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Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

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even by the plaintiffs today.86The plaintiffs were also unsuccessful on the issue <strong>of</strong> “limitedTimes.” The court explained that, at widest, if “Congress were[sic] to make copyright protection permanent, then it surely wouldexceed the power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause.”87 Itwent on to dispose <strong>of</strong> the argument at hand by saying:The present plaintiffs want a limit well short <strong>of</strong> the ruleagainst perpetuities, <strong>of</strong> course. And they claim to havefound it—or at least a bar to extending the life <strong>of</strong> asubsisting copyright—in the preamble <strong>of</strong> the CopyrightClause: “The Congress shall have power . . . To promotethe Progress <strong>of</strong> Science and useful Arts . . . .” Their ideais that the phrase “limited Times” should be interpretednot literally but rather as reaching only as far as isjustified by the preambular statement <strong>of</strong> purpose: If 50years are enough to “promote . . . Progress,” then a grant<strong>of</strong> 70 years is unconstitutional. Here the plaintiffs runsquarely up against our holding in Schnapper v. Foley, inwhich we rejected the argument “that the introductorylanguage <strong>of</strong> the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit oncongressional power.” The plaintiffs, however, disclaimany purpose to question the holding <strong>of</strong> Schnapper; indeed,they expressly acknowledge “that the preamble <strong>of</strong> theCopyright Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress’legislative power.” Their argument is simply that “theSupreme Court has interpreted the terms ‘Authors’ and‘Writings’ in light <strong>of</strong> that preamble, and that this Courtshould do the same with ‘limited Times.’”The problems with this argument are manifest. First,one cannot concede that the preamble “is not asubstantive limit” and yet maintain that it limits thepermissible duration <strong>of</strong> a copyright more strictly thandoes the textual requirement that it be for a “limitedTime.” Second, although the plaintiffs claim that Feistsupports using the preamble to interpret the rest <strong>of</strong> theClause, the Court in Feist never so much as mentions thepreamble, let alone suggests that the preamble informs86. Id. at 376-77.87. Id. at 377.

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