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Preventing Replay Attacks for Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Networks 143the overhead caused by flooding the whole network. The packets are flooded ina small area (a ring) first defined by a starting TTL (time-to-live) in the IPheaders. After RING TRAVERSAL TIME, if no RREP has been received, theflooded area is enlarged by increasing the TTL by a fixed value. The procedureis repeated until an RREP is received by the originator of the RREQ, i.e., theroute has been found [2].Nodes in the network avoid their packets from being replayed by incrementinga sequence number and RREQ ID for each new packet. From the descriptionin the last paragraph, we can observe that the RREQ’s only exist within anarea. The nodes outside the area will never know the freshest sequence numbersand RREQ ID’s. It is trivial to simply record the RREQ of one node and thenbroadcast it in another area of the network. If the area where the packets arebroadcast to has up-to-date information, the packets will be simply discarded.If the information is out-of-date, the packets will provoke extra unnecessaryrounds of route discoveries. By performing this attack massively, a denial ofservice attack can be launched.This attack is illustrated in Fig.1. At time t0, attacker M overhears the RREQfrom A. At time t1, M replays the RREQ to B. Because B has not heard thefreshest RREQ, it will start processing the RREQ so an unnecessary round ofroute discovery is launched in the area.Fig. 1. RREQ Flooding AttackWormhole Attack. Wormhole attack has been described in [16]. Here weoutline it just for a review. In this kind of replay attack, a tunnel is formedbetween two nodes through which attackers can transmit packets in a speedfaster than the normal hop-by-hop propagation through legitimate wireless linksby using long range directional wireless links or even wired links.Figure 2 illustrates this attack. Node A wants to find out a route to nodeB. It broadcasts an RREQ which first reaches X and M1 (an attacker-could betransparent to the network). While X relays RREQ to its neighbors W and Y,M1 tunnels this request to M2 (another attacker) using a fast link. M2 broadcaststhis RREQ to Z, which in turn relays it to B. Since this is faster than thevalid route, the valid RREQ is suppressed, and this route is shorter, the maliciousroute A-M1-M2-Z-B is selected. Furthermore, if nodes near A are about to
144 J. Zhen and S. SrinivasFig. 2. Wormhole Attackcommunicate with nodes near B, they will also choose this route passing M1-M2.Then M1 and M2 can drop, delay or modify packets in transit.One severe problem is that performing both kind of attacks does not even requireattackers to have legitimate keys in the network since only packet recording,replay and MAC spoofing are needed and these can easily be achieved withoutidentification.3 Related WorkThere have been many proposals for securing routing protocols in MANET’s.Marti et. al. [8] propose a “watch-dog” mechanism by implementing an overhearingmodule at each node to check if the forwarding of the packet at the nextnode has been changed illegitimately. Zapata and Asokan [3][4] present a secureextension to the AODV protocol to protect packets from malicious modification.Papadimitratos and Haas [5][9] propose the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) toset up a secure association between two nodes, and a secure link state routingalgorithm. Hu et. al. [6]propose SEAD (Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance VectorRouting) to secure the algorithm using a one-way hash chain. In [10], Yi et. al.define security levels for each node to avoid routing through un-trusted nodes.In [12] by Dahill et. al., packets are signed hop-by-hop using PKI (AuthenticatedRouting for Ad Hoc Networks-ARAN). Other approaches are proposedto enhance co-operations among nodes in [13] by Buttyan and Hubauz and [14]by Buchegger and Boudec. Hu et. al. [7] propose Ariadne, a new secure routingprotocol.Hu et. al. [16] define the wormhole attack and propose a solution using packetleashes. Their solution needs extra hardware to provide geographic informationand all nodes in the network need their clocks to be synchronized. Also, it needsaccurate prediction of packet sending time and receiving time. These requirementsare not feasible for current common-used hardware and software.Multi-path routing protocols in which multiple paths are returned in eachroute discovery can reduce the impact of the wormhole attack because the traffic
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Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2
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Samuel Pierre Michel BarbeauEvangel
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PrefaceAd Hoc Networks are wireless
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Program CommitteeG. Alonso, ETHZ, S
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XTable of ContentsResisting Malicio
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2 H. Dubois-Ferrière, M. Grossglau
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10 H. Dubois-Ferrière, M. Grossgla
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SAFAR: An Adaptive Bandwidth-Effici
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14 J. Doshi and P. Kilambiour proto
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16 J. Doshi and P. Kilambipacket th
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18 J. Doshi and P. Kilambibandwidth
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20 J. Doshi and P. Kilambi5 Simulat
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22 J. Doshi and P. Kilambiquery its
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24 J. Doshi and P. Kilambi4. David
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26 P. Narayan and V.R. SyrotiukThe
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28 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiuk2.2
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30 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiukrand
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32 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiukenti
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34 P. Narayan and V.R. SyrotiukDSRA
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36 P. Narayan and V.R. Syrotiuk7. A
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38 L. Qin and T. Kunzthese two prot
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40 L. Qin and T. Kunzsidered broken
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42 L. Qin and T. KunzP = Prdlog( )
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46 L. Qin and T. KunzFig. 5. Averag
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48 L. Qin and T. Kunz6. J. Broch et
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50 M. Diha and S. Pierrethe propose
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52 M. Diha and S. Pierre3. All proc
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54 M. Diha and S. Pierre3.3 Perform
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56 M. Diha and S. PierreCmip/Cprop0
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58 M. Diha and S. PierreThe tunneli
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Proactive QoS Routing in Ad Hoc Net
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62 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. LamontFig
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64 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. Lamontits
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66 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. Lamonttha
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68 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. Lamontwhi
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70 Y. Ge, T. Kunz, and L. Lamontver
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Delivering Messagesin Disconnected
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74 R. Shah and N.C. Hutchinson3.1 T
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76 R. Shah and N.C. Hutchinsonset c
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78 R. Shah and N.C. HutchinsonTable
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80 R. Shah and N.C. HutchinsonOracl
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82 R. Shah and N.C. Hutchinsonthe r
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Extending Seamless IP Multicast Edg
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86 P.M. Ruiz et al.Section 4 presen
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88 P.M. Ruiz et al.Access NetworkCo
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90 P.M. Ruiz et al.Access NetworkR
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Page 127 and 128: Towards Adaptive WLAN Frequency Man
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Page 187 and 188: 176 G. Calinescuof the UDG 2-hops a
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194 S.O. Krumke et al.The following
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196 S.O. Krumke et al.1. Let α =6l
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198 S.O. Krumke et al.for any given
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200 S. PatilIDEA uses the concept o
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202 S. PatilAfter flooding the quer
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204 S. Patil5 Simulation ModelSourc
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206 S. PatilAvg. Aggregate Energy C
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208 S. PatilTable 1. Probability of
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210 S. Patilergy consumption of the
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212 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidisenergy
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214 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidisaim at
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216 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidis12: end
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218 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidis1.8E+09
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220 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidis2.0E+10
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222 T. Chu and I. Nikolaidisattack
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224 F.J. Molina, J. Barbancho, and
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248 C.J. Colbourn, V.R. Syrotiuk, a
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260 S. Bhadra and A. Ferreirathe mo
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272 M.K. Denko and Q.H. MahmoudAn i
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274 M.K. Denko and Q.H. Mahmoud3.1
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276 M.K. Denko and Q.H. Mahmoud5. D
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278 B. Macabéo, S. Pierre, and A.
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280 B. Macabéo, S. Pierre, and A.
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282 A. Benslimane and A. BachirIn [
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284 A. Benslimane and A. BachirFig.
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286 A. Benslimane and A. Bachir5 Co
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288 L. Hughes, K. Shumon, and Y. Zh
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3BerlinHeidelbergNew YorkHong KongL
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Series EditorsGerhard Goos, Karlsru
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Organizing CommitteeConference Co-c
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Table of ContentsSpace-Time Routing
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Author IndexAlonso, G. 104Bachir, A
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