Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
material that appears questionable as regards copyright ordefamation law, without any requirement that ISPs affirmativelyestablish that such information is in fact unprotected. Such broadremoval discretion, with or without notice of alleged impropercontent or infringement, would impede the right of free speech forindividual Internet users.To rectify this problem while still applying the functionspecificprovisions of OCILLA and the E-Commerce Directive toAmerican defamation law, the notice-and-take-down requirementsoutlined in OCILLA could be softened in the defamation context.One possibility for softening OCILLA’s take-down requirementwould be requiring those claiming to be the victim of defamationto approach an ISP not with an allegation of inappropriate contenton its system, but rather with a court injunction, specifying thatthe speech is unprotected and should be removed from theInternet.203 Since the alleged victim of defamation carries theburden of proving that the other party’s speech is in fact false anddefamatory in a courtroom setting, such a showing should also beappropriate to restrict the open forum for free speech that existson the Internet. Requiring such a heightened showing to sanctionthe removal of material based on its content is consistent with theheightened freedom of speech that is guaranteed by the FirstAmendment.204 Also, since the heightened removal standardwould apply only where content was concerned, it would notimpede the privileges of copyright owners under the BerneConvention, which establishes that copyright owners shall not berequired to actively enforce their rights of ownership to retain itsprivileges.205203. Several scholars discussing the reality of a horizontal application of ISP safeharbors have endorsed the need for a court to weigh the competing interests of thevictims of defamation against those of Internet operators before resorting to automaticremoval and the resulting imposition on freedom of expression. See Lucas, supra note162, at 278; see also Dun & Bradsreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,756-61 (1985) (discussing, among other things, the need to balance the compelling stateinterest in enforcing defamation law against the First Amendment’s interest inallowing the free flow of speech in public debate, and how this balance is altered by thestatus of the victim as a public or private figure and the subject matter of the speech);Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48 (1974).204. See U.S. Const. amend I.205. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online CopyrightLiability Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2281 and 2280 Before the House Subcomm.On Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 58(1997).
CONCLUSIONThe Internet has continually expanded over the past decade,becoming an invaluable medium for communication on a globallevel.206 To efficiently enforce defamation and copyright lawonline, the liability of both individuals and Internet providersmust be easily determined and to some degree predictable. Itshould also be reflective of the roles that individual users andInternet service providers actually play in the digital world.Sometimes ISPs exercise no control over material that they sendvia the Internet, and act only as a conduit. In other instances, therole of the ISP is much more involved, and its knowledge of thecontent it produces is arguably greater. The blanket immunitythat the CDA offers Internet providers allows ISPs to act aspublishers and distributors of online content without facingliability for this role. This provision is outmoded. Defamation lawcan be better enforced on the Internet by employing a unified setof specific safe harbor provisions for ISPs that relate to thedifferent aspects of their online activities. Such a unified,horizontal approach to ISP liability is being constructed effectivelyin Europe.207 OCILLA’s negotiated provisions limiting ISPliability in the copyright context accurately address the role of anISP in transmitting information, and can be adequately modifiedfor application in a defamation context without improperlychilling free speech online. Such a unified standard will bettermeet the needs of users, providers, and defamation law in theUnited States.Lucy H. Holmes206. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”:Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1466, 1466 (1995).207. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11.
- Page 206 and 207: to by industry groups, with the res
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- Page 212 and 213: worth a thousand words. Picture a d
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- Page 216 and 217: law is a complex one.125 Although s
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material that appears questionable as regards copyright ordefamation law, without any requirement that ISPs affirmativelyestablish that such information is in fact unprotected. Such broadremoval discretion, with or without notice <strong>of</strong> alleged impropercontent or infringement, would impede the right <strong>of</strong> free speech forindividual Internet users.To rectify this problem while still applying the functionspecificprovisions <strong>of</strong> OCILLA and the E-Commerce Directive toAmerican defamation law, the notice-and-take-down requirementsoutlined in OCILLA could be s<strong>of</strong>tened in the defamation context.One possibility for s<strong>of</strong>tening OCILLA’s take-down requirementwould be requiring those claiming to be the victim <strong>of</strong> defamationto approach an ISP not with an allegation <strong>of</strong> inappropriate contenton its system, but rather with a court injunction, specifying thatthe speech is unprotected and should be removed from theInternet.203 Since the alleged victim <strong>of</strong> defamation carries theburden <strong>of</strong> proving that the other party’s speech is in fact false anddefamatory in a courtroom setting, such a showing should also beappropriate to restrict the open forum for free speech that existson the Internet. Requiring such a heightened showing to sanctionthe removal <strong>of</strong> material based on its content is consistent with theheightened freedom <strong>of</strong> speech that is guaranteed by the FirstAmendment.204 Also, since the heightened removal standardwould apply only where content was concerned, it would notimpede the privileges <strong>of</strong> copyright owners under the BerneConvention, which establishes that copyright owners shall not berequired to actively enforce their rights <strong>of</strong> ownership to retain itsprivileges.205203. Several scholars discussing the reality <strong>of</strong> a horizontal application <strong>of</strong> ISP safeharbors have endorsed the need for a court to weigh the competing interests <strong>of</strong> thevictims <strong>of</strong> defamation against those <strong>of</strong> Internet operators before resorting to automaticremoval and the resulting imposition on freedom <strong>of</strong> expression. See Lucas, supra note162, at 278; see also Dun & Bradsreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,756-61 (1985) (discussing, among other things, the need to balance the compelling stateinterest in enforcing defamation law against the First Amendment’s interest inallowing the free flow <strong>of</strong> speech in public debate, and how this balance is altered by thestatus <strong>of</strong> the victim as a public or private figure and the subject matter <strong>of</strong> the speech);Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48 (1974).204. See U.S. Const. amend I.205. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and Online CopyrightLiability Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2281 and 2280 Before the House Subcomm.On Courts and Intellectual Property <strong>of</strong> the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 58(1997).