Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
defamation.184 One case that illustrates the impact of a possiblenotice and take-down regime on ISP liability is the recent U.K.case, Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited.185In Godfrey, a British math, physics, and computer sciencelecturer sued Demon, a prominent Internet service provider inEngland and Wales, over a defamatory newsgroup posting thatthe provider carried on its service.186 While the actual third-partyuser who originally posted the defamatory statement remainsunknown, it was established that the posting originated in theUnited States with a different ISP.187 Demon’s sole connectionwith the statement was the fact that it carried the particularnewsgroup containing the defamatory content on its service.188The statement in question was “squalid, obscene and defamatoryof the plaintiff” and purported to come from the plaintiff, althoughhis name was misspelled.189 When Godfrey discovered thedefamatory newsgroup posting, he notified the managing directorof Demon that the posting was a forgery and requested that it beremoved from Demon’s Use-net news server.190 Although Demonadmitted receiving the message, and could have “obliterated theposting,” they did not remove the allegedly defamatory materialfrom their server until it naturally expired.191In deciding Godfrey, the court applied the U.K. DefamationAct of 1996,192 which, like the DMCA, provides safe harbors or“defences” limiting ISP liability as a publisher of third-partycontent when the provider can show that he was not the “author,editor, or publisher” of the defamatory statement;193 that he took“reasonable care” in relation to the statement;194 and that he “didnot know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did causedor contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.”195While the court concluded that Demon was not the actual184. See Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 108.185. 1999 WL 477647 (Q.B. Mar. 26, 1999).186. See id. at *2.187. See id.188. See id.189. See id.190. See id. at *3.191. See Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *3.192. See id. (quoting from the U.K. Defamation Act of 1996).193. See id.194. See id.195. See id. at *3.
publisher of the statement in question,196 it held that the providerwas ineligible for the liability limitation provided by the act.197Since Demon was notified of the defamatory statement and didnothing, the court concluded that the ISP had failed to exercisethe reasonable care required by the Act.198 The court also heldthat Demon, after notification by Godfrey, was in possession ofsufficient information to make the ISP aware that its actions werecontributing to the publication of a defamatory statement.199Because the ISP did not take affirmative action to remove theallegedly defamatory material after Godfrey’s notification, it lostthe liability limitation that the Defamation Act would haveotherwise provided it.200 As a result, the court held Demon liablefor the third-party defamatory statements posted on its service.201Although Godfrey was not decided under the provisionsrecited in the E-Commerce Directive, the Godfrey case is anexample of how strict adherence to a notice and take-downrequirement can result in chilling free speech. As Godfreyillustrates, an ISP under this regime must remove anyproblematic material as soon as it receives notice that theinformation is either defamatory or infringing copyright law toprotect itself from liability. Further, both the Directive andOCILLA recognize liability for ISPs when the provider shouldhave been aware of facts or circumstances making infringementapparent.202 If the reasoning applied in Godfrey is followed, ISPscould be held liable under these provisions for failing to remove196. See id.197. See Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *3.198. See id.199. See id.200. See id. at *7.201. See id. In deciding Godfrey, the court cited the American defamation casesdealing with ISP liability before the CDA, and then distinguished the court’sapplication of the CDA’s complete content immunity for ISPs in Zeran, noting that theBritish Defamation Act “did not adopt this approach or have this purpose.” SeeGodfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *8. The Godfrey court also distinguished Lunney’scommon law approach to limiting ISP liability by noting that under English commonlaw Prodigy would have been regarded as the publisher of its user’s third party contentrather than a passive conduit. See id. By this discussion, the Godfrey court illustratesthe massive liability that British ISPs faced under common law defamation principles,and how this liability has been significantly softened by recent statutory provisions likethe Defamation Act, which work to create safe harbors for ISPs.202. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c), (d) (Supp. IV 1998); Council Directive 2000/31/EC,2000 O.J. (L 178); see also Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 110; Köhler & Burmeister,supra note 159, at 499.
- Page 204 and 205: principles articulated in several i
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publisher <strong>of</strong> the statement in question,196 it held that the providerwas ineligible for the liability limitation provided by the act.197Since Demon was notified <strong>of</strong> the defamatory statement and didnothing, the court concluded that the ISP had failed to exercisethe reasonable care required by the Act.198 The court also heldthat Demon, after notification by Godfrey, was in possession <strong>of</strong>sufficient information to make the ISP aware that its actions werecontributing to the publication <strong>of</strong> a defamatory statement.199Because the ISP did not take affirmative action to remove theallegedly defamatory material after Godfrey’s notification, it lostthe liability limitation that the Defamation Act would haveotherwise provided it.200 As a result, the court held Demon liablefor the third-party defamatory statements posted on its service.201Although Godfrey was not decided under the provisionsrecited in the E-Commerce Directive, the Godfrey case is anexample <strong>of</strong> how strict adherence to a notice and take-downrequirement can result in chilling free speech. As Godfreyillustrates, an ISP under this regime must remove anyproblematic material as soon as it receives notice that theinformation is either defamatory or infringing copyright law toprotect itself from liability. Further, both the Directive andOCILLA recognize liability for ISPs when the provider shouldhave been aware <strong>of</strong> facts or circumstances making infringementapparent.202 If the reasoning applied in Godfrey is followed, ISPscould be held liable under these provisions for failing to remove196. See id.197. See Godfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *3.198. See id.199. See id.200. See id. at *7.201. See id. In deciding Godfrey, the court cited the American defamation casesdealing with ISP liability before the CDA, and then distinguished the court’sapplication <strong>of</strong> the CDA’s complete content immunity for ISPs in Zeran, noting that theBritish Defamation Act “did not adopt this approach or have this purpose.” SeeGodfrey, 1999 WL 477647 at *8. The Godfrey court also distinguished Lunney’scommon law approach to limiting ISP liability by noting that under English commonlaw Prodigy would have been regarded as the publisher <strong>of</strong> its user’s third party contentrather than a passive conduit. See id. By this discussion, the Godfrey court illustratesthe massive liability that British ISPs faced under common law defamation principles,and how this liability has been significantly s<strong>of</strong>tened by recent statutory provisions likethe Defamation Act, which work to create safe harbors for ISPs.202. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c), (d) (Supp. IV 1998); Council Directive 2000/31/EC,2000 O.J. (L 178); see also Julia-Barcelo, supra note 11, at 110; Köhler & Burmeister,supra note 159, at 499.