Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

the legislative power contained in the IP clause.141However, that was not the end of the matter and the SupremeCourt proceeded to test the validity of the statute against theCommerce Clause. As the Commerce Clause at that time wasnarrowly construed, the legislation was not upheld. Since thattime, an expanding view of the ambit of the Commerce Clausemeans that today the modern variant of this trademark law, theLanham Act, is seen to be an exercise of the commerce clause.142The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarised this point,saying that “although the 1876 Act did not survive due to therestrictive view of the Commerce Clause prevailing at that time,the Supreme Court’s analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases stands forthe proposition that legislation, which would not be permittedunder the Copyright Clause, could nonetheless be permitted underthe Commerce Clause, provided that the independentrequirements of the latter are met.”143However, the Court noted that another line of authority stoodin contrast to the Trade-Mark Cases and needed moreconsideration. In Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,144the Supreme Court considered a statute enacted by Congress thatpurported to alter a pending bankruptcy case by requiring thedebtor railroad company’s bankruptcy estate to pay $75 million tothe company’s former employees. That statute directly clashedwith the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution,145which provides that Congress is empowered to pass “uniform”bankruptcy laws, because the law targeted a particular situationand was anything but uniform. The Supreme Court rejected theview that the legislation could nevertheless be sustained underthe Commerce Clause, which contains no uniformity requirement,stating that “if we were to hold that Congress had the power toenact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the CommerceClause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation onthe power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”146 The Court141. See id. at 96-98.142. See Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally MandatedOriginality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1461,1467 (1992).143. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278.144. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).145. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4146. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69.