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Resisting Malicious Packet Dropping in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 155interest. Our proposed probing technique can be used as one of the monitoring techniquesin the CONFIDANT protocol.Awerbuch et al [2] proposed a secure routing protocol for resisting byzantine failuresin a wireless ad hoc network. The protocol requires an ultimate destination to sendan acknowledgment back to the sender for each of its successfully received packets. Ifthe loss rate of acknowledgment packets exceeds the predefined threshold, which is setto be slightly above the normal packet loss rate, the route used for sending packets fromthe source to the destination is detected as faulty and a binary search probing techniqueis deployed to locate the faulty link. The disadvantages of this protocol are: 1) it mayincur significant routing overhead; 2) a data packet with an inserted probe list can bedistinguished from those without probe lists, although the probe list is onion encryptedand cannot be tampered en route. Our proposed probing technique differs in that it canbe implemented above the network layer (e.g., based on UDP), and the end-to-end encryptionof IP payload using pair-wise shared keys can prevent intermediate nodes fromdistinguishing probe messages from data packets.Padmanabhan and Simon [20] proposed a secure traceroute to locate faulty routersin wired networks. In their approach, end hosts will monitor network performance. If anend-to-end performance degrade is detected by a host to a destination, a complaint bitis set in all the subsequent traffic to that destination. The complaining host itself or therouter sitting closest to the complaining host may start the troubleshooting process if itobserves enough complaints. It first sends a secure traceroute packet to the next hop,which can be derived from its routing table. The router receiving the secure traceroutepacket is expected to send a response back which also includes a next hop address. Thisprocess repeats until a faulty router is located (no response received from it) or everyrouter on the path to the ultimate destination proves healthy. Our approach is differentfrom the secure traceroute in that 1) our approach is proposed for MANET using sourcerouting protocols (e.g., DSR), the secure traceroute is mainly used in wired networks. 2)our approach does not require modification to existing routing infrastructures, the securetraceroute may need to modify IP layer in order to monitor performance problem; 3)our approach utilizes redundant routing information for diagnosis, the secure traceroutedoes not.Malicious nodes silently dropping packets exhibit the same behavior as selfish nodes,which may choose to drop packets for the sake of saving its own constraint resources,such as battery or CPU cycle. Selfishness and its threat to the network performance havebeen well studied by Roughgarden [23]. Incentive mechanisms have been proposed toencourage selfish nodes to be cooperative and to forward packets for others. Unfortunately,incentive mechanisms don’t work for malicious users since they never playby rules. Our proposed probing scheme can be used to detect and mitigate selfishnessproblem.3 Definitions and Assumptions3.1 Node StatesWe classify the states of a node as follows. A node is GOOD if it responds to probemessages for itself and forwards other probe messages along their source routes. A
156 M. Just, E. Kranakis, and T. Wannode is BAD if it responds to probe messages destined to itself but fails in forwardingprobe messages for others. A benign link failure may also be detected as BAD behaviorif it is not cleared by other mechanisms (e.g., route error in DSR). A node is consideredDOWN if 1) it is a neighbor node to the probing node and it doesn’t respond to probemessages; or 2) it is not a neighbor node and it doesn’t respond to probe messagesthrough all the known paths. A node is considered at the UNKNOWN state if on allknown paths from the probing node to the node, there exists at least one node in BADor DOWN state.3.2 AssumptionsProbe messages are indistinguishable from normal packets. One limitation of the probingtechnique is that it can be easily defeated if probe messages can be distinguishedfrom normal data packets. For example, a malicious node may forward probe messages,but drop all the other data packets, thereby avoiding detection. This assumption can berealized using end-to-end encryption of IP payload by pair-wise shared keys. Since amalicious node can understand only the IP header, it does not have the information ofupper layer protocols, such as TCP/UDP port numbers. By implementing the probingtechnique above the network layer (e.g., based UDP), an adversary will not be able todistinguish a probe message from a other data packet (e.g., HTTP or SMTP packet).Some other options are: 1) piggybacking a probe message on a normal data packetwhich requires acknowledgment, such as TCP SYN. The disadvantage is that such datapackets may not be available during the time of probing. 2) assuming that an adversarycannot modify the forwarding software of the compromised router. Therefore, theadversary can only make decisions based on IP addresses, which does not allow fordistinguishing a probe message from a normal data packet.Multi-hop source routing protocols. The probing technique assumes a multi-hopsource routing protocol since a probing node needs to specify the source route by whicha probe message takes to get to the destination. This assumption is practical since somerouting protocols, such as Dynamical Source Routing (DSR) [16], are multi-hop sourcerouting protocols.Bi-directional communication links. We assume that all communication links arebi-directional. This assumption is practical in some wireless networks, such as IEEE802.11 [1], where all links have to be bi-directional for link layer acknowledgment towork.4 The Distributed Probing SchemeIn order to monitor the behavior of mobile nodes by the probing technique, we needto decide which node should probe and how far it should probe. Given a network withn nodes, there are several interesting possibilities: 1) there is only one probing nodeand it probes all the other nodes; 2) there are k probing nodes (1
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Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2
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Samuel Pierre Michel BarbeauEvangel
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PrefaceAd Hoc Networks are wireless
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Program CommitteeG. Alonso, ETHZ, S
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XTable of ContentsResisting Malicio
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2 H. Dubois-Ferrière, M. Grossglau
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10 H. Dubois-Ferrière, M. Grossgla
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SAFAR: An Adaptive Bandwidth-Effici
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14 J. Doshi and P. Kilambiour proto
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16 J. Doshi and P. Kilambipacket th
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18 J. Doshi and P. Kilambibandwidth
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20 J. Doshi and P. Kilambi5 Simulat
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22 J. Doshi and P. Kilambiquery its
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24 J. Doshi and P. Kilambi4. David
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26 P. Narayan and V.R. SyrotiukThe
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28 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiuk2.2
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30 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiukrand
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32 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiukenti
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34 P. Narayan and V.R. SyrotiukDSRA
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36 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiuk7. A
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38 L. Qin and T. Kunzthese two prot
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40 L. Qin and T. Kunzsidered broken
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42 L. Qin and T. KunzP = Prdlog( )
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46 L. Qin and T. KunzFig. 5. Averag
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48 L. Qin and T. Kunz6. J. Broch et
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50 M. Diha and S. Pierrethe propose
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52 M. Diha and S. Pierre3. All proc
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54 M. Diha and S. Pierre3.3 Perform
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56 M. Diha and S. PierreCmip/Cprop0
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58 M. Diha and S. PierreThe tunneli
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Proactive QoS Routing in Ad Hoc Net
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62 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. LamontFig
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64 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. Lamontits
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66 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. Lamonttha
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Delivering Messagesin Disconnected
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Extending Seamless IP Multicast Edg
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88 P.M. Ruiz et al.Access NetworkCo
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90 P.M. Ruiz et al.Access NetworkR
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94 P.M. Ruiz et al.10.90.81-hop-750
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98 E.W. Grundke and A.N. Zincir-Hey
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100 E.W. Grundke and A.N. Zincir-He
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206 S. PatilAvg. Aggregate Energy C
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218 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidis1.8E+09
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280 B. Macabéo, S. Pierre, and A.
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3BerlinHeidelbergNew YorkHong KongL
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Series EditorsGerhard Goos, Karlsru
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Organizing CommitteeConference Co-c
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Table of ContentsSpace-Time Routing
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Author IndexAlonso, G. 104Bachir, A
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