Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law Vol 7 No 1 - Roger Williams University School of Law
the intellectual property balance of that regime, may givelicensees of information certain use and other rights that may notbe varied by contract.138 However, an examination of these rights,and the extent to which they are mandatory, is only the beginningof the analysis.139The second and larger question is what the appropriateframework should be for protection of rights in data. As ProfessorRochelle Dreyfus has noted, there is a balance struck in everyintellectual property scheme proposed (copyright, trademark,patent): the right of the creator inventor to exploit and the right ofthe public to use.140 Of course, the balance struck in the UnitedStates is not necessarily the same as the balance struck in othercountries: the inability to reach international consensus onappropriate international intellectual property schemes raises thepossibility of similar difficulties in attempts to reach internationalconsensus on appropriate private contractual schemes controllingthe right to use information. UCITA is one-sided to the extentthat it allows licensors of information to change that balance, i.e.,by allowing a creator of information to tie up that informationlonger, or for more uses, than would be allowed by IP law, withoutrecognition of the public domain and its importance:Each [intellectual property] regime premised is aroundleaks. Each depends upon information being private forlong enough for the creators to earn a profit, but theneach permits the information to leak—drip—into a placewhere the public can use it freely. UCITA, in contrast,finds every hole, and then either plugs it or allows thecontracting parties to plug it. Under UCITA, a licensor138. See, e.g., Murumba, supra note 70, at 107 (discussing such issues underAustralian law and the use of licenses “to destroy the delicate balance between theprivate and public domains that copyright in particular, and intellectual property ingeneral, have maintained over the years”).139. UCITA recognizes that some of its provisions may be preempted by federallaw such as copyright; if federal law invalidates a contract term, then federal lawcontrols. It further recognizes that a license provision may be unenforceable because itcontravenes fundamental public policy “to the extent that the interest in enforcementis clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the term.” UCITA §105. Provisions such as these avoid, rather than confront, the more critical issues ofwhat those laws or policies should be—which is of course the subject of the ongoingintellectual property law debates. Query whether it is not better to get the balanceright at the outset, rather than to depend upon an external body of law to draw thelimits on enforceability.140. Dreyfuss, Marketplace, supra note 124.
can “take out” a licensee—put a licensee out ofcompetition in the licensor’s creative market forever. Alicensor can bar fair use, reverse engineering, follow-oninventions, and new applications. The licensor canrequire grantbacks, tie ins and tie outs. What is more,UCITA is very efficient. It facilitates mass marketcontracts, and it makes sure those restrictions areimposed on successive licensees and remote purchasers,even when those purchasers are not aware of what theyare letting themselves in for. . . . In the final analysis,what UCITA does is this: in the name of promotingexploitation of this generation of works, it hobbles futuregenerations of creators.141The acceptability of such provisions internationally is far fromclear. As one commentator observed: “from a Europeanperspective, . . . [t]he combination of contract and technology posesa direct threat to the copyright system as we know it, and mayrequire an entierly new body of information law to safeguard thepublic domain.”142 On the other hand, another commentator hasnoted that “most of the European laws’ limitations on copyrightlaws are not mandatory in my view: licensors and licensees canestablish their own regulations for themselves, disregarding thelimitation to the copyright that benefit all people not bound bycontract.”143Whether or not one ultimately agrees with these observations,the point is that adoption of UCITA-like principles on theinternational level without a full inquiry into the merits of sucharguments would be undesirable. Enactment of a uniforminformation transaction code without a “coherent, integralinformation policy”—or at least without consideration of such apolicy—would be dangerous.144141. Id. at 52-53.142. See Hugenholtz, supra note 78, at 78-79 (footnote omitted).143. Dessemontet, supra note 104, at 76.144. Dreyfus, Marketplace, supra note 124; see also Murumba, supra note 70, at 92.Although they effect fundamental changes, these legislative initiatives aresometimes characterized as just an effort to systematize or reconfiguretransactional law into a form useable in the digital environment, but thevigorous worldwide debate which has surrounded these initiatives—especially UCITA—indicates that there is much more at stake here thanmere systematization or adaptation . . . . [What] is at stake is no less thanthe very foundations of an emerging law of the digital domain. In the context
- Page 168 and 169: ural and remote areas, where access
- Page 170 and 171: as “high-speed telecommunications
- Page 172 and 173: decrease innovation.30 On the other
- Page 174 and 175: could be called a trespass, since a
- Page 176 and 177: inform what permissible access and
- Page 178 and 179: Universal Music Group uses software
- Page 180 and 181: Taking UCITA on the Road: WhatLesso
- Page 182 and 183: the debate has centered on whether
- Page 184 and 185: It is against this background that
- Page 186 and 187: similarities as well as differences
- Page 188 and 189: as well, such as the American Bar A
- Page 190 and 191: American Law Institute refused to p
- Page 192 and 193: enactment of the draft. This led to
- Page 194 and 195: such application.35 To the extent,
- Page 196 and 197: transactions involving goods other
- Page 198 and 199: quite controversial.49 As the histo
- Page 200 and 201: provisions of Article 2 (based in p
- Page 202 and 203: form license of information.63 Alth
- Page 204 and 205: principles articulated in several i
- Page 206 and 207: to by industry groups, with the res
- Page 208 and 209: powers going well beyond the UNIDRO
- Page 210 and 211: Contracts deals with unfair terms i
- Page 212 and 213: worth a thousand words. Picture a d
- Page 214 and 215: types of provisions being sought by
- Page 216 and 217: law is a complex one.125 Although s
- Page 220 and 221: Other Substantive IssuesThere are,
- Page 222 and 223: law,153 and many of UCITA’s provi
- Page 224 and 225: nature of law-making both domestica
- Page 226 and 227: Transactions Act).
- Page 228 and 229: acts of copyright infringement.7 Un
- Page 230 and 231: these rights.I. ISP LIABILITY FOR T
- Page 232 and 233: Cubby, the court in Stratton Oakmon
- Page 234 and 235: liability for third-party content.5
- Page 236 and 237: network and removed the edition of
- Page 238 and 239: subscribers’ conversations.84 Fur
- Page 240 and 241: holder.92 Contributory liability ap
- Page 242 and 243: and Klemesrud on the counts of dire
- Page 244 and 245: eport, the White Paper on Intellect
- Page 246 and 247: imposed ISP liability both in insta
- Page 248 and 249: any infringing material either upon
- Page 250 and 251: provider liability, the European Co
- Page 252 and 253: of a defamatory statement.While saf
- Page 254 and 255: defamation.184 One case that illust
- Page 256 and 257: material that appears questionable
- Page 258 and 259: FBI’s Carnivore: Is the Governmen
- Page 260 and 261: and the legal limits of government
- Page 262 and 263: II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSISA. Const
- Page 264 and 265: application developed in Katz v. Un
- Page 266 and 267: Amendment protections.50Substantial
can “take out” a licensee—put a licensee out <strong>of</strong>competition in the licensor’s creative market forever. Alicensor can bar fair use, reverse engineering, follow-oninventions, and new applications. The licensor canrequire grantbacks, tie ins and tie outs. What is more,UCITA is very efficient. It facilitates mass marketcontracts, and it makes sure those restrictions areimposed on successive licensees and remote purchasers,even when those purchasers are not aware <strong>of</strong> what theyare letting themselves in for. . . . In the final analysis,what UCITA does is this: in the name <strong>of</strong> promotingexploitation <strong>of</strong> this generation <strong>of</strong> works, it hobbles futuregenerations <strong>of</strong> creators.141The acceptability <strong>of</strong> such provisions internationally is far fromclear. As one commentator observed: “from a Europeanperspective, . . . [t]he combination <strong>of</strong> contract and technology posesa direct threat to the copyright system as we know it, and mayrequire an entierly new body <strong>of</strong> information law to safeguard thepublic domain.”142 On the other hand, another commentator hasnoted that “most <strong>of</strong> the European laws’ limitations on copyrightlaws are not mandatory in my view: licensors and licensees canestablish their own regulations for themselves, disregarding thelimitation to the copyright that benefit all people not bound bycontract.”143Whether or not one ultimately agrees with these observations,the point is that adoption <strong>of</strong> UCITA-like principles on theinternational level without a full inquiry into the merits <strong>of</strong> sucharguments would be undesirable. Enactment <strong>of</strong> a uniforminformation transaction code without a “coherent, integralinformation policy”—or at least without consideration <strong>of</strong> such apolicy—would be dangerous.144141. Id. at 52-53.142. See Hugenholtz, supra note 78, at 78-79 (footnote omitted).143. Dessemontet, supra note 104, at 76.144. Dreyfus, Marketplace, supra note 124; see also Murumba, supra note 70, at 92.Although they effect fundamental changes, these legislative initiatives aresometimes characterized as just an effort to systematize or reconfiguretransactional law into a form useable in the digital environment, but thevigorous worldwide debate which has surrounded these initiatives—especially UCITA—indicates that there is much more at stake here thanmere systematization or adaptation . . . . [What] is at stake is no less thanthe very foundations <strong>of</strong> an emerging law <strong>of</strong> the digital domain. In the context