Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law

with respect to “patents of inventions” was limited by certaintraditional principles of patent law. They argued that:there were certain fixed minimum requirements for the“intellectual effort” required of inventors respectingnovelty and inventive steps;there was a crucial distinction between process andproduct claims andthe term “patents” imports a constitutional requirementof the scope of the monopoly rights which must begranted and limits the permissible statutoryqualifications to those rights.73The court rejected those arguments, finding that the legislativescheme before it was sufficiently connected to the notion of“patents of invention.” While inventive step, novelty and exclusiverights might be determined differently than they would under thePatents Act, 1990, that did not mean that the legislation was notwith respect to the subject matter of “patents of invention.” Inother words, the fact that the legislation invoked unique notions ofnovelty, inventive step and exclusive rights in relation to plantbreeding did not mean the legislation was beyond parliamentarypower to legislate with respect to “patents of inventions.”At a broader level, the plaintiff contended that theenumerated head of legislative power in the constitution did notsupport the Varieties and Breeders Act.74 In particular, theyclaimed that the head of power should not be read so as to supportlegislation granting rights for products of every level ofintellectual effort.75The majority commenced its reasoning by quoting from thejoint judgment of the High Court in Nintendo Co. Ltd. v.Centronics Systems Pty. Ltd.,76 upholding the validity of theCircuit Layouts Act, 1989, where the court considered theconstruction of the terms of section 51(xviii):The grant of Commonwealth legislative power whichsustains the [Circuit Layouts Act] is that contained in s73. Id. at para. 12.74. Id. at para. 17.75. Id.76. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 134 (Austl.).