Number 1<strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> <strong>Report</strong>Doing Business (<strong>20</strong>11) provides a picture on the enforcement of law in Kosovo byconsidering the number of days it takes to enforce a simple debt contract. As shown inTable 17, Kosovo compares well with other transition economies when it comes to enforcingcontracts. It outperforms most of SEE countries and, on average, even OECD countries. Ittakes 4<strong>20</strong> days to enforce a simple debt contract in Kosovo, while the SEE average is 506days, the CEE average 547 days, the CIS average 301 days and the OECD average 518days. The average number of days for the enforcement of a contract in Kosovo in <strong>20</strong>10substantially increased compared to year <strong>20</strong>05 (Table 17). This can be attributed to thecredit growth during this period while the number of cases sent to courts continuouslyincreased.The enforcement of contracts in Kosovo, however, may be impeded by the high cost ofcontract enforcement, which is higher than in all transition economies and OECDcountries. According to Doing Business (<strong>20</strong>11), the cost of enforcing a contract in Kosovo, onaverage, accounts for 61 percent of the debt, while the average for SEE countries is 34percent, for CEE countries 28 percent, for CIS countries 24 percent and for OECD countries<strong>20</strong> percent.Table 17. Contract Enforcement Days, Cost of Enforcement and Rule of LawIndexContract Enforcement Days Cost (% of debt) Rule of Law Index<strong>20</strong>05 <strong>20</strong>10 <strong>20</strong>05 <strong>20</strong>10 <strong>20</strong>05 <strong>20</strong>09Kosovo 153 4<strong>20</strong> … 61 -0.9 ‐0.5Albania 390 390 39 39 -0.8 ‐0.5Bosnia and Herzegovina 330 595 38 40 -0.6 ‐0.4Bulgaria 440 564 24 24 -0.1 ‐0.1Croatia 415 561 14 14 0.2 0.2Macedonia 335 370 33 33 -0.3 ‐0.2Romania 509 512 <strong>20</strong> 29 -0.1 0.1Serbia 1028 635 33 29 -0.9 ‐0.4SEE (average) 450 506 29 34 -0.4 ‐0.2CEE (average) 442 547 24 28 0.6 0.4CIS (average) 331 301 24 24 -0.9 ‐0.8OECD (average) 280 518 <strong>20</strong> <strong>20</strong> 1.6 1.3Source: World Bank, Doing Business (<strong>20</strong>11)However, World Bank’s ‘Governance Indicators’ paint a less favourable picture for lawenforcement in Kosovo compared to the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’, which is mainlyattributed to methodological changes. 16 .The Rule of Law Index, which is measured based onvarious aspects of the quality of institutions, reflects, among others, civil liberties, thefreedom of press, political rights, crime, infrastructure, enforceability of government andprivate contracts, speediness and fairness of judicial process. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 anda higher score corresponds to better law enforcement. The Rule of Law Index suggests that16 ‘Governance Indicators’ measure different aspects of the quality of institutions, such as political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, controlof corruption and rule of law.84 |
<strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> <strong>Report</strong>Number 1Kosovo lags behind the average of SEE countries with respect to the law enforcement(Table 17). In <strong>20</strong>09, the Rule of Law Index for Kosovo was ranked at -0.5 which is lowercompared to the average of SEE, CEE and OECD countries, but higher than the average ofCIS countries. Based on this methodology, the law enforcement in Kosovo in year <strong>20</strong>09improved compared to <strong>20</strong>05 when it stood at -0.9.10.3. The lender-borrower litigation process: an empirical studyThe previous section treated the enforcement of creditor rights in Kosovo, based onContract Enforcement Days (CED) and the Rule of Law Index (RLI). However, theseindicators have their drawbacks either because they may fail to fully capture the context oflender-borrower relationship (i.e. Contract Enforcement Days) or are multidimensional (i.e.Rule of Law Index). In this context, CED is constructed by specifying the time it takes forcourts to handle two types of cases: the eviction of residential tenant for non-payment ofrent and the collection of a cheque returned for non-payment. As such, the time needed forthe enforcement of a contract in these cases may not necessarily explain the lenderborrowerrelationship. Regarding the RLI, although it embodies some characteristicsrelated to the efficiency of contract enforcement such as the enforceability of privatecontracts, the fairness of judicial system and the speediness of judicial process, it containsdiverse other dimensions such as organized crime, violent crime and costs of crime, civilliberties, the freedom of press, political rights, infrastructure, etc. Even though thesemeasures may be good proxies for law enforcement in a particular country, they are amixture of indicators and reflect the general institutional setting. As such, the RLI does notexplicitly deal with law enforcement in the lender-borrower relationship.The need to concentrate on laws in practice in transition economies, explicitly with regardto the lender-borrower relationship, led the EBRD to embark on a New Legal IndicatorSurvey (hereinafter NLIS<strong>20</strong>03) aimed at helping credit providers assess the potentialadvantages of taking security, highlighting strengths and weaknesses of the legalframework for collateral and giving a basis for objective comparison. By trying to capturecommercial reality, the key concern of the survey was how effectively the process ofenforcement of movable collateral works in practice.As described in EBRD (<strong>20</strong>03), for the law enforcement survey a case study methodology wasadopted and an imaginary case was presented to commercial lawyers in transitioneconomies. They were asked to evaluate how the bank can enforce their rights in a case ofborrower default. The evaluation had three dimensions: (i) how much of the loan thecreditor can recover; (ii) how fast the creditor can recover the loan; and (iii) how simple isthe recovery procedure (amount, time and simplicity). In addition, 12 additional questionsconcerning the process of enforcement were asked to highlight the influence of third partiesin this process. For example, within the process factors if the debtor can obstruct theprocess then that would have implications for the amount, time and simplicity dimensionsin the enforcement process. The scope factors of enforcement would show how the responsesmight be affected if some circumstances would change. For example, to what extent theenforcement would be affected if the debtor files for bankruptcy, or how the enforcementwould be affected if immovables are pledged as collateral.In order to provide a more up-to-date picture on the enforcement of creditor rights withregard to the lender-borrower relationship in Kosovo, the Central Bank of the Republic ofKosovo conducted a survey with banks operating in Kosovo in <strong>20</strong>10, based on the NLIS| 85