790, which imposed a duty on the (then) Tribunal decassation to refer a question of <strong>in</strong>terpretation of law to the legislator if the Tribunal was disagreed with threeconsecutive times by the lower court <strong>in</strong> the same case (see Dawson, supra note 85 at 378-379). A provisionmak<strong>in</strong>g the decision of the Cour de cassation on a second appeal <strong>in</strong> cassation b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on the lower court was<strong>in</strong>troduced only <strong>in</strong> 1837. This, together with abolition of the référé legislatif (<strong>in</strong> 1828), was of paramountimportance for establish<strong>in</strong>g the Cour de cassation’s authority. On the significance of these two changes seeFréderic Zénati, ‘La nature de la Cour de cassation’, BICC No 575, 15/04/2003, available athttp://www.courdecassation.fr/ . (The pr<strong>in</strong>ted version was not available to me, so I could not provide moreprecise references), La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 71, Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 416-418). Accord<strong>in</strong>gto (current) Article L.431-6 of the Code on the organisation of the judiciary the second cassation, based on thesame legal grounds (moyens) must be heard by the Full Court (l’assemblée plénière).18
not, <strong>in</strong> Robespierre’s words, ‘to judge the citizens, but to protect enacted laws.’ In otherwords, the Tribunal (later turned <strong>in</strong>to the Cour) was created to protect the sovereign will ofthe people, embodied <strong>in</strong> the law, aga<strong>in</strong>st encroachment upon it by the ord<strong>in</strong>ary courts.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Zénati, the Cour de cassation has two pr<strong>in</strong>cipal tasks: to protect the unity of thelegislation <strong>and</strong> to serve as a guardian of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the separation of powers. The lattertask can seem contradictory to its nature – how can a court be a protector aga<strong>in</strong>st othercourts?) However, this is contradictory only if we th<strong>in</strong>k of the Cour as a judicial body <strong>and</strong> notas a quasi-legislator. We will see further what consequences such an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of theCour has for its jurisprudence.B. Who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed?1. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between “lawmak<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>and</strong> the question ofwho is constra<strong>in</strong>edDoes it follow that if the Cour de Cassation makes law then the product of this “mak<strong>in</strong>g” (i.e.judicial decision) is automatically b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on others? No. We must dist<strong>in</strong>guish betweenmak<strong>in</strong>g law <strong>in</strong> a particular case, which refers to a situation <strong>in</strong> which the judge’s decision is notconstra<strong>in</strong>ed by the exist<strong>in</strong>g sources (however def<strong>in</strong>ed), <strong>and</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g the judge’s creationb<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on others. Much of the discussion about the lawmak<strong>in</strong>g power of civilian judgesfocuses on the first question <strong>and</strong> somewhat confuses this with the second question. Forexample Dawson calls a ‘subsidiary issue’ the question of ‘the extent to which courts shouldbe bound by high court decisions,’ 112 when consider<strong>in</strong>g the German courts’, particularly theReichsgericht’s, practice of disregard<strong>in</strong>g statutory provisions on the basis of general clausesconta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the German Civil Code, particularly that on good faith. 113 Dawson notes that thedebate on whether Germany should have a system of follow<strong>in</strong>g previous decisions ‘ha[d] aweird, other worldly quality, [s<strong>in</strong>ce accord<strong>in</strong>g to him] Germany already had a precedentsystem work<strong>in</strong>g order.’ 114 That remark is, I suspect, based on the failure to dist<strong>in</strong>guish the twoissues.In France the dist<strong>in</strong>ction between judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> the normative force of law made <strong>in</strong>this way is much clearer due to the express prohibition on arrêts de règlement conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>Article 5 of the Civil Code. 115 Arrêts de règlement, decisions made by the pre-revolutionarycourts (Parlements) <strong>in</strong> particular disputes, but announc<strong>in</strong>g an abstract <strong>and</strong> general rule whichwas b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on all courts with<strong>in</strong> the jurisdiction of the Parlement which issued them, were thesymbols of the excessive judicial power of courts, <strong>and</strong> thus expressly prohibited. 116 Thereforeto admit that judges make law <strong>in</strong> the first sense (i.e. for a particular case before them) does notexpla<strong>in</strong> the extent to which other courts or participants <strong>in</strong> the legal system are bound by suchrules. And Article 5 prevents any open recognition of the general b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g force of priordecisions. This is further re<strong>in</strong>forced by Article 1351 of the Code, which establishes only the112 Dawson, supra note 85 at 487.113 See ibid. at 461-479.114 Ibid. at 484.115 ‘Judges are forbidden to decide cases submitted to them by way of general <strong>and</strong> regulatory provisions.’ Onarrêts de règlement <strong>in</strong> general see Dawson, supra note 85 at 305-314.116 In the revolutionary period it was truly believed that judges should exercise no normative power, if only by<strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g laws enacted by the legislator; thus Robespierre’s famous desire to erase the word jurisprudencefrom the French language. See La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 45-55.19
elative force of res judicata, limit<strong>in</strong>g it to the particular case decided by the court. 117 Thesetwo provisions (together with Article 4) 118 form the framework with<strong>in</strong> which the Frenchdebate on the normative effects of jurisprudence takes place <strong>and</strong> which shapes manyarguments which can seem formalistic <strong>and</strong> bl<strong>in</strong>d to crude reality. In fact, they are elaboratedresponses to the express limitations embodied <strong>in</strong> the Code by the Enlightenment legalth<strong>in</strong>kers.2. The vertical level: below the Cour de cassationCassation, whereby the Cour de cassation quashes a lower court’s decision <strong>and</strong> sends it backto another court for the f<strong>in</strong>al decision (while the Cour’s review is limited to po<strong>in</strong>ts of law - lesmoyens), 119 <strong>and</strong> the Cour’s wide supervisory power over the lower courts are the crucialelements giv<strong>in</strong>g the Cour’s jurisprudence its force.Cassation is conceived as a sanction imposed on lower judges (juges du fond) for disobey<strong>in</strong>gthe legislator. 120 The Cour de cassation is a ‘secular arm of the legislated law’ (le brasséculier de la loi). It therefore does not need to justify its <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the law; to do sowould only weaken it – ‘imperatoria brevitas of the supreme judgments borrows the concise<strong>and</strong> closed style of enacted laws.’ 121 Such a conceptualisation of the Cour <strong>in</strong> fact correspondsto Aust<strong>in</strong>’s conception of a judge as the sovereign’s delegate:The portion of the sovereign power which lies at [the judge’s] disposition is merelydelegated. The rules which he makes derive their legal force from authority given bythe state: an authority which the state may confer expressly, but which it commonlyimparts <strong>in</strong> the way of acquiescence.’ 122For Zénati, the delegation of power to the Cour is crucial for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the legal effects ofits jurisprudence. Jurisprudence borrows the legal effects from the <strong>in</strong>terpreted rules, but at thesame time is seen as a separate source of law, supported by a sanction – cassation. In thisrespect Zénati dist<strong>in</strong>guishes his conceptualisation from the ‘<strong>in</strong>corporation theory,’ whichsuggested that the Cour’s <strong>in</strong>terpretations of a legislative norm are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to it <strong>and</strong>must have the same effects. On this basis Zénati dist<strong>in</strong>guishes the jurisprudence of the Courfrom that of lower courts. Because of the sanction <strong>in</strong> the form of cassation only the former is atrue source of law. 123The authority of the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence is imposed through its widesupervisory power. This power was supported by the ideology of ‘<strong>in</strong>termediate law,’ which‘recognised all citizens’ power to impose on a judge [understood as a lower judge, “juge du117 ‘The force of res judicata takes place only with respect to what was the subject matter of a judgment. It isnecessary that the th<strong>in</strong>g claimed be the same; that the claim be based on the same grounds; that the claim bebetween the same parties <strong>and</strong> brought by them <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st them <strong>in</strong> the same capacity.’118 See supra note 107.119 On cassation see Sofie MF Geeroms, ‘Comparative Law <strong>and</strong> Legal Translation: Why the Terms Cassation,Revision <strong>and</strong> Appeal Should Not Be Translated...’, (2002) 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 201, 204-208, who also discusseschanges <strong>in</strong> the scope of the Cour’s review <strong>and</strong> its ability f<strong>in</strong>ally to dispose of the case itself.120 As Zénati <strong>in</strong> La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 43 says, cassation was <strong>in</strong>troduced to the French procedureby the K<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the 18 th century for the same purpose: to control judicial obedience to the royal authority.121 Zénati, supra note 111.122 S Aust<strong>in</strong> (ed), The Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Jurisprudence Determ<strong>in</strong>ed (2 nd ed, John Murray London 1861) at 25.123 See La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 129-130 <strong>and</strong> 221. Dawson, supra note 85 at 416-431 summarizes anearlier French debate on the status of jurisprudence among the sources of law, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>corporationtheory.20
fond”] respect for the law.’ 124 An attentive reader will perhaps note how similar this sounds tothe Court of Justice’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of direct effect <strong>and</strong> its use for the purposes of privateenforcement of EC law by ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizens. 125 The Cour has always dealt with a muchgreater number of cases than courts <strong>in</strong> countries where the supreme courts’ authority hasrested on different grounds. 126 At the same time, as regards the lower courts its power toimpose its <strong>in</strong>terpretation is absolute, s<strong>in</strong>ce after the second cassation the lower court is boundby the Cour de cassation’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the law. 127 Zénati contends that the only freedomwhich the lower courts have is to do mischief <strong>and</strong> be exposed to sanction <strong>in</strong> the form ofcassation. 128 We will see below, when I discuss the nature of jurisprudence’s force, that this isnot completely true <strong>and</strong> that it is important that lower courts do sometimes disobey.3. The horizontal level: the Cour de cassation <strong>and</strong> the problemof revirementsThe concept of lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation f<strong>in</strong>ds its limits when the Cour wants tochange the exist<strong>in</strong>g jurisprudence. Overturn<strong>in</strong>g (revirement de la jurisprudence) conflictswith the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of legal certa<strong>in</strong>ty, the French doctr<strong>in</strong>e therefore debated the possibility oflimit<strong>in</strong>g the effects of overturn<strong>in</strong>g only for the future. After a group of academics <strong>and</strong>practitioners submitted a report to the First President of the Cour, 129 the Cour actuallydeclared that it had such competence. 130 Morvan considers this to mark the cross<strong>in</strong>g of theRubicon, 131 s<strong>in</strong>ce it is taken as proof of the lawmak<strong>in</strong>g power of the Cour 132 – now openlyadmitted by the Cour itself. 133 One is then faced with the prohibition of arrêts de règlementimposed on the French civil courts by Article 5 of the Civil Code. But here rema<strong>in</strong>s anotherimportant element of the normative effects of jurisprudence: its relationship with thelegislator.4. Jurisprudence <strong>and</strong> the legislatorPortalis predicted the creative role of judges <strong>and</strong> their jurisprudence. 134 He writes:124 Ibid. See also La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 49-55.125 See e.g. CWA Timmermans, ‘<strong>Judicial</strong> Protection Aga<strong>in</strong>st the Member States: Articles 169 <strong>and</strong> 177Revisited’, <strong>in</strong> D Curt<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> T Heukels (eds), 2 Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays <strong>in</strong>Honour of Henry G. Schermers (Mart<strong>in</strong>us Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht; Boston 1994).126 This applies not only to supreme courts <strong>in</strong> common law jurisdictions but also to supreme courts based on theGerman model. For a comparison of different review models see Geeroms, supra note 119 (provid<strong>in</strong>g a richhistorical account of different models of review, <strong>and</strong> not<strong>in</strong>g at 215 that the German revision model ‘as a reactionaga<strong>in</strong>st the cassation ideal, ... explicitly <strong>in</strong>tended not to supervise the lower court. Instead, its primary purposewas, <strong>and</strong> still is, the assurance of uniformity <strong>in</strong> case law <strong>and</strong> the harmonious development of exist<strong>in</strong>g lawwithout disregard<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terests of the parties.’).127 See supra note 111.128 La jurisprudence, supra note 100 at 182, quot<strong>in</strong>g Jacques Maury, ‘Observations sur la jurisprudence en tantque source du droit’, <strong>in</strong> 1 Études offertes au Georges Ripert (LGDJ, Paris 1950) at 49.129 N Molfessis (ed), Les revirements de jurisprudence: rapport remis à monsieur le premier président GuyCanivet, mardi 30 novembre 2004 (Litec, Paris 2005).130 Cour de Cassation, Deuxième chambre civile, 8 July 2004 [Case No 01-10.426], Bull. civ. II No 387, 374available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/deuxieme_chambre_civile_570/arret_no_689.html.See P Deumier, ‘Evolutions du pouvoir de modulation dans le temps: fondement et mode d’emploi d’un nouveaupouvoir des juges’, (2007) RTD eur. 72, mapp<strong>in</strong>g more recent developments (also <strong>in</strong> the Conseil d’Etat).131 Patrick Morvan, ‘Le revirement de jurisprudence pour l’avenir: humble adresse aux magistrats ayant franchile Rubicon’, (2005) Dalloz, Chr. 247.132 See e.g. Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 269-274.133134 See the text accompany<strong>in</strong>g notes 88 <strong>and</strong> 99 supra.21
It is necessary that the legislator keep an eye on [jurisprudence]. He can learn from it<strong>and</strong> he can, for his part, correct it.’ 135 In the words of the today’s commentator, this is‘essential,’ s<strong>in</strong>ce ‘while it was not possible to keep the system which reserved<strong>in</strong>terpretation of the law to the legislator by way of référé legislatif, the democraticpr<strong>in</strong>ciple comm<strong>and</strong>s recogniz<strong>in</strong>g the legislator’s power, <strong>and</strong> even a duty, to erasejurisprudence which it considers erroneous, shock<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong>appropriate. 136This is also why the Cour produces its annual reports, although their role has changed s<strong>in</strong>ce,while ‘[i]nitially conceived as an <strong>in</strong>strument of the subord<strong>in</strong>ation of the [Cour de cassation] tothe legislative power, they became an <strong>in</strong>strument of diffusion of the jurisprudential<strong>in</strong>novations <strong>and</strong> the normative policy of the supreme court.’ 137The idea of “lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation” permits the borrow<strong>in</strong>g of the effects of the<strong>in</strong>terpreted rules, but at the same time conta<strong>in</strong>s a constra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g element: the legislator canalways undo jurisprudence it dislikes. 138 That is why Ghest<strong>in</strong>, who classifies jurisprudence asa source of law, at the same time opposes abolish<strong>in</strong>g the prohibition of the arrêts derèglement. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ghest<strong>in</strong>, jurisprudence would acquire the same status as enacted law,which could lead to irreconcilable conflicts between the two. 139However, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Zénati such conflict cannot arise, precisely because of the unitybetween enacted laws <strong>and</strong> the jurisprudence which <strong>in</strong>terprets them. If the text of an enactedlaw contradicts previous jurisprudence, it must be seen as amend<strong>in</strong>g it, <strong>and</strong> vice versa. If thereis a contradiction between jurisprudence <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g a hierarchically subord<strong>in</strong>ate norm on theone h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the text of an enacted norm superior to it on the other, it must be conceived asif the Cour was also implicitly <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g the superior norm. 140 This of course holds onlytheoretically <strong>and</strong> it can f<strong>in</strong>d its limits <strong>in</strong> the very clear word<strong>in</strong>g of the text of the enactednorm; <strong>in</strong> practice some scholars talk about contra legem jurisprudence. 141 Be that as it may,an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of academics question whether the prohibition of the arrêts derèglement has any real mean<strong>in</strong>g. 142C.The nature of jurisprudence’s constra<strong>in</strong>t: legislative precedent1. The absence of a ‘workable case-law technique’If we th<strong>in</strong>k of the Cour de cassation as the secular arm of legislated law, we cannot expect itto provide extensive reason<strong>in</strong>g: imperatoria brevitas says Zénati. The brevity of the decisionis someth<strong>in</strong>g which constantly perplexes observers from other legal systems, who also stress135 Le Discours (supra note 88) at xxix (translation von Mehren <strong>and</strong> Gordley, supra note 99).136 Foyer, supra note 100 at 28.137 Zénati, supra note 111. On annual reports see also <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations (supra note 84) at 199-200.138 This construction however encounters two fundamental problems: one concern<strong>in</strong>g general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of law,which, once formulated by the Cour, can be “corrected” by the legislator only to a limited extent (see particularlyP Morvan, Le pr<strong>in</strong>cipe de droit privé (Panthéon-Assas, Paris 1999) at 735-749), <strong>and</strong> another related to thecontrol of the compatibility of the legislation with <strong>in</strong>ternational treaties (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g EU law) b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on France(see e.g. Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 248-258).139 Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 446-448.140 La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 224.141 Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 276.142 As early as 1958 see André Aud<strong>in</strong>et, ‘Faut-il ressusciter les arrêts de règlement’, <strong>in</strong> Mélanges offerts à JeanBrèthe de la Gressaye (Bière, Bordeaux 1967) referr<strong>in</strong>g to Hélène S<strong>in</strong>ay, ‘La résurgence des arrêts derèglement’, (1958) Dalloz, Chr. 85. See also Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 280-281 <strong>and</strong> Lajurisprudence (supra note 100) at 214-218.22
the scanty treatment of facts <strong>in</strong> the Cour’s decisions. 143 Dawson comments on the brevity ofthe Cour de cassation’s judgments <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way:To readers tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> our own tradition [the US], the extreme parsimony of itsstatements of facts is even more strik<strong>in</strong>g than the brevity of its propositions of law. Itis not only strik<strong>in</strong>g but <strong>in</strong> a way more important, for it raises issues that are central notonly to workable case-law technique but to conceptions of the k<strong>in</strong>d of law that judgesare qualified to make. 144By ‘workable case-law technique [<strong>and</strong>] conceptions of the k<strong>in</strong>d of law that judges arequalified to make’ Dawson means what I described above as the centrality of the case <strong>and</strong> itsfacts for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g what is b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the previous court’s decision, primarily by separat<strong>in</strong>gf<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs from dicta or possibly dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g the case before the judges from that which ledto a precedent decision. 145 Extensive reason<strong>in</strong>g of the precedent judgment then serves as ameans of limit<strong>in</strong>g the rulemak<strong>in</strong>g power of the precedent court: it is the subsequent courtwhich def<strong>in</strong>es the scope of hold<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> can possibly dist<strong>in</strong>guish the subsequent case on thebasis of the facts before it, or at least on the basis of what the court said.The whole concept of cassation speaks aga<strong>in</strong>st the limit<strong>in</strong>g of the Cour de cassation <strong>in</strong> thisway. Unlike the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court, the Cour is not part of the judicial system; it is a seculararm of the legislated law, which sanctions ord<strong>in</strong>ary courts if they disrespect it. As Zénat<strong>in</strong>otes, it ‘represses jurisprudence <strong>in</strong> the name of the legislated law’ 146 by not allow<strong>in</strong>g a lowercourt to participate <strong>in</strong> the formulation of the “precedent” rule <strong>and</strong> also by the way it reasons.Zénati therefore calls the Cour de cassation’s production ‘legislative jurisprudence’ <strong>and</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>guishes it squarely from “genu<strong>in</strong>e” jurisprudence produced by other supreme courtswhich have full appellate jurisdiction. While the latter serve as model for lower courts, theCour de cassation issues legislation-like rules <strong>and</strong> controls obedience to them. 147Does this mean that the Cour de cassation is virtually unconstra<strong>in</strong>ed as a result of be<strong>in</strong>gliberated from the duty to reason <strong>in</strong> the way common law judges do?2. Brevity constra<strong>in</strong>sHere we can come to a paradoxical response to Dawson’s concerns: it is brevity itself whichconstra<strong>in</strong>s the lawmak<strong>in</strong>g activity of the Cour. In its decision the Cour is expected to deal onlywith specific legal 148 grounds submitted <strong>in</strong> the appeal <strong>in</strong> cassation. 149 At the same time,everyth<strong>in</strong>g the Cour says <strong>in</strong> its judgment has immediate legal consequences for the processbefore the lower court; 150 if there is a second appeal <strong>in</strong> cassation pursued on the basis of thesame moyens, it will be the General Assembly of the Cour that will hear the case. 151 And itsdecision is then b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g (on the po<strong>in</strong>ts of law) on the lower court – no other appeal is143 See <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations (supra note 84) at 28 <strong>and</strong> 244.144 Dawson, supra note 85 at 413.145 See section II.B supra.146 Zénati, supra note 111.147 La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 40-44, 177-180 <strong>and</strong> more explicitly Zénati, supra note 111.148 See Zenati-Casta<strong>in</strong>g supra note 163 at 1557.149 ‘Appeal <strong>in</strong> cassation’ corresponds to ‘pourvoi en cassation,’ while ‘legal grounds’ correspond to ‘moyens;’these are translations used by the European Court of Justice.150 And yet another translation – ‘lower court’ refers to ‘juge du fond,’ i.e. the court the decision of which wasappealed <strong>in</strong> cassation to the Cour de cassation.151 See supra note 127.23
possible. The ability to raise an issue on its own motion is very limited <strong>and</strong> the Cour uses itonly rarely. 152 The Cour de cassation is therefore far more constra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> what it can say <strong>in</strong> itsdecision than, for example, the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court; it can thus produce fewer statementswhich can be taken as its authoritative pronouncements of law. Some authors even mentionthat dicta, which the Cour nevertheless occasionally utters, breach the prohibition on arrêts derèglement. 153This underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the reason<strong>in</strong>g also expla<strong>in</strong>s why the Cour, after mak<strong>in</strong>g public materialsrelated to its decision, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the op<strong>in</strong>ion of its avocat général <strong>and</strong> the report of theconseiller rapporteur, does not make them part of the official decision but puts them to oneside 154 as travaux préparatoires. Their title of travaux préparatoires aga<strong>in</strong> suggests that Courdecisions are legislative works rather than a process of judicial deliberation, rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g us thatthe Cour is an adjunct to the legislator). 1553. Legislative precedent <strong>and</strong> the prudence of the lawMost comparatists note that the Cour de cassation’s decisions pay only scant attention to thefacts. 156 We can underst<strong>and</strong> why this is so, once we view cassation <strong>in</strong> the sense discussed byZénati – as a sanction enforc<strong>in</strong>g lower judges’ obedience to the legislated law <strong>and</strong> not as amechanism for correct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>justices. For some scholars this is but an illustration ofa much wider phenomenon divid<strong>in</strong>g the common law <strong>and</strong> civil law traditions. While theformer focuses on the particular <strong>and</strong> factual, the latter emphasises the general <strong>and</strong> abstract. 157But is the notion of jurisprudence truly limited to a set of abstract norms expressed <strong>in</strong>legislation-like language conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the Cour’s decisions? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Zénati, the Cour‘represses jurisprudence <strong>in</strong> the name of the legislated law.’ 158 What does Zénati mean by this?Do the Cour’s decisions not form jurisprudence proper?152 Ghest<strong>in</strong> et al., supra note 93 at 474-475.153 See Malaurie <strong>and</strong> Morvan, supra note 93 at 280. This feature of brief judgments is well noted <strong>in</strong> [the] Frenchcomparative scholarship. See particularly Horatia Muir Watt, ‘La motivation des arrêts de la Cour de cassation etl’élaboration de la norme’, <strong>in</strong> N Molfessis (ed), La Cour de cassation et l’élaboration du droit (Economica, Paris2004) at 61.154 See Deumier, supra note 100 for a discussion of the different ways <strong>in</strong> which the Cour de cassation changes orcould change its publication practices. On the trend of open<strong>in</strong>g the Cour to the public generally see Guy Canivet,‘Formal <strong>and</strong> Informal Determ<strong>in</strong>ative Factors <strong>in</strong> the Legitimacy of <strong>Judicial</strong> Decisions: The Po<strong>in</strong>t of View of theFrench Court of Cassation’, <strong>in</strong> N Huls, M Adams <strong>and</strong> J Bomhoff (eds), The Legitimacy of Highest <strong>Courts</strong>’Rul<strong>in</strong>gs: <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations <strong>and</strong> Beyond (T.M.C. Asser, The Hague 2009) at (supra note 92) 125.155 I leave aside here the question of comprehensibility of the Cour’s judgments; despite some criticisms (amongthe most <strong>in</strong>fluential see Adolphe Touffait <strong>and</strong> André Tunc, ‘Pour une motivation plus explicite des décisions dejustice notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation’, (1974) RTD civ. 487, many academics ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that it isonly a question of a special skill (which should be taught better, it is true) to underst<strong>and</strong> the judgment of theCour <strong>and</strong> its reason<strong>in</strong>g well. See particularly Jacques Ghest<strong>in</strong>, ‘L’<strong>in</strong>terprétation d’un arrêt de la Cour decassation’, (2004) Dalloz, Chr. 2239. One should not overlook difficulties which the common law style ofjudgment draft<strong>in</strong>g also causes; see e.g. Alec Samuels, ‘Those Multiple Long Judgments’, (2005) 24 C. J. Q. 279.156 See e.g. <strong>Judicial</strong> Deliberations (supra note 84) at 32, Dawson, supra note 85 at 411.157 See particularly Vivian Grossvald Curran, ‘Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: LegalUniformity <strong>and</strong> the Homogenization of the European Union’, (2001) 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 63, 75-111 with furtherreferences.158 Supra note 146.24
For Zénati jurisprudence has a very special mean<strong>in</strong>g of ‘prudence of the law’ (la prudence dudroit). In that respect he refers to the Aristotelian virtue, prudence, 159 which is ‘turnedtowards the action [<strong>and</strong>] aims at determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the good <strong>and</strong> the bad for act<strong>in</strong>g well.’ 160Prudence is connected to a concrete factual situation, not a set of abstract norms. Zénatibelieves that ‘[w]hile the supreme courts of unlimited jurisdiction found the law <strong>in</strong> theprudence, the Cour de cassation searched for it <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the legal rules.’ 161 Due tothe nature of cassation (concerned with proper application of law, not <strong>in</strong>dividual justice <strong>in</strong> thecase be<strong>in</strong>g reviewed) there is no jurisprudence of the Cour, properly so called, s<strong>in</strong>ce the Courdoes not decide <strong>in</strong> the prudential mode. 162Lower courts play a crucial role here. Unlike the Cour, they are fac<strong>in</strong>g “real-life situations”<strong>and</strong> see how the abstract rules are be<strong>in</strong>g applied <strong>in</strong> them. 163 They therefore decide <strong>in</strong> theprudential mode, like courts with unlimited jurisdiction. So when an abstract rule conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence produces results which do not fit the conception ofjustice which would correspond to the situation before the lower courts, they can always try toprovoke its change. The fact that the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence is not officiallyb<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g on the lower courts is of crucial importance here. While they do not have the meansof moderat<strong>in</strong>g the precedent rule like courts below the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court, French lowercourts are always free to depart from the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>vite theCour to change it so that it is updated to reflect the needs of society. 164 In this way they<strong>in</strong>corporate experience <strong>in</strong>to the life of the law – like doctr<strong>in</strong>al writers, 165 who are <strong>in</strong> a constantdialogue with the Cour <strong>and</strong> can force it to a change. 1664. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PROBLEMS OFAN INCOMPLETE TRANSLATIONIn the forego<strong>in</strong>g two parts I wanted to show how the conceptualization of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> the nature of precedential constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the US <strong>and</strong> France make the <strong>in</strong>volvement of otheractors – lower courts <strong>and</strong> legislators (or, more widely, political branches) – possible. In thispart I want to argue that while the Court of Justice’s precedent <strong>in</strong> some respects resemblesprecedents <strong>in</strong> both systems, it does not conta<strong>in</strong> (or does not employ <strong>in</strong> practice) the elementswhich achieve this. That is why I call this part ‘problems of an <strong>in</strong>complete translation.’159 In Greek (phronēsis), often translated as ‘practical wisdom,’ which can create confusions, s<strong>in</strong>ce wisdom isanother virtue: (sophos).160 La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 86.161 Zénati, supra note 111.162 Ibid.163 See Frédéric Zenati-Casta<strong>in</strong>g [the same author as that of La jurisprudence (supra note 100) <strong>and</strong> Zénati, supranote 111], ‘La motivation des décisions de justice et les sources du droit’, (2007) Dalloz, Chr. 1553.164 On the role of the lower courts <strong>and</strong> their decisions see e.g. Marie-Anne Frison-Roche <strong>and</strong> Serge Bories, ‘Lajurisprudence massive’, (1993) Dalloz, Chr. 287.165 As I expla<strong>in</strong> above (supra note 16), I do not deal with doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> more detail here.166 See La jurisprudence (supra note 100) at 245-272 <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> English J Bell, French Legal Cultures(Butterworths, London, Ed<strong>in</strong>burgh, Dubl<strong>in</strong> 2001) at 72-88.25
A. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> the Courtof Justice’s supremacy1. <strong>Judicial</strong> lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> the US <strong>and</strong> FranceWhile both systems – the US <strong>and</strong> the French - acknowledge that judges “make law,” they also<strong>in</strong>sist that this judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g is based on creative <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the foundationaldocuments – the Constitution <strong>and</strong> the Civil Code. Both courts are often said to declare whatthese documents mean; they are not recognized as hav<strong>in</strong>g an autonomous power to createnorms which would be <strong>in</strong>dependent of the foundational document. In the US thisunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g activity (<strong>in</strong> the context of constitutional adjudication)allows other branches of government to claim that they can come up with compet<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>terpretations of the Constitution. In France the fiction of “lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as creative<strong>in</strong>terpretation” allows the legislator to control the Cour by adopt<strong>in</strong>g legislative provisionswhich correct <strong>in</strong>terpretations adopted by the Cour.Of course, this is a rather idealised picture, s<strong>in</strong>ce the idea of other branches’ <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong>constitutional <strong>in</strong>terpretation is deeply contested <strong>in</strong> the US, <strong>and</strong> because <strong>in</strong> France it is possibleto take the legislator out of the game – particularly by judicial control of legislation’scompatibility with the European Convention, European Union law, <strong>and</strong> the general pr<strong>in</strong>ciplesof law. Moreover, the recent <strong>in</strong>troduction of ex post constitutional review (on references fromord<strong>in</strong>ary courts to the Conseil constitutionnel) has made the legislature’s control of thejudiciary even more illusory. 167 But these idealisations help to accommodate the normativeeffects of decisions of both courts beyond the context of the cases <strong>in</strong> which they are delivered<strong>and</strong> allow other actors – particularly the political process – to react.The Court of Justice’s judicial activity is also presented as a mere <strong>in</strong>terpretation of law. 168 So,for example, the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of Member State liability, which goes ‘well beyond the terms of therelevant treaties <strong>and</strong> legislation,’ 169 is justified as ‘<strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> the system of the [EC]Treaty.’ 170 The need to preserve the image of the Court as a mere <strong>in</strong>terpreter of the law isnicely illustrated by the follow<strong>in</strong>g statement by Alberto Trabucchi, at the time AdvocateGeneral at the Court of Justice:The judicial nature of the activity prescribed by Article 177 [now 234 EC] implies <strong>in</strong>particular its clear dist<strong>in</strong>ction from the legislative function. The Court should not,therefore, be called to determ<strong>in</strong>e the best way how to regulate a particular case, but todef<strong>in</strong>e what the best <strong>in</strong>terpretation that can apply to the act, that is an expression ofheteronomy, is. If this fundamental dist<strong>in</strong>ction disappeared, the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal pillar of theCommunity constitution would be wrecked, because the constitution has been167 On this constitutional reform see a special issue of (2009) R.D.P. 565-684 or (<strong>in</strong> English), Federico Fabbr<strong>in</strong>i,Kelsen <strong>in</strong> Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform <strong>and</strong> the Introduction of A Posteriori Constitutional Review ofLegislation’, (2008) 9 German L.J. 1297.168 See e.g. Alberto Trabucchi, ‘L’effet “erga omnes” des décisions préjudicielles rendues par la Cour de justicedes Communautés européennes’, (1974) RTD eur. 56, 62, AG Toth, ‘The Authority of Judgments of theEuropean Court of Justice: B<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g Force <strong>and</strong> Legal Effects’, (1984) 4 Yb. Eur. L. 1, 69 or more recently KLenaerts et al, Procedural Law of the European Union (2 nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) at 195.169 James E Pf<strong>and</strong>er, ‘Member State Liability <strong>and</strong> Constitutional Challenge <strong>in</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> Europe’,(2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 237, 248.170 Jo<strong>in</strong>ed Cases C‐6/90 <strong>and</strong> C‐9/90 Francovich <strong>and</strong> Others [1991] ECR I‐5357, paragraph 35.26
conceived as an organisation ruled by the law <strong>in</strong> the attribution of different powers <strong>and</strong>with the guarantee of the judicial control exercised precisely by the Court of Justice. 171Does such underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g have the same effects as <strong>in</strong> the US <strong>and</strong>France, allow<strong>in</strong>g other actors to control or at least constra<strong>in</strong> the Court of Justice’s creativeactivity? I th<strong>in</strong>k that this question must be answered <strong>in</strong> the negative.2. The absence of competition over the foundational document’smean<strong>in</strong>gFirst, unlike the US Constitution <strong>and</strong> the French Civil Code, the Treaties are an unf<strong>in</strong>ishedproject, the purpose of which is contested. 172 The Treaties are not a fixed po<strong>in</strong>t of reference,either <strong>in</strong> the form of a commitment of ‘We the People’ to ‘form a more perfect Union,’ as <strong>in</strong>the US Constitution, nor an enlightened codification of a ‘secular natural law ideal of one lawapplicable to all Frenchmen,’ 173 as <strong>in</strong> the French Civil Code. In short, the Treaties are not ‘theholy books of the law.’ 174 The uncerta<strong>in</strong> nature of the European Union allows the Court toplay the role of an <strong>in</strong>stitution responsible for giv<strong>in</strong>g the European project momentum, whichis tacitly approved by the actors with decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g power. The Court’s pronouncementsare sometimes even taken as conclusive evidence for the constitutional character of theUnion; 175 but it is a generally accepted narrative of European <strong>in</strong>tegration that it was the Courtthat ‘constitutionalised’ it. 176 As Damian Chalmers notes, ‘judicial supremacy has been acentral seam <strong>in</strong> the EU legal order,’ although he expla<strong>in</strong>s that it has applied <strong>in</strong> an extremelylimited doma<strong>in</strong>. 177Secondly, there are no EU <strong>in</strong>stitutions to compete with the Court. In other words, <strong>in</strong> Europethere is no constitutional voice other than the Court’s. Whenever the Court issues acontroversial judgment, it is a national government or other representative which compla<strong>in</strong>s;such compla<strong>in</strong>ts are always treated with suspicion <strong>and</strong> little serious attention. 178 To myknowledge there has been no declaration from the Council, let alone the Commission, that itfelt discontent with the Court of Justice’s rul<strong>in</strong>g, comparable to those occasionally made bysome governments. 179 Similarly, when a Member State’s constitutional court challenges the171 Trabucchi, supra note 168 at 61-62.172 See e.g. the contributions to C Joerges, Y Mény <strong>and</strong> JHH Weiler (eds), What K<strong>in</strong>d of Constitution for WhatK<strong>in</strong>d of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, Jean Monnet Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper No. 7/00, available athttp://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/symp.html.173 JH Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe <strong>and</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong>America (2 nd ed, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1985) at 28.174 See RC van Caenegem, European Law <strong>in</strong> the Past <strong>and</strong> the Future. Unity <strong>and</strong> Diversity over Two Millennia(CUP, Cambridge 2002) at 54-72, who calls both ‘foundational documents.’ I do not suggest that the EUTreaties should ever be based on the same foundational ideas as the US Constitution or the Civil Code. Here Ionly po<strong>in</strong>t out the difference.175 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism <strong>and</strong> the Many Faces of Federalism’, (1990) 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 210,quot<strong>in</strong>g Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] E.C.R. 1339, paragraph 23.176 See <strong>in</strong> particular Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘How Constitutional Can the European Union Be? The TensionBetween Intergovernmentalism <strong>and</strong> Constitutionalism <strong>in</strong> the European Union’, <strong>in</strong> JHH Weiler <strong>and</strong> CL Eisgruber(eds), Altneul<strong>and</strong>: The EU Constitution <strong>in</strong> a Contextual Perspective, Jean Monnet Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper No. 5/04available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-18.html at 4-13 with references to otherclassics.177 ‘<strong>Judicial</strong> Authority <strong>and</strong> the Constitutional Treaty’, (2005) 3 Int’l. J. Const. L. 448, 448.178 See e.g. Editorial, (2008) 45 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1571.179 One of the rare examples could be Council Resolution of 19 December 2002 on the amendment of theDirective concern<strong>in</strong>g liability for defective products (2003/C 26/02), [2003] O.J. C26/1 at 2-3, where the Councilstates that ‘[the] legal situation [created by the Court’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the relevant provisions of the directive]27
Court of Justice’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation, such challenge is based on the Member State court’s ownframe of reference, not EU law. When the German Constitutional Court expresses its concernover the Union’s exercise of its competences or the Union’s respect for fundamental rights, it<strong>in</strong>terprets the German Basic Law, not the Treaties. It is a competition between two dist<strong>in</strong>ctnormative frames of reference, limited to one jurisdiction – that of the Member State <strong>in</strong>question.Thirdly, the Union’s legislature is not superior to the Court. As such it is unable to monitor<strong>and</strong> modify the Court’s activity, as is traditional <strong>in</strong> France. In fact, the contrary is true; theCouncil (a part of the Union’s legislative body) is sometimes presented as an <strong>in</strong>stitution whichimpedes the process of <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>and</strong> must therefore be controlled by the Court. Manc<strong>in</strong>i <strong>and</strong>Keel<strong>in</strong>g describe Cassis de Dijon 180 as ‘the judgment which best epitomizes “many<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs you could do with the law”.’ 181 There ‘the Court imposed on the States amutual recognition of their respective st<strong>and</strong>ards, which practically amounted to render<strong>in</strong>g theenactment of harmoniz<strong>in</strong>g directives unnecessary.’ 182 In this way, the Court overcame therequirement of unanimity <strong>in</strong> Council decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g, which had hitherto prevented theadoption of much harmoniz<strong>in</strong>g legislation. 183 Moreover, s<strong>in</strong>ce the Court derived therequirement of mutual recognition directly from the EC Treaty, it was impossible for the EUlegislator to undo its work—the only way would be to adopt an express Treaty amendment—someth<strong>in</strong>g as rare as amendments to the US Constitution <strong>in</strong> response to the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’srul<strong>in</strong>gs. 184To summarise, the fiction of judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g as <strong>in</strong>terpretation does not mobilize otheractors to limit the power of the Court as it does <strong>in</strong> the US <strong>and</strong> French systems, which employthe same fiction.B. Who is constra<strong>in</strong>ed?S<strong>in</strong>ce I exhausted the question of the relevance of precedent beyond judicial process <strong>in</strong> thelast section, I will focus here on the relevance of precedent <strong>in</strong> the Union judiciary, start<strong>in</strong>gwith courts other than the Court of Justice.gives rise to concern,’ <strong>and</strong> ‘considers ... there is a need to assess whether [the directive], should be modified.’But as we can see, the Council’s concern is expressed <strong>in</strong> most cautious terms <strong>and</strong> does not question authority ofthe Court as such.180 Case 120/78 Rewe‐Zentral (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649.181 Giuseppe F Manc<strong>in</strong>i <strong>and</strong> David T Keel<strong>in</strong>g ‘Language, Culture <strong>and</strong> Politics <strong>in</strong> the Life of the European Courtof Justice’, (1995) 1 Colum. J. Eur. L. 397, 405 quot<strong>in</strong>g Tim Koopmans, ‘The Role of Law <strong>in</strong> the Next Stage ofEuropean Integration’, (1986) 35 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 925, 928.182 Ibid. at 406.183 See Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, <strong>in</strong> ibid. (ed), The EU, theWTO <strong>and</strong> the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001)at 219.184 On the few examples of Treaty amendments see Joseph HH Weiler <strong>and</strong> Ulrich R Haltern, ‘The Autonomy ofthe Community Legal Order - Through the Look<strong>in</strong>g Glass’, (1996) 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 411, 416 (fn. 22), but asthe current developments concern<strong>in</strong>g the Lisbon Treaty confirm, <strong>in</strong> the Union of 27 any Treaty amendment isextremely difficult to adopt. As regards the US, MJ Gerhardt, The Power of <strong>Precedent</strong> (OUP, New York 2008)at 9 notes that ‘the only alternative for politically retaliat<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st specific precedent [is] the appo<strong>in</strong>tment ofnew justices dedicated to overturn<strong>in</strong>g them.’ (Gerhardt also lists the four examples of express constitutionalamendment adopted <strong>in</strong> reaction to a specific rul<strong>in</strong>g of the Court).28
1. Other courts <strong>and</strong> the Court of Justice’s expositionalexclusivityAs Monica Claes rightly observes, ‘it has become truism’ to th<strong>in</strong>k of Member States’ courtsas true European courts. 185 This is perhaps the s<strong>in</strong>gle most important difference between thejudicial systems of the EU <strong>and</strong> the US, where the central authority can rely on a completesystem of federal judiciary, functionally dist<strong>in</strong>ct from the judicial systems of particular states.So although a significant part of US federal law is applied by states’ courts, 186 the central(federal) authority can rely on its own system of courts <strong>and</strong> jurisdictional rules to securesufficient control over the proper application of federal law throughout the United States. 187As a consequence of this, much of the federal law is <strong>in</strong>terpreted by lower federal courts <strong>and</strong>the op<strong>in</strong>ions of the courts of appeal play an important role <strong>in</strong> the development of federallaw. 188In contrast, it is <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> the Court of Justice itself which creates the whole body of Unioncase law <strong>in</strong> all areas of Union activity. The Court of First Instance (CFI) <strong>and</strong> the Civil ServiceTribunal are the only equivalents to the US lower federal courts, but they have limitedjurisdiction <strong>and</strong> have comparatively less impact on Member States’ legal systems. Thesecourts seem to be constra<strong>in</strong>ed by the Court’s precedent <strong>in</strong> a way not unlike lower federalcourts, a fact which follows from the existence of an appeal. 189 There is potential for theCFI’s moderat<strong>in</strong>g role, however; Jégo-Quéré, 190 where the CFI <strong>in</strong>vited the Court to change itsforty-year old case law concern<strong>in</strong>g the st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of private parties to challenge EU legalacts, 191 was rather exceptional. 192The prom<strong>in</strong>ent role of the Court of Justice is highlighted by its reluctance to share jurisdictionto hear prelim<strong>in</strong>ary references with the CFI, as is possible now that the Treaty of Nice (2000)has <strong>in</strong>troduced Article 225(3) EC. The ‘centralisation of the <strong>in</strong>terpretative function, whichpromotes uniformity’ was described by Advocate General Colomer 193 as the ma<strong>in</strong>justification for this reluctance <strong>and</strong> seems to be shared by other members of the Court. 194185 M Claes, The National <strong>Courts</strong>’ M<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> the European Constitution (Hart, Oxford <strong>and</strong> Portl<strong>and</strong> Oreg.2006) at 3.186 See generally Donald H Zeigler, ‘Gaz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the St<strong>and</strong>ards State JudgesShould Use to Ascerta<strong>in</strong> Federal Law’, (1999) 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1143.187 See e.g. Friedman, supra note 24.188 See the text preced<strong>in</strong>g supra note 73.189 On the CFI’s approach to the Court’s precedent <strong>in</strong> general see A Arnull, The European Union <strong>and</strong> its Court ofJustice (2nd ed. OUP, Oxford 2006) at 633-637. On the importance of appeal see the text accompany<strong>in</strong>g supranote 28.190 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2002] E.C.R. II-2365.191 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] E.C.R. 95. See e.g. John Usher, ‘Direct <strong>and</strong> Individual Concern –An Effective Remedy or a Conventional Solution’, (2003) 28 Eur. L. Rev. 575 with further references.192 Arnull, supra note 189 at 635 gives another example: Case T-586/93 Kotzonis v ESC [1995] E.C.R. II-665,paragraph 92, where the CFI stated that it ‘considers that the case-law [of the Court of Justice] ought to bereconsidered.’ The case was not appealed to the Court.193 Op<strong>in</strong>ion of Advocate General Colomer <strong>in</strong> Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] E.C.R. I-9445, paragraph 74.194 See Koen Lenaerts (a judge of the Court), ‘The Unity of European Law <strong>and</strong> the Overload of the ECJ – TheSystem of Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Rul<strong>in</strong>gs Revisited’, <strong>in</strong> I Pernice, J Kokott <strong>and</strong> C Saunders (eds), The Future of theEuropean <strong>Judicial</strong> System <strong>in</strong> a Comparative Perspective (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2006) at 232-236. For a critiqueof this centraliz<strong>in</strong>g approach, stress<strong>in</strong>g uniformity as the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal value, see Jan Komárek, ‘“In the Court(S) WeTrust?” On the Need for Hierarchy <strong>and</strong> Differentiation <strong>in</strong> the Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Rul<strong>in</strong>g Procedure’, (2007) 32 Eur. L.Rev. 467.29
On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the Court has very limited means of enforc<strong>in</strong>g the authority of itsprecedents <strong>in</strong> Member States’ courts although it clearly considers that they are b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g onthem. There is no appeal from Member States’ courts – only the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>g procedure,which lies entirely <strong>in</strong> their h<strong>and</strong>s. 195 It is true that, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Köbler, if a Member State’scourt of last <strong>in</strong>stance gives a decision ‘<strong>in</strong> manifest breach of the case-law of the Court <strong>in</strong> thematter,’ 196 private parties can claim damages from that state. However, such an action canpotentially be decided by the same court 197 <strong>and</strong> the criterion of manifest breach ratherdiscourages the br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g to court of a liability claim. Infr<strong>in</strong>gement actions <strong>in</strong>itiated by theCommission do not seem to be a promis<strong>in</strong>g avenue either. 198 So it can be that the authority ofthe Court of Justice’s precedent <strong>and</strong> the exclusivity of its lawmak<strong>in</strong>g role are “moderated” byMember States’ courts’ simple disregard of them.Moreover, if the Member States’ courts were duly to obey the Court’s prescriptions, the Courtwould collapse. Some authors believe that any court ‘m<strong>in</strong>ded to diverge’ from the previousCourt’s case law, ‘must first attempt to obta<strong>in</strong> a change ... by mak<strong>in</strong>g a request for aprelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>g.’ 199 Although we will see that from one possible perspective the Court isgiven too few cases, compared with both the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court <strong>and</strong> the Cour de cassation, 200it does not have the means rationally to manage even the (comparatively small!) number ofcases it receives. There is no case selection, 201 nor is it possible to deal with references forprelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> a mechanical way, as is possible <strong>in</strong> most cases before the Cour, 202which <strong>in</strong> addition has far more judges. 203 Perhaps it is as good as it gets?2. The arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess of horizontal precedent‘The general position is <strong>and</strong> always has been that the Court of Justice is not bound by itsprevious decision but that <strong>in</strong> practice it does not often depart from them,’ Arnull says. 204 Thiswould be true if we saw precedential constra<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the b<strong>in</strong>ary way of b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g/non-b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g,which nevertheless does not fit reason<strong>in</strong>g from precedent. 205 The US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court canoverrule itself, yet it can do so only under certa<strong>in</strong> circumstances <strong>and</strong> it is common to talkabout ‘horizontal stare decisis.’ 206 The Court of Justice seems to do the same - sometimes.There are few cases <strong>in</strong> which the Court of Justice has declared explicitly that it was chang<strong>in</strong>gits previous case law. The very first such case was HAG II, where the Court stated that it195 Jan Komárek, ‘Federal elements <strong>in</strong> the Community judicial system: Build<strong>in</strong>g coherence <strong>in</strong> the Communitylegal order’, (2005) 42 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 9, 10.196 Case C‐224/01 Köbler [2003] E.C.R. I‐10239, paragraph 56.197 See Komárek, supra note 195 at 29.198 See ibid. at 23-26.199 Lenaerts et al. supra note 168 at 80 with further references.200 See the text accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>fra note 229.201 On the possibility of <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> the EU see Liz Heffernan, ‘The Community <strong>Courts</strong> Post-Nice: AEuropean Certiorari Revisited’, (2003) 52 Int’l. & Comp. L.Q. 907.202 Out of the thous<strong>and</strong>s of cases decided by the Cour, only a small percentage are important or complex, whichis reflected, among other th<strong>in</strong>gs, by the Cour’s selective publication of decisions <strong>and</strong> classification of theirimportance. See the contribution of Ala<strong>in</strong> Lacabarats, a judge <strong>and</strong> the Head of the Service of documentation <strong>and</strong>studies at the Cour, (2007) Dalloz, Chr. 889-891.203 This, however, creates its own problems (particularly <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g consistency <strong>and</strong> coherence), which arebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to appear at the Court of Justice too. See Michal Bobek, ‘Learn<strong>in</strong>g to Talk: Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Rul<strong>in</strong>gs, the<strong>Courts</strong> of the New Member States <strong>and</strong> the Court of Justice’, (2008) 45 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1611, 1636-1640.204 Arnull, supra note 189 at 627.205 See section II.B supra.206 See subsection II.C.2 supra.30
‘believe[d] it necessary to reconsider the <strong>in</strong>terpretation given <strong>in</strong> [a previous] judgment <strong>in</strong> thelight of the case-law which has developed with regard to the relationship between <strong>in</strong>dustrial<strong>and</strong> commercial property <strong>and</strong> the general rules of the Treaty, particularly <strong>in</strong> the sphere of thefree movement of goods.’ 207 In Keck the Court expla<strong>in</strong>ed the need to depart from settled caselaw concern<strong>in</strong>g the def<strong>in</strong>ition of an obstacle to trade caused by ‘the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g tendency oftraders to <strong>in</strong>voke Article [28] of the Treaty as a means of challeng<strong>in</strong>g any rules whose effect isto limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from otherMember States.’ 208On the other h<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Metock the Court merely stated that a conclusion arrived at <strong>in</strong> Akrich 209(a previous decision on the po<strong>in</strong>t) ‘must be reconsidered.’ 210 In some cases the Court does noteven acknowledge that it is depart<strong>in</strong>g from a previous decision. 211 It is therefore not very clearunder what circumstances the Court of Justice decides to amend its previous <strong>in</strong>terpretation. 212Moreover, as some commentators note,references to [the Court’s] previous decisions became commonplace, but the analysisof them rema<strong>in</strong>ed superficial <strong>and</strong> selective by the st<strong>and</strong>ards of English court. Thereader of the Court’s judgments will be struck by the fact that previous decisions areoften only cited by the Court where they support its argument. Authorities which po<strong>in</strong>tthe other way are sometimes not mentioned at all, <strong>and</strong> sometimes even presented as ifthey support the l<strong>in</strong>e the Court has chosen to take. 213Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, while Keck is generally regarded by academics as a fundamental change <strong>in</strong> thefree movement of goods rules, 214 Ole Due, former president of the Court of Justice, feels thedecision is ‘not as surpris<strong>in</strong>g as it may seem, … nor [was] the change of the case-law as farreach<strong>in</strong>g as it may seem at first look.’ 215 Tesauro also did not regard it as ‘a revolutionarytransition.’ 216 While statements of members of the Court can be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by a desire to playdown the importance of the change <strong>and</strong> thus protect the Court’s image as a neutral <strong>in</strong>terpreterof Union law, the contrast with those of external observers of the Court may suggest that, <strong>in</strong>207 Case C-10/89 HAG [1990] E.C.R. I-3711, paragraph 10.208 Jo<strong>in</strong>ed Cases C-267/91 <strong>and</strong> C-268/91 Keck <strong>and</strong> Mithouard [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, paragraph 14.209 Case C‐109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607.210 Case C-127/08 Metock <strong>and</strong> Others, n.y.r., paragraph 58.211 A well known example is Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm <strong>and</strong> Goupil v Commission [2000] E.C.R. I-5291,where the Court changed the st<strong>and</strong>ards applicable for EU liability without admitt<strong>in</strong>g it. See Arnull, supra note189 at 628-629 for a critique.212 There are also differences among advocates general: while Advocate General Maduro <strong>in</strong> his op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> Jo<strong>in</strong>edCases C‐94/04 <strong>and</strong> C‐202/04 Cipolla <strong>and</strong> Others [2006] E.C.R. I‐11421, paragraphs 26-30 expressly expla<strong>in</strong>sthe value of precedent for the Court <strong>and</strong> the need to have additional reasons for revers<strong>in</strong>g well-established caselaw; [on the other h<strong>and</strong>,] Advocate General Léger, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> his first op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>in</strong> Case C‐280/00Altmark Trans <strong>and</strong> Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] E.C.R. I‐7747, paragraphs 73-98 only <strong>in</strong>vites theCourt to review its previous <strong>in</strong>terpretation given <strong>in</strong> Case C-53/00 Ferr<strong>in</strong>g [2001] E.C.R. I-9067.213 A Arnull et al, Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union Law (5 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) at 409. See alsoArnull, supra note 211 at 628 (which says the same, but <strong>in</strong> more diplomatic terms).214 Norbert Reich, ‘The “November Revolution” of the European Court of Justice. Keck, Meng <strong>and</strong> AudiRevistited’, (1994) 31 Common Market L. Rev. 459.215 Ole Due, ‘Dassonville Revisited or No Cause for Alarm?’, <strong>in</strong> AIL Campbell <strong>and</strong> M Voyatzi (eds), LegalReason<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>Judicial</strong> Interpretation of European Law. Essays <strong>in</strong> Honour of Lord Mackenzie-Stuart (Trenton,London 1998) at 28.216 Giuseppe Tesauro, ‘The Community’s Internal Market <strong>in</strong> the Light of the Recent Case-law of the Court ofJustice’, (1995) 15 Yb. Eur. L. 1, 6.31
the absence of some shared (let alone articulated) precedent methodology, different actors canview developments <strong>in</strong> the Court’s case law quite differently.3. The nature of the Court of Justice’s precedent: say<strong>in</strong>g toomuch <strong>and</strong> too little at the same time1. The importance of a caseWe have seen that a conception of a case before the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court <strong>and</strong> the Cour decassation is important for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the nature of precedential constra<strong>in</strong>t.Firstly, the case limits the precedent court’s lawmak<strong>in</strong>g activity. The scope of the <strong>Supreme</strong>Court’s precedent can be limited primarily by subsequent courts 217 - with reference to someelements of the case which gave rise to the precedent decision subsequent courts can eithernarrow the hold<strong>in</strong>g of precedent or dist<strong>in</strong>guish the precedent case from that before them. Thescope of the Cour’s legislative precedents is limited by the Cour’s duty to reply to the legalgrounds of appeal <strong>in</strong> cassation <strong>and</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g more.Secondly, the case br<strong>in</strong>gs elements of “real life” <strong>in</strong>to lawmak<strong>in</strong>g through adjudication (<strong>in</strong>contrast to lawmak<strong>in</strong>g by legislatures). While the real-life element is most clearly present <strong>in</strong>common law adjudication, <strong>in</strong> most of the constitutional cases the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court decides <strong>in</strong> arather abstract fashion, dis<strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual circumstances of the applicant.However, “real life” enters the adjudicative process before it reaches the peak of the judicialpyramid. It is noted more clearly <strong>in</strong> the context of the Cour de cassation’s adjudication as theprudence of law, implanted <strong>in</strong>to the Cour’s jurisprudence through lower courts <strong>and</strong> alsoacademic doctr<strong>in</strong>e.How about the case before the Court of Justice <strong>and</strong> its relevance for precedent?2. The nature of cases before the Court of Justice <strong>and</strong> therelevance of factsThe answer is complicated by the very different nature of procedures before the Court. Theserange from prelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>gs which may concern the identity of two factual situations forthe purposes of the application of the ne bis <strong>in</strong> idem pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, 218 to op<strong>in</strong>ions on thecompatibility of an <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>in</strong>ternational treaty with EU law prior to its conclusion, wherethe Court decides <strong>in</strong> a purely abstract context. 219 However the procedure tends to br<strong>in</strong>g theCourt closer to the Cour de cassation model—a court decid<strong>in</strong>g purely legal questions. Thepurity is not absolute s<strong>in</strong>ce the Court has far more flexibility when it comes to its will<strong>in</strong>gnessto engage with facts which underlie the legal questions before it. While this is generallyacknowledged <strong>in</strong> the context of the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>g procedure, 220 it is also true for otherprocedures, particularly <strong>in</strong> the light of an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g tendency to deal with <strong>in</strong>fr<strong>in</strong>gementsconsist<strong>in</strong>g of the misapplication of EU law <strong>in</strong> concrete situations. 221 The Court can very often217 ‘Subsequent courts’ are both lower courts <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court itself, decid<strong>in</strong>g later <strong>in</strong> a similar case.218 Case C‐436/04 Van Esbroeck [2006] E.C.R. I‐2333, paragraph 36.219 Article 300(6) EC. See e.g. Lenaerts et al. supra note 168 at 408-415.220 See e.g. Simon Whittaker, ‘<strong>Precedent</strong> <strong>in</strong> English Law: A View from the Citadel’, (2006) 5/6 Eur. Rev. PrivateL. 705, 741-742.221 See Jan Komárek, ‘Infr<strong>in</strong>gements <strong>in</strong> Application of Community Law: Some Problems <strong>and</strong> (Im)possibleSolutions’, (2007) Rev. Eur. Adm<strong>in</strong>. L. 87.32
choose <strong>in</strong> a rather arbitrary fashion the level of generality on which it wants to engage withthe case, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the level of attention it wants to pay to the facts. 222However, we have seen that <strong>in</strong> many of the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s decisions facts are relatively<strong>in</strong>significant <strong>and</strong> yet a case, def<strong>in</strong>ed differently, can play a role <strong>in</strong> precedential reason<strong>in</strong>g.Curran expla<strong>in</strong>s it <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way:The common-law recognition of precedents as a b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g source of law is blend<strong>in</strong>gwith the civil-law custom of norm-formation for general prospective deductiveapplication. The manner of apply<strong>in</strong>g the norms derived from European Court ofJustice precedents is emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the civil-law style of privileg<strong>in</strong>g the deductiveprocess from norm to application, <strong>and</strong> depart<strong>in</strong>g from the common-law <strong>in</strong>sistence onlimit<strong>in</strong>g the applicability of norms derived from precedents to factually analogousfuture cases. 223At the same time, the Court is not constra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> what it can say <strong>in</strong> its judgments, as the Courde cassation is. Ironically, the Court says both too little <strong>and</strong> too much <strong>in</strong> its judgments <strong>and</strong>possesses a freedom <strong>in</strong>comparable to that of the US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court <strong>and</strong> the Cour de cassation.From this Arnull <strong>in</strong>fers that ‘<strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple everyth<strong>in</strong>g that is said <strong>in</strong> a judgment of the Court ofJustice expresses the Court’s op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>and</strong> is therefore capable of hav<strong>in</strong>g the same persuasiveforce.’ 224 This appears <strong>in</strong>correct, given the occasional practice of the Court’s AdvocatesGeneral <strong>and</strong> the Court of First Instance of us<strong>in</strong>g the dist<strong>in</strong>ction between hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> dicta. 225But to my knowledge there have been no attempts to formulate a coherent approach to thisdist<strong>in</strong>ction which aims at provid<strong>in</strong>g reasons why statements made by the Court can be ignoredas mere “dicta.” And a concept of a case—here different from that before both the US<strong>Supreme</strong> Court <strong>and</strong> the French Cour de cassation—would be crucial <strong>in</strong> such an effort.3. Comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g without a sanctionThe way <strong>in</strong> which courts communicate depends largely on the conception of authority theyadopt. They can either seek to persuade through their precedents, or comm<strong>and</strong> by them. Thisdist<strong>in</strong>ction corresponds to two conceptions of the organisation of state authority <strong>and</strong>officialdom suggested by Mirjan Damaška - coord<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> hierarchical 226 – <strong>and</strong> is transposed<strong>in</strong>to the organisation of the judicial process. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between persuad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>comm<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is also reflected <strong>in</strong> two types of judicial discourse - authoritative or authoritarian– exam<strong>in</strong>ed (<strong>in</strong> a rather esoteric way) by Joseph V<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. 227222 See Gareth Davies, ‘Abstractness <strong>and</strong> concreteness <strong>in</strong> the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>g procedure: implications for thedivision of powers <strong>and</strong> effective market regulation’, <strong>in</strong> NN Shuibhne (ed), Regulat<strong>in</strong>g the Internal Market(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; Northampton Mass. 2006).223 Curran, supra note 157 at 73.224 Arnull, supra note 189 at 631 <strong>and</strong> also the op<strong>in</strong>ion of Advocate General Roemer <strong>in</strong> Case 9/61 Netherl<strong>and</strong>s vHigh Authority [1962] E.C.R. 213, 242.225 Note that Arnull (at 631) acknowledges that ‘[o]ccasionally, the Court seeks to dist<strong>in</strong>guish a case on which aparty has sought to rely.’ However, dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g a case <strong>and</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g its ratio are analytically two differentth<strong>in</strong>gs, although they aim at the same result – the avoidance of precedent. By dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g the subsequent courtseeks to show that precedent is not relevant <strong>in</strong> the case before it, while by identify<strong>in</strong>g some statement <strong>in</strong> theprecedent judgment as “dicta” it assumes that it is not b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g (even if relevant).226 See MR Damaška, The Faces of Justice <strong>and</strong> State Authority; A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process(Yale University Press, New Haven <strong>and</strong> London 1986) at 16-46.227 See J V<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, The Authoritative <strong>and</strong> the Authoritarian (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. <strong>and</strong>London 1986).33
The US <strong>Supreme</strong> Court’s precedent reflects coord<strong>in</strong>ate authority <strong>and</strong> authoritative judicialdiscourse, while the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence/legislative precedent corresponds tohierarchical authority <strong>and</strong> authoritarian discourse. The Court of Justice seem to lie somewherebetween the two.If we were to exam<strong>in</strong>e its nature <strong>in</strong> Zénati’s footsteps, we could be <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to say that theEuropean Court of Justice is not a court – especially <strong>in</strong> the context of the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>gprocedure (if be<strong>in</strong>g a court primarily means decid<strong>in</strong>g on the rights <strong>and</strong> duties of parties beforeit). Aga<strong>in</strong>, the diversity of procedures before the Court underm<strong>in</strong>es such characterization,s<strong>in</strong>ce it sometimes acts as a court, especially <strong>in</strong> the appeals it hears from the Court of FirstInstance. Although it can decide only legal questions, the fundamental difference from theCour de cassation is that it can directly <strong>and</strong> conclusively determ<strong>in</strong>e the rights of the partiesbefore it.However, even if the Court’s ma<strong>in</strong> task were to say what the law is (<strong>in</strong> the abstract), it cannotact with the same k<strong>in</strong>d of authority as the Cour de cassation. Remember, the Cour is viewedas a “secular arm of the legislator,” which has been delegated the task of supervis<strong>in</strong>g lowercourts <strong>and</strong> possibly develop<strong>in</strong>g the law if needed. The legislator is believed (whatever thereality) to “keep an eye” on it <strong>and</strong> possibly correct its jurisprudence. No such l<strong>in</strong>k exists <strong>in</strong> thecase of the Court of Justice. With some exaggeration it can be said to be a secular arm ofEuropean <strong>in</strong>tegration – but such k<strong>in</strong>d of legitimacy appears deeply problematic, s<strong>in</strong>ce –contrary to the ideal of representative government – European <strong>in</strong>tegration is a very muchcontested project.More importantly, the Court of Justice lacks any sanction by means of which it could imposeits authority on Member States’ courts 228 <strong>and</strong> exercises very limited control <strong>in</strong> terms of thenumber of decisions of other courts it can review or guide through the prelim<strong>in</strong>ary rul<strong>in</strong>gprocedure. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Court’s Annual Report for 2008, <strong>in</strong> that year the Court was given592 new case <strong>and</strong>, completed 567 cases, <strong>and</strong> 767 cases rema<strong>in</strong>ed pend<strong>in</strong>g. 229 Compared tothis, <strong>in</strong> the October 2007 Term, 230 the U.S <strong>Supreme</strong> Court received 8,241 cases <strong>and</strong> disposedof 8,374, while 1,228 cases rema<strong>in</strong>ed on its docket. 231 F<strong>in</strong>ally, the Cour de cassation <strong>in</strong> 2008was seised of 27,280 new cases <strong>and</strong> decided 28,833 cases, <strong>and</strong> 21,544 rema<strong>in</strong>ed to bedisposed of. 232 The Court is therefore dependent on persuasion <strong>and</strong> cannot limit itself togiv<strong>in</strong>g brief unreasoned answers. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, as we saw <strong>in</strong> the previous subsection,there are few mechanisms which would limit its law-pronounc<strong>in</strong>g activity. Aga<strong>in</strong>, the <strong>Courts</strong>ays both too little <strong>and</strong> too much <strong>in</strong> its judgments.CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCHIn conclusion I would like to suggest possible l<strong>in</strong>es of further <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong>to judicial lawmak<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> precedent <strong>in</strong> supreme courts, <strong>in</strong>formed by the comparative f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs offered by this article.228 See the text accompany<strong>in</strong>g supra note 195.229Annual Report for 2008, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/annual-report , part‘Statistics of judicial activity of the Court of Justice’.230 Last<strong>in</strong>g from 1 October 2007 to 6 October 2008.231The Journal of the <strong>Supreme</strong> Court of the United States, October Term 2007, available athttp://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/journal.html at II.232 Cour de cassation, Rapport annuel 2008, available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_cour_26/rapport_annuel_36/ at 396 <strong>and</strong> 398.34
Involvement <strong>and</strong> communication among constitutional actors beyond the supreme courts,when they give mean<strong>in</strong>g to the ‘foundational documents,’ is an underly<strong>in</strong>g theme of thisarticle. Involvement <strong>and</strong> communication allow each constitutional actor’s competence <strong>and</strong>legitimacy capital to be comb<strong>in</strong>ed so that better <strong>and</strong> more legitimate decisions (<strong>in</strong> comparisonto decisions taken by a s<strong>in</strong>gle actor) can be taken. I hope to have shown that while the US <strong>and</strong>French systems seek to achieve this through their particular underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of judiciallawmak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> precedent, <strong>in</strong> the EU this is far more problematic. More work is needed toexam<strong>in</strong>e how <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>and</strong> communication through judicial precedent work <strong>in</strong> the realcontext of constitutional adjudication, where the traditional conceptions do not hold. Forexample, it is difficult to f<strong>in</strong>d a satisfactory def<strong>in</strong>ition of a case <strong>in</strong> the context of constitutionaladjudication. Is it an abstract issue only? Or do “real-life” facts play any role <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>itionof the case?A case – either <strong>in</strong> the form of a real-life situation or as a legal issue presented for the court’sdecision – constitutes a framework through which the precedent decision can be connected tosubsequent cases. There must be some criteria determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g why the precedent case is‘relevantly similar’ to a subsequent one <strong>in</strong> which a norm implicated <strong>in</strong> the precedent is<strong>in</strong>tended to be applied. Schauer calls these criteria ‘rules of relevance.’ 233 What are the rulesof relevance <strong>in</strong> constitutional adjudication?I hope this article has provided some material for further thought about these questions <strong>and</strong>,more importantly, shown their practical importance for our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of supreme courts’role as adjudicators <strong>and</strong> at the same time lawmakers. But the real work is only beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.233 See Frederick Schauer, ‘<strong>Precedent</strong>’, (1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 576-579. In the context of reason<strong>in</strong>g byanalogy see Schauer (Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g), supra note 3 at 92-96. Brian Leiter, ‘Heidegger <strong>and</strong> the Theory ofAdjudication’, (1996) 106 Yale L.J. 253 however suggest that it is not possible to theorize such relevancejudgments.35