Financial Stability Report No1 20 December 2010 - Banka Qendrore ...
Financial Stability Report No1 20 December 2010 - Banka Qendrore ... Financial Stability Report No1 20 December 2010 - Banka Qendrore ...
Number 1Financial Stability Reporteconomies. Third chapter presents the macroeconomic developments in the region pointingout the similarities of their developments despite different monetary and exchange rateregimes that countries implemented to stabilize their economies. Financial sectordevelopment in the region is presented in chapter four. It is shown that financial crisis didaffect the SEE countries although they still experience relative abundance of financialsources to support the economic growth. Potential sources of economic catch-up of theregion are presented in chapter five. Chapter six concludes.8.2 What have we learned in the last twenty years of transition?At the time the transition began, there was little experience with the processes of economictransformation. Guidance and western expertise were drawn on general principles andexperiences from structural reforms in developing countries. The Latin American countriesserved as a starting point in designing the programs of macroeconomic stabilizationalthough starting points in those countries were substantially different from the emergingproblems in transition economies. However, the facts on distinguishable characteristics oftransition economies were mainly learned while the transformation had already begun andwell before the evidence could be gathered.What economists knew a priori about restructuring and transformation was that theinflation stabilization was necessary for the resumption of growth. However, the strikingproblem at the beginning of transition was the enormous fall in output ranging from 30 to50 % accompanied by a high inflationary environment. Although the transitionencompasses a wide horizon of institutional and political changes, macroeconomicstabilization and restructuring of the ill-designed economies, it was the inflation and outputperformance in the first days of transition that occupied economists across the world. Anextension of the problem and lack of experience of economic transformation from centrallyplanned to market-oriented economies generated surprise on a great scale. All advise andhelp to design the reforms had to be drawn on general economic principles or - somehow toa lesser extent - lessons from structural reforms in developing countries.While countries started the transition with different sets of starting positions eitherregarding political environment or unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, they all haveexperienced the common challenge of transforming their economies from a centrallyplanned system to a market-oriented framework. This has transformed a rather differentassessment of structural changes across the region to a uniform process of transition thathas taken place during the last decade. Experiences with the transition process weredifferent from country to country in the region, however, all tried to focus on the mostpending problem in their economies, namely, how to curb the inflation rates which weremitigating the success of all other reforms.Although the Central and Eastern European countries have adopted different exchangerate regimes, they have all experienced real appreciation as well as large inflows of capitalin a relatively short time span . Although capital inflows were not the most important issueat the beginning of the transition, the relevance of the presence of foreign capital intransition economies have become substantial just after the first shock of political andeconomic transformation had slowly started to die out. Those economies that were fast inrestructuring and privatization of state and social entities where among the first to enjoythe positive effects of fresh foreign capital. It is true that surge in foreign capital inflowswas associated with new problems in terms of pressures on external competitiveness;60 |
Financial Stability ReportNumber 1however, it seems that negative effects of capital inflows were mainly offset by early growthrecovery. In contrast, those economies that were slow in adopting reform measures andmainly attracted foreign capital into the government debt instruments to finance theirincreasing budget deficits have suffered from balance of payments and financial crises.The choice of fundamental macroeconomic policy in the design of a stabilization programwas even more pronounced in transition economies with special reflection on theimportance of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy in transition economies does not only entail thecontrol over the budget deficit, but also involves the issue of reducing the role of thegovernment in the economy. However, to tackle inflationary pressure was not the only areaof action needed to bring transition economies on the right track of transformation andrestructuring toward market economies. The need for action in transition economies waswidely recognized in six areas (Fisher, Sahay, and Vegh, 1996):- macroeconomic stabilization;- price liberalization;- trade liberalization and current account convertibility;- enterprise reform (especially privatization);- creation of a safety net; and- development of the institutional and legal framework for a market economy,including the creation of a market-based financial system.There were few authors 11 in the 90’especially emphasized the importance of building theinstitutional arrangements, since there is danger of informal institutionalization that fillsthe systemic vacuum. One cannot separate one area of action from the others. However,sound macroeconomic stabilization was necessary for the success of all other reforms, sinceit forced some state enterprises to contract as a consequence of the implementation of hardbudgetconstraints and pushed people into a new private sector. In some respects, economicreforms in transition economies can be compared to reforms introduced in Latin Americancountries (Bruno, 1992). However, the extent of institutional reforms required in transitioneconomies was much greater and demanded the change of fundamental characteristics ofthe institutional legacy of the centrally-planned regime.8.3 Macroeconomic Developments in South-Eastern EuropeAfter twenty years of political turmoil and uncertain economic developments economies ofthe South Eastern Europe 12 are struggling with reaching their growth potential. Beinggeographically far from EU common market if one does take into account that trade flowswith Greece and Bulgaria which are EU member countries are relatively modest, the SEEcountries are mostly left on their own in the process of reinvigorating their economicdevelopment. As it will be shown the thrust of the problem lies in the lack of appropriatedevelopment of the market institutions which mitigates the effects of initial positivemacroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic liberalization.11 Wyplosz (1999) and Kolodko (1999).12 Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, and Montenegro.| 61
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Number 1<strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> <strong>Report</strong>economies. Third chapter presents the macroeconomic developments in the region pointingout the similarities of their developments despite different monetary and exchange rateregimes that countries implemented to stabilize their economies. <strong>Financial</strong> sectordevelopment in the region is presented in chapter four. It is shown that financial crisis didaffect the SEE countries although they still experience relative abundance of financialsources to support the economic growth. Potential sources of economic catch-up of theregion are presented in chapter five. Chapter six concludes.8.2 What have we learned in the last twenty years of transition?At the time the transition began, there was little experience with the processes of economictransformation. Guidance and western expertise were drawn on general principles andexperiences from structural reforms in developing countries. The Latin American countriesserved as a starting point in designing the programs of macroeconomic stabilizationalthough starting points in those countries were substantially different from the emergingproblems in transition economies. However, the facts on distinguishable characteristics oftransition economies were mainly learned while the transformation had already begun andwell before the evidence could be gathered.What economists knew a priori about restructuring and transformation was that theinflation stabilization was necessary for the resumption of growth. However, the strikingproblem at the beginning of transition was the enormous fall in output ranging from 30 to50 % accompanied by a high inflationary environment. Although the transitionencompasses a wide horizon of institutional and political changes, macroeconomicstabilization and restructuring of the ill-designed economies, it was the inflation and outputperformance in the first days of transition that occupied economists across the world. Anextension of the problem and lack of experience of economic transformation from centrallyplanned to market-oriented economies generated surprise on a great scale. All advise andhelp to design the reforms had to be drawn on general economic principles or - somehow toa lesser extent - lessons from structural reforms in developing countries.While countries started the transition with different sets of starting positions eitherregarding political environment or unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, they all haveexperienced the common challenge of transforming their economies from a centrallyplanned system to a market-oriented framework. This has transformed a rather differentassessment of structural changes across the region to a uniform process of transition thathas taken place during the last decade. Experiences with the transition process weredifferent from country to country in the region, however, all tried to focus on the mostpending problem in their economies, namely, how to curb the inflation rates which weremitigating the success of all other reforms.Although the Central and Eastern European countries have adopted different exchangerate regimes, they have all experienced real appreciation as well as large inflows of capitalin a relatively short time span . Although capital inflows were not the most important issueat the beginning of the transition, the relevance of the presence of foreign capital intransition economies have become substantial just after the first shock of political andeconomic transformation had slowly started to die out. Those economies that were fast inrestructuring and privatization of state and social entities where among the first to enjoythe positive effects of fresh foreign capital. It is true that surge in foreign capital inflowswas associated with new problems in terms of pressures on external competitiveness;60 |